1 March Memorandum (Turkish: 1 Mart Tezkeresi), is a memorandum which concerns about the governmental policies of Turkish State about Iraq War. It was carried out on 25 February 2003 and rejected by the parliament. The full name of the memorandum is "Prime Ministerial memorandum on sending the Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and authorizing the Government to have foreign armed forces in Turkey" which is based on article 92 of Turkish Constitution.
Content
editThe plan of US invasion of Iraq was shared with Turkey since it contained Turkey in the plan as well. This plan was presented to Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gül by US Secretary of Defense Deputy Paul Wolfowitz on 3 December 2002.
"Sending the Turkish Armed Forces to Northern Iraq, as required, scope, limit and time to be determined by the government, which is responsible to the Supreme Assembly for ensuring national security and preparing the Armed Forces for homeland defense in accordance with Article 117 of the Constitution; in order to maintain an effective deterrence, these forces to be deployed in Northern Iraq are to be used in accordance with the principles to be determined when necessary, and to the Government to make the necessary arrangements for the air elements belonging to the foreign armed forces to use the Turkish airspace in accordance with the principles and rules to be determined by the Turkish authorities, within the framework of a possible military operation. In accordance with the 92nd article, it was requested to give permission for 6 months. In the memorandum, it was envisaged that a maximum of 62 thousand foreign military personnel would be in Turkey for 6 months. Air elements of foreign forces was not allowed to exceed 255 aircraft and 65 helicopters."[1]
533 members of parliament participated in the voting. 264 votes in favor, 250 votes against and 19 votes of abstention were cast. Since electoral quotient could not be reached, which required 268 votes for approval, the memorandum could not pass from the parliament, therefore, was rejected.[1]
Arguments in favor
editIn those times, there were 2 main political parties in the parliament: Justice and Development Party, as abbreviated in Turkish AKP, and Republican People's Party, also abbreviated as CHP. Among those parties, AKP was mainly in favor of the memorandum, whereas CHP was against.
Those who supported the acceptance of the memorandum had 2 main arguments. Firstly, they argued that the Turkish relations with USA should not be damaged[2] In case of a reject, USA's requests and plans would be disrupted and USA would be forced to change its strategy during the invasion because Turkey was playing a critical role in their strategy due to its geographical location and prior collaborations. Considering the fact that USA ships started to anchor at İskenderun Harbour, it can be said that USA was relying on Turkey as an ally in the region and expecting the memorandum to be passed from the parliament.[3]
The second main argument was obtaining the chance of intervention in the region by utilizing the power gap during the war. They claimed that this was a big opportunity for the State and if not seized, Turkey would be in a disadvantageous position in which it would not be able to have a voice in the critical decisions that would also affect Turkey in the region. Hence, it was claimed that Turkey could prevent a situation against its favors only if Turkey was active in the region by passing the memorandum.[4]
Arguments against
editOne of the arguments against the memorandum was the number of helicopters, airplanes, and soldiers that were going to be allowed to enter freely in the Turkish region. Some claimed that these numbers would arise the question about whether Turkey will be the next target after Iraq. Furthermore, some people stated that it was a humanitarian plight to help a war and sacrifice your soldiers' lives for that.[5]
One of the most effective and deciding point against the memorandum was the fact that Iraq was a Muslim populated country. Turkish Muslim population was opposing the memorandum for this reason. Besides that, some deputies had this same idea. This concern had a considerable impact on the memorandum votes because some AKP deputies followed this idea and did not want to give the vote that their party presented. Opposing party CHP also remarked this situation and warned AKP deputies. One of the effective speeches was given by Önder Sav, CHP Ankara Deputy:
- " ...Now, for God's sake, tell me, which excuse should we believe? Which excuse is right and which one is true? Please, have a clear mind dear fellows. Otherwise, we do not see it possible to argue this memorandum.
- Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense of the United States, says that they are able to reach their goal with or without Turkey. So, let them succeed without Turkey. Stop following USA no matter how, but you do not stop! Unfortunately, soon, you will see very painfully that America ate the sugar apple and that the stalk will remain in Turkey's hands. (Applause from CHP desks)
Reactions
editFrom USA perspective, this desicison from parliament was unexpected. USA planned the operation assuming Turkey would be on their side helpfully. After the refusal of 1 March memorandum USA had to change their strategy to a more expensive and inconvenient one. The prolongation of the operation and the loss of more lives by the American troops, whose aim is to occupy the Iraqi army in the north, were considered as negative results of this change. Furthermore, USA had to switch the locations of its ships and use them from the Gulf region, which was resulted in more economic burden.[8]
In his book Decision Points, George W. Bush, used the sentence "Our NATO ally Turkey had let America down in one of our most important requests to date." to describe his feelings.[9]
On the other side, Turkey was appreciated mostly from Muslim countries and their population since they thought Turkey did not involve in the invasion of a Muslim country. Also, some Turkish people and even AKP voters, in contrast with their part, were satisfied with this result. Furthermore, some considered this rejection as a big step in order to overcome USA occupation in foreign diplomacy. Those who were in favor of anti American policies also were satisfied after 1 March memorandum.[4]
References
edit- ^ a b "1 Mart Tezkeresi'nin tutanakları açıklanacak mı?". Habertürk (in Turkish). 14 February 2013. Archived from the original on 4 July 2023. Retrieved 4 July 2023.
- ^ Türkmen, Muhammed (31 May 2021). "1 Mart Tezkeresi Bağlamında Türkiye'nin Irak Politikası". Bölgesel Araştırmalar Dergisi (in Turkish). 5 (1): 185–212. ISSN 2587-1234. Archived from the original on 9 September 2024. Retrieved 4 July 2023.
- ^ "İlk ABD gemisi". www.hurriyet.com.tr (in Turkish). 26 February 2003. Archived from the original on 4 July 2023. Retrieved 4 July 2023.
- ^ a b Türkmen, Muhammed (31 May 2021). "1 Mart Tezkeresi Bağlamında Türkiye'nin Irak Politikası". Bölgesel Araştırmalar Dergisi (in Turkish). 5 (1): 185–212. ISSN 2587-1234. Archived from the original on 4 July 2023. Retrieved 4 July 2023.
- ^ "1 Mart Tezkeresi tutanakları". OdaTV. 12 March 2013. Archived from the original on 4 July 2023. Retrieved 4 July 2023.
- ^ CHP Genel Sekreteri Sayın Önder Sav'ın 1 Mart Irak Tezkeresi Konuşması. Archived from the original on 4 July 2023. Retrieved 4 July 2023 – via YouTube.
- ^ "CHP Ankara Milletvekili Önder Sav'ın TBMM'de yaptığı 1 Mart Tezkere konuşması". İstanbul Gerçeği (in Turkish). Archived from the original on 9 September 2024. Retrieved 4 July 2023.
- ^ Babacan, Abdurrahman (4 July 2018). "AK PARTİ DÖNEMİ İLK KÜRESEL KARŞILAŞMA: 1 MART 2003 TEZKERESİ". Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi (in Turkish) (51): 21–38. doi:10.18070/erciyesiibd.382696. ISSN 1301-3688. S2CID 188599164. Archived from the original on 4 July 2023. Retrieved 4 July 2023.
- ^ Bush, George W. (2010). Decision Points (Enhanced ed.). Crown.[full citation needed][page needed]