International communication centers (ICC, Chinese: 国际传播中心) are state media institutions established by provinces and municipalities of the People's Republic of China. They operate under the funding and supervision of the Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party. The first ICCs were established in 2018 in response to General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping's call to "innovate" foreign-directed propaganda.[1][2] According to Qiushi, the theoretical journal of the Chinese Communist Party, ICCs are "developed based on local propaganda needs" and aim to be a "new force" in the country's global propaganda ecosystem.[3]
ICCs have been described as part of China's soft power initiatives and have represented a shift from foreign-directed propaganda being created at mostly the central government level to creation and dissemination by the country's provincial and local governments.[2][3][4]
History
editIn 2018, Chongqing established the first ICC in the country.[2] The same year, Gansu Daily and the propaganda department of the Gansu Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party jointly launched an ICC.[5] In 2020, Sichuan Daily and the Sichuan Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party jointly formed an ICC.[6] In May 2022, China Daily and the propaganda department of the Yunnan Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party established an ICC called the South and Southeast Asian Media Network that publishes content in multiple regional languages.[7][3]
From 2021 to 2023, over 30 ICCs were created.[2] In June 2023, the country's ICCs organized a national association to better coordinate their work.[7] The same month, Shenzhen Media Group formed an ICC.[8]
In July 2023, Jiangsu launched an ICC.[3] In November 2023, Guangdong launched an ICC that brands itself as GDToday and Daily Bae in English.[9] The same month, Shandong launched an ICC under the state-owned Shandong Television.[10] In January 2024, Hebei created its Great Wall International Communication Center.[3]
In May 2024, Zhejiang established an ICC.[3] It signed an agreement with the University of Nottingham Ningbo China the following month.[11] In June 2024, Tianjin formed an ICC that aims to "serve the country’s overall public diplomacy."[3] In June 2024, the Sichuan ICC inaugurated a branch center in São Paulo, Brazil in cooperation with Kuaishou.[12] In September 2024, the Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee of the Chinese Communist Party launched an ICC based in Lhasa to coordinate government narratives about the region.[13] The launch was condemned by the International Campaign for Tibet.[14]
As of December 2024[update], over 70 ICCs have been established.[11] Many have struggled with hiring talent as native-level foreign language skills are required and, therefore, have begun signing cooperation agreements with foreign universities for talent.[11]
References
edit- ^ Colville, Alex (2024-12-04). "Telling Zhejiang's Story". China Media Project. Retrieved 2024-12-04.
- ^ a b c d Fang, Shu (2024), Chang, Lu; de Araujo, Gabriel Antunes; Shi, Lei; Zhang, Qian (eds.), "Localization and Globalization, the Complexities and Strategies of Establishing Local International Communication Centers in China", Proceedings of the 2024 8th International Seminar on Education, Management and Social Sciences (ISEMSS 2024), Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research, vol. 867, Paris: Atlantis Press, pp. 573–579, doi:10.2991/978-2-38476-297-2_72, ISBN 978-2-38476-296-5
- ^ a b c d e f g Yang, Lin (2024-06-21). "Cities, provinces across China join global propaganda push". Voice of America. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
- ^ Tang, Didi; Klepper, David (2024-09-28). "In global game of influence, China turns to a cheap and effective tool: fake news". Associated Press. Archived from the original on 2024-09-28. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
Media groups at the local level are creating "international communication centers" to build an overseas presence with websites, news channels and social media accounts.
- ^ Kilpatrick, Ryan Ho (2023-11-02). "Desert Power, Discourse Power". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2024-10-01. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
- ^ Bandurski, David (2023-09-20). "Gilding the Panda". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2024-10-01. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
- ^ a b Bandurski, David (2024-02-29). "China's Local Game of Global Propaganda". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2024-02-29. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
- ^ Bandurski, David (2023-10-05). "Reading China's Media Counter-Attack". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2023-10-09. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
- ^ Parete, Dalia; Bandurski, David (2024-01-04). "What Does It Mean to Understand China?". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2024-10-05. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
- ^ Colville, Alex (2024-07-23). "How to Push China's Narrative Abroad". China Media Project. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
- ^ a b c Colville, Alex (2024-12-06). "China's Global Talent Crunch". China Media Project. Archived from the original on 2024-12-06. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
- ^ Bandurski, David (2024-06-28). "Olá Panda!". China Media Project. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
- ^ Yang, William (2024-09-12). "China tries to reshape Tibet, Xinjiang narratives with new propaganda efforts". Voice of America. Retrieved 2024-12-06.
- ^ "Tibet rights organisation condemns launch of Chinese propaganda centre in Lhasa". Asian News International. September 13, 2024. Retrieved 2024-12-06.