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Draft:Spa Conference (2-3 July 1918)

  • Comment: Watch use of tense, such as present instead of past: "The war aims of the Reich are reaffirmed" and so on. Mathglot (talk) 10:30, 4 July 2024 (UTC)

The British Hotel in Spa, where the conference was held on 2 and 3 July 1918.

The Spa conference of 2-3 July, 1918, called by Fritz Fischer “the great Spa conference”, is the second of the four main meetings between different political and military leaders of the Imperial Reich;[a] it took place between the two major German offensives at the end of the First World War, in the spring and summer of 1918. Gathered in Spa by Emperor Wilhelm II, the participants reaffirmed the objectives pursued in the conflict which was then in his fifth year. The last supporters of a compromise peace still present in the Reich government were disavowed by the emperor, and their main representative, Secretary of State Richard von Kühlmann, was forced to resign. At the same time, the supreme command of the German army (the OHL) prepared its last offensive of the conflict, after the blows inflicted on the Allies in the spring. Held during the last days of preparation for Friedensturm,[b] this conference constituted the last opportunity for German officials to affirm their firm belief in the victory of the Reich.

Context

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From the beginning of 1918, the Germans achieved significant success on the Western Front. However, they were not decisive, and their impact was undermined by the lack of offensive plans on other fronts. These successes were not the decisive victories that German strategists dreamed of, in order to impose a peace in accordance with their imperialist ambitions.

This lack of decisive success pushed the Reich government, confined to an increasingly decorative role, to seek a certain independence with regard to the war aims pursued by the military leaders of the OHL; thus, since the beginning of 1918, the government tried to partially recover its autonomy, to the great discontent of the military leaders of Reich.[c] Supporter of a compromise peace, Richard von Kühlmann appeared weakened by the revelation of compromising details about his private life in the Pan-Germanist press subject to the Dioscuri, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, then at the head of the General Staff.[1][2]

Political context: the speech of June 24, 1918

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Thus, aware of the growing military and economic impasse in which the Reich and its allies found themselves, Richard von Kühlmann, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had been trying for months to prepare German public opinion for a compromise peace with the Allies.[1]

The search for the conditions of this peace earned him the hatred of the military, Erich Ludendorff first. On June 24, 1918, Kühlmann, visibly tired, formalized his position by giving a speech in the Reichstag, as part of the vote on the appropriations of his ministry; on this occasion, he expressed his skepticism about the victory of the Reich, calling for a compromise peace.[3]

Hated for months by Pan-Germanist and imperialist circles, Kühlmann, described by the Bavarian press as a “walking corpse”,[4] triggered (with this speech) the curse which led to his ouster from the government in the days that followed:[5] the majority of the Reichstag, notably the national liberals, led by Gustav Stresemann,[6] broke away from him.[7] The next day, Paul von Hindenburg informed Reich Chancellor Georg von Hertling of the soldiers' possible reaction to the position of the Secretary of State.[8][d] Supported then by the left-wing parties in favor of a compromise peace, Richard von Kühlmann nevertheless found himself obliged to withdraw the next day, under pressure from the military: he only succeeded in making his supporters doubt, while the majority of right-wingers were not grateful for his retreat.[4]

Parallel to this German context, negotiations between the Reich and Austria-Hungary seemed to be at a standstill, the representatives of the dual monarchy having in fact managed to empty the agreements concluded by the two emperors the previous spring of their substance.[9]

Waiting for the victory of the Reich

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Erich Ludendorff, at his work table in 1918, wanted to lead the battle to annihilate the Franco-British forces, sought by Reich strategists since 1914.

During the conference's preceding month, Reich political leaders multiplied declarations calling for the opening of peace negotiations, but these talks must begin after a resounding victory over the Allies. These declarations clashed with the wishes of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, supporters of a peace of victory signing.

To impose peace conditions consistent with the war goals of the Reich, Erich Ludendorff, the main spokesperson for the German hardliners, supporters of the realization of the program of war goals,[10] wanted to lead the great battle of annihilation which German strategists had dreamt of since the outbreak of the conflict in the West. The rupture had to be obtained by shock troops and their unlimited tactical and strategic exploitation once the Allied front was broken.[11][e]

June 15, during the celebration of the thirtieth anniversary of his accession, Wilhelm II, wishing to mobilize the Germans for the new battle announced and destined to be decisive, affirmed that the victory of the Reich was within reach and would mark a change of civilization.[12] These positions were relayed by a significant part of the political class represented in the Reichstag: the Catholic Center, the National Liberals and the Pan-Germanists.[4]

The occupation of vast portions of territory of the Allied Powers, as well as the victorious peace imposed on Russia at Brest-Litovsk and on Romania at Bucharest, comforted German officials in their policy, but misled them about the reality of the power balance: the massive arrival of American soldiers on the Western Front in reality reversed this balance to the disadvantage of the Reich and the Quadruple.[12]

Military context

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Main articles: German spring offensive and Second Battle of the Piave River

For months, military officials increased their attempts to achieve a decision on the Western Front. After the failure of May, Erich Ludendorff was in favor of launching an offensive against the British army.[8]

However, the successes encountered by the troops of the Central Powers destroyed the numbers and contributed to the morale crisis suffered by German units since the beginning of 1918;[10] in fact, the non-decisive nature of the successes achieved since March 1918 disappointed the soldiers at the front, as well as their officers. This disappointment was reflected in the reports reaching the Dioscuri, who report the words exchanged by soldiers on the trains, emphasizing the soldiers' aspiration for the conclusion of peace.[10]

Finally, the decline in numbers forced German strategists to deploy increasingly younger or older men on the front line, and all less and less motivated. Young men were sometimes forced to go to the front, while older soldiers, members of units deployed to occupy conquered territories, showed no enthusiasm for front-line service.[11]

Economic context

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Main article: Blockade of Germany (1914–1919)

For almost three years, the Central Powers suffered from an increasingly restrictive Allied blockade, weighing on the supply of food and raw materials for the war economy of the Reich and its allies.

To find out the state of the Reich's strategic raw material reserves, the economic ministries launched, on May 30, 1918, a major survey, the results of which reached the sponsors on June 29. The investigators insisted on the reality of the control exercised by the Allies over the trade in raw materials and on the consequences of this control on the Reich's war effort.[13]

Participants

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Main articles: Oberste Heeresleitung and German Empire
 
WilhelmII, center, and the Dioscuri, Hindenburg on the left and Ludendorff on the right, in Spa in 1918.

During this meeting, chaired by Emperor Wilhelm II at the OHL headquarters in Spa, the Le Britannique hotel welcomed civilians and military personnel involved in German war policy. However, the Dioscuri quickly informed the Emperor and the Reich Chancellor of their wish to no longer participate in the crown council, if the State Secretary, Richard von Kühlmann, was present.[4]

Civilians

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In addition to Wilhelm II, the conference brought together the Chancellor, Georg von Hertling, the Undersecretary of State at the Chancellery, Wilhelm von Radowitz, the Imperial Minister for the Navy, Eduard von Capelle, and the representative of the Auswärtiges Amt with the OHL, Friedrich Rosenberg.[14]

These representatives of the imperial government were joined by Hermann von Stein, Prussian Minister of War.[14]

Military

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Also present are the Dioscuri, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff,[f] assisted by their main collaborators, Paul von Bartenwerffer, Erich von Oldershausen and Detlof von Winterfeldt.[14]

Decisions

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During this conference, German conflict management officials defined Reich policy while a large-scale offensive, the last, was planned by the Dioscuri for the middle of the month.

Kühlmann's resignation

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Georg von Hertling, painted here by the painter Paul Beckert in 1908, aligned his policy with the wishes of the high command.

The resignation of Secretary of State Kühlmann was decided on July 1, 1918 during a meeting between the high command, mainly Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, and Chancellor Georg von Hertling: in fact, he was released the next day by the emperor and the chancellor[15] in the face of the scale of the controversy unleashed by his speech of June 24 before the Reichstag.[16] On July 8, during an interview between Wilhelm II and his Secretary of State, the emperor, totally subjugated by the Dioscuri, laconically announced to his minister his dismissal.[15]

Following this departure, the foreign policy of the Reich was entrusted to a fervent supporter of war aims achievement, Paul von Hintze,[14] recalled for the occasion from his post as ambassador to Denmark;[15] this appointment entrusted a convinced nationalist with the achievement of the objectives decided at the conference.[14] The new State Secretary received the support of the majority of the Reichstag when, on July 13, he defended before this assembly an increase in war credits. This idea was rejected only by the members of the USPD.[14]

This resignation aroused numerous reservations among main members of the Reich cabinet: Chancellor Georg von Hertling and Vice-Chancellor Friedrich von Payer foresaw “serious internal consequences” following this dismissal.[14][g] Thus, on July 3, the SPD, through its main speaker, Philipp Scheidemann, recalled in a speech the situation of the population of the Reich, then called for the conclusion of an “honorable peace”.[17]

Reaffirmation of war aims

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The war aims of the Reich were reaffirmed, while their realization seemed within reach: the Eastern program appeared on the verge of being achieved; Western war aims were reaffirmed.

Thus, Belgium should have been placed under strict German control, militarily occupied,[h] or even partially annexed.[i][18][14] The kingdom promised a partition between Flanders and Wallonia, both integrated into the German customs union, while the Belgian railways were to be ceded to the Prussian railway administration;[15] certain portions of its territory, an area going from the German border to the region of Liège in particular, were promised direct annexation to the Reich,[16] just like the iron basin of Briey, a constant claim of the German Empire since the outbreak of hostilities.[15]

In the East, Ukraine was independent of Russia and supplied the Central Powers with foodstuffs.[19][j]

During this conference, a new opportunity to define the war aims of the Reich, the participants recorded the cessation of talks with the American government, begun by indirect means[k] in the spring by the Secretary of State, while the requests for American clarifications receive no response.[20]

Notes and references

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Notes

  1. ^ Between 1871 and 1945, the official name of the German state was Deutsches Reich, simplified to "Reich" thereafter.
  2. ^ The Champagne offensive of 1918 is also referred to by this term.
  3. ^ Between Richard von Kühlmann and Erich Ludendorff, questions of precedence also add to the initially political dispute.
  4. ^ For months, the military has wanted to get rid of Kühlmann.
  5. ^ The strategic planning for this offensive did not specify a precise objective.
  6. ^ Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff appeared to German public opinion to be inseparable, like the Dioscuri of Greek mythology.
  7. ^ Neither of them specified their thoughts.
  8. ^ Great Britain had entered the war in 1914 to enforce Belgian neutrality.
  9. ^ Georges-Henri Soutou asserts the opposite: in his view, the German ministers and soldiers meeting on 2 and 3 July 1918 said they wished to guarantee Belgium's territorial integrity.
  10. ^ This supply made the question of its evacuation particularly delicate.
  11. ^ The Netherlands, which had remained neutral, acted as an intermediary between the Germans and the Americans.

References

  1. ^ a b Renouvin (1934, p. 570)
  2. ^ Le Naour (2016, p. 278)
  3. ^ Renouvin (1934, p. 571)
  4. ^ a b c d Le Naour (2016, p. 280)
  5. ^ Fischer (1970, p. 617)
  6. ^ Fischer (1970, p. 618)
  7. ^ Fischer (1970, p. 619)
  8. ^ a b Renouvin (1934, p. 572)
  9. ^ Soutou (1989, p. 720)
  10. ^ a b c Jardin (2008, p. 3)
  11. ^ a b Jardin (2008, p. 2)
  12. ^ a b Le Naour (2016, p. 279)
  13. ^ Soutou (1989, p. 727)
  14. ^ a b c d e f g h Fischer (1970, p. 621)
  15. ^ a b c d e Le Naour (2016, p. 281)
  16. ^ a b Fischer (1970, p. 620)
  17. ^ Le Naour (2016, p. 282)
  18. ^ Soutou (1989, p. 582)
  19. ^ Soutou (1989, p. 693)
  20. ^ Fischer (1970, p. 622)

Works cited

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  • Fischer, Fritz (1970). Les Buts de guerre de l'Allemagne impériale (1914-1918) [Griff nach der Weltmacht]. Translated by Migeon, Geneviève; Thiès, Henri. Paris: Éditions de Trévise.
  • Jardin, Pierre (2008-06-15). "La fin de la guerre en Allemagne". Revue historique des armées (in French) (251): 35–46. doi:10.3917/rha.251.0035. ISSN 0035-3299.
  • Le Naour, Jean-Yves (2016). 1918: l'étrange victoire. Paris: Perrin. ISBN 978-2-262-03038-4. OCLC 961212181.
  • Renouvin, Pierre (1934). "La Crise européenne et la Première Guerre mondiale". Presses Universitaires de France, Coll. Peuples et Civilisations. 19: 500–502.
  • Soutou, Georges-Henri (1989). L' or et le sang: les buts de guerre économiques de la Première Guerre Mondiale. Nouvelles études historiques. Paris: Fayard. ISBN 978-2-213-02215-4.

See also

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The First World War in Spa

Website of the boarding school housed in the former Hôtel Le Britannique building

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