The 1657 Ottoman campaign in Palestine was a military expedition launched by the Ottoman Empire to reassert control over Palestine and suppress local unrest. Particularly concentrated in Jabal Nablus, which was also known as the Nablus Sanjak.
The campaign reflected the Empire’s effort to stabilize its holdings in the region during a period marked by internal strife and decentralization. The campaign was led by Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, the influential Grand Vizier appointed to restore order in various Ottoman territories.
Background
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In the mid-17th century, the Ottoman Empire was experiencing significant internal challenges, including economic hardships, military revolts, and challenges from provincial leaders who held substantial local power. Palestine, a region within the Ottoman administrative framework and that fell within the Damascus Eyalet, had increasingly become difficult for the central authorities to control. Local leaders often defied orders from Istanbul, leading to a breakdown in central authority.[1]
Still, a certain level of control was held over its territories by leveraging rivalries among local leaders and, when necessary, launching punitive expeditions against rebellious regions. One such expedition took place in 1657 as part of a broader Ottoman effort to restore central authority following years of widespread social and economic upheaval. Palestine was a strategic focus due to its critical role in maintaining land routes to Egypt and ensuring the security and funding of the Damascus pilgrimage caravan.[1]
The Köprülü era, established in the early 1650s, aimed to restore Ottoman authority by strengthening administrative and military control in strategic areas, including Palestine. Köprülü Mehmed Pasha was known for his decisive actions and strict approach to governance, which sought to quell dissent across the empire. By 1657, he turned his attention toward Palestine, where unrest and local insubordination had become a pressing issues.[1][2]
Course of the Campaign
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During the 1657 Ottoman campaign in Palestine, the power structure of rural areas played a critical role in shaping both resistance and control dynamics. Rural chiefs derived their authority from their ability to mobilize violence or the threat thereof. Operating from fortress-like compounds in strategic kursi villages, they established political and military strongholds. These chiefs utilized peasant militias and their knowledge of the hilly terrain to exert influence over surrounding villages and control key trade routes leading to Nablus.[1]
By restricting or facilitating movement, rural chiefs could reward allies and punish rivals. However, direct confrontations were rare due to their extensive patronage networks, which ensured peasant loyalty in exchange for protection. Chiefs further solidified their power by marrying into influential clans, resettling their kin in key areas, and resolving disputes through customary law (urf). This decentralized rural power posed a significant challenge to Ottoman authority.[3]
To address these challenges, the Ottoman administration initially employed its well-honed and pragmatic strategies. Rather than imposing rigid control, they adapted to local political realities. Subdistricts served primarily as "fiscal shells," designed to optimize revenue collection with minimal disruption to existing power structures.[1]
Local leaders were co-opted into the Ottoman system, becoming intermediaries of imperial authority. Subdistrict chiefs, formally appointed by the governor of Damascus, were responsible for tax collection and maintaining order. While these annual appointments were often ceremonial, the chief positions became hereditary in practice, consolidating power within prominent families over generations. Eventually necessitating a military response by the Ottomans.[4][1]
The campaign's military force relied heavily on Arab local militias (yerliyya) from central Syria.[5] To compensate them, cavalry officers (sipahis) were granted agricultural lands in Jabal Nablus as timar or za‘ama, depending on the land size. To prevent any single group from consolidating power, the Ottoman government dispersed these grants geographically, assigning key villages to different holders. This land distribution was carefully managed, with annual renewals to prevent privatization through inheritance.[6][7]
Additionally, the government took measures to weaken the long-term authority of rural chiefs. By fostering rivalries and dispersing economic opportunities, the Ottomans sought to undercut the chiefs' ability to organize resistance. These strategies reflected the empire's broader approach to absorbing semi-autonomous regions while maintaining sufficient local order to safeguard strategic interests, including the critical land routes to Egypt and the Damascus pilgrimage caravan.[1][7]=
Legacy
editOver time, the leaders of the 1657 Ottoman expedition gradually integrated into the local population and became more focused on managing their business affairs than on fulfilling any military obligations.[8]
The most powerful among them constructed large, fortress-like homes, many of which remain standing today. Former subdistrict chiefs received the majority of land grants.[9]
They quickly ascended to key administrative positions such as mutasallim and miralay (chief of the alay, or local sipahi company). Additionally, they formed strategic alliances by intermarrying with wealthy merchants, eventually getting absorbed into the general population.[8][9]
References
edit- ^ a b c d e f g "Rediscovering Palestine". publishing.cdlib.org. Retrieved 2024-11-16.
- ^ "Köprülü Mehmed Paşa | Ottoman Grand Vizier & Conqueror of Crete | Britannica". www.britannica.com. 2024-10-27. Retrieved 2024-11-05.
- ^ Ihsan Nimr, Tarikh Jabal Nablus wa al-Balqa, NIMR, 1:197–198
- ^ Ekinci, Ekrem Buğra (2017-08-26). "Autonomous Ottoman provinces". Daily Sabah. Retrieved 2024-11-16.
- ^ Ihsan Nimr, Tarikh Jabal Nablus wa al-Balqa 1:86 ,(4 vols.; Nablus, 1936–1961).
- ^ Officially, the former generated no more than 20,000 akjas (an old Ottoman currency) annually, whereas the latter could go up to 100,000. For a subtle discussion of this institution, see Kunt, Sultan’s Servants, pp. 9–14. A fairly comprehensive list of names of timar and za‘ama holders in Jabal Nablus during the early eighteenth century can be found in NICR, 4:342; 5:8, 36. Remarkably, this arrangement, at least in its outer form, survived well into the nineteenth century. For example, a document dated June 29, 1852, lists the timar holders in Jabal Nablus and indicates whether they served in the armed escort contingent (jarda) of the pilgrimage caravan (NMSR, p. 223–225). Additional information can be gleaned from NMSR, pp. 215–216, 231, 301–302, and 306.
- ^ a b NIMR, 2:224–227. Nimr’s contention is borne out by a list of revenues from Lajjun district in the sixteenth century, according to Ottoman cadastral survey records. The list shows that individuals with timar revenues from more than one village had these villages dispersed at separate geographical ends of the district (Hütteroth and Abdulfattah, Historical Geography, p. 103).
- ^ a b Some of the new leading families—such as the Tamimis, Jawharis, Khammashs, and Mir‘is—came to dominate important posts in the religious hierarchy. Others—such as the ancestors of the Bishtawi, Nabulsi, and Sadder families—joined the merchant elite. Still others—such as the Nimrs, Shafi‘is, Sultans, Akhramis, Bayrams, and Asqalans—retained their military orientation (NIMR, 1:86–105)
- ^ a b Early on, most began to avoid military duty by paying for replacements when called upon. In 1724, for example, Muhammad Agha Nimr arranged for the payment of one lump sum (2,000 piasters) on behalf of all 52 timar and za‘ama holders (NICR, 4:341).