The ethnic competition thesis, also known as ethnic competition theory or ethnic competition hypothesis, is an academic theory that posits that individuals support far-right political parties because they wish to reduce competition from immigrants over scarce resources such as jobs, housing, mating opportunities and welfare benefits.[1] According to the theory, support for the far right should be higher in areas if there are more immigrants and more lower-educated and lower-skilled voters who would face competition from them (because of the relative ease of onboarding in low-skilled jobs, even for a non-integrated foreigner).
Several studies have found support for ethnic competition thesis. A 2011 study by Jens Rydgren and Patrick Ruth found some support for the theory in that support for the far-right Sweden Democrats party was higher in areas where there were a higher number of immigrants.[2] Another study by Abbondanza and Bailo, published in 2018, found similar support for this thesis with the Lega Nord in Northern Italy as a case study.[3] However, other studies have questioned the link between the number of refugees, number of asylum seekers, or proportion of noncitizens and people born abroad and the success of the far right.[4]
See also
editReferences
edit- ^ Rydgren, Jens; Ruth, Patrick (September 2011). "Voting for the radical right in Swedish municipalities: social marginality and ethnic competition?". Scandinavian Political Studies. 34 (3): 209. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9477.2011.00269.x.
- ^ Rydgren, Jens; Ruth, Patrick (September 2011). "Voting for the radical right in Swedish municipalities: social marginality and ethnic competition?". Scandinavian Political Studies. 34 (3): 202. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9477.2011.00269.x.
- ^ Abbondanza, Gabriele; Bailo, Francesco (2018). "The electoral payoff of immigration flows for anti-immigration parties: the case of Italy's Lega Nord". European Political Science. 17 (3): 378–403. doi:10.1057/s41304-016-0097-0.
- ^ Norris, Pippa (2005). Radical right : voters and parties in the electoral market. New York, New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521613859.