Genocidal intent is the mens rea (mental element) for the crime of genocide.[1] Intent to destroy is one of the elements of the crime of genocide according to the 1948 Genocide Convention.[2] There is an unresolved "intend debate" over whether dolus directus (direct intent, meaning that the perpetrator committed the act with both the knowledge of its harmful consequences and the desire to cause that harm) needs to be proven to convict for genocide, or whether a knowledge-based standard should be enough to convict for genocide.[3]

Intent is the most difficult aspect for prosecutors to prove as perpetrators often fail to leave recorded statements about their intent, although courts sometimes ascribe intent based on other factors.[4][5] If the intent is not proven, the actions would likely qualify as war crimes or crimes against humanity.[6] Perpetrators often claim that they merely sought the removal of the group from a given territory, instead of destruction as such,[7] or that the genocidal actions were collateral damage of military activity.[8]

The focus on genocidal intent has been detrimental to efforts to prevent genocide.[9]

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For an act to be classified as genocide (under the Genocide Convention), it is essential to demonstrate that the perpetrators had a deliberate and specific aim (dolus specialis) to physically destroy the group based on its real or perceived nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion. Intention to destroy the group's culture or intending to scatter the group does not suffice.[10]

In 2019, Canada's National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women argued that when it comes to state responsibility for genocide, "a state's specific intent to destroy a protected group can only be proved by the existence of a genocidal policy or manifest pattern of conduct."[11]

Judicial interpretations

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International Criminal Tribunals

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The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and International Court of Justice have ruled that, in the absence of a confession, genocidal intent can be proven with circumstantial evidence, especially "the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while excluding the members of other groups."[12]

Standards of intent

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It is non-controversial that proving dolus directus would meet the Genocide Convention's intent requirement; the weaker standard of dolus indirectus (indirect intent, meaning that the perpetrator did not desire the harm but foresaw it as a certain result of their actions and committed the act with this knowledge) is less clear.

Some scholars argue that a knowledge standard would make it easier to obtain convictions. Some of the existing international tribunal cases like Akayesu and Jelisić have rejected the knowledge standard.[13]

The acquittal of Jelisić under the more onerous standard was controversial, and one scholar opined that Nazis would have been allowed to go free under the ICTY's ruling.[14] When Radislav Krstić became the first Serb convicted by the ICTY under the purpose standard, the Krstić court explained that its decision did not rule out a knowledge standard under customary international law.[13]

Recent developments

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In 2010, the Khmer Rouge Tribunal referred to the precedent of the ICTR in discussing the role of genocidal intent.[15]

Debate

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In the 2004 United Nations Commission of Inquiry into the War in Darfur, Claus Kress argued that the ICTY and ICTR were incorrect in their view of the genocidal intent of individuals.[16] Hans Vest argued for the interlinked roles of an individual's intent and the individual's expectation of contributing to a collective action.[17] Kjell Anderson discussed ways of separating out the roles of collective policies and their interaction with individual intent.[18] Olaf Jenssen disagreed with the lack of sentencing Goran Jelisić for genocidal intent, arguing that legal consistency would imply that some of the perpetrators of the Holocaust would not have been convicted for genocide.[14]

Cases

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  • Akayesu: The court rejected the knowledge standard.
  • Jelisić: Acquittal under the more onerous standard, controversial for its implications.
  • Krstić: First Serb convicted by the ICTY under the purpose standard; did not rule out a knowledge standard under customary international law.

References

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  1. ^ Simon, Thomas W. (2016). Genocide, Torture and Terrorism: Ranking International Crimes and Justifying Humanitarian Intervention. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 17. ISBN 978-1-349-56169-8.
  2. ^ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide   art. 2, 9 December 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 1021 – via Wikisource. ("In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy [emphasis added], in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such ...") [scan  ]
  3. ^ Rodenhäuser, Tilman (2018). Organizing Rebellion: Non-state Armed Groups Under International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights Law, and International Criminal Law. United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. p. 284.
  4. ^ Kiernan, Madley & Taylor 2023, pp. 4, 9.
  5. ^ Ochab & Alton 2022, pp. 28, 30.
  6. ^ Ochab & Alton 2022, p. 28.
  7. ^ Bachman 2022, p. 57.
  8. ^ Bachman 2022, p. 47.
  9. ^ Moyd, Michelle (2022). "Genocide and War". In Bloxham, Donald; Moses, A. Dirk (eds.). Genocide: Key Themes. Oxford University Press. p. 227. ISBN 978-0-19-286526-7.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  10. ^ "United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect". United Nations. Retrieved 2024-01-26.
  11. ^ A Legal Analysis of Genocide: Supplementary Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (PDF) (Report). National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. 2019-05-29. p. 20. Retrieved 2024-01-26.
  12. ^
  13. ^ a b Nersessian, David L. (2002). "The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence from the International Criminal Tribunals". Texas International Law Journal. 37: 231.
  14. ^ a b Jensen, Olaf (2013). "Evaluating genocidal intent: the inconsistent perpetrator and the dynamics of killing". Journal of Genocide Research. 15 (1): 1–19. doi:10.1080/14623528.2012.759396. S2CID 146191450.
  15. ^ Park, Ryan (2010). "Proving Genocidal Intent: International Precedent and ECCC Case 002" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 63: 129.
  16. ^ Kress, Claus (2005). "The Darfur Report and Genocidal Intent". Journal of International Criminal Justice. 3 (3): 562–578. doi:10.1093/jicj/mqi054.
  17. ^ Vest, H. (2007). "A Structure-Based Concept of Genocidal Intent". Journal of International Criminal Justice. 5 (4): 781–797. doi:10.1093/jicj/mqm036.
  18. ^ Anderson, Kjell (2019). "Judicial Inference of the 'Intent to Destroy'". Journal of International Criminal Justice. 17 (1): 125–150. doi:10.1093/jicj/mqz025.

Sources

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