Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court. The case established the right of defendants to challenge for cause any juror that would automatically impose the death penalty in all capital cases.
| Morgan v. Illinois | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Argued January 21, 1992 Decided June 15, 1992 | |
| Full case name | Derrick Morgan v. State of Illinois |
| Citations | 504 U.S. 719 (more) 112 S. Ct. 2222; 119 L. Ed. 2d 492; 1992 U.S. LEXIS 3548; 60 U.S.L.W. 4541; 92 Cal. Daily Op. Service 5037; 92 Daily Journal DAR 7962; 6 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 421 |
| Case history | |
| Prior | Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Illinois |
| Holding | |
| A defendant facing the death penalty may challenge for cause a prospective juror who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty in every case. | |
| Court membership | |
| |
| Case opinions | |
| Majority | White, joined by Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter |
| Dissent | Scalia, joined by Rehnquist, Thomas |
| Laws applied | |
| U.S. Const. amend. VI, Due Process Clause | |
Background
editIn an elaboration of the Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) doctrine, the Rehnquist Court considered challenges to the selection of jurors who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty on a defendant convicted of a capital offense. In a 6–3 decision, Justice White wrote for the majority that a defendant facing the death penalty may challenge for cause a prospective juror who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty in every case. Just as a juror who is unalterably opposed to the imposition of the death penalty must be excluded because he or she cannot conscientiously fulfill the oath to follow the law and the instructions to the jury pursuant thereto, so should one who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty be excluded for the same reason. Such a juror, he emphasized, would lack the qualities of impartiality and indifference required by due process. Furthermore, Justice White noted, jurors who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty would not "in good faith ... consider evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances" as may be required by law and included in jury instructions.[1]
See also
editFurther reading
edit- Belt, John C. (1994). "Morgan v. Illinois: The Right to Balance Capital Sentencing Juries as to Their Views on the Death Sentence Is Finally Granted to Defendants". New Mexico Law Review. 24 (1): 145–170.
- Dillehay, Ronald C.; Sandys, Marla R. (1996). "Life under Wainwright v. Witt: Juror Dispositions and Death Qualification". Law and Human Behavior. 20 (2): 147–165. doi:10.1007/BF01499352. S2CID 145150019.
References
edit- ^ "Morgan v. Illinois". Oyez. Retrieved April 9, 2021.
External links
edit- Text of Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) is available from: Findlaw Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)