The Battle of Ragusa was a naval engagement in 1617 between Francisco de Rivera from the Spanish Viceroyalty of Naples and Lorenzo Venier of the Republic of Venice. It resulted in a Spanish and Neapolitan victory.
| Battle of Ragusa | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Venetian-Habsburg conflicts | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 Spanish Empire |
 Republic of Venice | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
| Francisco de Rivera | Lorenzo Venier | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
|
15 galleons
|
18 galleons 34 galleys 6 galleasses 16 barks | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 300 killed |
4 galleys lost 4000 killed | ||||||
Background
editIn December 1616, political tensions peaked between Spain and Venice due to the republic's alliances with Spain's enemies during the concurrent Ottoman–Habsburg wars, the War of the Montferrat Succession and the Uskok War, as well as their trade rivalry with Portugal, by then in dynastic union with Spain. Venice claimed exclusivity over the Adriatic Sea and aggraviated Spanish merchants,[1] leading the Spanish viceroy of Naples, Pedro Téllez-Girón, Duke of Osuna, to order his lieutenants Francisco de Rivera and Ottavio d'Aragona to engage in unlimited privateering against Venice. Venetian merchant trade was disrupted, their ships were attacked and their allied ports in Zara and Espalatro were bombarded by the Neapolitan navy.[2] Osuna ambitioned to destroy Venetian power permanently and make the Neapolitan city of Brindisi the new great Mediterranean port.[2]
Venice deployed their full armada under the command of Justo Antonio Belegno, but although they managed to force Rivera and his way smaller fleet retreat, reinforcements by d'Aragona turned the tables, making the Venetians return home even if they still outnumbered their enemies.[3][4] Belegno was later demoted and replaced by Giacomo Zane, who also avoided the battle.[5][6] As Osuna maintained unofficial alliances with the Uskoks, the Venetian senate attempted to buy the services of the Ottoman navy in their favor, but the Venetian fleet carrying their payment of 400,000 ducats was captured in route by the Spanish ships.[4][7] Osuna also sent letters with the Ottoman Empire to further try to undo the alliance.[8] However, Philip III's court was not favorable to the viceroy and preferred the peace obtained in the finished War of the Monferrat, so Osuna was ordered to cease his privateering and give back all the captured Venetian ships.[9][10] Venice celebrated this result as a political victory and returned to its previous claims over the Adriatic.[9]
In spite of his orders, Osuna was unwilling to drop his policy of aggression, especially given that Venice continued fostering Ottoman and Dutch presence, and threatened to resign when the court entertained to call all of his ships to Genoa.[11] However, he eventually convinced Philip III to give back nothing and keep obstructing Venice under the Neapolitan flag and not the Spanish one.[12][13] On November 9, 1617, two months after the end of the Uskok War, Francisco de Rivera came out of Brindisi with a fleet of 15 galleons to patrol the Strait of Otranto. After approaching the allied port of Ragusa, they were found out by Venetian merchants, who sent notice to their armada.
Battle
editOn 21 November, Rivera and his 15 galleons faced against Venetian admiral Lorenzo Venier at the head of a large half moon formation of 18 galleons, 34 galleys, 6 galleasses and 18 Albanian barks.[14]
Despite the encounter, both fleets remained cautious and night fell with them still observing each other. Rivera was in a bad position, as the absence of wind rendered the galleons immobile while the currents slowly separated them, while Venir fielded galleys which could row freely against him and capitalize on the chance. However, Venier was aware of the reputation of the Spanish navy and marine infantry and opted to wait for daybreak. Rivera meanwhile sent captain Diego Duque de Estrada in a felucca to exchange messages between the Spanish ships and remind them they would be at advantage in case of being boarded. Duque was shot at by Venetian boats and his pilot was killed.[14]
At daybreak of November 22, wind finally arose and allowed Rivera to reagroup his ships. Venier ordered his fleet to advance, but his flagship received fire and he ordered to turn back to the previous formation. Rivera then caught them off guard by chasing him in his own flagshp, the Nuestra Señora de la Concepción, so quickly that the rest of Spanish ships could not follow him immediately. The Nuestra Señora entered deep into the Venetian formation, but Rivera had ordered his crew to hide and pretend the ship was unmanned, with the consequence that the Venetians believed it was some kind of explosive fireship and rushed to get away from it. In the attempt, the large Venetian fleet fell into chaos, which Rivera capitalized on to fire all of his artillery, causing much damage.[15]
The rest of the Spanish fleet finally reached Rivera, formed in order not to be surrounded, and opened fire. The Venetian ships tried to resume formation and offer an effective response, but their attempts only disaggregated their fleet further and increased the effectivity of the Spanish artillery. Four Venetian galleys sank during the struggle, and their huge 60-gun galleon San Marcos, the biggest ship in both fleets, was peppered. Rivera sought to board the closest enemy ships, but the Venetian ships finally managed to turn and keep the distance thanks to the wind blowing in their favor.[16] The battle lasted until nightfall, when the wind and darkness allowed Venier to retreat.[13]
Upon the next daybreak, Venier found the state of his fleet and called for a general withdrawal towards Korčula. Most of his galleys were either sunk or inoperative and many galleons were heavily damaged, among them the San Marcos, which had to be towed with a great effort. They counted 4000 casualties, in comparison to 300 in the Spanish side, where damage was minor. Rivera was ready to give chase, but a storm separated the fleets, forcing the Spaniards to head for Brindisi and the Venetians to do the same towards Manfredonia. Being unseaworthy due to the battle, 13 Venetian galleys and one galeass sank with the storm, adding up 2000 more casualties, while many survivors reached to Croatian coast only to be assaulted by Uskoks in retaliation for the events of the war.[4] It took three days for Rivera to finally reach Brindisi.
Aftermath
editThe Spanish victory was highly celebrated in Naples and Sicily.[4] However, its memory would be overshadowed in May 1618 by the so-called Venetian conspiracy, where multiple riots and executions happened in the republic among accusations that Osuna and other local noblemen planned to stage a revolt in order to take over Venice, using French and Dutch mercenaries who up to the point had been in Venetian service.[17] Regardless of its veracity, news of the event spread across Europe and were fueled by the Spanish Black Legend.[4] At the same time, Neapolitan aristocrats accused Osuna of planning his own revolt to separate from Spain and turn Naples into his personal kingdom, and this coincided with the breakup between Osuna and Ottavio d'Aragona, the fall of royal minister Francisco de Sandoval, Duke of Lerma, and the scrutiny of all the members of his circle, which included Osuna.[4][18] As a result, the king called Osuna to Spain and relevated him in 1619.[18]
References
edit- ^ Fernández Duro (2012), p. 115.
- ^ a b Canales & Rey (2019).
- ^ Fernández Duro (2012), p. 123-124.
- ^ a b c d e f San Juan Sánchez (2018).
- ^ Fernández Duro (2012), p. 128.
- ^ Canales & Rey (2019), p. 39.
- ^ Canales & Rey (2019), p. 38.
- ^ Fernández Duro (2012), p. 118.
- ^ a b Canales & Rey (2019), p. 39-40.
- ^ Fernández Duro (2012), p. 134.
- ^ Fernández Duro (2012), p. 131.
- ^ Fernández Duro (2012), p. 135-137.
- ^ a b Canales & Rey (2019), p. 40.
- ^ a b Fernández Duro (2012), p. 140.
- ^ Fernández Duro (2012), p. 141-142.
- ^ Fernández Duro (2012), p. 142-143.
- ^ Canales & Rey (2019), p. 41.
- ^ a b Canales & Rey (2019), p. 42.
Sources
edit- Canales, Carlos; Rey, Miguel (2019). Naves mancas: la Armada Española a vela de Cabo Celidonia a Trafalgar. EDAF. ISBN 84-414-2879-4.
- Fernández Duro, Cesáreo (2012). El Gran Duque de Osuna y su marina: jornadas contra turcos y venecianos, 1602-1624. Madrid: Renacimiento. ISBN 9788484726944.
- San Juan Sánchez, Víctor (2018). Breve historia de las batallas navales del Mediterráneo. Nowtilus. ISBN 9788499679365.