Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829) was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that held certain treaties ratified by the United States, even if otherwise valid and in force, cannot be given effect domestically without a specific act of Congress.[1][2] The ruling articulated a more restrictive interpretation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which automatically grants treaties the force of domestic federal law.[3]
Foster v. Neilson | |
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Decided March 9, 1829 | |
Full case name | Foster v. Neilson |
Citations | 27 U.S. 253 (more) |
Holding | |
Certain treaties ratified by the United States, even if otherwise valid and in force, cannot be given effect domestically without a specific act of Congress. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinion | |
Majority | Marshall, joined by unanimous |
Laws applied | |
Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and the United States |
The Foster decision was the first to formulate the concept of "self-execution", which distinguishes between treaties that are "self-executing" (meaning domestic courts can enforce them directly upon their ratification) and those that are "non-self-executing" (which are not directly enforceable in U.S. courts unless Congress passes specific implementing legislation). It was also the first time the Court applied the "intent-based doctrine of self-execution", which examines the text of a treaty, as well as its related documents and negotiations, to determine whether the treaty makers intended it to be self-executing.[4]
Decision
editThe Court's opinion, authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, recognized that the U.S. Constitution, through the Supremacy Clause, "declares a treaty to be the law of the land" and "consequently to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature." However, Justice Marshall immediately adds a qualifying statement that a treaty is only the equivalent of a legislative act when the treaty "operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision"' when the terms of the treaty "import a contract" or suggest that some future legislative act is necessary, "the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court."[5]
Using this test, the Foster Court held that the treaty provision at issue—which stated that certain land grants from the King of Spain "shall be ratified and confirmed"—was non-self-executing because it suggested that Congress would ratify the land grants through a future legislative act.[6]
References
edit- ^ Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314–15 (1829).
- ^ Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaties | Constitution Annotated | Congress.gov | Library of Congress
- ^ Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Vol. 122, No. 2 (Dec. 2008), p 606, www.jstor.org/stable/40042748.
- ^ Sloss, David L. (2012). "Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties" (PDF). Harvard International Law Journal. 53 (1): 146.
- ^ Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
- ^ Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
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