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This page is about the beach codenamed in World War II. For other uses, see Juno Beach (disambiguation).

Juno Beach
Part of Normandy Landings and the Battle for Caen
Canadian soldiers landing at Juno Beach on the outskirts of Bernières-sur-Mer.
Date 6 June 1944 Location Courseulles-sur-Mer, Saint-Aubin-sur-Mer and Bernières-sur-Mer, France Result Allied victory
Belligerents
Canada United Kingdom	Germany
Commanders and leaders
John Crocker R.F.L. Keller	Wilhelm Richter
Strength
1 Infantry Division 1 Armoured Brigade	1 Infantry Division
Casualties and losses
340 dead 574 wounded 47 captured	Unknown

Juno Beach is the code name for one of the five sectors of the Allied invasion of German-occupied France in the Normandy landings on 6 June 1944, during World War II. The beach is situated on the Normandy coast in northern France, between the British sectors of Gold Beach and Sword Beach. The sector spanned from St.-Aubin-sur-Mer in the east to Courseulles-sur-Mer in the west. Landings here were necessary to provide flanking support to the British drive on Caen from Sword Beach, as well as capture the German airfield at Carpiquet to the west of Caen. Taking Juno Beach was the responsibility of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and commandos of the Royal Marines, with support from Naval Force J - including units of the Royal Canadian Navy - and sea transport provided by the Royal Navy and RCN. The beach was defended by six battalions of the German 716th Infantry Division, with elements of the 21st Panzer Division held in reserve near Caen.

The invasion plan called for two brigades of the 3rd Canadian Division to land in two sectors - Mike and Nan - focusing on Courseulles, Bernieres-sur-Mer and St.-Aubin. Preliminary naval and air bombardment would soften up the beach defences and destroy coastal strongpoints. Close support on the beaches was to be provided by amphibious tanks of the 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade. Once the landing zones were secured, the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade was to land reserve battalions and deploy inland. The Royal Marine commandos would establish contact with the British 3rd Infantry Division on Sword Beach, while the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade would link up with the British 50th Infantry Division on Gold Beach. The D-Day objectives called for the 3rd Canadian Division to be situated at the Caen-Bayeux railway line, as well as have captured Carpiquet Airfield, by nightfall on 6 June.

The landings initially encountered heavy resistance; the preliminary bombardment proved less effective than had been hoped, while rough weather forced the first wave to be delayed by ten minutes - the first wave touched down at 07:35. Several assault companies - notably those of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles and The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada - took heavy casualties in the opening minutes of the first wave. Strength of numbers, as well as coordinated fire support from artillery and armoured squadrons, ensured that most of the coastal defences were cleared within two hours of landing. The reserves of the 7th and 8th brigades began deploying at 08:30 (along with the Royal Marines), while the 9th Brigade began its deployment at 11:40.

The subsequent push inland towards Carpiquet and the Caen-Bayeux railway line achieved mixed results. The sheer volume of men and vehicles on the beaches created lengthy delays between the landing of the 9th Brigade and the beginning of substantive attacks to the south. The 7th Brigade encountered heavy initial opposition, before pushing south and making contact with the 50th Infantry Division at Creully. The 8th Brigade encountered heavy resistance from a battalion of the 716th at Tailleville, while the 9th Brigade deployed towards Carpiquet early in the evening. Resistance in St.-Aubin prevented the Royal Marines from establishing contact with the British 3rd Division on Sword Beach. When all operations on the Anglo-Canadian front were ordered to halt at 21:00, only one unit had reached its D-Day objective. Despite this, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division had succeeded in pushing farther inland than any other landing force on D-Day.

Background

The Invasion of Normandy

Further information: Invasion of Normandy and Operation Overlord

Allied invasion plans and German preparations for Normandy

Following the Fall of France in June 1940 British Prime Minister Winston Churchill vowed to return to continental Europe and liberate German-occupied states. In 1942 the Western Allies agreed to open a Second Front in western Europe to take pressure off of the beleaguered Red Army in the Soviet Union. While Britain and the United States did not yet possess the resources to mount a full invasion, planning was undertaken that in the event of the German position in western Europe weakening or the USSR's situation becoming dire, forces could be landed in France; these plans came to be known as Operation Sledgehammer. In August 1942 Anglo-Canadian forces attempted an abortive landing - Operation Jubilee - at the Calais port-town of Dieppe. The attack was poorly planned and ended in disaster; 4,963 soldiers were killed, wounded or captured. Following the Anglo-American victory against General Erwin Rommel in North Africa in May 1943, British, American and Canadian troops invaded Sicily in July 1943, followed by Italy in September. By December the Allies' progress had ground to a halt amidst tenacious German resistance and the difficult geography of the Italian Peninsula.

With Churchill's "soft underbelly of Europe" proving too slow an advance to take significant pressure off the Eastern Front, Western Allied planners returned to the plans to invade Northern France, now postponed into 1944. Under the direction of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force) and Frederick Morgan plans for the invasion of France began to crystallize in the form of Operation Overlord. With a target date of 1 May 1944, the attack would comprise five initial infantry divisions "simultaneously loaded in landing craft", constituting the largest amphibious operation in military history. The beaches of Normandy were selected as the landing site, with a zone of operations extending from the Cotentin Peninsula to Caen. After delays of both logistical planning and weather, the D-Day of Overlord was scheduled for 6 June 1944. Eisenhower and Bernard Montgomery aimed to capture Caen within the first day, and liberate Paris by D+90.

Juno beach

Operation Neptune - the landing phase of Overlord - called for a five-division front spread across fifty miles of coastline; three airborne divisions (two American, one Anglo-Canadian) would also land in the pre-dawn hours of D-Day. By nightfall on D-Day Eisenhower and General Bernard Montgomery - commander of ground forces in Operation Overlord - hoped to have eight infantry divisions and fourteen tank regiments on the Normandy beachhead. The landing zone was divided into five beaches—Sword, Juno, Gold, Omaha, and Utah—with the Americans attacking Utah (the westernmost) and Omaha, the British attacking Gold, Juno and Sword. Juno Beach was assigned to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, and covered a six-mile stretch of shoreline between La Riviere to the west and Saint-Aubin-sur-Mer to the east; the beach also encompassed Courseulles-sur-Mer and Bernieres-sur-Mer.

Planning and Preparation

German Defences

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel inspecting Atlantic Wall defences, April 1944

While the German Wehrmacht had seen its strength and morale heavily depleted by campaigns in Russia, North Africa and Italy, it remained a powerful fighting force with a strong cadre of junior officers and "superb armoured divisions". Despite this, most of the German divisions along the French coast in late-1943 were either newer recruits or rebuilding veterans of the Eastern Front; altogether some 856,000 soldiers were stationed in France (predominantly on the coast). An additional 60,000 Hilfswillige—Russian and Polish conscripts to the German army—served on the French coast. Under the command of Generals Erwin Rommel and Gerd von Rundstedt, the defences of the Atlantic Wall—a line of coastal gun emplacements, machine-gun nests, minefields and beach obstacles along the French coast—were heavily upgraded; in the first six months of 1944 the Germans laid 1.2 million tons of steel and 17.3 million cubic yards of concrete. Rommel also surrounded the coast with four million antitank and antipersonnel mines and 500,000 beach obstacles.

On Juno Beach the defences of the Atlantic Wall were heavier than many other landing sectors. The Germans assumed that the Allies would land during high tide—to minimize the distance for which they were exposed on the beaches—and thus created "a 'devils garden' of beach obstacles, designed to impede a landing at high water, [which were] deployed in rows between twelve and seventeen feet above the low-tide mark". Strong-points of machine gun positions, antitank and antipersonnel artillery and bunkers were located every 1,000 yards (910 m), manned by several platoons and mortar positions. Minefields were deployed surrounding these strongpoints, and additional defences were present in the Courseulles harbour.

The beaches of Normandy were defended by the 716th Coastal and 352nd Infantry Divisions, with the Canadian landing zone defended by the 716th. It was formed with soldiers "largely below the age of eighteen and with men over thirty-five", comprising a total of 7,771 combat troops. While the 352nd was considered a first-rate division, the 716th was "accounted a better-than-average static division", in that it had very little motorized or mechanized capability. On Juno Beach the 716th deployed four infantry companies: 7 Kompanie held what was to become "Mike Sector", 6/736 was stationed in Courseulles, 5/736 at Bernieres, while the fifth and ninth Grenadier companies held "Nan Sector" and St. Aubin. A second line of four infantry companies and one panzer company was stationed 1 mile (1.6 km) inland. Rommel also deployed the 21st Panzer Division southeast of Caen to act as a counterattack against landings on what would be Sword and Juno. Two battalions of Polish and Russian conscripts were also stationed on the flanks of Juno adjacent to Sword and Gold Beaches.

Canadian Preparations

American air-force units bombing Pointe du Hoc before D-Day

Canadian training for D-Day had begun as early as July 1943, when General Andrew McNaughton of the First Canadian Army informed Harry Crerar—commander of I Canadian Corps—that the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division would play a role in the invasion of France. Initial training was difficult—Canadian troops possessed no Landing Craft, Assault (LCAs) with which to practice coastal invasion—yet the pace of the drills was "physically and psychologically demanding". Field exercises in Scotland commenced in August and September 1943, and succeeded in establishing unique techniques and equipment for use by armoured and artillery regiments in storming the beach. Through winter 1943 units worked in close cohesion to develop more advanced assault tactics among the Juno Beach regiments.

The landings would be supported by the largest invasion fleet in history—7016 vessels in total. The Royal Canadian Navy contributed 121 vessels to the armada, including destroyers, frigates, corvettes, landing ships, minesweepers, and torpedo boats. Four Canadian Tribal-class destroyers formed the Royal Navy's 10th Destroyer Flotilla, which joined other RN units in keeping the English Channel near Normandy clear of German naval units. The Juno contingent of the fleet—Force J—had begun intense training for the invasion with the 3rd CID in February 1944, with a full-scale simulation of the invasion carried out on 4 May with Exercise Fabius. On D-Day itself Force J—commanded from HMS Hilary—was to bombard German defensive positions along the landing zone with everything from heavy-calibre cruiser guns to self-propelled artillery attached to landing craft. Light bombardment of the landing zone would commence "30 minutes before H Hour and continue for 15 minutes; heavy bombing would then begin on the flanks of the divisional attack, lasting until H Hour". Additional cover would be provided by Royal and Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons both before and on D-Day. A successful surprise invasion required total air superiority over the English Channel and Normandy. In the months preceding D-Day the RAF Second Tactical Air Force attacked airfields, coastal garrisons, radar, rail-lines and transportation routes in order to soften the beach defences, as well as prevent the German Luftwaffe from mounting a serious challenge to air superiority over Normandy.

The operational plan for Juno Beach was divided into two main sectors: Mike (west) and Nan (east). Mike Sector would be attacked by the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade, with the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, The Canadian Scottish Regiment and the 1st Hussars in support. The 7th Brigade was to take Courseulles-sur-Mer and drive inland. Nan Sector would be assaulted by The Royal Regina Rifles of 7th Brigade, as well as the North Shore Regiment and The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada of the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade, while tanks of the Fort Garry Horse provided armoured support; elite engineers of the British 79th Armoured Division would land on the beach as well. The 8th Brigade was to capture Bernieres and the western edge of St. Aubin, then push south into Normandy. By nightfall of D-Day the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was slated to have captured the high ground west of Caen, the Bayeux-Caen rail-line, and the seaside towns of Courseulles, Bernieres, St. Aubin and Beny-sur-Mer. Within 24 hours the operational plan also called for the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade and the Sherbrooke Fusiliers to be deployed to Juno as reinforcements.

D-Day Landings

Early bombardment

The cruiser HMS Belfast bombarding Juno Beach on D-Day

Air attacks on Normandy's coastal defences began in earnest on 5 June at 23:30, with RAF Bomber Command giving the order for bombers to target the chief coastal batteries. All told the attack continued until 05:15, with 5,268 tons of bombs dropped by 1,136 sorties; this marked the largest attack by Bomber Command in terms of tonnage up to this point in the war. Initial attacks on the Atlantic Wall proved ineffective, with inclement weather making it difficult to accurately hit the bunkers and turrets. The immediate bombing left the defences on Omaha, Gold and Juno virtually intact, yet did not damage Allied landing craft in the Channel (as many planners feared it would). 230 RCAF bombers specifically bombed targets on Juno beach during this raid, yet direct damage was limited.

As the Americans began their own bombing runs against Omaha and Utah to the west, the Anglo-Canadian naval forces began their Counter-Battery Fire, seeking to knock out German shore batteries and bunkers. Sixteen Canadian minesweepers had spent the early hours of 6 June clearing the Norman coast, thus preparing the sea for Force J to anchor and bombard the beach. The British had attached the cruisers HMS Belfast and Diadem to Force J to serve as heavy support. Belfast and Diadem commenced bombardment of the Atlantic Wall at 05:30 and 05:52 on 6 June. The naval gunfire proved more effective than the aerial bombardment; the battery at Longues was the only one to return fire, and was quickly destroyed by the light cruiser HMS Ajax. Indeed, most of the gun batteries at Juno Beach were incomplete on D-Day, and thus did not possess sufficient protection or communication measures to accurately return fire on Force J. The Beny-sur-Mer battery was neutralized by Diadem shortly after she opened fire.

At 06:10 the eleven destroyers of Force J moved shoreward to begin bombardment, hoping to damage light gun emplacements and prevent the German 716th from mobilizing and moving across the beach. They were supplemented by additional raids by medium bombers and fighter-bombers of the RAF and USAAF, who dropped an additional 2,796 tons of ordinance on the five landing zones. While the medium bombers proved inaccurate, the Hawker Typhoon fighter-bombers proved more effective at attacking coastal defences. As the bombing runs continued to saturate Juno Beach with ordinance, the destroyers and landing craft moved towards the beach to begin "Beach Drenching Fire". In addition to the eleven destroyers of Force J—two Canadian, eight British, one French—Drenching Fire was also provided by Landing Craft Gun (Large)—converted Landing Craft (Tank) fitted with 4.7-inch guns. Smaller Light-Gunned LCs were able to get closer to the beach and use their 6-pound guns against German defensive positions. Additional firepower was provided by eight Landing Craft, Rocket (Tank), each fitted with twenty-six salvoes of high-explosive rockets; sixteen LCTs were also fitted with M7 Priest self-propelled guns of the Canadian artillery regiments.

The bombardment was scheduled to cease immediately before the assault companies deployed on Juno Beach, but due to heavy seas Commodore G.N. Oliver - Force J's commander - delayed landing by ten minutes, meaning that Canadian units would land in Mike sector at 07:45 (rather than 07:35), while Nan Sector would land at 07:55. This would mean a lower tide, necessitating that the LCIs "would be obliged to touch down in the middle of the obstructions [beach obstacles] designed to destroy them". The LCTs carrying artillery were forced to adjust course to avoid landing too early; the LCTs carrying DD tanks were forced to break off their advance. The seas proved too rough to launch the DD tanks, so they were ordered to deploy from the LCTs several hundred yards out from the beach.

Landing: 7th Brigade (Mike, Nan Green)

The Royal Winnipeg Rifles heading towards Juno Beach

Though the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade was scheduled to land at Mike Sector at 07:35, rough seas and poor craft coordination pushed this time back by ten minutes. Two assault companies of the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, one assault company of the Canadian Scottish Regiment, and two squadrons of the 1st Hussars were to land in the sectors of "Mike Red" and "Mike Green", while the Regina Rifle Regiment landed on "Nan Green" sector. The first Winnipegs touched down at 07:49, with the remaining assault companies deploying within seven minutes. Because of the lower tide than planned, the Winnipegs faced a 700-yard run across open beach from the LCIs to the seawall. B Company moved for the seawall, taking heavy casualties in the face of four gun casemates and fifteen machine-gun nests. B Company cleared the barbed wire, yet was unable to advance further without armoured support. The Hussars' tanks first reported deploying twenty minutes before the infantry, with B Squadron reporting their landing at 07:58. "A" Squadron launched 1500 yards from the beach, but would not be fully deployed until a full six minutes after the Winnipegs were ashore. To their west D Company faced less defensive fire, as it was clear of the WN31 strongpoint. The company easily cleared the beach, and was through the barbed wire with light casualties. A platoon of the 6th Field Company Royal Canadian Engineers were redirected to clear the minefields facing D Company, given that the flail tanks had yet to land. On the far right, C Company of the Canadian Scottish Regiment landed with little opposition, and discovered that their objective - a 75mm gun emplacement - had been destroyed by naval gunfire.

To the east of Mike Sector, the Regina Rifles came ashore at Nan Green with the objective of subduing German forces in Courseulles. Companies A and B reported touchdown at 08:09 and 08:15; "A" Company met heavy resistance almost immediately. They faced the task of destroying WN29—a heavy gun emplacement with 88mm and 75mm guns, and four-foot-thick concrete walls. Pre-landing bombardment had failed to destroy it, and heavy machine-guns inflicted high casualty rates on the company; one LCA reported six men killed within seconds of lowering the ramps. One platoon was able to breach the barbed wire lining the beach and take cover in Courseulles, and then eliminated the machine-gun positions engaging A Company of the Regina Rifles. Unlike for the Winnipegs, the DD Tanks had arrived at the Regina Rifles' beaches before the infantry, and in greater numbers than in Mike Sector. The 75mm gun emplacement in the Courseulles strongpoint was destroyed by fire from B Squadron of the 1st Hussars; the 88mm was similarly silenced. To their east, B Company encountered limited resistance, and succeeded in pushing into Courseulles, and soon "had cleared a succession of the assigned blocks in the village".

With the initial assault companies ashore and fighting for their objectives, the reserve companies and battalion (Canadian Scottish Regiment) began their deployment on Juno. "A" and C Companies of the Winnipeg Rifles landed at 08:05, and began to push towards the villages of Banville and Ste. Croix-sur-Mer. "A" Company encountered heavy machine-gun resistance, and had to request support from the 1st Hussars to clear the position. On Nan Green, C and D Companies of the Regina Rifles prepared to storm Courseulles. C Company touched down at 08:35, and moved into the village without difficulty. D Company was further delayed, meaning that several LCIs struck antitank mines attached to beach obstacles; only 49 D Company soldiers reached the beach. The Canadian Scottish Regiment arrived on the beach at 08:30, with the leading companies coming under heavy mortar fire. It took the CSR a full hour to get off the beaches and push further inland.

Landing: 8th Brigade (Nan White, Red)

Canadian troops moving towards Juno Beach

Originally scheduled to land at 07:45 to the east of the 7th, the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade's two assault regiments were postponed by ten minutes as a result of heavy seas. The Queen's Own Rifles (QOR) landed at 08:12 at Nan White, and faced the most tenacious defences of any unit in Nan Sector; an 88mm gun-emplacement with multiple machine-gun nests outside of Bernieres-sur-Mer. The first LCA to touch down saw ten of its first eleven soldiers either killed or wounded. B Company came ashore 200 yards east of their intended landing zone, and were positioned directly in front of the main resistance nests, subjecting them to heavy mortar and machine-gun fire. The QOR had been scheduled to advance with DD fire support, but the heavy seas meant that "instead of swimming in, they [DD Tanks] left their craft close inshore and landed behind the infantry assault companies". Several soldiers from B Company succeeded in outflanking the main pillbox and killing its gunners with grenades and small-arms. One LCA's rudder from B Company had jammed, and thus deployed a platoon far to the left of the rest of B Company, enabling them to easily outflank and destroy the gun emplacements. With the defences silenced, the QOR was able to advance into Bernieres, having taken 65 casualties on the beaches. To their west, A Company encountered less resistance, but was limited by poorly-coordinated run-ins by the LCAs to the beach. A Company was able to quickly reach the seawall, breach the barbed wire, but encountered heavy mortar and sniper resistance in Bernieres. This was the only sector of Juno where armoured supported proved virtually ineffective, as B Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse was too far out from the beach to provide heavy support.

The first units of the North Shore Regiment's A and B Companies touched down on Nan Red at 08:10 in chest-deep water. They were tasked with securing St.-Aubin and clearing defences in the village. B Company landed to find that the St.-Aubin strongpoint "appeared not to have been touched" by preliminary naval bombardment. The two assault companies faced a 100-yard sprint across open beach in the face of fire from St.-Aubin. A Company suffered the heaviest casualties, incurring many fatalities from the mines placed across the beach. B Company faced stronger opposition at WN27, yet managed to breach the seawall and barbed wire. The strongpoint's 50mm antitank gun was still active, and the thick concrete casemates protected it from infantry fire. By 08:10 both Sherman tanks of the Fort Garry Horse and Centaur tanks of the British Engineering companies had landed at Nan Red, and began to assist B Company in clearing the gun emplacement. The 50mm gun knocked out four of the Squadron's tanks, while the North Shore's machine-gun platoon flanked the position. The right section of the strongpoint was eliminated by antitank guns and combat engineers, while the central antitank gun was silenced by petard shells from the British Centaurs. When the North Shore captured WN27 approximately half the defenders were killed; 48 German soldiers surrendered.

The 8th Brigade's reserve battalion - Le Régiment de la Chaudière - began deploying to the beaches at 08:30 along with the reserve companies of the North Shore and QOR. More than half of the LCAs were crippled by mines strewn across the beach; QOR C Company was forced to touch down further offshore when their LCAs were damaged by mines. C Company linked up with B Squadron of the Fort Garry Horse, and moved to assist the pinned-down and exhausted A Company. The North Shore's C and D Companies landed outside of St. Aubin, with C Company taking over for A Company in the advance further into St. Aubin, while D Company established a firm presence inside the village. All but one of the LCAs carrying Chaudière A Company foundered before they could touch down on the beach, forcing them to swim for the shore - they lost most of their equipment in the process. The Chaudières quickly formed up outside Bernieres and St. Aubin, linking up with both the QOR and the North Shores. In the reserve that came ashore was also the No. 48 Commando Unit of the Royal Marines, which was scheduled to land at H+45 minutes. It was planned for the No. 48s to pass St.-Aubin's eastern edge and "drive along the coast to secure Langrune-sur-Mer on the extreme left flank of Juno Beach". They found the strongpoint facing them uncleared, and incurred extremely heavy casualties; close to half of the 400-man unit was killed within seconds of landing.

Deploying reinforcements

Soldiers of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade deploying in Nan White Sector

With Juno Beach itself largely secured, Major-General Keller prepared to deploy the reserves of the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade and tanks of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers. The reports coming in from the battalions already on Juno were mixed; the North Shore was "proceeding according to plan", while the Chaudieres were "making progress slowly". The two self-propelled artillery regiments - the 14th Field and 19th Army Field Regiments, RCA - had deployed at 09:25 and 09:10, and had several dozen guns in action before 11:00. Opposition and continued problems with mine obstacles on Nan Red meant that the entire 9th Brigade would have to land in Bernieres-sur-Mer and Nan White sector. When the 9th Brigade's LCIs touched down at 11:40, the congestion on the beach in Nan White was so heavy that most infantry companies could not disembark from their landing craft. The 9th Brigade's reserves consisted of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa, the North Nova Scotia Highlanders, the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders, and the Highland Light Infantry of Canada. The Glens reported coming under mortar fire from German positions further inland, as "with little room to manoeuvre on dry land, the entire 9th Brigade became easy targets for German artillery". The 9th Brigade quickly made it across the beach, and joined the Chaudieres, QOR and Fort Garry Horse in Bernieres to await further advance inland.

Having subdued German defences on the beach, the other priority of the landed forces was to clear Juno of obstacles, debris and undetonated mines, as well as establish the 3rd CID's headquarters in Bernieres. Movement Control Units came ashore just before noon, with military policemen beginning to marshal vehicles through to Bernieres and Courseulles. Sappers of 619 Independent Field Company also moved in to begin clearing the minefields surrounding the beach, so as to free up the advance south towards Carpiquet. Keller himself established divisional headquarters in Bernieres shortly after noon.

The advance inland

Initial attacks

the Royal Winnipeg Rifles advance inland on D-Day

At 14:35, Major-General Keller met with the commanders of the 8th and 9th Infantry Brigades, as well as the newly-reconstituted 2nd Armoured Brigade (Fort Garry Horse, Sherbrooke Fusiliers, 1st Hussars). With the first line of objectives (Yew) secured on the beachhead, Keller ordered the 7th and 8th Brigades to advance with armoured support towards the second line of objectives (Elm), whereupon 9th Brigade would then leapfrog over the 7th and 8th to reach the third objective line (Oak). Facing them were the remains of three battalions of the 736th Grenadier Regiment, and three battalions of the 726th Regiment. B Company of the Winnipegs was still facing heavy resistance from snipers and machine-guns in Courseulles, while the eastern Companies of the North Shore Regiment were fighting for St.-Aubin. A and C Companies of the Royal Winnipegs moved off the beach, cut through the walls of barbed wire behind the German bunkers, pushed through Vaux and Graye-sur-Mer, and began to advance towards St. Croix and Banville. C Company advanced on Banville - the headquarters of II Battalion of the 726th - but was stopped by three machine-gun emplacements just short of the town. Winnipeg A Company joined C Company of the Canadian Scottish Regiment and a troop of C Squadron of the 1st Hussars and advanced on St.-Croix, the Winnipegs unaware of a large German counterattack massing in St.-Croix under the command of 8 Battalion/726 Regiment. C Company of the Canadian Scottish Regiment had deployed to their west, and was able to spot the units of the 8th Battalion, and halt the counterattack before it fully materialized. D Company of the Winnipegs joined the advance on Banville with covering fire from the Cameron Highlanders and the 12th and 13th Field Artillery Regiments; Banville was declared captured at 13:10; small pockets of resistance would survive until nightfall and then retreat. D Company of the Canadian Scottish moved to capture two bridges on the Seulles River further inland from the Winnipeg Companies. B Company joined them, and pushed through the gap between St.-Croix and Banville, joining C Company as it did so. C Squadron of 1st Hussars provided armoured support, To their east, the Regina Rifles advanced south towards Reviers, engaging troops of the 7th Battalion of the 736th Grenadier Regiment. They reported reaching the town by 12:15 with two companies, and began consolidating their position in preparation for further advance.

In Nan Sector the 8th Brigade's advance started slower than that of the 7th Brigade, owing to the fact that the Chaudieres had lost most of their equipment on the advance over the beaches. The QOR's C Company was pinned down at the edge of Bernieres by sniper-fire, and could not cross the open fields behind the town; their armoured support was also stopped by heavy antitank fire coming from Beny-sur-Mer. The Chaudieres A and B Companies were caught in the crossfire, B Company losing almost an entire platoon when a German 88mm scored a direct hit on a Priest SPG. Chaudiere and QOR proegress was slow; all told, it took nearly two hours for artillery and heavy guns to clear the defences at Beny-sur-Mer, allowing the QOR to advance towards the town. Beny-sur-Mer was reported cleared at 14:00, at which point the Chaudieres began to mass in the town for a further advance south towards Carpiquet. The QOR broke off to the left to engage heavy artillery batteries to the west of Beny, B Company was assisted by the guns of HMCS Algonquin, which destroyed a bunker of 105mm guns. To their east, C and D Company of the North Shores advanced towards Tailleville - the headquarters of II Battalion of the 736th Grenadiers. Mortar fire north of the headquarters was both concentrated and accurate, slowing the advance of C Company. They were supported in their drive south by tanks of the Fort Garry Horse, which caught close to 100 German defenders in open fields. The North Shores and their armour support entered Tailleville at 14:00, at which point the six tanks of C Squadron moved through the village, destroying German gun emplacements. However, the defenders of the II Battalion had created a complex underground bunker system in the village, which enabled them to continuously outflank Canadian infantry; it would take another seven hours to clear Tailleville of defenders, which ensured that the North Shores would be unable to capture German radar sites to the south on D-Day.

Meanwhile, B Company of the North Shore Regiment and No. 48 Commando of the Royal Marines were engaged in a protracted fight to secure St.-Aubin and Lagrune-sur-Mer. B Company had generally neutralized the strongpoint at WN27 within two hours of landing, which allowed Troops A and B of the Royal Marines to push west. These units had the important objective of bridging the five-mile gap between the landing zones at Juno and Sword Beaches, which would allow for a continuous Anglo-Canadian front by the end of the first day. The Royal Marines began to advance on Lagrune and strongpoint WN26, while to their east No. 41 Commando Royal Marines advanced from Sword Beach. The strongpoint was defended by "a reinforced platoon from the 736th Grenadiers", and was centred on a group of fortified houses and 50mm antitank guns. B Troop's first attempt to capture it failed, and the assault renewed with support from Centaur tanks only to again falter in the face of heavy resistance. No. 48 Commando was forced to call the assault off at nightfall, as reports of massing counterattacks by the 21st Panzer Division against the divide between Sword and Juno began to filter in. The strongpoints at Lagrune and Luc-sur-Mer were finally captured on 8 June.

Drive to Elm

Canadian advances on D-Day

The division's advance south of Tailleville had halted, preventing an attack on German radar stations. The QOR and C Company of the Chaudieres opted to continue their advance towards Anguerny and Columby-sur-Thaon and Objective Line "Elm". The beachhead was now overflowing with troops, to the point that B Company of the Chaudieres could not be deployed alongside C Company without severely hindering the advance of the QOR to their east. C Company's advance on Basly was even further hindered by the proximity of the combat; fighting was so close-quarters that the 14th Field Artillery would not provide fire support for fear of friendly-fire casualties. When C Company reached Basly, the North Nova Scotia Highlanders formed up outside Beny-sur-Mer, with the intention of overtaking the Chaudieres and making for Carpiquet and the Caen-Bayeux highway. At 16:45 the North Novas assembled in Beny, and were the target of concentrated German mortar fire as the Sherbrooke Fusiliers de-waterproofed their tanks. Three companies of the North Novas and a squadron of the Sherbrookes advanced on the mortar positions, taking heavy infantry casualties but clearing the positions. The QOR entered Anguerny - on the Elm Objective Line - at 17:30, and sent D Company to probe German defences on the hills overlooking the village. The Chaudieres reported that Basly was cleared of defenders at 18:15, allowing the 9th Brigade to advance towards Carpiquet Airfield. By 19:00 the North Nova Scotia Highlanders were advancing towards Carpiquet, encountering their first resistance an hour later. With reports of the 21st Panzer Division attacking the flanks of the British 3rd Infantry Division on Sword, Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey - commander of the British Second Army - ordered forces on Sword, Juno and Gold to establish defensive positions at their intermediate objectives.

On the western edge of the Canadian sector, the advance of the 7th Brigade had stalled in the face of stiffening resistance in St.-Croix and Banville, throwing the right flank of the assault off-schedule. German defenders gave ground slowly, and did not begin withdrawing from the towns until the Bren Gun platoons began to arrive at 14:00. Once St.-Croix and Banville were cleared, the Canadian Scots pushed south to Colombiers, reinforce the platoons that had captured the bridge across the Seulles earlier in the day, and move towards the Creully-Caen road. The Canadian Scots' reported reaching the road at 16:30, and continued to push south past Objective Line Elm. To their west the Royal Winnipegs stopped at Elm Line, and began to erect defensive positions with Bren gun carriers and artillery. The Regina Rifles, meanwhile, had been slow to advance from Courseulles on account of the heavy casualties taken securing the village; the 1st Hussars' B Squadron was in a similar position, with only half its fighting strength having made it off the beach. By 18:00 the Reginas has begun their advance, while the Hussars scouted ahead of the infantry companies. As the Reginas linked up with the Canadian Scots, the order to hold positions and dig in arrived from Keller's headquarters; the two battalions both halted at 21:00.

While the 7th Brigade had stopped just south of Objective Line Elm, three tanks of the 1st Hussars' C Squadron (No. 2 Troop) had continued to advance southwards, pushing through side-roads towards Carpiquet Airfield. Aside from a German staff-car and a machine-gun nest, the three Sherman tanks encountered virtually no resistance, advancing all the way to the Caen-Bayeux railway line; in doing so it became the only unit on the whole of D-Day to reach its final objective. Though the commander of the unit - Lieutenant William F. McCormick - attempted to contact his superiors to bring up reinforcements to attack Carpiquet Airfield, the three tanks eventually withdrew back to the Canadian lines.

Positions at nightfall

The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada dug in at the end of D-Day near Carpiquet

At the end of D-Day, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was situated firmly on Objective Line Elm, short of their final D-Day objectives. In the west, the 7th Brigade was anchored in Creully and Fresne-Camilly. The 9th Brigade was positioned a mere three miles from Caen, the furthest inland of any Allied units on D-Day. On the eastern edge of the Canadian sector the 8th Brigade had taken up positions in Anguerny and Columby, having begun to dig in in the late afternoon. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division had succeeded in advancing farther than any other divisional element in the Allied Expeditionary Force, but due to heavy fighting in Lagrune and St.-Aubin had failed to link up with the British 3rd Division from Sword Beach. The German 716th Infantry Division was both heavily depleted and scattered, with General Richter recording that less than one full battalion could be mustered for further defence. The German 21st Panzer Division had driven a wedge between the British and Canadian 3rd Divisions, yet had been unable to dislodge either from the beaches. To the south, Hitler had freed up the veteran Panzer Lehr Division and the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, both of which now prepared to head north to form the I SS Panzer Corps.

Aftermath

While the D-Day landings in all five sectors managed to establish footholds in Normandy, the success at achieving the set D-Day objectives was less pronounced. The 82nd and 101st American Airborne Divisions had suffered heavy casualties - their landings were scattered all over the dropzones - but had captured Ste. Mere-Eglise to the west of Utah Beach. On the Cotentin Peninsula, the American 4th Division had suffered comparatively light casualties in securing Utah Beach, and had established a strong bridgehead by the end of D-Day. Omaha had met with less success, as intact defences and high-calibre trooops of the 352nd Division caused heavier casualties than any of the other beaches; at one point the attack was going so badly that General Omar Bradley considered withdrawing the US V Corps from the beaches. A second wave of attacks breached the coastal defences, but could only push 2,000 yards inland by nightfall. To the west of Juno, the British 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division encountered only light resistance, and succeeded both in advancing inland and creating a continuous front with Juno (though not with Omaha) with only 413 casualties. To their east, the British 3rd Infantry Division succeeded in establishing a foothold on Sword Beach. However, counterattacks by the 21st Panzer Division in the afternoon prevented an advance on Caen; it also meant that the British 3rd could not make contact with the Canadian 3rd on Juno. However, the counterattack did not succeed in driving the British off of the beaches, as units of the British 6th Airborne Division - which had landed the previous night near the Orne river - were able to outflank the 21st and force it to withdraw.

In spite of the heavy casualties inflicted on the 352nd and 716th Infantry Divisions, the German Seventh Army quickly established plans for counterattacks. Early logistical responses to the invasion were confused, as the divisions necessary for counterattacks fell under a different jurisdiction than those defending the coast. Furthermore, the heavy Panzer divisions, such as the Panzer Lehr, 12th SS Panzer, and 2nd SS Panzer, could not be mobilized to the coast without the explicit authorization of Hitler himself. The order to mobilize Panzer Lehr and the 12th SS was finally given in the mid-afternoon of 6 June. When the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade and the Sherbrooke Fusiliers began to advance on 7 June, they were met by entrenched forces of the 716th Infantry and 21st Panzer Divisions. At 17:00, the advancing force was counterattacked by the 12th SS, under the command of Kurt Meyer. After heavy fighting the 9th Brigade was forced to withdraw to their D-Day positions, having suffered heavier casualties than any single unit on Juno Beach itself the previous day. However, the 7th Brigade succeeded in reaching its final D-Day objectives along Line Oak, while the 8th Brigade attempted (unsuccessfully) to destroy German radar stations to their east, a task which would only be completed on 11 June.

The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division made contact with the British on Sword Beach on 7 June, before forming one continuous front with the American sector by D-Day+7. The subsequent advance on Caen and Cherbourg was slow, as a greater number of elite German Panzer units concentrated near Caen and Carentan. The Canadians captured Carpiquet Airfield during Operation Windsor on 5 July, while Anglo-Canadian forces captured Caen as part of Operation Charnwood (8-9 July) and Operation Goodwood (18-20 July).

Casualties

Initial predictions for the likely casualties on Juno Beach had been very high, estimating total casualties approaching 2,000, including 600 drowned. In the end the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division suffered casualties of 340 killed, 574 wounded, and 47 taken prisoner. The Queen's Own Rifles suffered the heaviest, with 143 casualties, the Royal Winnipegs 128, the North Shore 125, the Regina Rifles 108. Of the varied landing-craft used on the run-in to Juno Beach, 90 of 306 were lost or damaged. Due to the breakdown of logistics on D-Day the exact breakdown of casualties for the German 716th Infantry Division is unknown. However, of the division's four German battalions numbering 7,771 men before the invasion, General Richter reported that the equivalent only one battalion - at 80% strength - remained. At least one of the two conscript battalions of the 716th was reported to have fled. General Richter also reported that 80% of the division's artillery had been destroyed or captured on D-Day, while only two gun batteries were intact west of the Orne River. By 9 June, the division had been reduced to a battlegroup of 292 officers and men.

Analysis

Effectiveness of preliminary bombardment

Military historians have generally drawn the conclusion that the preliminary aerial and naval bombardment of Juno Beach was not as effective as had been hoped, yet differ in their analysis of to how great an extent this was the case. The aerial bombardment of Juno's defences the night before are considered to have been very ineffective, primarily because of the inclement weather. John Keegan notes that "the prevailing low, thick cloud frustrated its [Bomber Command's] efforts". Colonel Stacey - the official historian of the Canadian Army in the Second World War - considers the effects of the bombing runs to have been "spotty", noting that while several coastal batteries were not hit, those that were (such as the battery at Houlgate) were hit accurately. Chester Wilmot offers a different view, suggesting that "[the coastal guns] had been accurately bombed, but had survived because they were heavily protected by the concrete casemates Rommel had insisted upon". Historians' assessment of the naval bombardment is even more mixed; while they generally agree that it failed to fully neutralize German defences on Juno Beach, they are in disagreement as to why. Stacey suggests that while the "beach-drenching fire" was concentrated and substantial, it was both inaccurate and of insufficient firepower to destroy the coastal bunkers. He further suggests that the effect of the drenching fire was moral rather than material, in that it forced defenders to keep below-ground and sapped their morale. Terry Copp echoes this analysis, noting that "reasonable accuracy could not be obtained from the pitching decks of LCTs [by mounted artillery on the ships]"; the 13th Field Regiment's drenching fire fell on average 200 yards past their targets. British historian Max Hastings notes that because of the delay in landing times by ten minutes, a substantial gap existed between the cessation of bombardment and the actual landing of the first waves of infantry, meaning that platoons of the 716th had ample time to re-man their positions. The bombardment of specific strongpoints in the towns along the coast was incosistent; the North Shore Regiment reported that the strongpoint near St.-Aubin "appeared not to have been touched" by bombardment, while the strongpoints facing the Canadian Scottish Regiment had been eliminated by naval bombardment before their landing.

Overall

Canadian soldiers guarding German prisoners on Juno Beach

Despite the failure to capture any of the final D-Day objectives, the assault on Juno Beach is generally considered - alongside Utah Beach - the most strategically successful of the D-Day landings. Historians suggest a variety of reasons for this success. Mark Zuehlke notes that "the Canadians ended the day ahead of either the US or British divisions despite the facts that they landed last and that only the Americans at Omaha faced more difficulty winning a toehold on the sand", suggesting that the calibre of the training the 3rd CID had received beforehand explains their success. Chester Wilmot claims that the Canadian success in clearing the landing zones is attributable to the presence of DD Tanks on the beaches; he also notes that the absence of DD Tanks was largely responsible for the heavier casualties on Omaha - the only beach with heavier resistance than Juno. Canadian historian Terry Copp attributes the steady advance of the 7th Brigade in the afternoon to "less serious opposition" than the North Shore Regiment encountered in Tailleville.

Despite the verdict of a successful D-Day for the 3rd CID, the failure of Canadian units to reach their final objectives has proven more disputed than the reasons for their success. Terry Copp places the blame on poor logistical planning on the part of Major-General Keller in terms of landing the reserve brigade. The reports that Keller received concerning the 7th Brigade's progress on the beaches were "sparse", and thus he committed the entirety of the 9th Brigade reserve to land on the narrower beaches of the 8th Brigade—which was still itself fighting to clear the seaside towns. Dutch historian Dan Van der Vat notes that "the planned breakout of the 9th Brigade was held up by a huge jam of vehicles". Wilmot also places the blame with logistical difficulties of the landing, saying that "on the whole it was not so much the opposition in front as the congestion behind - on the beaches and in Bernieres - that prevented the Canadians from reaching their final D-Day objective". Stacey offers a different view, suggesting that it was not impossible for the 3rd CID to reach its D-Day objectives, and that the failure to do so rests in the fact that "British and Canadian forces were usually better at deceiving the enemy and achieving initial success in an assault than they were at exploiting surprise and success once achieved. Perhaps they were rather too easily satisfied". Copp disagrees with Stacey's assessment, suggesting that such caution was not the result of poor planning but of the fact that "the British and Canadians fought the way they had been trained, moving forward to designated objectives in controlled bounds and digging in at the first sign of a counterattack". He also disputes whether the capture of the final objectives would have been strategically intelligent, observing that "if 9th Brigade had reached Carpiquet and dug in, with artillery in position to offer support, the commander of the 26th Panzer Grenadiers might have followed orders and waited until a coordinated counterattack with other divisions had been organized. Such an attack might well have done far more damage to the Allied beachhead than the hastily improvised operation actually carried out [on 7 June]".

Stacey offers a second line of analysis on the Canadians' failure to advance to Line Oak, suggesting that difficulties encountered by the British 3rd Infantry Division on Sword Beach caused General Dempsey to halt the advance of the entire British Second Army. The British encountered heavy counterattacks by the 21st Panzer Division, which prevented the British 9th Brigade from establishing contact with the Canadians at Juno. Copp offers agreement on this assessment, writing that "Before this withdrawal [of the 21st Panzer Division] became evident, Dempsey had concluded that more armoured counterattacks could be expected. So he ordered all three assault divisions to dig in at their second line of objectives. This decision was relayed to subordinate commanders somewhere after 19:00", just as the 9th Canadian Brigade was preparing to advance south towards Carpiquet. Wilmot also agrees with this analysis, arguing that the British 3rd Infantry Division's brigade commanders were overly-cautious in advancing towards Caen. This, in turn, slowed the momentum of the entire Anglo-Canadian advance, especially given the reports of counterattacks Dempsey received from Sword Beach.

References

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