Talk:Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.

Name of case

A question has been raised on the actual title of this case-- not the abbreviated title, but the case name itself. The website of the New York Courts lists the name as Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Company. [1] Defendant's actual name however apparently used the term Rail Road, not Railroad. Could someone with access to the North East reporter or official state reporter confirm the name used by the Court of Appeals in its decision? Thank you. Kablammo 02:47, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

LEXIS reports it as "Railroad" in the case name, so I've moved the article accordingly. Postdlf 15:19, 11 December 2006 (UTC)

Influence of the case readability

Influence of the Case is something like 2 pages of a single paragraph. Could someone kind break that up please?

On the same note, while I as a 1L appreciate the analysis, can we get some cites as to who did the analysis? Or should the author just add his/her sig? --Psyphics_ΨΦ 17:01, 26 October 2007 (UTC)

Typically not, since the analysis can be edited by anyone. It is formed by consensus. Brianga (talk) 14:08, 30 October 2008 (UTC)

Issue with the analysis

I do not think the analysis of the opinions is correct. The turning-point in the majority and dissenting opinion is the definition of proximate cause. Under Cardozo's definitation, there was no legal causation for her injuries, but under Andrews' there was. I believe this should be further discussed. Maybe I am not reading this blurb intelligently, but... —Preceding unsigned comment added by Dlapee (talk • contribs) 03:03, 5 November 2007 (UTC)

Actually, you are mistaken. It's common for people to misinterpret Palsgraf as a foreseeability case when, in actuality, it's a duty case. The majority and dissent focused in on two different elements. Cardozo was concerned with the duty aspect, reasoning that a duty of care with regard to the woman could not be imposed on the guard because she was not at a foreseeable risk of injury from his actions. In contrast, the dissent focused in on causation, thinking it sufficient that the guard's actions were inherently wrong and set in motion the chain of events that injured Palsgraf. Of course, since the majority makes the law, Palsgraf stands for the proposition that one owes no duty to those outside the foreseeable "zone of danger."-PassionoftheDamon (talk) 05:36, 28 February 2009 (UTC)

Cardozo (in the majority): "The law of causation, remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us." Even if Palsgraf is a duty case, it is strained to say that it establishes proximate cause in American law. Proximate cause (in some sense) was _already_ in American law, and Cardozo here was urging a competitor principle to proximate cause.68.101.215.30 (talk) 20:32, 2 May 2013 (UTC)

Unclear article text

A new editor left this note on my talk page today...

the case history etc seems to indicate that the Appellate Division dismissed the complain which I believe is not the case. I think it was 3-2 upholding the trial court. The COA then reversed the two lower courts. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Mrpete3.5 (talk • contribs) 12:36, 26 December 2014 (UTC)

I'm guessing that he wrote to me because my edit to update one of the categories is currently the most recent in the article history. I am not familiar with this article's text or with legal documentation and analysis, so I'll leave this feedback to editors who can make appropriate changes to the article. Thanks! Slambo (Speak) 14:33, 26 December 2014 (UTC)

English Law

How would English Law have handled this case? Is this case studied in English Law schools? Can anyone associated with English Law enter into a discussion about this case? jall — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:C7D:7E1A:5700:7036:36F5:D8D0:C727 (talk) 08:26, 24 August 2017 (UTC)

It is interesting to me (as an English lawyer) reading the case, and to note how similar it is in both reasoning and outcome to Lord Atkin's decision in the equivalent English case: Donoghue v Stevenson: "You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question." Also interesting that Palsgraf (1928) and Donoghue (1932) were decided at very similar periods of time in history, and both marked a move away from the old tests predicated on directly caused harm to tests based upon foreseeability. It looks like a few others have noted this similarity over the years: [2] --Legis (talk - contribs) 13:53, 24 August 2017 (UTC)