1950 Aeroflot Ilyushin Il-12 crash

The 1950 Karaganda Il-12 crash was a fatal accident involving an Il-12 operated by Aeroflot on 30 July 1950, in which all 25 people on board were killed when the aircraft crashed in Karaganda.

1950 Aeroflot Ilyushin Il-12 crash

Accident
Date	30 July 1950 (1950-07-30)
Summary	Unexplained engine failure, pilot error
Site	Karaganda Airport
Aircraft
Aircraft type	Ilyushin Il-12
Operator	Aeroflot (Kazakh Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet, 25th Transport Aviation Detachment)
Registration	CCCP-Л1803
Flight origin	Alma-Ata Airport, Alma-Ata
Stopover	Karaganda Airport, Karaganda
Destination	Vnukovo Airport, Moscow
Occupants	25
Passengers	19
Crew	6
Fatalities	25
Survivors	0

Aircraft

The Il-12P, with tail number USSR-L1803 (factory number 93013302, serial number 33-02), was manufactured by MMZ "Znamya Truda" on 31 March 1949 and was soon transferred to the Main Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet, which assigned it to the 25th Transport Aviation Detachment of the Kazakh Directorate of the Civil Air Fleet. At the time of the crash, the airliner had accumulated 953 flight hours.

Accident

The aircraft was operating a passenger flight from Almaty, piloted by a crew consisting of commander (KK) Vasily Alexandrovich Alexandrov, co-pilot Nikolay Alexandrovich Fedulov, navigator Boris Yuryevich Kobets, flight engineer Ivan Vasilyevich Tregubov, and radio operator Anatoliy Petrovich Gerasimov. A stewardess named Koptseva was also on board. At 04:50, the Il-12 made an intermediate stop at Karaganda Airport for refueling, after which it took off at 05:36 on a magnetic heading of 210°. There were 19 passengers on board. The weather was clear, with scattered stratocumulus clouds, and visibility was about 30 kilometers.

After climbing to an altitude of 150 meters, the crew began a right turn to a heading of 285°. Witnesses reported that at 05:38, the left engine experienced sudden backfires. Then at 05:42, the crew reported to the dispatcher that the left engine had failed and they intended to return to the airport. The dispatcher gave clearance for a direct landing on heading 30°. The crew then made a right turn to heading 110° and proceeded towards the airfield. As there was a 67-meter-high elevator ahead in the flight path, the crew adjusted their course to the right and was now flying at an 80° angle to the extended runway centerline. The aircraft was flying at an altitude of 100 meters with a right bank and some tail drift.

Crossing the extended runway centerline at an altitude of 50-70 meters, the commander began to level the right bank by turning left and also extended the landing gear. However, the Il-12 suddenly veered sharply to the left, lost speed, and entered a spin. At 05:44, it crashed into the ground with the right wing and engine at a 60° angle and exploded. All 25 people on board perished.

Investigation

The investigation revealed that on 27 July, this aircraft underwent its 100-hour routine maintenance at the Almaty base. On 29 July, a test flight was performed by the same crew that later operated the ill-fated flight. Before takeoff, the left engine had stopped but was restarted after a short time. However, the crew concealed this technical issue. The reasons for the engine stoppage were not investigated.

According to the commission's findings, the crash was caused by the following factors:

1. Failure of the left engine for an unknown reason.
2. Poor management of flight operations at Karaganda Airport.
3. Pilot error due to the commander's insufficient training for single-engine flight (turning towards the failed engine and extending the landing gear).

The commission believed the commander made the correct decision to land straight ahead. However, when the dispatcher granted clearance for landing on heading 30°, this only added confusion and significantly worsened the situation. Furthermore, the large size of Karaganda airfield with its level approach paths and clear weather conditions should have allowed the crew to make a safe landing on one functioning engine. Contributing factors included the lack of qualified assistance from the airport commander, who delegated flight management to an insufficiently qualified dispatcher, and poor maintenance oversight, as evidenced by the concealed engine failure before the test flight.