Wikipedia

Taiwan independence movement

(Redirected from Taiwan independence)
"Republic of Taiwan" redirects here. For the 1895 republic in Taiwan, see Republic of Formosa. For the current Taiwanese state, see Taiwan.

The Taiwan independence movement is a political movement which advocates the formal declaration of an independent and sovereign Taiwanese state, as opposed to Chinese unification or the status quo in Cross-Strait relations.

Taiwan independence movement
Traditional Chinese臺灣獨立運動 or
台灣獨立運動
Simplified Chinese台湾独立运动
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinTáiwān dúlì yùndòng
Bopomofoㄊㄞˊ ㄨㄢ ㄉㄨˊ ㄌㄧˋ ㄩㄣˋ ㄉㄨㄥˋ
Gwoyeu RomatzyhTair'uan durlih yunndonq
Wade–GilesT'ai2-wan1 tu2-li4 yün4-tung4
Tongyong PinyinTái-wan dú-lì yùn-dòng
MPS2Táiwān dúlì yùndùng
IPA[tʰǎɪ.wán tǔ.lî yn.tʊ̂ŋ]
Hakka
RomanizationThòi-vân thu̍k-li̍p yun-thung
Southern Min
Hokkien POJTâi-oân to̍k-li̍p ūn-tōng
Tâi-lôTâi-uân to̍k-li̍p ūn-tōng
Abbreviation
Traditional Chinese臺獨 or 台獨
Simplified Chinese台独
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinTáidú
Bopomofoㄊㄞˊ ㄉㄨˊ
Gwoyeu RomatzyhTairdur
Wade–GilesT'ai2-tu2
Tongyong PinyinTái-dú
MPS2Táidú
IPA[tʰǎɪ.tǔ]
Hakka
RomanizationThòi-thu̍k
Southern Min
Hokkien POJTâi-to̍k
Tâi-lôTâi-To̍k
A proposed flag for an independent Taiwan designed by Donald Liu in 1996
Flag of the World Taiwanese Congress
Flag of the 908 Taiwan Republic Campaign

Into the 21st-century, Taiwan's political status is ambiguous. China claims it is a province of the People's Republic of China (PRC), whereas the administration of Taiwan under its current presidency (held by the Democratic Progressive Party since 2016) maintains that Taiwan is already an independent country as the Republic of China (ROC) and thus does not have to push for any sort of formal independence.[1] As such, the ROC consisting of Taiwan and other islands under its control already conducts official diplomatic relations with and is recognized by 12 member states of the United Nations and the Holy See.[2]

The use of "independence" for Taiwan can be ambiguous. If some supporters articulate that they agree to the independence of Taiwan, they may either be referring to the notion of formally creating an independent Taiwanese state (Republic of Taiwan) or to the notion that Taiwan has become synonymous with the current Republic of China and is already independent (as reflected in the concept of One Country on Each Side). Some supporters advocate the exclusion of Kinmen and Matsu, which are controlled by Taiwan but are located off the coast of mainland China.[3] Taiwan independence is supported by the Pan-Green Coalition in Taiwan but opposed by the Pan-Blue Coalition, which seeks to retain the somewhat ambiguous status quo of the Republic of China (Taiwan) under the so-called "1992 Consensus" or gradually "reunify" with mainland China at some point.

The government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) oppose Taiwanese independence since they believe that Taiwan and mainland China comprise two portions of a single country's territory. As for the ROC (Taiwan), such a move could also be considered a violation of its current constitution. The process for a constitutional amendment in ROC or national territory alternation must be initiated by one-fourth (25%) of the members of the Legislative Yuan (the unicameral parliament of ROC), then voted in the Legislative Yuan with at least three-fourths (75%) members attended and by a three-fourths (75%) supermajority, then approved by majority popular vote in a referendum.

Historically, both governments have formulated a "One China" policy, whereby foreign countries may only conduct official diplomatic relations with either the PRC or the ROC, on the condition that they sever official diplomatic relations with and formal recognition of the other. The ROC's One-China policy was softened following democratization in the 1990s.[4]

History of Taiwan independence

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Many supporters of independence for Taiwan view the history of Taiwan since the 17th century as a continuous struggle for independence and use it as an inspiration for the current political movement.[5][promotional source?]

According to this view, the people indigenous to Taiwan and those who have taken up residence there have been repeatedly occupied by groups including the Dutch, the Spanish, the Ming, Koxinga and the Ming loyalists, the Qing, the Japanese and finally the Chinese Nationalists led by the Kuomintang. From a pro-independence supporter's point of view, the movement for Taiwan independence began under Qing rule in the 1680s which led to a well known saying those days, "Every three years an uprising, every five years a rebellion". Taiwan Independence supporters compared Taiwan under Kuomintang rule to South Africa under apartheid.[6] The Taiwan independence movement under Japan was supported by Mao Zedong in the 1930s as a means of freeing Taiwan from Japanese rule.[7]

With the end of World War II in 1945, by issuing "General Order No. 1" to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the Allies agreed that the Republic of China Army under the Kuomintang would "temporarily occupy Taiwan, on behalf of the Allied forces."[8]

From 1928 to 1942, the Chinese Communist Party maintained that Taiwan was a separate nation.[7] Mao Zedong was an early supporter of Taiwanese independence, telling Edgar Snow in the 1930s that the Chinese Communist Party would lend "our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence." He changed this position only after the Nationalists started claiming Taiwan with the Cairo Declaration.[9]

Martial law period

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Woodcut print by Huang Rong-can, "The Terrible Inspection" describing the February 28 Incident massacre in 1947
 
"Terror In Formosa", a news article from The Daily News of Perth, reported the status in March 1947.

The modern-day political movement for Taiwan independence dates back to the Japanese colonial period, but it only became a viable political force within Taiwan in the 1990s.[citation needed] Taiwanese independence was advocated periodically during the Japanese colonial period, but was suppressed by the Japanese government. These efforts were the goal of the Taiwanese Communist Party of the late 1920s. Unlike current formulations, and in line with the thinking of the Comintern, such a state would have been a proletarian one. With the end of World War II in 1945, Japanese rule ended, but the subsequent autocratic rule of the ROC's Kuomintang (KMT) later revived calls for local rule. However, it was a movement supported by the Chinese students who were born on the Island and not associated with KMT. It found its roots in the US and Japan. In the 1950s a Republic of Taiwan Provisional Government was set up in Japan. Thomas Liao was nominally the President. At one time it held quasi-official relations with the newly independent Indonesia. This was possible mainly through the connections between Sukarno and the Provisional Government's Southeast Asian liaison, Chen Chih-hsiung, who had assisted in Indonesia's local resistance movements against Japanese rule.

After the Kuomintang began to rule the island, the focus of the movement was as a vehicle for discontent from the native Taiwanese against the rule of "mainlanders" (i.e. mainland Chinese-born people who fled to Taiwan with KMT in the late 1940s). The February 28 Incident in 1947 and the ensuing martial law that lasted until 1987 contributed to the period of White Terror on the island. In 1979, the Kaohsiung Incident, occurred as the movement for democracy and independence intensified.[10]

Between 1949 and 1991, the official position[11] of the ROC government on Taiwan was that it was the legitimate government of all of China and it used this position as justification for authoritarian measures such as the refusal to vacate the seats held by delegates elected on the mainland in 1947 for the Legislative Yuan. The Taiwan independence movement intensified in response to this and presented an alternative vision of a sovereign and independent Taiwanese state. This vision was represented through a number of symbols such as the use of Taiwanese in opposition to the school-taught Mandarin Chinese.

Several scholars drafted various versions of a constitution, as both political statement or vision and as intellectual exercise. Most of these drafts favor a bicameral parliamentary rather than presidential system. In at least one such draft, seats in the upper house would be divided equally among Taiwan's established ethnicities. In the 1980s the Chinese Nationalist government considered publication of these ideas criminal. In the most dramatic case, it decided to arrest the pro-independence publisher Cheng Nan-jung for publishing a version in his Tang-wai magazine, Liberty Era Weekly (自由時代週刊). Rather than giving himself up, Cheng self-immolated in protest. Other campaigns and tactics toward such a State have included soliciting designs from the public for a new national flag and anthem (for example, Taiwan the Formosa). More recently the Taiwan Name Rectification Campaign (台灣正名運動) has played an active role. More traditional independence supporters, however, have criticized name rectification as merely a superficial tactic devoid of the larger vision inherent in the independence agenda.

Various overseas Taiwan Independence movements, such as the Formosan Association, World United Formosans for Independence, United Young Formosans for Independence, Union for Formosa's Independence in Europe, United Formosans in America for Independence, and Committee for Human Rights in Formosa, published "The Independent Formosa" in several volumes with the publisher "Formosan Association." In "The Independent Formosa, Volumes 2–3", they tried to justify Taiwanese collaboration with Japan during World War II by saying that the "atmosphere covered the whole Japanese territories, including Korea and Formosa, and the Japanese mainlands as well", when Taiwanese publications supported Japan's "holy war", and that the people who did it were not at fault.[12][promotional source?]

The Anti-communist Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China on Taiwan, believed the Americans were going to plot a coup against him along with Taiwan Independence. In 1950, Chiang Ching-kuo became director of the secret police, which he remained until 1965. Chiang also considered some people who were friends to Americans to be his enemies. An enemy of the Chiang family, Wu Kuo-chen, was kicked out of his position of governor of Taiwan by Chiang Ching-kuo and fled to America in 1953.[13] Chiang Ching-kuo, educated in the Soviet Union, initiated Soviet style military organization in the Republic of China Military, reorganizing and Sovietizing the political officer corps, surveillance, and Kuomintang party activities were propagated throughout the military. Opposed to this was Sun Li-jen, who was educated at the American Virginia Military Institute.[14] Chiang orchestrated the controversial court-martial and arrest of General Sun Li-jen in August 1955, for plotting a coup d'état with the American CIA against his father Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. The CIA allegedly wanted to help Sun take control of Taiwan and declare its independence.[13][15]

During the martial law era lasting until 1987, discussion of Taiwan independence was forbidden in Taiwan, at a time when recovery of the mainland and national unification were the stated goals of the ROC. During that time, many advocates of independence and other dissidents fled overseas, and carried out their advocacy work there, notably in Japan and the United States. Part of their work involved setting up think tanks, political organizations, and lobbying networks in order to influence the politics of their host countries, notably the United States, the ROC's main ally at the time, though they would not be very successful until much later. Within Taiwan, the independence movement was one of many dissident causes among the intensifying democracy movement of the 1970s, which culminated in the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was eventually formed to represent dissident causes.[citation needed]

Multiparty period

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After the lifting of martial law in 1987, and the acceptance of multi-party politics, the Democratic Progressive Party became increasingly identified with Taiwan independence, which entered its party platform in 1991. At the same time, many overseas independence advocates and organizations returned to Taiwan and for the first time openly promoted their cause in Taiwan, gradually building up political support. Many had previously fled to the US or Europe and had been on a blacklist held by KMT, which had held them back from going back to Taiwan. Where they had fled, they built many organisations like European Federation of Taiwanese Associations or Formosan Association for Public Affairs. By the late 1990s, DPP and Taiwan independence have gained a solid electoral constituency in Taiwan, supported by an increasingly vocal and hardcore base.[citation needed]

 
Banner displaying the slogan "UN for Taiwan"

As the electoral success of the DPP, and later, the DPP-led Pan-Green Coalition grew in recent years, the Taiwan independence movement shifted focus to identity politics by proposing many plans involving symbolism and social engineering. The interpretation of historical events such as the February 28 Incident, the use of broadcast language and mother tongue education in schools, the official name and flag of the ROC, slogans in the army, orientation of maps all have been issues of concern to the present-day Taiwan independence movement. The movement, at its peak in the 70s through the 90s in the form of the Taiwan literature movement and other cultural upheavals, has moderated in recent years with the assimilation of these changes. Friction between "mainlander" and "native" communities on Taiwan has decreased due to shared interests: increasing economic ties with mainland China, continuing threats by the PRC to invade, and doubts as to whether or not the United States would support a unilateral declaration of independence. Since the late 1990s many supporters of Taiwan independence have argued that Taiwan, as the ROC, is already independent from the mainland, making a formal declaration unnecessary. In May 1999, the Democratic Progressive Party formalized this position in its "Resolution on Taiwan's Future".[citation needed]

Lee Teng-hui administration (1988–2000)

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In 1995, Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui was given permission to speak at Cornell University about his dream of Taiwanese independence, the first time a Taiwanese leader had been allowed to visit the United States. This led to a military response from China that included buying Russian submarines and conducting missile tests near Taiwan.[16]

Chen Shui-bian administration (2000–2008)

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Republic of China passport mentioning Taiwan since 2003 in order to distinguish it from the People's Republic of China passport. In 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a redesigned passport that highlights "Taiwan"[17][18]
 
An example of a "Taiwan passport", which is typically not accepted in place of the R.O.C. passport

In February 2007, President Chen Shui-bian initiated changes to names of state-owned enterprises, and the nation's embassies and overseas representative offices. As a result, Chunghwa Post Co. (中華郵政) was renamed Taiwan Post Co. (臺灣郵政) and Chinese Petroleum Corporation (中國石油) is now called CPC Corporation, Taiwan (臺灣中油) and the signs in Taiwan's embassies now display the word "Taiwan" in brackets after "Republic of China".[19] In 2007, the Taiwan Post Co. issued stamps bearing the name "Taiwan" in remembrance of the February 28 Incident. However, the name of the post office was reverted to "Chunghwa Post Co." following the inauguration of Kuomintang president Ma Ying-jeou in 2008.

The Pan-Blue camp voiced its opposition to the changes and the former KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou said that it would generate diplomatic troubles and cause cross-strait tensions. It also argued that without a change in the relevant legislation pertaining to state-owned enterprises, the name changes of these enterprises could not be valid. As the Pan-Blue camp held only a slim parliamentary majority throughout the administration of President Chen, the Government's motion to change the law to this effect were blocked by the opposition. Later, U.S. Department of State spokesman Sean McCormack said that the U.S. does not support administrative steps that would appear to change the status-quo by either Taipei or Beijing as threats to regional security.[20]

Former president Lee Teng-hui has stated that he never pursued Taiwanese independence. Lee views Taiwan as already an independent state, and that the call for "Taiwanese independence" could even confuse the international community by implying that Taiwan once viewed itself as part of China. From this perspective, Taiwan is independent even if it remains unable to enter the UN. Lee said the most important goals are to improve the people's livelihoods, build national consciousness, make a formal name change and draft a new constitution that reflects the present reality so that Taiwan can officially identify itself as a country.[21]

Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008–2016)

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Legislative elections were held on 12 January 2008, resulting in a supermajority (86 of the 113 seats) in the legislature for the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Pan-Blue Coalition. President Chen Shui-bian's Democratic Progressive Party was handed a heavy defeat, winning only the remaining 27 seats. The junior partner in the Pan-Green Coalition, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, won no seats.

Two months later, the election for the 12th-term President and Vice-President of the Republic of China was held on Saturday, 22 March 2008.[22] KMT nominee Ma Ying-jeou won, with 58% of the vote, ending eight years of Democratic Progressive Party rule.[23] Along with the 2008 legislative election, Ma's landslide victory brought the Kuomintang back to power in Taiwan.

On 1 August 2008, the Board of Directors of Taiwan Post Co. resolved to reverse the name change and restored the name "Chunghwa Post".[24] The Board of Directors, as well as resolving to restore the name of the corporation, also resolved to re-hire the chief executive dismissed in 2007, and to withdraw defamation proceedings against him.[25]

On 2 September 2008, President Ma defined the relations between Taiwan and mainland China as "special", but "not that between two states" – they are relations based on two areas of one state, with Taiwan considering that state to be the Republic of China, and mainland China considering that state to be the People's Republic of China.[26][27]

Ma's approach with the mainland is conspicuously evasive of political negotiations that may lead to unification which is the mainland's ultimate goal. The National Unification Guidelines remain "frozen" and Ma precluded any discussion of unification during his term by his "three no's" (no unification, no independence, and no use of force).[28]

Tsai Ing-wen and Lai Ching-te administration (2016–present)

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The Democratic Progressive Party, led by Tsai Ing-wen, won a landslide victory over the Kuomintang in 2016 and was reelected in 2020.[29][30] Her administration stated that it sought to maintain the current political status of Taiwan.[31][32] The PRC government continued to criticize the ROC government, as the DPP administration has continued to not officially recognize the 1992 Consensus and the One China policy.[33][34]

Lai Ching-te, the Democratic Progressive Party candidate, won the presidential election in 2024. During the campaign period, Lai asserted Taiwanese sovereignty, but said a formal declaration of independence would be unnecessary and favored maintaining the status quo.[35] He also said he would be willing to work with the Chinese government, but only if they renounce any intentions to use force against Taiwan.[36][37]

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Taiwan independence is supported by the Pan-Green Coalition in Taiwan, led by the centre-left Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), but opposed by the Pan-Blue Coalition, led by the conservative Kuomintang (KMT). The former coalition aims to eventually achieve full sovereign independence for Taiwan. Whereas, the latter coalition aims to improve relations with the Beijing government (PRC) — which it refers to as "mainland China" — and eventually "reunify" at some point.

Both factions have long been forced to precariously dance around the so-called "status quo" of Taiwan's political status. The DPP is unable to immediately declare independence due to pressure from the PRC and the KMT, whereas the KMT and PRC are unable to immediately achieve Chinese unification due to pressure from the DPP and its de facto allies (including the United States, Japan, and the European Union); further, the vast majority of Taiwanese as well as the KMT oppose the mainland's proposed one country, two systems solution.[38][failed verification]

The 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki and 1951 Treaty of San Francisco are often cited as the main bases for Taiwan independence in international law,[39][40][41] if such things as "self-determination" and the Montevideo Convention (on the Rights and Duties of States) are to be disregarded. These two treaties are not recognized by the Beijing government and the Pan-Blue Coalition of Taiwan.

Undetermined status theory

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One hypothesis as to a legal basis for an independent Taiwanese state, the theory of the undetermined status of Taiwan, posits that:

a) Japan gained sovereignty over Taiwan in 1895

b) Japan lost sovereignty over Taiwan in 1951–1952 according to the Treaty of San Francisco

c) The Treaty of San Francisco does not assign Taiwan to any power

Therefore, some activists and legal scholars hold that, legally speaking, the island of Taiwan is not an integral part of the territory of the Republic of China (or any other internationally-recognized state); its status is more similar to a League of Nations mandate or United Nations trust territory administered by (the Republic of) China pending a final decision.

Mainland position

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The PRC government regards these agreements as irrelevant to the Taiwan issue, arguing that the Treaty of Shimonoseki (being an unequal treaty) has been nullified and the Treaty of San Francisco assigns Taiwan to China. It also cites the Potsdam Declaration and Cairo Communique as confirming Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan; inasmuch as the PRC is the internationally-recognized "China", it thus posits that it is the lawful sovereign power on the island. The United Nations currently recognizes Taiwan as an integral part of China (and thus, implicitly, the PRC).

Huadu or Taidu?

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Within the Pan-Green Coalition of Taiwan, there are two main factions, the Huadu and Taidu. The more moderate Huadu faction, mainly located in the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, posits Taiwan and its outlying islands are already a sovereign state under the name "Republic of China", making a formal declaration of independence unnecessary. Huadu politics is the semi-official stance of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party under the Lai Ching-te and Tsai Ing-wen administrations.

Conversely, the more radical Taidu faction advocates a more radical departure from the status quo by making a formal declaration of independence to create a de jure "Republic of Taiwan"; advocates for a de jure Taiwanese state can be found in smaller parties in the Pan-Green coalition, such as the Taiwan Statebuilding Party and Taiwan Solidarity Union, as well as in minority elements of the ruling DPP.

The term "Taiwan independence movement" is thus somewhat imprecise inasmuch its main representative, the Democratic Progressive Party, does not support any change in the constitutional name of the Taiwanese state for the foreseeable future; they generally view the modern Republic of China as synonymous with a sovereign Taiwanese state; the incumbent President of Taiwan, Lai Ching-te of the DPP, believes that "Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country called the Republic of China".[42]

Kinmen and Matsu issue

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Background

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Main articles: Kinmen and Matsu Islands

When the government of the Republic of China (under the Kuomintang) was forced to retreat to Formosa and the Pescadores[43] (Taiwan and Penghu) in 1949, several Chinese (i.e. not Japanese) islands still remained under Kuomintang control. Because the Chinese Communist Party never gained control of the Kinmen, Wuqiu, and Matsu Islands, they are now governed by the Republic of China on Taiwan as Kinmen County (Kinmen and Wuqiu) and Lienchiang County (Matsu) within a streamlined Fujian Province. The islands are often referred to collectively as Quemoy and Matsu[44] or as "Golden Horse".

Historically, Kinmen County ("Quemoy") and Lienchiang County ("Matsu") served as important defensive strongholds for the Kuomintang during the 1950–1970s, symbolizing the frontline of Kuomintang resistance against the Communist rebellion. They represented the last Kuomintang presence in "mainland China".[45] The islands received immense coverage from Western (especially United States) media during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954–1955 and the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958. They were very significant in the context of the Cold War, a period from 1946 until 1991 of geopolitical tension between the Soviet Union (and its allies) and the United States (and its allies).

Ever since the transition into multi-party politics (i.e. "Democratization") during the 1990s, Kinmen and Lienchiang counties have now essentially developed into two electorates that can be contested through democratic elections. Currently the two electorates are "strongholds" for the Kuomintang[46] due mainly to popular opinion within the electorates, rather than brute control (as in the past). The two electorates have recently developed close relations with the mainland, which lies only around 2–9 km west from the islands, whereas Taiwan lies around 166–189 km east from the islands.

Significance of Quemoy and Matsu

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Quemoy and Matsu are unique and important for several reasons.

  • The islands straddle the southeastern coastline of mainland China, only a few kilometers away from mainland China's Fujian Province.
  • The islands are geographically defined as being part of mainland China rather than Taiwan (aka "Formosa and the Pescadores").
  • The islands are defined as comprising the truncated, streamlined Fujian Province (officially "Fuchien Province") of the ROC on Taiwan.

Quemoy and Matsu in Cross-Strait relations

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Reportedly, the local government of Kinmen County supports stronger business and cultural ties with mainland China, similarly to the Kuomintang, and views itself as an important proxy (representative) or nexus (focal point) for improving Cross-Strait relations (that is, in the favour of Chinese unification). In January 2001, direct travel between Kinmen County (and Lienchiang County) and mainland China re-opened under the "mini Three Links".[47] As of 2015, Kinmen has plans to become a "special economic zone" in which free trade and free investment would be allowed between it and the neighbouring mainland SEZ of Xiamen.[48] This might be accomplished in part by building a huge bridge connecting Kinmen to Xiamen, via the island of Lesser Kinmen (Lieyu);[49] A bridge has since been constructed between Greater Kinmen and Lesser Kinmen.[50] Additionally, Kinmen has plans to become a "university island".[51] In 2010, "National Kinmen Institute of Technology" was upgraded to "National Quemoy University".[52] Kinmen County plans to establish several branches of mainland Chinese universities in Kinmen, and has bargained with the central Taiwanese (ROC) government so that universities in Kinmen don't have to be bounded by the same quotas as other Taiwanese universities in terms of admitting mainland Chinese students. In 2018, the local government of Kinmen County unveiled a new undersea pipeline linking Kinmen to mainland China, through which drinking-water can be imported.[53] This business deal caused controversy in Taiwan and resulted in a "stand-off" between Kinmen County and the Mainland Affairs Council of Taiwan (ROC).[54]

Quemoy and Matsu as part of Taiwan

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Within Taiwan, one camp[who?] believes that Kinmen County (Quemoy) and Lienchiang County (Matsu) should be abandoned from a potential independent and sovereign Taiwanese state. This view aligns with the aforementioned treaties and acts that do not define Kinmen and Matsu as being part of Taiwan. This same camp also believes that the PRC has only "allowed" the ROC to continue controlling Kinmen and Matsu in order to "tether" Taiwan to mainland China. The fact that the PRC propagandizes Kinmen and Matsu is evidence that this is true to at least a certain degree. In a hypothetical scenario where Kinmen and Matsu are abandoned by the Taiwanese state, they would likely be "ceded" to the People's Republic of China via a peace treaty, officially ending the Chinese Civil War.

Also within Taiwan, a second camp[who?] believes that Quemoy and Matsu belong to Taiwan. This camp believes that the ROC and Taiwan have become one and the same. By this logic, Taiwan effectively owns all of the same territories that the ROC is said to own. Among these territories is Quemoy and Matsu. If a potential Taiwanese state were to be created, this camp believes that the new country will actually be the successor state to the ROC, rather than an entirely new country. Therefore, if Taiwan independence were to be successfully achieved, then the islands of Quemoy and Matsu would hypothetically cease to be administered as "Fujian Province", and would instead simply be classified as "satellite islands of Taiwan" (much in the same way as Penghu).

Despite the differing views of these two camps, there is a general understanding throughout Taiwan that Quemoy and Matsu are not part of the historical region of "Taiwan", due to having never been governed under the following regimes: Dutch Formosa, Spanish Formosa, Kingdom of Tungning, Republic of Formosa, and Japanese Formosa. Additionally, Quemoy and Matsu experienced a unique history for several years as military outposts of the ROC, further separating the islands from Taiwan in terms of culture.

Positions

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The questions of independence and the island's relationship to mainland China are complex and inspire very strong emotions among Taiwanese people. There are some who continue to maintain the KMT's position, which states that the ROC is the sole legitimate government for all of China (of which they consider Taiwan to be a part), and that the aim of the government should be eventual unification of the mainland and Taiwan under the rule of the ROC. Some argue that Taiwan has been, and should continue to be, completely independent from China and should become a Taiwanese state with a distinct name. Then, there are numerous positions running the entire spectrum between these two extremes, as well as differing opinions on how best to manage either situation should it ever be realized.

On 25 October 2004, in Beijing, the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said Taiwan is "not sovereign," provoking strong comments from both the Pan-Green and Pan-Blue coalitions – but for very different reasons. From the DPP's side, President Chen declared that "Taiwan is definitely a sovereign, independent country, a great country that absolutely does not belong to the People's Republic of China". The TSU (Taiwan Solidarity Union) criticized Powell, and questioned why the US sold weapons to Taiwan if it were not a sovereign state. From the KMT, then Chairman Ma Ying-jeou announced, "the Republic of China has been a sovereign state ever since it was formed [in 1912]." The pro-unification PFP Party Chairman, James Soong, called it "Taiwan's biggest failure in diplomacy."[55]

Support for independence

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Parade of Taiwan independence supporters

The first view considers the move for Taiwan independence as a nationalist movement. Historically, this was the view of such pro-independence groups as the Tangwai movement (which later grew into the Democratic Progressive Party) who argued that the ROC under the Kuomintang had been a "foreign regime" forcibly imposed on Taiwan. Since the 1990s, supporters of Taiwan independence no longer actively make this argument. Instead, the argument has been that, in order to survive the growing power of the PRC, Taiwan must view itself as a separate and distinct entity from "China." Such a change in view involves:

  • removing the name of "China" from official and unofficial items in Taiwan,
  • changes in history books, which now portrays Taiwan as a central entity,
  • promoting the use of Hokkien Language in the government and in the education system,
  • reducing economic links with mainland China,
  • opposing Chinese unification regardless of mainland China being a democracy and
  • promoting the general thinking that Taiwan is a separate entity.

The goal of this movement is the eventual creation of a country where China is a foreign entity, and Taiwan is an internationally recognized country separate from any concept of "China." The proposed "Republic of Taiwan" will exclude areas such as Quemoy and Matsu off the coast of Fujian, and some of the islands in the South China Sea (Taiping Island, Pratas Island, Zhongzhou Reef), which historically were not part of Taiwan. Some supporters of Taiwan independence argue that the Treaty of San Francisco justifies Taiwan independence by not explicitly granting Taiwan to either the ROC or the PRC, even though neither the PRC nor the ROC government accepts such legal justification. It is also thought that if formal independence were declared, Taiwan's foreign policies would lean further towards Japan and the United States, and the desirable option of United Nations Trusteeship Council is also considered.[56]

The Taiwan Independence Party won a single seat in the Legislative Yuan in the 1998 legislative election. The Taiwan Solidarity Union was formed in 2001, and is also supportive of independence. Though it gained more legislative support than TAIP in elections, the TSU's legislative representation has dropped over time. In 2018, political parties and organizations demanding a referendum on Taiwan's independence formed an alliance to further their objective. The Formosa Alliance was established on 7 April 2018, prompted by a sense of crisis in the face of growing pressure from China for unification. The alliance wanted to hold a referendum on Taiwan's independence in April 2019, and change the island's name from the "Republic of China" to "Taiwan," and apply for membership in the United Nations.[57] In August 2019, another party supportive of independence, the Taiwan Action Party Alliance was founded.

Support for status quo

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See also: Huadu (Taiwan)

A second view is that Taiwan is already an independent nation with the official name "Republic of China," which has been independent (i.e. de facto separate from mainland China/de jure separate from PRC) since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, when the ROC lost control of mainland China, with only Taiwan (including the Penghu islands), Kinmen (Quemoy), the Matsu Islands off the coast of Fujian Province, and some of the islands in the South China Sea remaining under its administration.[58] Although previously no major political faction adopted this pro-status quo viewpoint, because it is a "compromise" in face of PRC threats and American warnings against a unilateral declaration of independence, the DPP combined it with their traditional belief to form their latest official policy. This viewpoint has not been adopted by more radical groups such as the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which favor only the third view described above and are in favor of a Republic or State of Taiwan. In addition, many members of the Pan-Blue Coalition are rather suspicious of this view, fearing that adopting this definition of Taiwan independence is merely an insincere stealth tactical effort to advance desinicization and the third view of Taiwan independence. As a result, supporters of Pan-Blue tend to make a clear distinction between Taiwan independence and Taiwan sovereignty, while supporters of Pan-Green tend to try to blur the distinction between the two.[59]

Most Taiwanese and political parties of the ROC support the status quo, and recognize that this is de facto independence through sovereign self-rule.[60] Even among those who believe Taiwan is and should remain independent, the threat of war from PRC softens their approach, and they tend to support maintaining the status quo rather than pursuing an ideological path that could result in war with the PRC. When President Lee Teng-hui put forth the two-states policy, he received 80% support. A similar situation arose when President Chen Shui-bian declared that there was "one country on each side" of the Taiwan Strait. To this day, the parties disagree, sometimes bitterly, on such things as territory, name (R.O.C. or Taiwan), future policies, and interpretations of history. The Pan-Blue Coalition and the PRC believe that Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian are intent on publicly promoting a moderate form of Taiwan independence in order to advance secretly deeper forms of Taiwan independence, and that they intend to use popular support on Taiwan for political separation to advance notions of cultural and economic separation.

Opposition to independence

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See also: Chinese unification and Anti-Secession Law
 
Anti-Taiwan independence protesters in Washington, D.C. during Lee Teng-hui's visit in 2005
 
In 2023, in Taiwan, a joint anti-Taiwan independence and anti-intervention protest against William Lai Ching‑te

The third view, put forward by the government of the PRC and Nationalists of the KMT, defines Taiwan independence as "splitting Taiwan from China, causing division of the nation and the people." What PRC claims by this statement is somewhat ambiguous according to supporters of Taiwanese independence, as some statements by the PRC seem to identify China solely and uncompromisingly with the PRC. Others propose a broader and more flexible definition suggesting that both mainland China and Taiwan are parts that form one cultural and geographic entity, although divided politically as a vestige of the Chinese Civil War. The PRC considers itself the sole legitimate government of all China, and the ROC to be a defunct entity replaced in the Communist revolution that succeeded in 1949. Therefore, assertions that the ROC is a sovereign state are construed as support for Taiwan independence, so are proposals to change the name of the ROC. Such a name change is met with even more disapproval since it rejects Taiwan as part of the greater China entity (as one side of a still-unresolved Chinese civil war). The ROC used to be recognized by the UN as the sole legal government of China until 1971. In that year, the UN Resolution 2758 was passed, and the PRC became recognized as the legal government of China by the UN. Chinese nationalists have called the Taiwan independence movement and its supporters to be hanjian (traitors).[citation needed]

The Chinese Communist Party classifies Taiwan independence activists as one of the Five Poisons.[61][62] In 2005, the 10th National People's Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law authorizing military force for unification.[63] In 2024, the Chinese government issued a directive to the courts stating that "diehard" independence supporters could be tried in absentia with capital punishment imposed.[64][65]

Opinion polls

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See also: Opinion polling on Taiwanese identity

In an opinion poll conducted in Taiwan by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation in 2022 found that among Taiwanese adults aged 20 years and older, 50% said they support Taiwan independence, 11.8% for unification, 25.7% for maintaining status quo. [66]

Several polls have indicated an increase in support of Taiwanese independence in the three decades after 1990. In a Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation poll conducted in June 2020, 54% of respondents supported de jure independence for Taiwan, 23.4% preferred maintaining the status quo, 12.5% favored unification with China, and 10% did not hold any particular view on the matter. This represented the highest level of support for Taiwanese independence since the survey was first conducted in 1991.[67][68] A later TPOF poll in 2022 showed similar results.[69][70] The Election Study Center, NCCU Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland Survey shows a steady increase in respondents choosing "maintain the status quo and move toward independence in the future" since it started in 1994. However, the option "maintain the status quo indefinitely" had a similar increase in the same period and the most popular option was "maintain the status quo and decide in the future between independence or unification" every year between 1994 and 2022. The option "independence as soon as possible" never went above 10% in the same time period. "unification as soon as possible" has been more unpopular – never going above 4.5%.[71][72][73]

Date(s)
conducted 		Polling
firm 		Sample size Margin of error Independence[a] Unification[b] Status quo No opinion Lead
17–21 October 2019 MAC 1,073 ±2.99 pp 27.7% 10.3% 56.8% 5.2% 29.1%
21–24 November 2019 CWMSC 1,073 ±2.99 pp 32% 5.5% 58.1% 4.4% 26.1%
15–16 June 2020 TPOF 1,074 ±2.99 pp 54% 12.5% 23.4% 10% 30.6%
8–9 August 2022 TPOF 1,035 ±3.05 pp 50% 11.8% 25.7% 12.5% 24.3%
Polls conducted by ESC, NCCU (1994–2023)
Year
conducted 		Sample size Independence as soon as possible Maintain status quo, move toward independence Maintain status quo, decide at a later date Maintain status quo indefinitely Maintain status quo, move toward unification Unification as soon as possible No opinion
1994 1,209 3.1% 8.0% 38.5% 9.8% 15.6% 4.4% 20.5%
1995 21,402 3.5% 8.1% 26.3% 15.6% 19.4% 2.3% 26.3%
1996 10,666 4.1% 9.5% 30.5% 15.3% 19.5% 2.5% 18.6%
1997 3,910 5.7% 11.5% 30.5% 16.3% 17.3% 3.2% 15.4%
1998 14,063 5.7% 11.5% 30.3% 15.9% 15.9% 2.1% 18.7%
1999 9,273 4.7% 13.6% 30.9% 18.8% 15.2% 2.2% 15.2%
2000 11,062 3.1% 11.6% 29.5% 19.2% 17.3% 2.0% 17.4%
2001 10,679 3.7% 10.5% 35.9% 16.4% 17.5% 2.8% 10.5%
2002 10,003 4.3% 13.8% 36.2% 15.0% 15.7% 2.5% 12.4%
2003 14,247 6.2% 14.5% 35.0% 18.0% 11.9% 1.8% 12.5%
2004 34,854 4.4% 15.2% 36.5% 20.9% 10.6% 1.5% 11.0%
2005 7,939 6.1% 14.2% 37.3% 19.9% 12.3% 1.8% 8.5%
2006 13,193 5.6% 13.8% 38.7% 19.9% 12.1% 2.0% 7.9%
2007 13,910 7.8% 13.7% 36.8% 18.4% 10.0% 1.9% 11.4%
2008 16,280 7.1% 16.0% 35.8% 21.5% 8.7% 1.5% 9.4%
2009 20,244 5.8% 15.0% 35.1% 26.2% 8.5% 1.3% 8.1%
2010 13,163 6.2% 16.2% 35.9% 25.4% 9.0% 1.2% 6.1%
2011 23,779 4.6% 15.6% 33.8% 27.4% 8.8% 1.5% 8.2%
2012 18,011 4.8% 15.1% 33.9% 27.7% 8.7% 1.7% 8.1%
2013 13,359 5.7% 17.2% 32.6% 26.3% 9.2% 1.9% 7.2%
2014 20,009 5.9% 18.0% 34.3% 25.2% 7.9% 1.3% 7.3%
2015 22,509 4.3% 17.9% 34.0% 25.4% 8.1% 1.5% 8.8%
2016 15,099 4.6% 18.3% 33.3% 26.1% 8.5% 1.7% 7.4%
2017 13,455 5.1% 17.2% 33.1% 25.3% 10.1% 2.3% 6.9%
2018 9,490 5.0% 15.1% 33.4% 24.0% 12.8% 3.1% 6.6%
2019 16,276 5.1% 21.8% 29.8% 27.8% 7.5% 1.4% 6.5%
2020 11,490 6.6% 25.8% 28.8% 25.5% 5.6% 1.0% 6.8%
2021 12,026 6.0% 25.1% 28.4% 27.3% 6.0% 1.4% 5.8%
2022 12,173 5.2% 24.4% 27.7% 29.4% 5.9% 1.3% 6.0%
2023 14,933 3.8% 21.5% 27.9% 33.2% 6.2% 1.2% 6.2%
2024/06 6,151 3.8% 22.4% 27.3% 33.6% 5.5% 1.1% 6.3%

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ Includes respondents who answered that they would like the ROC government to maintain the status quo at present but eventually work towards independence.
  2. ^ Includes respondents who answered that they would like the ROC government to maintain the status quo at present but eventually work towards unification with China.

References

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Further reading

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Library resources about
Taiwan independence movement
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Taiwan_independence_movement&oldid=1256401328"