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Ming succession dispute

The Ming succession dispute from 1586 to 1614 was a conflict between the Wanli Emperor, the emperor of the Ming dynasty of China, and a significant group of Ming officials. The disagreement centered around the appointment of the crown prince. While officials argued for the legal principle of primogeniture and the appointment of the emperor's eldest son, Zhu Changluo, as crown prince, the emperor seemed to favor his favorite concubine Lady Zheng's son, Zhu Changxun, as his successor. Despite pressure from officials, the emperor delayed making a decision until 1601, when he finally named Zhu Changluo as his successor and Zhu Changxun as the prince. However, the emperor kept Zhu Changxun in Beijing until 1614, when he was supposed to be sent to his regional seat after turning eighteen in 1604. This decision raised suspicions about the emperor's intentions and sparked further protests from opposition officials.

Ming succession dispute
Traditional Chinese國本之爭
Simplified Chinese国本之争
Literal meaning"dispute over the foundation of the state", or "struggle over the root of the state"
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinGuóběn Zhīzhēng
Alternative Chinese name
Traditional Chinese爭國本
Simplified Chinese争国本
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinZhēng Guóběn

In 1615, disputes over the succession resurfaced in relation to the infamous "case of the attack with the stick", which may have been an attempted assassination of Zhu Changluo.

In the political terminology of that time, the heir to the throne was referred to as the "foundation of the state" (simplified Chinese: 国本; traditional Chinese: 國本; pinyin: Guóběn).

The dispute

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In 1586, the issue of succession arose when the emperor elevated his favorite concubine, Lady Zheng, to the rank of "Imperial Noble Consort" (Huang Guifei),[1][2] after she bore him a son, placing her one step below Empress Wang and above any other of his concubines, including Lady Wang, the mother of the emperor's eldest son Zhu Changluo (1582–1620). This made it clear to those around him that he preferred the son of Lady Zheng, Zhu Changxun (1586–1641)—his third son (the second son died in infancy)—as his successor rather than Zhu Changluo. The bureaucracy then split; some officials began to defend the rights of the first son based on legal primogeniture, while others aligned themselves with the promotion of Lady Zheng's son.[2]

The emperor, despite his autocratic rule, did not possess legislative authority and was limited in his ability to make autonomous decisions. As a result, he lacked the power to alter the rules of succession.[3] In response to the widespread support for the rights of the eldest son among officials, he chose to delay the decision and did not appoint either the first-born or the younger son as his successor.[2]

In 1589, the emperor agreed to appoint his eldest son as his successor. However, Lady Zheng opposed this decision, causing a wave of mutual recriminations and arrests two years later when a pamphlet was circulated in Beijing accusing her of conspiring with high officials against the emperor's eldest son. In an attempt to improve her public image, the emperor made efforts to portray Lady Zheng in a favorable light.[1] This reached its peak in 1594 when he ordered all Beijing officials of the fifth rank and above to contribute to her aid efforts for the famine in Henan.[4] The emperor's justification for postponing the appointment of a successor was that he was waiting for a son from the empress.[5] However, this decision sparked protests from high dignitaries, including Grand Secretaries Shen Shixing (in office 1578–91) and Wang Xijue (in office 1584–91 and 1593–94).[2] Empress Dowager Li, the Wanli Emperor's mother, also supported Zhu Changluo's succession. When the emperor objected, stating that his eldest son was the son of a mere palace servant, Empress Dowager Li countered that the Wanli Emperor was also the son of a mere servant.[5] Critics argued that this succession case revealed the Wanli Emperor's inability to fulfill the duties of a monarch.[3] Empress Dowager Li's public and behind-the-scenes support of Empress Wang countered the emperor's support of Lady Zheng. Additionally, Empress Dowager Li relied on Ming law, which considered the appointment of the crown prince a family matter, giving her, as the emperor's mother, the final and decisive say. As a result, a loose group formed around Empress Dowager Li, consisting of high-ranking officials, prominent Buddhist monks, rank-and-file officials, and even some eunuchs, all supporting her interests and the interests of the emperor's eldest son.[6] The followers of the empress and her son feared for her safety, as they believed that if she were to die, the emperor could appoint Lady Zheng as the new empress, making her son the legal successor.[6]

When Zhu Changluo turned eight years old in 1590, officials insisted that he be appointed as successor so that his education, which typically began at the age of six, could officially commence. They used the example of the Wanli Emperor, who had also been appointed as successor as a child, to support their argument. However, the Wanli Emperor defended himself by stating that princes were traditionally taught by eunuchs.[7] Despite this, in 1591, the emperor, under pressure from officials, finally agreed to appoint a successor within two years. However, the opposition, fearing further delays, demanded that Zhu Changluo's teaching and preparations for his appointment begin immediately. This request was met with anger from the monarch, who refused to comply.[8]

In the 1590s, Lady Zheng publicly promoted her son as the heir to the throne. This was evident in the stelae erected in Beijing's Dongyue Taoist Temple (early 1592) and Sanyang Monastery on Mount Tai (1594 and 1596), which referred to her son as the crown prince (taizi). Empress Wang and Lady Wang also sought supernatural assistance, but through Buddhist practices. For instance, at the beginning of 1592, Empress Wang financially supported the publication of a book of prayers to Guanyin, the most popular bodhisattva among women. Additionally, with the support of Empress Dowager Li, Empress Wang financed the reconstruction of Buddhist monasteries. Steles and inscriptions requesting blessings for the emperor's first-born son also mentioned Lady Wang.[6]

In 1593, officials were eagerly anticipating whether the monarch would fulfill the promise made in 1591. The emperor had initially suggested to Grand Secretary Wang Xijue that he appoint his three living sons as princes, in accordance with the law, and wait to see if the empress would bear a son. Wang drafted the edict and sent it to the Ministry of Rites to begin preparations. However, the idea faced opposition from critics who argued that the eldest son should be appointed crown prince, not prince. This forced Wang Xijue to apologize to the emperor, admitting that the appointment of three princes would go against the law, which he had not previously realized. As a result, the emperor abandoned the idea of appointing his sons as princes and declared that he would not appoint a successor in the next two to three years.[9]

In 1599, on Zhu Changluo's eighteenth birthday, there was a surge of requests for his appointment as crown prince. In response, the emperor demanded that the Ministry of Revennur collect 24 million liang of silver to cover the expenses of the ceremonies for naming the successor and his other sons. This was a blatant obstruction from the emperor, as the requested amount far exceeded the ministry's annual income in silver and even surpassed the state's annual income in both silver and goods.[10]

It was not until 1601 that the monarch finally agreed to the appointment, and the Grand Secretariat prepared an edict. However, at the last minute, the emperor attempted to delay the edict. Despite this, Senior Grand Secretary Shen Yiguan (沈一貫) stood firm and did not back down, and the emperor ultimately appointed his eldest son as successor and his four younger sons as princes in November 1601.[10] Zhu Changxun was given the title of Prince of Fu,[3] but he remained in Beijing instead of being sent to the province as planned when he turned eighteen in 1604. This fueled rumors that the question of succession was still open.[11] In 1614, after numerous appeals and protests against the prince's inactivity, the emperor finally sent him to his provincial seat.[12][13] During one of these protests, Lady Zheng argued that the prince should stay in Beijing to care for Empress Dowager Li and attend her birthday celebrations the following year. In response, the Empress Dowager summoned her younger son, Zhu Yiliu, Prince of Lu, to Beijing. This decision was a challenge to the emperor, as it was considered inappropriate and risky for the princes to stay in the capital since they could potentially oppose the crown prince as alternative heirs.[5] The emperor eventually backed down.[5]

Case of the attack with the stick

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In May 1615, a man named Zhang Chai was arrested at the successor's palace for carrying a stick. It was later discovered that he was mentally unstable[14] and had intended to use the stick to settle a dispute with two palace eunuchs whom he did not get along with. The case was initially closed and the man was to be executed.[15] However, prison official Wang Zhicai intervened and challenged the idea that the man was insane. He pushed for a public investigation involving representatives from the Ministry of Justice. This new version of the case suggested that the man was mentally sound and had been hired by two eunuchs close to Lady Zheng and her brother. This raised suspicions that their intention was to assassinate the heir and replace him with Lady Zheng's son.[16] The case caused a stir at court and the Wanli Emperor took the unprecedented step of summoning civil and military officials from Beijing. He appeared before them, which was his first meeting with "outer court" officials since 1602.[17] He was accompanied by Zhu Changluo and his family, including his sons and daughter. The emperor expressed his anger towards the officials for doubting his relationship with the heir, whom he trusted and relied on. Zhu Changluo confirmed his close bond with his father and requested an end to the entire affair. In addition, the emperor ordered the execution of Zhang Chai and the two eunuchs involved in the case.[18] However, representatives from the Ministry of Justice opposed the execution and demanded further investigation. The Grand Secretaries intervened and brokered a compromise—Zhang Chai was executed the following day, while the suspected eunuchs were to be interrogated. The interrogation took place, but both suspects remained under the watch of the emperor's eunuchs. On the fifth day after the emperor's speech, officials were informed that the suspects had died.[16] The case then went quiet.

References

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Citations

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  1. ^ a b Brook (2010), p. 101.
  2. ^ a b c d Huang (1988), p. 516.
  3. ^ a b c Huang (1988), p. 517.
  4. ^ Brook (2010), p. 102.
  5. ^ a b c d McMahon (2016), p. 130.
  6. ^ a b c Zhang (2020), pp. 63–64.
  7. ^ Duindam (2016), pp. 63–64.
  8. ^ Zhao (2002), p. 131.
  9. ^ Zhao (2002), pp. 131–134.
  10. ^ a b Goodrich & Fang (1976), pp. 1179–1182.
  11. ^ Huang (1988), p. 550.
  12. ^ Dardess (2002), p. 9.
  13. ^ Huang (1988), pp. 517, 550.
  14. ^ Dardess (2002), p. 10.
  15. ^ Huang (1988), p. 554.
  16. ^ a b Huang (1988), p. 555.
  17. ^ Dardess (2002), p. 14.
  18. ^ Dardess (2002), p. 15.

Works cited

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  • Brook, Timothy (2010). The troubled empire: China in the Yuan and Ming dynasties. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-04602-3.
  • Huang, Ray (1988). "The Lung-ch'ing and Wan-li reigns, 1567—1620". In Twitchett, Denis C; Mote, Frederick W. (eds.). The Cambridge History of China Volume 7: The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 511–584. ISBN 0521243335.
  • McMahon, Keith (2016). Celestial Women: Imperial Wives and Concubines in China from Song to Qing. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 9781442255029.
  • Zhang, Dewei (2020). Thriving in Crisis: Buddhism and Political Disruption in China, 1522–1620 (1 ed.). New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Duindam, Jeroen (2016). Dynasties: A Global History of Power, 1300-1800. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9781107637580.
  • Zhao, Jie (2002). "A Decade of Considerable Significance: Late-Ming Factionalism in the Making, 1583-1593". T'oung Pao. Second Series. 88 (1/3): 112–150. doi:10.1163/156853202320465404.
  • Goodrich, L. Carington; Fang, Chaoying (1976). Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368-1644. Vol. 2., M–Z. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-03801-1.
  • Dardess, John W (2002). Blood and History in China: The Donglin Faction and Its Repression, 1620-1627. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 9780824825164.
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