Talk:Siege of Kazan (1487)

Succession crisis

@Dushnilkin: Hi, thanks again for letting me proofread and correct your draft! It is an interesting topic that I have read about before, but not yet in so much detail. I think it is a good start, but it can use further improvements. I have tried to limit myself to what you have asked me to do, namely, correct grammatical mistakes and rephrase the text at certain points, as well as add English-language literature on this subject. Those issues have now been mostly addressed. Ongoing issues relate to the contents of the story: what is relevant, and what is redundant? I've given several suggestions in tags and between brackets, and made some additions, but I am hesistant to change too much without your permission.

I think the story should be centred on the succession crisis and war of succession in Kazan. It was the reason for this war of 1479/1486 to 1487, and reason for the previous war of 1466/7 to 1469. Muscovy only intervened from the outside into what was originally an internal, dynastic conflict between members of the same family of the deceased khan. As you can see in List of wars of succession in Europe#15th century, I have described this conflict as Kazan war of succession (1479/86–1487), after the death of khan Ibrahim of Kazan. It was not really a war of Moscow against Kazan per se; the Muscovites took a side in the internal conflict of Kazan, namely, that of the candidate Möxämmädämin of Kazan against candidate Ilham Ghali of Kazan. Similarly, in the previous war of 1466/7 to 1469, Muscovy intervened in the Kazan succession crisis between Qasim and Ibrahim. We should explain to our readers that this is the reason why these wars broke out in the first place. We should also make clear that the restoration of Möxämmädämin to the Kazan throne was Ivan's objective and justification for the intervention. But I don't think I can just change the text everywhere to reflect that, unless you are willing to grant me your permission. This is still your draft, after all. NLeeuw (talk) 00:51, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

Hi! Thank you so much for what you did, I really appreciate it. In the meantime, I will give a couple of explanations about what you asked on the page and here.

1: About Alexeev: During the 1552 campaign, the average daily speed was 30 kilometers in this case, he takes these figures as the basis for the war of 1487 and continues to build on it to verify the veracity of the dates in the Russian chronicles.

2: About Karamzin: I'm sorry, but there is only such an online publishing house, I can't add a page here. I can ask my friend to give me another publisher of a book with a page (paper)

3: About 1469: Of course, the Russians intervened in the internal conflict, but precisely because

Ibrahim was in the anti-Russian party, after the surrender of Kazan in 1469, he changed his course of policy, so that his change was simply unnecessary. So he agreed to give up the Russian slaves who had been captured earlier, which was Ivan's primary goal. The text of the agreement contains only one expression, Khudyakov 2012, p.47: the text of the agreement was certainly beneficial to Russia, its exact content is unknown, but the following statements have reached us: «We conclude an agreement on the entire will of the Grand Prince, as well as release the prisoners for 40 years» Subsequently, Ibrahim swore allegiance to Moscow. (1478)

4: About Kazan independence: You are right, in 1484, with the victory of the Russophile party, Kazan's politics became dependent on Moscow, but there is one important point, this is only a temporary benefit of the elections, the direct consequence of our war was that the anti-Russian party was suppressed at times and only direct uprising could usurp power.

5: About your idea: In fact, the proposal to create such an article is certainly a good one, the topic is important and should be reflected in the articles. But (!) I want my draft to cover specifically the actions of Russians in these wars in a specialized way, I would help you write an article about the civil wars in Kazan if necessary, but I want the concept of this article to remain unchanged. Of course, the policy towards Kazan was determined mainly by the results of the elections, but still, the Russians pursued exclusively their own goals, and they didn't care who fulfilled them, so the change of power was not always the main reason. Dushnilkin (talk) 08:51, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

You're welcome! If we combine our skills, I think we can achieve a lot together.

1. I still don't understand...

2. Well, one of the problems is that the website is "untrusted" according to Web of Trust. For old text whose copyright has expired, Wikisource is often a good place to collect and collate the texts. s:ru:История государства Российского (Карамзин) is currently being digitised, but the relevant part had not been created yet. I've just taken the liberty to make a Wikisource version of Karamzin's book History of the Russian State, Tome VI, Chapter IV: s:ru:История государства Российского (Карамзин)/Том VI/Глава IV (Продолжение государствования Иоаннова. 1480—1490). This way, we can link to that in our Bibliography.

3. Hmmm okay. I'm not sure if I share these observations. Martin 2007 wrote on p. 352: As the Muscovite–Kazan contest for dominance over the northeast took shape, Mahmutek, the khan of Kazan, died (1467). He was succeeded by his son Ibrahim. But at least some clan elders in Kazan preferred Kasim, then khan of Kasimov, over his nephew. Signaling this preference, Mahmutek’s widow traveled to Muscovy, where in accordance with Muslim tradition she wed Kasim, her late husband’s brother. Ivan III lent military support to Kasim’s candidacy, but his efforts to remove Ibrahim and establish Kasim in his place failed. Ivan III and Ibrahim, nevertheless, concluded a peace treaty, which provided a framework for relatively peaceful relations between their two states for the next twenty years. Kasim, having lost his bid for the throne of Kazan, died soon afterward. In short, Martin concluded that Ivan's intervention in the 1466/7–1469 Kazan succession crisis was a foreign policy failure. On page 354, Martin confirms this: Mengli-Girey then formulated a plan to place his new wife’s son, Muhammed Amin, on the Kazan throne and enlisted the aid of Ivan III to implement it. As he had done twenty years earlier, the Muscovite grand prince in 1486–87 sent armed forces to intervene in a succession struggle in Kazan. This time his efforts succeeded. In other words, his efforts twenty years earlier had failed. The goal had been to put a vassal on the throne of Kazan; that failed in 1469 (Qasim/Kasim), but succeeded in 1487 (Möxämmädämin / Muhammed Amin). I'm not sure how Kudryashev 2012 can conclude that the 1469 treaty was beneficial for Ivan just because (A) some prisoners were exchanged and (B) Ivan agreed to the terms. Ivan could have agreed to terms that were unfavourable to himself; that happens in history all the time. The fact that Ibrahim allied with Moscow 9 years later seems irrelevant, and rather suggests the opposite, namely: that he was not an ally of Moscow between 1466/7 and 1478. The only positive side Martin sees for Ivan is relatively peaceful relations between their two states for the next twenty years, but that wasn't his goal when he decided to intervene on Qasim's side of the succession conflict.

4. Maybe. Martin isn't very clear about what happened in 1484. I may have to read what Charles J. Halperin wrote about that situation.

5. My proposal was not to create a separate article on the wars of succession in Kazan; there would probably be too much WP:OVERLAP with Russo-Kazan Wars, and we would end up with a WP:REDUNDANTFORK. Instead, I think the context of the siege of Kazan in 1487 cannot be properly understood without explaining the dynastic conflicts within Kazan. But I would agree that much of that might be better explained in Russo-Kazan Wars than here. I could make a start with that, and then we'll see which information should be told in which article later. NLeeuw (talk) 11:16, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

Thanks for the answer!

1: It means that the army crossed a distance of 30 kilometers every day

2: I have already replaced it with a paper version of the source (thanks for that @Rxsxuis )

3: In this case, you need to specify this in the article, but a couple of notes:

• a) It was the Tatars who agreed to Moscow's terms, not the other way around. (I'm sorry if the first text caused problems with understanding)
• b) The Russian prisoners were returned free of charge.

Kudryashev's opinion is also shared by Alexeev, on p.96: The victory over Kazan created a new strategic situation. The possibility of moving to active actions in other directions opened up, primarily in the north-west, where for a number of years the situation became increasingly critical due to the sentiments of part of the Novgorod boyars and the claims of King Casimir. The resolution of the long-brewing crisis was the campaign of 1471. Moreover, it should also be noted that comparing 1469 and 1487, he contrasts them as success and failure, perhaps referring to the direct capture of Kazan, which failed in 1469.

4: Of course, we need more WP:RS about it.

5: Oh, well, I don't mind clarifying about the crises in Kazan, but I still want the vector of focus to be on the actions of the Russians.

Thanks for the help again! Dushnilkin (talk) 11:39, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

4. Unfortunately Halperin (1987) doesn't say much about Kazan. Raffensperger & Ostrowski (2023) say a bit more. P. 653–654 mention Kudaikul surrendering to Muscovy at the end of the siege of Kazan 1487. NLeeuw (talk) 11:39, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

Oh, I'll try to look for literature on this topic. Dushnilkin (talk) 11:42, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

PSRL, vol. XXVII (1962), p. 288. Is a primary source on the siege. NLeeuw (talk) 11:42, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

Robert M. Croskey and E. C. Ronquist, ‘George Trakhaniot’s Description of Russia in 1486’, Russian History/Historie Russe, XVII/1 (1990). is probably valuable. NLeeuw (talk) 11:48, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

Hello again, I added pages to some sources, as well as slightly changed the text, please take a look and tell me if the article is ready for publication.

@Nederlandse Leeuw Dushnilkin (talk) 10:49, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

Russo-Kazan Wars improvements

Good job on this draft so far! I was happy to help with some initial corrections and suggestions. Hopefully this can be made ready for the mainspace.

In the meantime, I've done some improvements to main article Russo-Kazan Wars. I was surprised to find out just how important the role of dynastic politics was, more than I already thought. It seems that the Crimean Khanate treated the Khanate of Kazan as a sort of appanage, a fiefdom for junior princes of the Giray dynasty, and that Muscovy was happy to be the bridge between the two. I've had to rephrase and rewrite a lot of texts, especially unsourced claims that are probably based on WP:OR. A lot of related articles such as Russo-Kazan War (1505–1507) are still quite badly written (based on 1 source from 1880 + WP:OR), and in need of much improvement. Janet L. B. Martin emphasises that during Ivan III and Vasily III, Kazan and Moscow were actually allies and junior partners of the Crimean khan, and Moscow's interventions in Kazan's succession crises – mainly to serve the Crimean dynastic interests – were exceptions to the rule of decades of peaceful Moscow–Kazan relations between 1437 and 1556.

I've left the Russo-Kazan Wars#1480s Kazan succession crisis section mostly untouched for you, because here we should place a Template:Main article if your draft is approved for publication. And then you can rewrite that section based on a summary of your new article. Perhaps you could also help a bit with the last paragraph of the Russo-Kazan Wars#General section? It is about the physical geography and logistics of Muscovite military campaigns into Kazan territory in this period, which your sources seem to have valuable information on. Cheers, NLeeuw (talk) 09:58, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

PS: The Muscovite–Crimean–Kazan–Astrakhan alliance was quite strong since the 1470s to 1490s, but I should note that Halperin (1987) claims that the Muscovite–Crimean–Kazan–Astrakhan alliance fell apart almost as soon as it completed its goal of destroying the remnants of the Great Horde in 1502/3. While Martin (2007) claims that Vasily III remained allied to the Crimean Khanate for his entire reign, she also notes that Crimea was losing interest in this alliance around 1505, because it no longer served its interests as much. Of course we've got the 1521 Invasion of Muscovy and some other conflicts during Vasily III's later reign, so maybe it was a bit more complicated than Martin suggested. NLeeuw (talk) 10:06, 13 November 2024 (UTC)