Governmental relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Namibia were first established the day after Namibia's independence, but relations with Namibian independence movements date back to the 1960s.[1]

China–Namibian relations
Map indicating locations of China and Namibia

China

Namibia
Former Chinese embassy in Windhoek, Namibia.

Chinese support for independence movements

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Beginning in the 1960s, during the Namibian War of Independence, China provided various indigenous Namibian independence movements (at first South West African National Union (SWANU))[2] and later South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) with "moral and material support".[1]

Since Namibian independence

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From 1989 to 1990, China sent 20 personnel to Namibia to help monitors its elections; this was China's first involvement in United Nations peacekeeping efforts in Africa.[3]: 205 

Namibia and the PRC established relations on 22 March 1990, which was the day after Namibia's independence.[1] The government of Namibia adheres to the One-China policy.[4]

Namibia was among the African countries which expressed support for the Chinese government during the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests.[3]: 41  In January 2020, Namibia's land reform minister stated that Namibia fully supports Chinese territorial integrity and sovereignty, including with respect to Hong Kong.[3]: 41 

Economic relations

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China and Namibia have developed close economic relations, with trade increasing two-fold between the two countries from 2003 to 2006.

Namibia is a major destination for Chinese investment in uranium mining.[5]: 205  Chinese companies have invested in Namibia's three biggest uranium producers: Husab, Langer Heinrich, and Rössing.[5]: 205 

Chinese development finance to Namibia

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From 2000 to 2011, there are approximately 64 Chinese official development finance projects identified in Namibia through various media reports.[6] During a February 2007 visit, Chinese President Hu Jintao pledged Namibia "RMB 1 billion of concessional loans, 100 million US dollars of preferential export buyer's credit, RMB 30 million yuan of grants and RMB 30 million of interest-free loans..."[1] In November 2005, Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohama and Chinese Politburo member Li Chang Chun witnessed the signing of a 250 million Yuan concessional loan by Export-Import Bank of China to be used for purchasing locomotives and trains for a new railway being built in northern Namibia.[7]

Migration

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A large number of Chinese are estimated to have taken up residence in Namibia since independence. In 2006, their number was estimated at 40,000.[8]

An Yue Jiang scandal

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In April 2008, a weapons shipment on the An Yue Jiang sailed from China destined for Zimbabwe. It was stopped from porting in South Africa because of protests regarding the weapons and the disputed Zimbabwean presidential election which had taken place a month earlier. Seeking a destination for the ship, it was rumored that it would be port on Namibia's coast at Walvis Bay. On 24 April 2008, a protest took place in Namibia's capital of Windhoek, where two hundred protesters marched from a Zoo Park in central Windhoek to the Chinese embassy.[9] Among those leading the protesters were Bishop and SWAPO politician Zephania Kameeta and the Legal Assistance Centre.[9] The ship did not port in Namibia.

Space cooperation

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Namibia and China also jointly operate the China Telemetry, Tracking, and Command Station which was established in 2001 in Swakopmund, Namibia.[3]: 304  This station tracks Chinese satellites and space missions.[3]: 304 

Extradition

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China has an extradition treaty with Namibia.[3]: 188 

See also

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Bibliography

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  • Cardenal, Juan Pablo; Araújo, Heriberto (2011). La silenciosa conquista china (in Spanish). Barcelona: Crítica. pp. 282–283. ISBN 9788498922578.

References

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  1. ^ a b c d Interpretation of China-Namibia Relations in Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China
  2. ^ SWANU official web site Archived 2004-11-07 at the Wayback Machine
  3. ^ a b c d e f Shinn, David H.; Eisenman, Joshua (2023). China's Relations with Africa: a New Era of Strategic Engagement. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-21001-0.
  4. ^ President Hu calls for closer China-Namibia ties in China Daily, 20 December 2005
  5. ^ a b Massot, Pascale (2024). China's Vulnerability Paradox: How the World's Largest Consumer Transformed Global Commodity Markets. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-777140-2.
  6. ^ Austin Strange, Bradley C. Parks, Michael J. Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher, and Vijaya Ramachandran. 2013. China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection. CGD Working Paper 323. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.[1]
  7. ^ Strange, Parks, Tierney, Fuchs, Dreher, and Ramachandran, China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection.http://aiddatachina.org/projects/131
  8. ^ "40,000 Chinese in Namibia". The Namibian. as quoted in the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). 21 November 2006. Archived from the original on 2012-09-27. Retrieved 21 March 2011.
  9. ^ a b Namibians say NO to arms by Tanja Bause, The Namibian, 25 April 2008
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