Raids inside the Soviet Union during the Soviet–Afghan War
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The raids inside Soviet Union during Soviet Afghan War were an effort to foment unrest and rebellion by the Islamic populations of the Soviet Union, starting in late 1984 Director of CIA William Casey encouraged Mujahideen militants to mount sabotage raids inside the Soviet Union, according to Robert Gates, Casey's executive assistant and Mohammed Yousef, the Pakistani ISI brigadier general who was the chief for Afghan operations. The rebels began cross-border raids into the Soviet Union in spring 1985.[1][2][3]
| Raids inside Soviet union during Soviet Afghan war | |||||||
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| Part of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and Operation Cyclone | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 Soviet Union Democratic Republic of Afghanistan |
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| Units involved | |||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
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1 Train destroyed 1 Factory destroyed 1 bridge destroyed Several barges destroyed One airfield damaged Unknown killed | Unknown | ||||||
Raids
edit1985 airbase attack
editIn August 1985 Afghan Mujahideen bombed a Soviet military airbase in Krasnovodsk, Turkmenistan. Three soldiers were killed.[2]
January 1987 rail attack
editIn January 1987 a bomb exploded on a Moscow-bound train in northwestern Uzbekistan, killing 3 citizens. The attack was likely meant to target Soviet troops.[2]
April 1987 raids
editIn April 1987 three separate teams of Afghan rebels were directed by the ISI to launch coordinated raids on multiple targets across the Soviet border and extending, in the case of an attack on an Uzbek factory, as deep as over 16 kilometres (10 mi) into Soviet territory.[4]
Kushka raid
editOne of the most notable attacks launched by the Mujahideen inside the Soviet Union was the 1988 attack on the town of Kushka. The Afghan Mujahideen captured the town and held it for several days before being forced to withdraw.[2]
Destruction of Termez bridge and barge system
editPakistan's ISI requested limpet mines from Britain in the hope of attacking Soviet transport barges on the South bank of the Amu Darya River. MI6 facilitated the attacks which included the Limpets. In this they were successful in destroying a number of barges as well as damaging the bridge pylons spanning the river near Termez.[5]
Foreign involvement
editPakistan
editThe Soviet paratroopers found that the Afghan mujahideen actually wore the black uniforms with rectangular black-yellow-red stripes, and suspected to be Pakistan Army Special Service Group personnel; Pakistan's government has officially denied their involvement. The American author, Aukai Collins, identified the elements as "Black Storks" who crossed the border to join the Afghan mujahideen – a claim also backed by American author, David Campbell.: 60–61 [6]
United States
editCIA director William Casey secretly visited Pakistan numerous times to meet with the ISI officers managing the mujahideen,[7] and personally observed the guerrillas training on at least one occasion.[8] Coll reports that
Casey startled his Pakistani hosts by proposing that they take the Afghan war into enemy territory—into the Soviet Union itself. Casey wanted to ship subversive propaganda through Afghanistan to the Soviet Union's predominantly Muslim southern republics. The Pakistanis agreed, and the CIA soon supplied thousands of Korans, as well as books on Soviet atrocities in Uzbekistan and tracts on historical heroes of Uzbek nationalism, according to Pakistani and Western officials.[8]
CIA also supplied Mujahideen with Weapons and Ammunition as well as Financial aid and this proved to be a crucial factor in the success of these raids.
United Kingdom
editThe UK's role in the Soviet Afghan war entailed direct military involvement not only in Afghanistan but the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union.[9] From 1984 in conjunction with the CIA and ISI, MI6 helped organize and execute "scores" of guerrilla-style attacks. These included rocket attacks on villages in Tajikistan and raids on Soviet airfields, troop supplies and convoys in Uzbekistan which flowed through these areas, some 25 kilometers in these territories.[10]
These were the first direct Western attacks on the Soviet Union since the 1950s and they reached their peak in 1986.[11] MI6 directly remitted money into an account of Pakistani leader of Jamaat-e-Islami Qazi Hussain Ahmad who had close links with Hekmatyar & Massoud. MI6's aim was for Ahmad to spread radical and anti-Soviet Islamic literature in the Soviet republics in the hope of rebellions against their Communist governments. These went as far as Chechnya and Bosnia.[12] The uprisings did not occur but the Soviets were concerned about potential uprisings during the war and even threatened retaliation with bombings in Pakistan.[10]
Impact
editThe Mujahideen attacks inside the Soviet Union had a significant impact on the Soviet war effort. The attacks forced the Soviet Union to divert resources away from the front lines and to focus on protecting its borders. The attacks also damaged the morale of the Soviet troops and contributed to the Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989.
See also
edit- Soviet–Afghan war
- Operation Cyclone
- Badaber uprising
- Afghanistan–Pakistan skirmishes
- Operation Curtain
- Battle for Hill 3234
- Battle of Jaji
- Siege of Khost
- Operation Magistral
- First Battle of Zhawar
- Second Battle of Zhawar
- Pakistan Soviet air confrontations during the Soviet Afghan war
- KHAD-KGB campaign in Pakistan
References
edit- ^ Coll 2004, p. 104.
- ^ a b c d Westermann, Edward B. (Fall 1999). "The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Failure of Military Coercion in Afghanistan, 1979–89". Journal of Conflict Studies. XIX (2). Retrieved 3 October 2015.
- ^ Kaplan 2008, p. 128: "... the farmer told Wakhil [Kaplan's translator] about all the irrigation ditches that had been blown up by fighter jets, and the flooding in the valley and malaria outbreak that followed. Malaria, which on the eve of Taraki's Communist coup in April 1978 – was at the point of being eradicated in Afghanistan, had returned with a vengeance, thanks to the stagnant, mosquito-breeding pools caused by the widespread destruction of irrigation systems. Nangarhar [province] was rife with the disease. This was another relatively minor, tedious side effect of the Soviet invasion."
- ^ Coll 2004, pp. 161–162.
- ^ Riedel 2014, p. 48.
- ^ Campbell, David (2017). "Battlefield Environment" (google books). Soviet Paratrooper vs Mujahideen Fighter: Afghanistan 1979–89 (1st ed.). New York, US: Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 80. ISBN 9781472817655. Archived from the original on 14 February 2023. Retrieved 28 January 2019.
- ^ Schaffer, Howard B.; Schaffer, Teresita C. (2011). How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster. US Institute of Peace Press. ISBN 9781601270757. Retrieved 4 July 2020 – via Google Books.
- ^ a b Coll, Steve (19 July 1992). "Anatomy of a Victory: CIA's Covert Afghan War". Retrieved 4 July 2020 – via www.washingtonpost.com.
- ^ Cormac 2018, pp. 235–36.
- ^ a b Coles 2018, p. 48.
- ^ Curtis 2010, pp. 146–47.
- ^ Sareen 2005, p. 74.
Sources
edit- Coles, T. J (2018). Manufacturing Terrorism: When Governments Use Fear to Justify Foreign Wars and Control Society. West Hoathly, W. Sussex: Clairview Books. ISBN 9781905570973. OCLC 1076248472.
- Coll, Steve (2004). Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001. New York: Penguin Press. ISBN 978-1-59420-007-6.
- Cormac, Rory (2018). Disrupt and Deny: Spies, Special Forces, and the Secret Pursuit of British Foreign Policy. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-878459-3.
- Curtis, Mark (2010). Secret Affairs: Britain's Collusion with Radical Islam. London: Serpent's Tail. ISBN 978-1-84668-763-1. OCLC 655641314.
- Kaplan, Robert D. (2008). Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. ISBN 978-0-307-54698-2. OCLC 48367823.
- Riedel, Bruce (2014). What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979-89. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 9780815725855.
- Sareen, Sushant (2005). The Jihad Factory Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation in association with Har-Anand Publications. ISBN 9788124110751. OCLC 62517115.