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Clapper v. Amnesty International USA

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Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that Amnesty International USA and others lacked standing to challenge section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. § 1881a), as amended by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008.[1][2][3][4]

Clapper v. Amnesty International
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 29, 2012
Decided February 26, 2013
Full case nameJames R. Clapper, Jr., Director of National Intelligence, et al., Petitioners v. Amnesty International USA, et al.
Docket no.11-1025
Citations568 U.S. 398 (more)
133 S. Ct. 1138; 185 L. Ed. 2d 264; 2013 U.S. LEXIS 1858; 2013 ILRC 1311; 41 Med. L. Rptr. 1357; 81 U.S.L.W. 4121
Case history
Priordefendant motion for summary judgment granted sub nom. Amnesty International v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); reversed, 638 F.3d 118 (2nd Cir. 2011); rehearing en banc denied, 667 F.3d 163 (2011); certiorari granted, 566 U.S. ___ (2012)
Holding
Respondents lack Article III standing to challenge FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U. S. C. §1881a.
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
Antonin Scalia · Anthony Kennedy
Clarence Thomas · Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Stephen Breyer · Samuel Alito
Sonia Sotomayor · Elena Kagan
Case opinions
MajorityAlito, joined by Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
DissentBreyer, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan

Background

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Clapper was a challenge to the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which empowers the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to authorize surveillance without a showing of probable cause that the target of the surveillance is an agent of a foreign power. The government must demonstrate only that the surveillance targets “persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States” and seeks “foreign intelligence information.”[5] The plaintiffs alleged that they sustained greater inconvenience and higher costs because of the need to conduct secure communications with parties overseas whom the US government had probably targeted for surveillance.[5] The challenge was brought against James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence.

Decision

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The Court dismissed the case by following the US government's argument that "the claims of the challenges that they were likely to be targets of surveillance were based too much on speculation and on a predicted chain of events that might never occur, so they could not satisfy the constitutional requirement for being allowed to sue."[6] "Respondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending," Justice Samuel Alito wrote in the majority opinion.[7]

Justice Breyer, in dissent, said that the case should have proceeded to trial. Of the spying, he wrote: “Indeed it is as likely to take place as are most future events that commonsense inference and ordinary knowledge of human nature tell us will happen.”[8]

Reactions

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According to Jameel Jaffer, deputy legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which argued the case on behalf of the plaintiffs before the Supreme Court, the challenged amendments made in 2008 to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act essentially allow the National Security Agency (NSA) "to engage in dragnet surveillance of Americans’ international communications," even of those "who might not be suspected at all of having done anything wrong" and so "it's a very broad surveillance statute" and "arguably broader than any surveillance statute that Congress has sanctioned in the past."[9] According to him, the Supreme Court, by requiring the plaintiffs to show that they have been monitored under the law, has essentially created a barrier to judicial review by preventing anyone from ever challenging that kind of statute in court as indeed, nobody can show that they have been monitored under the law since the government does not disclose its targets.[9]

After the decision in favor of the government, several legal experts stated, "Clapper also hints at a rocky reception for the challenge to the NDAA in Hedges."[5][10]

Aftermath

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Before the process, Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. had denied that ruling in the US government's favor would immunize the surveillance program from constitutional challenges. “That contention is misplaced,” Verrilli wrote in a brief. “Others may be able to establish standing even if respondents cannot. As respondents recognize, the government must provide advance notice of its intent to use information obtained or derived from” the surveillance authorized by the 2008 law “against a person in judicial or administrative proceedings and that person may challenge the underlying surveillance.”[11][12] Specifically, Verrilli unequivocally assured the Supreme Court in its brief,[13] that criminal defendants would receive notice of FAA surveillance and an opportunity to challenge the statute:

If the government intends to use or disclose any information obtained or derived from its acquisition of a person's communications under [the FAA] in judicial or administrative proceedings against that person, it must provide advance notice of its intent to the tribunal and the person, whether or not the person was targeted for surveillance under [the FAA].[14]

The USCC then took Verrilli's assurance and ruled in accordance with the FAA §1881a according to which criminal defendants who are prosecuted using evidence obtained or derived from FAA surveillance are entitled to notice:[15]

If the Government intends to use or disclose information obtained or derived from a §1881a acquisition in judicial or administrative proceedings, it must provide advance notice of its intent, and the affected person may challenge the lawfulness of the acquisition.[11][16]

The opposite of what Verrilli told the Supreme Court has happened in actual criminal prosecutions. Federal prosecutors, apparently unaware of his representations, have refused to make the promised disclosures. In a prosecution in Federal District Court in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, against two brothers accused of plotting to bomb targets in New York, the government has said that it plans to use information gathered under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which authorizes individual warrants.[8][17] However, prosecutors have refused to say whether the government obtained those individual warrants based on information derived from the 2008 law, which allows programmatic surveillance.[11][18] Prosecutors in Chicago have taken the same approach in a prosecution of teenager accused of plotting to blow up a bar.[17][19]

While both the original Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act[19] and the FISA Amendments Act[15] require the government to notify defendants when evidence being used against them is derived from surveillance authorized by the corresponding law, there is a crucial difference between both laws with respect to warrants. A traditional FISA court order pursuant to the original Act requires the government to go to a FISA judge and show probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power.[19] The expanded surveillance program authorized in 2008 allows the FAA, however, targets non-Americans persons “reasonably believed” to be located outside the United States, and it does not require that the government to obtain individual warrants before it intercepts communications.[19] Moreover, the purpose of the collection is “foreign intelligence,” a broad category that may include everything from information on terrorism to nuclear proliferation to European journalist writing on human rights abuses or an African businessman talking about global financial risk.[19] In essence, the law authorized the government to wiretap Americans’ e-mails and phone calls without an individual court order and on domestic soil if the surveillance is “targeted” at a foreigner abroad.[20] Judge John O'Sullivan explained it this way in the Florida case:

Before passage of the FAA in 2008, FISA generally foreclosed the government from engaging in "electronic surveillance" without first obtaining an individualized and particularized order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"). To obtain an order from the FISC, the government had to satisfy certain requirements including that a "significant purpose" of the surveillance was to obtain "foreign intelligence information. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(B).
When FISA was amended in 2008, the FAA provided legislative authority for the warrantless surveillance of U.S. citizens' and residents' communications. Although the FAA left FISA intact regarding communications known to be purely domestic, the FAA expanded FISA by allowing the mass acquisition of U.S. citizens' and residents' international communications without individualized judicial oversight or supervision. See Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143-44 (2013). Under the FAA, the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence ("DNI") may "authorize jointly, for a period of up to one year... the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information." 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a).[21]

Verrilli had told the Supreme Court justices that somebody would have legal standing to trigger review of the program because prosecutors would notify people facing evidence derived from surveillance under the 2008 FISA Amendments law. However, it turned out that Verrilli's assurances clashed with the actual practices of national security prosecutors, who had not been alerting such defendants that evidence in their cases had stemmed from wiretapping their conversations without a warrant. For Verrilli, that led to the question of whether any persuasive legal basis exists for failing to clearly notify defendants that they faced evidence linked to the 2008 warrantless surveillance law, which prevented them from knowing that they had an opportunity to argue that it derived from an unconstitutional search.[12] After internal deliberations in which Verrilli argued that there was no legal basis to conceal from defendants that evidence derived from legally-untested surveillance, which prevented them from knowing that they had an opportunity to challenge it,[20] the US Justice Department concluded “that withholding disclosure from defendants could not be justified legally.”[22] As a consequence, the Justice Department, as of October 2013, was setting up a potential Supreme Court test of whether it is constitutional by notifying criminal defendants for the first time that evidence against them had been derived from eavesdropping that had been authorized under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.[12][23] The first defendant who received notice that he had been monitored under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) was Jamshid Muhtorov on October 25, 2013.[20][24][25] According to the New York Times, the move is expected to set up a Supreme Court test of whether eavesdropping from a warrantless wiretap is constitutional.[20]

The American Civil Liberties Union praised Verrilli for providing criminal defendants who are prosecuted using evidence obtained or derived from FAA surveillance and are entitled to notice that this evidence was acquired under the FISA Amendments Act with such statutorily-required notice that is required under the FISA Amendments Act.[22] That gives defendants the opportunity to move to suppress FAA-derived evidence and to right to challenge the warrantless wiretapping law and trial courts the opportunity to adjudicate the FAA's constitutionality.[20][22] Despite its praise, the ACLU urged Verrilli "should now submit a letter-brief alerting the [Supreme] Court to the significant factual error in the government's submissions. His letter should explain what the NSD's [National Security Division of the U.S. Justice Department] notice policy was when Clapper was before the courts; on what basis the NSD came to the conclusion that the policy was justified; how it came to pass that the government misrepresented the NSD's policy; and what the NSD's notice policy is now."[22]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ "Section 702: Title VII, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), "Procedures for Targeting Certain Persons Outside the United States Other Than United States Persons" (50 U.S.C. sec. 1881a)" (PDF). Federation of American Scientists. Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved February 26, 2013.
  2. ^ Liptak, Adam (March 6, 2013). "Justices Turn Back Challenge to Broader U.S. Eavesdropping". The New York Times. Retrieved February 26, 2013.
  3. ^ Sledge, Matt (February 26, 2013). "Clapper v. Amnesty International, Warrantless Wiretapping Challenge, Struck Down By Supreme Court". The Huffington Post. Retrieved March 6, 2013.
  4. ^ Leonard, Barbara (February 26, 2013). "U.S. Warrantless Spying Program Survives Challenge in Supreme Court". Courthouse News Service. Retrieved July 23, 2013.
  5. ^ a b c Wittes, Benjamin (February 27, 2013). "Peter Margulies on Clapper". 'Lawfare' Blog. Retrieved March 6, 2013.
  6. ^ Denniston, Lyle (February 26, 2013). "Opinion recap: Global wiretap challenge thwarted". SCOTUSBlog. Retrieved March 7, 2013.
  7. ^ Farivar, Cyrus (June 11, 2013). "ACLU sues four top Obama administration officials over Verizon metadata sharing". Ars Technica. Retrieved August 13, 2013.
  8. ^ a b Kravets, David (May 13, 2013). "Feds Won't Say if NSA Surveilled New York Terror Suspects". Wired Magazine. Retrieved February 13, 2014.
  9. ^ a b "ACLU Blasts Supreme Court Rejection of Challenge to Warrantless Spying Without Proof of Surveillance". Democracy Now!. February 27, 2013. Retrieved April 21, 2013.
  10. ^ Sledge, Matt (February 27, 2013). "Supreme Court's Clapper v. Amnesty International Decision Could Affect Indefinite Detention Lawsuit". The Huffington Post. Retrieved July 19, 2013.
  11. ^ a b c Liptak, Dama (July 13, 2013). "A Secret Surveillance Program Proves Challengeable in Theory Only". The New York Times. Retrieved July 16, 2013.
  12. ^ a b c Savage, Charlie (October 16, 2013). "Door May Open for Challenge to Secret Wiretaps". The New York Times. Retrieved October 25, 2013.
  13. ^ Verrilli Jr., Donald B. (July 2012). "No. 11-1025 In the Supreme Court of the United States James R. Clapper, Jr., Director of National Intelligence, et al., Petitioners v. Amnesty Internal USA, et. Al on writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Brief for the Petitioner" (PDF). Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr. American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). p. 8. Retrieved February 13, 2014.
  14. ^ Toomey, Patrick C. (June 25, 2013). "Government Engages In Shell Game To Avoid Review Of Warrantless Wiretapping". Retrieved February 13, 2014.
  15. ^ a b See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 188le(a)
  16. ^ Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, No. 11-1025, slip op. at 22, 568 U.S._ (Feb. 26, 2013) (citing 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1806(e), 1881e(a))
  17. ^ a b Eric Schmitt, David E. Sanger and Charlie Savage (June 7, 2013). "Administration Says Mining of Data Is Crucial to Fight Terror". The New York Times. Retrieved February 13, 2014.
  18. ^ Barrett, Devlin (July 31, 2013). "U.S. Spy Program Lifts Veil in Court". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved October 25, 2013.
  19. ^ a b c d e Nakashima, Ellen (June 22, 2013). "Chicago federal court case raises questions about NSA surveillance". The Washington Post. Retrieved February 13, 2014.
  20. ^ a b c d e Savage, Charlie (October 26, 2013). "Federal Prosecutors, in a Policy Shift, Cite Warrantless Wiretaps as Evidence". The New York Times. Retrieved February 13, 2014.
  21. ^ O'Sullivan, John (May 6, 2013). "United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 12-60298-CR-SCOLA/O'SULLIVAN: Document 77 entered on FLSD Docket 05/06/2013 in United States of America (Plaintiff) v. Raees Alam Qazi a/k/a "Shan," and Sheheryar Alam Qazi (Defendants )" (PDF). Wired Magazine. pp. 2–3. Retrieved February 13, 2014.
  22. ^ a b c d "The Solicitor General Should Correct the Record in Clapper". Jameel Jaffer and Patrick C. Toomey. Just Security - A Forum on Law, Rights, and U.S. National Security. October 10, 2013. Retrieved February 13, 2014.
  23. ^ Toomey, Patrick C. (October 18, 2013). "In Reversal, DOJ Poised to Give Notice of Warrantless Wiretapping". American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Retrieved February 13, 2014.
  24. ^ Savage, Charlie (October 25, 2013). "United States District Court for the District of Colorado Criminal Case No. 1:12-cr-00033-JLK-01: Document 457 filed 10/25/13 in United States of America (Plaintiff) v. Jamshid Muhtorov (Defendants)". DocumentCloud. Retrieved February 13, 2014.
  25. ^ Toomey, Patrick C. (February 5, 2014). "Who Did the NSA's Illegal Spying Put in Jail?". The American Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved February 13, 2014.

Further reading

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