Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy

(Redirected from 460 U.S. 766)

Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court.

Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy
Argued March 1, 1983
Decided April 19, 1983
Full case nameMetropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, et al.
Citations460 U.S. 766 (more)
103 S. Ct. 1556; 75 L. Ed. 2d 534; 1983 U.S. LEXIS 21; 51 U.S.L.W. 4371; 18 ERC (BNA) 1985; 52 P.U.R.4th 189; 13 ELR 20515
Holding
The NEPA did not require the NRC to consider the conditions of PANE.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr. · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall · Harry Blackmun
Lewis F. Powell Jr. · William Rehnquist
John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor
Case opinions
MajorityRehnquist, joined by unanimous
ConcurrenceBrennan
Laws applied
National Environmental Policy Act

Background

edit

After the meltdown of reactor number 2 at Three Mile Island, the People Against Nuclear Energy (PANE) contended that restarting reactor number 1 would cause severe psychological trauma to residents of nearby towns. When the NRC failed to consider this evidence in the statutorily required environmental impact statement, PANE sought review in the court of appeals, citing National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) protections of the natural environment. The court granted the petition for review, and agreed with PANE that the NRC had acted improperly in failing to consider their evidence.

Holding

edit

The Court ruled that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission did not act improperly in not considering the conditions of PANE.

In considering such concerns as warm water released into the Susquehanna River, and the release of low level radiation, the NRC acted properly under § 102(C) of the NEPA in considering environmental risks.

Concurrence

edit

Justice Brennan filed a concurring opinion, agreeing with the Court's reasoning, but noting that PANE's argument extended the chain of causation too far by attempting to link restarting the reactor with the hypothetical psychological injury of a "perception of risk."

See also

edit

References

edit