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Draft:Ocean-centred macro-regional strategies of the European Union

Macro-regional strategies are the European Union’s way of promoting regional cooperation between states. Two of these macro-regional strategies are centred around the sea.

The Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) was adopted by the European Union (EU) in 2008 and is the starting point of the macro-regional strategies. However, talks for an EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) were already underway. The MSFD defines a ‘macro-region’ as ‘an area including territory from several countries or regions associated with one or more common features or challenges’ with ‘flexible and even vague boundaries’[1]. Dealing with transboundary marine environments, the MSFD recognises the governance limits of fragmented national jurisdictions[2] and calls for a decentralised approach to promote implementation by giving states greater flexibility in protecting their maritime space and developing relevant regional programs[3]. Macro-regional strategies are ‘building blocks’[1] for achieving broader European goals.

The European Union’s two macro-regional strategies focusing on ocean governance

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The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR)

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The first macro-regional strategy in the EU was the EUSBSR: an ‘experiment’[4] for future macro-regional strategies. The EUSBSR was an initiative by the European Parliament’s Euro-Baltic Intergroup in 2005. It was introduced by the European Commission in June 2009 following a six-month public consultation with regional stakeholders and was adopted in October during the Swedish EU presidency. It is primarily an ‘internal strategy’[4]: its members include Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden, but some non-EU states are associated (Russia and Norway). The strategy contained four pillars aiming to improve the environmental state of the Baltic Sea, promote economic development, make the sea more accessible and increase regional security. Successive revisions in 2010, 2013 and 2015, narrowed the strategy's scope to three objectives: ‘Save the Sea’, ‘Increase Prosperity’, and ‘Connect the Region’. These revisions acknowledge the key role of the 40 pan-baltic institutions[4], in achieving the aims of EUSBSR.

The European Union Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR)

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The European Council adopted the EUSAIR in June 2011 as an instrument for implementing the MSFD in the Adriatic-Ionian basin. It was launched in 2014 by four EU members and four EU non-member countries (Croatia, Greece, Italy, Slovenia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia). North Macedonia joined the group in 2020 and San Marino in 2022. The EUSAIR focuses on four pillars: blue growth, regional infrastructure development, environmental quality and sustainable tourism. In 2023, after a wide consultation process, the Governing Board of the EUSAIR approved the proposal to introduce a new ‘social’ pillar[5].

The EU’s macro-regional strategies in the different sectors of ocean governance

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Environment

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To protect the marine environment, coordination is promoted. All European macro-regional strategies are based on a geographic feature: they are associated with environmental concerns[6] and encourage intersectoral coordination and multilevel governance in ecologically meaningful geographic areas. In both the EUSBSR and the EUSAIR, the environment is a key concern. The EUSBSR makes Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) a prerequisite for all energy-related infrastructure projects. In the EUSAIR, the ‘connecting the region’ pillar emphasises reducing the environmental impact of transport systems and developing environment-friendly fuels in marine transport.

Economic development

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Macro-regional strategies ‘capitalise’ on the fact they are built around natural features: ocean macro-regional strategies have to balance environmental aims and economic development, which is usually the driving force[6]. Although the EUSBSR was created following concerns about the impact of human activities in the Baltic Sea, the strategy promotes economic cooperation and increased trade. Macro-regional strategies create links between EU and non-EU countries that drive regional economic growth (and EU enlargement policy), for example, ferry connections between Italy and the Balkans are essential for the tourism industry[7].

Regional cohesion and enlargement

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European macro-regional strategies were created in the 2010s at the same time as the European Neighborhood Policy: enlargement of the EU was in a crisis and both these policies tried to relaunch it[5]. This impetus of macro-regional strategies as instruments to support enlargement has been mentioned in the annual reports on the implementation of EU macro-regional strategies since 2020[5]. Particular attention in this regard has been placed on EUSAIR, which includes many non-EU countries and its potential to create links across the Adriatic and Ionian seas[8].

Security

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Security is also a concern in macro-regional strategies. The EUSBSR fostered significant hopes that it would allow an evolution in the Baltic Sea from an area of ‘high pitch securitisation’[9] and militarisation, as it has been during the Cold War, to an area of cooperation on ‘soft’ security issues[10] such as global warming, environmental issues, economic growth, migration… However, Russia has not played a very active role in the region since its creation in 2009[10].

The challenges for macro-regional strategies

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Regardless of the intention to share policy-making across levels in the EU, regional actors have no formal power to directly shape policies at a supranational level[2]. The MSFD is a unique piece of European legislation: it promotes regional cooperation yet the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) does not recognise this level[3]. Macro-regional strategies are also limited by the Three No’s: macro-regional strategies should not trigger the establishment of new institutions, not result in 'macro-regional legislation' and not create important additional costs[1].

This leads to high levels of ‘institutional ambiguity’[3] because the interactions between different institutional levels are not defined. Institutional linkage is limited because there is no intermediate level between the EU and states, therefore macro-regional strategies usually call on Regional Sea Conventions to create linkage. Institutional ambiguity is high when the aims of the Conventions and the MSFD differ: states will choose the objectives which align with their interest. Institutional ambiguity is the highest in the Mediterranean where pre-existing frameworks include multiple non-EU members (who have more power in shaping their objectives)[3].

Complications arise from the involvement of non-EU actors in macro-regional strategy. In the  EUSBSR, the EU initially hoped that Russia would become a partner in shaping the Baltic regional strategy by recognising the EU as a ‘natural and promising partner’[11]. However, Moscow has consistently referred to the EUSBSR as an internal EU strategy and has interacted with the region through bilateral or multilateral frameworks such as the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM). In the same way, the Neighbourhood policy of the EU is a counter-hegemonic strategy vis-à-vis Russia, Russia regards itself as counter-hegemonic vis-à-vis the EUSBSR. Since the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014, cooperation in the EUSBSR with Russia has come to a halt, as have the hopes of a post-Cold War Baltic region of peace and prosperity[11].

References

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  1. ^ a b c Gänzle, Stefan (2017). "The European Union's Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR): improving multilevel governance in Baltic Sea cooperation?". Journal of Baltic Studies. 48 (4): 407–420. ISSN 0162-9778.
  2. ^ a b Maier, Nina; Markus, Till (2013-02-15). "Dividing the common pond: Regionalizing EU ocean governance". Marine Pollution Bulletin. 67 (1): 66–74. doi:10.1016/j.marpolbul.2012.11.042. ISSN 0025-326X.
  3. ^ a b c d van Leeuwen, Judith; van Hoof, Luc; van Tatenhove, Jan (2012-05-01). "Institutional ambiguity in implementing the European Union Marine Strategy Framework Directive". Marine Policy. 36 (3): 636–643. doi:10.1016/j.marpol.2011.10.007. ISSN 0308-597X.
  4. ^ a b c Gänzle, Stefan (2018). "'Experimental union' and Baltic Sea cooperation: The case of the European Union's strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR)". Regional Studies, Regional Science. 5 (1): 339–352.
  5. ^ a b c Coletti, Raffaella; Chiodi, Luisa (2024). "EU Macro-Regional Strategy in the Adriatic and Ionian Region: A Territorial Perspective on the EU Enlargement Policy". Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies. 20 (1).
  6. ^ a b Gløersen, Erik; Balsiger, Jörg; Cugusi, Battistina; Debarbieux, Bernard (2019-07-01). "The role of environmental issues in the adoption processes of European Union macro-regional strategies". Environmental Science & Policy. 97: 58–66. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2019.04.002. ISSN 1462-9011.
  7. ^ Niavis, Spyros; Papatheochari, Theodora; Kyratsoulis, Theofilos; Coccossis, Harry (2017-06-01). "Revealing the potential of maritime transport for 'Blue Economy' in the Adriatic-Ionian Region". Case Studies on Transport Policy. 5 (2): 380–388. doi:10.1016/j.cstp.2017.03.002. ISSN 2213-624X.
  8. ^ Vidas, Davor (2013-01-01), "Chapter 19. Subregional Marine Governance: The Case of the Adriatic Sea", Regions, Institutions, and Law of the Sea, Brill Nijhoff, pp. 337–355, doi:10.1163/9789004220218_022, ISBN 978-90-04-22021-8, retrieved 2024-12-10
  9. ^ Browning, Christopher S.; Joenniemi, Pertti (2004). "Regionality Beyond Security? The Baltic Sea Region after Enlargement". Cooperation and Conflict. 39 (3): 233–253. ISSN 0010-8367.
  10. ^ a b Stead, Dominic (2014). "European integration and spatial rescaling in the Baltic Region: Soft spaces, soft planning and soft security". European Planning Studies. 22 (4): 680–693.
  11. ^ a b Makarychev, Andrey; Sergunin, Alexander (2017). "Russia's role in Regional Cooperation and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR)". Journal of Baltic Studies. 48 (4): 465–479.
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