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Draft:Pompey's campaign against the pirates

Map of Pompey's campaign.

Pompey's campaign against the pirates took place in 67 BC, at a time of a rise of piracy in the Mediterranean Sea.

Cilician piracy

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In the 140s, a pirate leader named Diodotus Tryphon is recorded as launching raids on the coast of Syria in a bid to seize the Seleucid throne.[1] He was based in Coracaesium in Cilicia (now the southeastern coast of Turkey), which area was off-limit for the Seleucids since their defeat against the Roman Republic and the subsequent Treaty of Apamea.[1] The pirates continued their important raids even after the defeat of Tryphon, as they were encouraged by the Ptolemies in order to weaken their Seleucid rivals.[2] After a long period of indifference, the Romans started to act against piracy in the eastern Mediterranean Sea in 102, with a short campaign of Marcus Antonius the orator.[3] Antonius only wanted to gain a triumph by winning a quick victory, which did not solve the problem of the Cilician piracy.[4] The province of CIlicia was possibly created at this occasion, or in 100.[5] The pirates were free to operate during the first two Mithridatic Wars (89–85; 83–81) between Rome and the king of Pontus Mithridates, who was accused by ancient historians to have cooperated with them.[6] Between 78 and 74, the Roman proconsul Publius Servilius Vatia campaigned in southern Anatolia, partly to deal with pirates led by Zeniketos from his stronghold of Olympos in Lycia, which he captured.[7] In 74, the praetor Marcus Antonius Creticus (the orator's son) took over the fight against the pirates by receiving a special imperium on the sea with authority on the coastline up to 80km inland.[8] Antonius nevertheless lacked resources to carry his mission; his troops were inadequately recruited from Roman allies in the area. He therefore suffered from an humiliating defeat against the Cretans, for which he received the cognomen "Creticus".[9]

The lex Gabinia

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After his consulship of 70, Pompey and his colleague Crassus refused to take any proconsular command in the provinces, and returned to private life.[10] Pompey remained active in the background, cultivated his network of clients and used devoted tribune of the plebs to continue influencing politics. He possibly undermined the position of the proconsul Lucius Lucullus, who was winning a streak of victories against Pontus and Armenia during the Third Mithridatic War, by using the young Clodius Pulcher to foment disent among Lucullus' troops. Pompey wanted to force the recall of Lucullus in order to be designated commander instead.[11][12]

In 68, the most pressing issue was the Cilician pirates, who attacked trading ships and made the price of grain go up as a result. Pirates even launched raids on Italy and two praetors were abducted in Italy that year.[13][14] In July 68, two of Pompey's supporters, a plebeian Gaius Cornelius and Aulus Gabinius were elected tribunes of the plebs. In early January 67, Pompey drafted a law that would give him an extraordinary command against the pirates and asked Gabinius to propose it before the people instead of the senate, where it would have been immediately rejected (Pompey was not popular among senators). Gabinius' bill stated that a general taken from among the former consuls would be given a three year command over the entire Mediterranean and Black seas and their coastline up to 80km inland. In addition, this commander would be entitled to use as much money as needed from the public treasury and receive an authority equal to that of the provincial governors.[15] Although not named, everybody understood that this general would be Pompey, who was extremely popular among the citizenry, and the lex Gabinia was approved. Reception was much colder among senators when they debated the law; only Julius Caesar is said to have spoken in its favour; possibly because Caesar had been ransomed by the pirates a few years earlier. The consul Gaius Calpurnius Piso even hinted that Gabinius could be murdered if he did not abandon his law. The senate was then stormed by a crowd and Piso almost lynched.[16]

Gabinius then proposed a second bill that made Pompey the commander against the pirates and called for Pompey to speak before the people.[16] Pompey wanted to avoid appearing as forcing his way into power, so he refused the offer.[17] Lucius Trebellius, another tribune opposed to Pompey and Gabinius, put his veto on the lex Gabinia. Gabinius countered by using the same tactics as Tiberius Gracchus against Marcus Octavius in 133, and put to vote the removal of Trebellius as tribune. As this vote progressed, it appeared clear that Trebellius would lose his office, so he withdrew his veto. The leading conservative politicians Catulus and Hortensius tried to speak against the bill, but without effect. The day of the vote Pompey left to his country house to fend off accusations of having influenced the vote. In his absence, he was triumphally chosen to be the commander against the pirates.[18]

This carefully staged process was well executed by Gabinius and Pompey, and enabled the latter to receive the most important command ever given to a Roman general at the time.[19]

Preparations

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This denarius minted by Gaius Calpurnius Piso Frugi in 67 BC was probably issued to pay for the war expenses.[20]

The winter of 68/67 was spent preparing the army of 500 ships, 120,000 soldiers and 5,000 cavalry—the largest army ever mustered by Rome.[21] 36 million denarii were kept in reserve for the war expenses.[22] The lex Gabinia also gave Pompey the freedom to appoint 15 legates to assist him, but surprisingly, he did not appoint anybody from his Picenian inner circle. He chose instead to expand his clientela and picked men who could owe him a favour. Four of them later became consuls (Metellus Nepos, Lentulus Marcellinus, Lucius Torquatus, Pupius Piso). Pompey also appointed the former pair of consuls in 72 and censors in 70: his friends Lucius Gellius and Lentulus Clodianus; perhaps to repay a debt he owed them.[23] Pompey's two sons Gnaeus and Sextus served under Clodianus in their first military campaign.[24]

13 of the legates were assigned a region of the Mediterranean, so the entire sea was covered by a fleet in order to prevent the pirates from escaping to another area as they used to do. If the pirates sought shelter into a harbour, then they would be blocked by a fleet while foot soldiers would be disembarked to attack them on land.[25][26]

The 13 legates of Pompey were:[27]

Two other legates are also mentioned, but without a sea district:

The epitomist Florus wrongly makes legates the two sons of Pompey, and cites Marcus Porcius Cato, but he was only a tribune of the soldiers in Macedonia. Florus also mentions a Servilius, either the half-brother of Cato who died on his way to Asia in 67, or Pompey's admiral in the Black Sea in 65, which is wrong in either case.[28][29]

Campaigns

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Pompey's first objective was to secure the sea route to Rome for the grain. He sailed to Sicily, Africa then Sardinia, which were the three main regions producing grain. He followed by moving to Spain, Gaul and completed his trip by landing in Etruria. In 40 days, the western Mediterranean Sea was cleared of the pirates, who had to return to the East. The only trouble came from Piso, who had received Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul as his proconsular command, because he tried to hamper Pompey's recruitment of troops on his province. In Rome, Gabinius had already started a procedure to remove Piso from his province, but Pompey discouraged him, after ensuring that Piso would stop interfering.[24][26]

Meanwhile, Terentius Varro guarded the area from the Strait of Otranto (between Italy and Albania) to prevent the pirates in the Adriatic Sea from escaping the fleet of Lentulus Clodianus. For this action, Varro received the naval crown from Pompey.[30] In the eastern Mediterranean, Lentulus Marcellinus blocked access to African coasts, whereas and Metellus Nepos guarded the coasts of Cyprus, Phoenicia, Lycia, and Pamphylia. Pompey's goal was to force the pirates to gather in their strongholds in Cilicia, the only region that was not patrolled.

After his short stop in Rome to deal with Piso, Pompey moved to Brundisium, where the main fleet had been waiting for him, and sailed off to Athens and Rhodes in order to merge his forces with that of his legates to prepare for the final battle. Anticipating fierce resistance, Pompey brought siege equipment to conquer several pirate fortresses in the hinterland, while he attacked from the sea. The only large battle of the war took place near Coracaesium (now Antalya), during which Pompey soundly defeated the pirates, then captured their city after a short siege. Many pirates seem to have surrendered without fighting. In his biography of Pompey, Plutarch tells that he captured more than 20,000 pirates. The eastern campaign was complete in just seven weeks, three months after Pompey launched the operations.[31]

As in west, the only setback of the campaign came from another Roman commander. In 69, Quintus Caecilius Metellus had been appointed proconsul in Crete in order to end piracy from this island, but his command was still active when Pompey arrived in the area. As he harshly treated the Cretans, the local pirates surrendered to Pompey because they expected more leniency from him. He sent his legate Lucius Octavius to supervise their surrender, whereas Lucius Cornelius Sisenna (Pompey's legate in Greece) arrived with troops, but died soon after. Tension heated between Octavius and Metellus, but Pompey finally backed off and let Metellus conquer the island.[32]

Settlement

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Ruins of Soli, refounded as Pompeiopolis by Pompey with former pirates.

The swiftness with which Pompey ended the war can be explained by his mercy towards the pirates, as shown by their quick reddition in Coracaesium or the struggle with Metellus in Crete. Pompey founded or repopulated several cities in Cilicia that had been devastated by the Mithridatic War, like Mallus, Adana, Epiphaneia and especially Soli—refounded as Pompeiopolis—by offering lands to the pirates. Thankful for their new life as farmers, the former pirates became strong supporters of Rome and their new cities were pivotal in the control of Asia. Pompey was still careful to send many of them in the interior in order to prevent them from returning to piracy. Some of them were also sent far away from their home to make them forget their past, such as in Ptolemais in Libya, Dyme in Achaia (which received the most important influx of former pirates), and even in Calabria.[33][34]

As several of the Cilician cities were founded in the area officially under the control of the Seleucid Empire, it shows that Pompey was already considering the annexation of this decaying power.[35]

Aftermath

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Denarius minted in 56 BC by Faustus Cornelius Sulla, a supporter of Pompey. The three wreaths on the reverse refer to the three triumphs of Pompey, while the aplustre on the lower left alludes to his victory against the pirates.[36][37]

While Pompey was still in Cilicia, his supporters in Rome worked to get him the command of the Third Mithridatic War. Gabinius had managed to remove Bithynia and Pontus from Lucullus; a decision that allowed Mithridates to win the battle of Zela. In early 66, the new tribune of the plebs Gaius Manilius passed the lex Manilia, which granted Pompey the command of the war against Mithridates. This new appointment was as extraordinary as that of the lex Gabinia: it gave Pompey authority over all the governors of Asia, new legates, and the possibility to make peace and war as he saw fit, while he still retained the powers received from the lex Gabinia.[38]

References

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  1. ^ a b de Souza, Piracy, p. 98.
  2. ^ de Souza, Piracy, p. 99.
  3. ^ de Souza, Piracy, pp. 99–107.
  4. ^ de Souza, Piracy, pp. 104, 107, 108.
  5. ^ de Souza, Piracy, pp. 108–110.
  6. ^ de Souza, Piracy, pp. 116–127, thinks this is an exaggeration.
  7. ^ de Souza, Piracy, pp. 128–130.
  8. ^ de Souza, Piracy, pp. 141, 142.
  9. ^ de Souza, Piracy, pp. 145–148.
  10. ^ Leach, Pompey, p. 63.
  11. ^ Leach, Pompey, p. 65, though Leach is not certain about this: "How far, if at all, Pompey was involved in these machinations we have no means of telling."
  12. ^ Seager, Pompey, p. 43.
  13. ^ Leach, Pompey, p. 66.
  14. ^ Seager, Pompey, pp. 43, 44.
  15. ^ Leach, Pompey, pp. 66, 67.
  16. ^ a b Leach, Pompey, p. 67.
  17. ^ Leach, Pompey, pp. 67, 68.
  18. ^ Leach, Pompey, p. 68.
  19. ^ Leach, Pompey, p. 70.
  20. ^ Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, vol. I p. 419 vol. II p. 705.
  21. ^ Leach, Pompey, p. 70.
  22. ^ Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, vol. II p. 638.
  23. ^ Seager, Pompey, pp. 46, 47.
  24. ^ a b Leach, Pompey, p. 71.
  25. ^ Leach, Pompey, p. 70.
  26. ^ a b Seager, Pompey, p. 47.
  27. ^ Broughton, Magistrates, vol. II, pp. 147, 148.
  28. ^ Florus, Epitome, i. 41.
  29. ^ Broughton, Magistrates, vol. II, p. 148.
  30. ^ Leach, Pompey, pp. 71, 72.
  31. ^ Leach, Pompey, p. 72.
  32. ^ Leach, Pompey, p. 74.
  33. ^ Leach, Pompey, p. 73.
  34. ^ Seager, Pompey, pp. 47, 48.
  35. ^ Seager, Pompey, p. 48.
  36. ^ Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, pp. 449–451, though he only links the aplustre with Pompey's cura annonae of 57.
  37. ^ de Souza, Piracy, p. 174.
  38. ^ Leach, Pompey, pp. 74, 75.

Bibliography

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  • T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, New York, American Philological Association, 1952–1986.
  • Michael Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, Cambridge University Press, 1974. ISBN 9780521074926.
  • Philip de Souza, Piracy in the Graeco-Roman World, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 149-178. ISBN 9780521012409
  • John Leach, Pompey the Great, London, Croom Helm, 1978. ISBN 9780415747332
  • Kit Morrell, Pompey, Cato, and the Governance of the Roman Empire, Oxford University Press, 2017. ISBN 9780198755142
  • Robin Seager, Pompey the Great, a Political biography, Oxford, Blackwell, 1979. ISBN 0631227202
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