Wikipedia

Hristijan Mickoski

Hristijan Mickoski (Macedonian: Христијан Мицкоски, pronounced [ˈxristijan ˈmit͡skɔski]; born 29 September 1977) is a Macedonian politician and former mechanical engineer, currently serving as Prime Minister of North Macedonia, a position he has held since June 2024. He is also a university professor and the party leader of VMRO-DPMNE. In 2016, Mickoski became the director of Power Plants of Macedonia, and in the period from 2015 to 2017, he was an energy advisor to prime ministers Nikola Gruevski and Emil Dimitriev. As the sole candidate, he was elected leader of VMRO-DPMNE at the party's 16th congress in Valandovo.

Hristijan Mickoski
Христијан Мицкоски
Official portrait, 2024
13th Prime Minister of North Macedonia
Incumbent
Assumed office
23 June 2024
PresidentGordana Siljanovska-Davkova
Preceded byTalat Xhaferi
Leader of the Opposition
In office
23 December 2017 – 23 June 2024
Prime MinisterZoran Zaev
Oliver Spasovski
Zoran Zaev
Dimitar Kovačevski
Talat Xhaferi
Preceded byNikola Gruevski
Succeeded byVenko Filipče
President of VMRO-DPMNE
Incumbent
Assumed office
23 December 2017
Preceded byNikola Gruevski
Personal details
Born (1977-09-29) 29 September 1977 (age 47)
Skopje, SR Macedonia, Yugoslavia
Political partyVMRO-DPMNE
Children2
Alma materSs. Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje
OccupationMechanical engineer • Politician

Early life and career

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Mickoski was born on 29 September 1977 in Skopje, then in Socialist Republic of Macedonia, part of SFR Yugoslavia. From 2016 to 2017, he was the director of Power Plants of Macedonia, the state-owned electricity producing company.[1] He has a PhD degree. In 2011, he was a visiting professor at Vienna's Technical University.[2] He was an associate professor at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering at the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje,[3][4] but in 2019 he became a regular professor.[5] From 2015 to 2017, he was the energy advisor of prime ministers Nikola Gruevski and Emil Dimitriev.[2]

Political career

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Party leader

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After the resignation of Nikola Gruevski, Mickoski became the new leader of the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE party in 23 December 2017 in the party's 16th congress in Valandovo,[6] and thus leader of the opposition in the country.[7]

According to some party members, in his youth Hristijan Mickoski was a candidate of the Liberal Democratic Party for the presidency of the Union of students at St. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje and a fierce opponent to then ruling VMRO-DPMNE.[8] Other members of VMRO-DPMNE accused him of not being a party member up until 2010.[8] According to Ljubčo Georgievski, Mickoski displayed himself as a party activist firstly in 2016.[9] Mickoski previously was the party's secretary general from July 2017.[7]

The veracity of his pro-EU and pro-NATO orientation has been met with doubt by some political observers.[10][11] Mickoski has stated that he and his party are in favour of joining the European Union and NATO but not with "capitulation", i.e. rejecting the Prespa Agreement signed with Greece, which resolved the Macedonia naming dispute and secured North Macedonia's NATO accession.[12] He and the party he leads became the main participants of the July 2022 North Macedonia protests against the French proposal for the start of the negotiation process of North Macedonia and the EU.[13] In August 2022, Mickoski promised to leave politics forever, if Bulgarians were recognized in the country's constitution, a mandatory requirement included in the negotiating framework with the EU.[14] In September he proposed a referendum under which the friendship treaty between Bulgaria and North Macedonia would be annulled.[15][16] Mickoski has close ties with the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán and Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić,[17][18][19] who are providing suitable model to Western Balkans' politicians with autocratic leanings.[20][21][22]

Prime Minister (2024–present)

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Election and government

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Mickoski with Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković in Zagreb, 29 August 2024

After the VMRO-DPMNE gained a plurality of seats in the Assembly of North Macedonia and entered into a coalition agreement with the VLEN Coalition and ZNAM following the 2024 North Macedonian parliamentary election, Mickoski was given the mandate from the president Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova to form the next government on 6 June.[23] In his address on 23 June 2024, before the vote for the new government in the Assembly, he promised that his government would work to reduce taxes, increase pensions, start a project with over 200 million euros for municipal projects, invest one billion euros for the economy, initiate new foreign investments for new jobs, make textbooks free for all, fight against corruption, and fight for growth of up to 5 percent of the economy. After the vote, he became the country's 13th Prime Minister.[24][25]

After he referred to his country as "Macedonia" shortly before his election and described the constitutional name North Macedonia as "shameful", Greece accused the country of reneging on the Prespa Agreement and warned that its accession into the European Union was at risk of being blocked.[26] Mickoski promised in his speech also that as long as he is prime minister, the Bulgarian minority will not be recognized and there will be no more constitutional changes, describing this EU requirement as Bulgarian dictate.[27] On this occasion, the Bulgarian side warned that North Macedonia's intention not to abide to its international commitments is unacceptable and this is incompatible with the country's European path.[28]

Mickoski has chosen close party allies and partners as ministers, reserving fewer posts for ethnic Albanians, and selecting one vice PM with well-known links to Russia and Serbia: Ivan Stoilković. It includes also all four VMRO-DPMNE vice presidents, most of whom held high positions under the autocratic regime of the former PM and party leader Nikola Gruevski. The government consists mainly of VMRO-DPMNE, VLEN, ZNAM and the Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia members.[29]

In September 2024, Mickoski replaced most of the experts, members of the joint commission with Bulgaria, established under the Treaty of Friendship between the two countries, working to seek a consensus in common reading of history of both countries and peoples. He accused them of neglecting the Macedonian national interests.[30]

Geopolitical orientation

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In July 2024, Mickoski met with his Hungarian colleague Viktor Orban during the NATO summit in Washington. He informed that they have concluded an economic agreement to establish a special economic cooperation between the countries. The idea is for Hungary to provide a large financial credit to North Macedonia.[31] The agreement was condemned by the opposition party SDSM.[32] Its leader Venko Filipče was concerned that such a policy is leading the country to a hostagе situation relative to Hungary, and Mickoski wants to implement Orbán's autocratic system in North Macedonia.[33] According to news sources, after VMRO-DPMNE came to power, the foreign policy priorities of the country changed, with Mickoski setting himself up to spread Orbanism there, as his predecessor Gruevski, who is a fugitive in Budapest.[34] In this way, Orbán saw an opportunity to increase Hungarian influence in the region.[35] Per Bulgarian historians, Orbán's position in the European Union is complicated and it is important for the landlocked Hungary to retain Budapest–Belgrade–Skopje–Athens railway, which gives it access to the Mediterranean and Chinese production.[36][37]

Simultaneously, Mickoski argued that the construction of Pan-European Corridor VIII was unfeasible. This project secures a direct railway connection between North Macedonia, Albania and Bulgaria. The railway has been under construction for over 30 years, but without much success. He suggested reallocating the European funds to modernize the existing Budapest–Belgrade–Skopje–Athens railway, part from the China-CEE hallmark initiative instead, which links North Macedonia with Hungary, Serbia and Greece.[38] Mickoski's claims on the impracticability of the project were rejected by the managements of the Macedonian and Bulgarian railways.[39][40][41] Moreover, North Macedonia signed a memorandum on the construction of Corridor VIII during the NATO 2024 Washington summit, where Mickoski was present.[42] Nevertheless, Mickoski's office stated that his government was freezing the construction of Corridor VIII.[43] Some analysts suppose, in this way Mickoski was included in the building of a new nationalist axis between Skopje, Belgrade and Budapest that would defend Moscow's interests on the Balkans.[44][45][46] Others see in this also an intervention of Beijing, which seeks to consolidate the transport corridor from Greece to Hungary as part of his European expansion.[47] In practice, the financial credit granted to North Macedonia by Hungary was secured by China.[48]

Some observers in North Macedonia claim too that Mickoski who is following in the footsteps of Orban and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, is sympathizing also with Trump's policies and that all could be harmful to his country.[49] Former leading members of VMRO-DPMNE as Ljubčo Georgievski and Filip Petrovski accused Mickoski of serbianising North Macedonia.[50][51] Analysts in Bulgaria assume, he is actually a politician with a pronounced anti-Bulgarian orientation.[52][53][54]

On 20 September 2024, Mickoski declared in Brussels that his country will no longer accept any ultimatums on its EU path.[55] On 25 September, the EU announced the decoupling of Albania from North Macedonia on the EU accession path, due to the disputes between North Macedonia and Bulgaria around the Bulgarian minority there, which had stalled further talks.[56] Following this decision, Albania continued its path separately on October 15, 2024.

Personal life and views

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Mickoski is married and has two children.[8] Apart from his native language Macedonian, he also knows English and some Italian.[1]

Shortly after his assumption of office, the results of the 2023 Albanian census were published, from which it appeared that there are a little more than 7,000 Bulgarians and around 2,000 Macedonians. Mickoski stated on that occasion, that this was the result of Bulgarian propaganda and assimilationist policy there, as well as of the carelessness of the previous government.[57][58][59] On the other hand, over 100,000 Macedonian nationals have received Bulgarian citizenship in the last decades, most of them based on declared Bulgarian origin.[60] In this case, Mickoski claimed, that this situation was based on Bulgaria's accession to the European Union, and all Macedonians will tear up their Bulgarian passports after North Macedonia is accepted into the EU.[61] He maintained that only several hundreds citizens of North Macedonia identify as Bulgarians, while the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria consists of tens of thousands of people.[62] On November 13, 2024, marking the 80th anniversary of the driving of German troops out of Skopje during WWII, Mickoski gave a speech in which he hinted that Bulgarian occupation forces were expelled from the city then,[63] while in fact, the Bulgarian army played the major role in the capture of Skopje.[64]

References

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  1. ^ a b "Христијан Мицкоски - претседател на Владата". Kanal 5 (in Macedonian). 23 June 2024. Archived from the original on 28 June 2024. Retrieved 26 June 2024.
  2. ^ a b "Новиот генерален секретар на ВМРО-ДПМНЕ е Христијан Мицкоски, директор на ЕЛЕМ". МКД.мк (in Macedonian). 30 June 2017. Archived from the original on 25 February 2019.
  3. ^ "Мицкоски Христијан". Универзитет "Св. Кирил и Методиј", Машински факултет – Скопје. 22 June 2009. Archived from the original on 24 December 2017.
  4. ^ "Христијан Мицкоски е новиот претседател на ВМРО-ДПМНЕ". NovaTV (in Macedonian). 23 December 2017. Archived from the original on 26 June 2022. Retrieved 26 June 2024.
  5. ^ "Мицкоски е избран во звање редовен професор на Mашинскиот факултет во Скопје". Netpress (in Macedonian). 19 December 2019. Archived from the original on 28 June 2024. Retrieved 26 June 2024.
  6. ^ "Христијан Мицковски - нов лидер на ВМРО-ДПМНЕ". 24 ВЕСТИ. 23 December 2017. Archived from the original on 28 January 2018.
  7. ^ a b "Hristijan Mickoski to Lead Macedonia's Frail Opposition". Balkan Insight. 23 December 2017.
  8. ^ a b c Димковиќ-Мишевска, Габриела (5 December 2017). "Христијан Мицкоски иден лидер на ВМРО-ДПМНЕ?!". МАКФАКС (in Macedonian). Archived from the original on 4 April 2023. Retrieved 26 February 2021.
  9. ^ Деск 2 (7 March 2024). "Георгиевски го нарече Мицкоски „идеолошки наследник на Четничкиот вардарски корпус"". Рацин.мк (in Macedonian). Retrieved 28 June 2024.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  10. ^ Rizaov, Erol; Vesnik, Nezavisen (7 July 2019). "Mickoski's offer no longer stands". Independent Balkan News Agency. Archived from the original on 27 July 2021.
  11. ^ Taylor, Alice; Trkanjec, Zeljko (25 February 2022). "War with Russia and what it means for the Western Balkans". www.euractiv.com. Retrieved 28 June 2024.
  12. ^ "Mickoski: Zaev's deal is capitulation, VMRO-DPMNE will not support it". 13 June 2018. Retrieved 28 June 2024.
  13. ^ Service, RFE/RL's Balkan. "Debate Derailed In North Macedonian Parliament Amid Unrest Over Proposed Deal With EU, Bulgaria". RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Retrieved 28 June 2024.
  14. ^ "Мицкоски се зарече да напусне политиката, ако българите бъдат вписани в Конституцията на РСМ". Dnes.dir.bg. 16 August 2022. Retrieved 28 June 2024.
  15. ^ "ВМРО-ДПМНЕ обяви въпроса за референдума, свързан с Договора за приятелство с България". Dnes.dir.bg. 5 September 2022. Retrieved 28 June 2024.
  16. ^ "North Macedonia Opposition Seeks Referendum Against Bulgaria Deal". Balkan Insight. 6 September 2022. Archived from the original on 28 June 2024. Retrieved 26 June 2024.
  17. ^ "Mickoski in Budapest meets with Orban, says support from Hungary proof of friendship". MIA. 24 October 2023. Archived from the original on 26 June 2024. Retrieved 26 June 2024.
  18. ^ "North Macedonia Opposition Leader Attends Orban's Victory Party". Balkan Insight. 4 April 2022. Archived from the original on 26 June 2024. Retrieved 26 June 2024.
  19. ^ "Орбан и Вучич поздравиха Силяновска и ВМРО-ДПМНЕ с изборната победа". www.bta.bg (in Bulgarian). Retrieved 28 June 2024.
  20. ^ "Understanding the Orbán-Vučić Relationship". www.policysolutions.hu. Retrieved 28 June 2024.
  21. ^ Griessler, Christina; Elek, Fanni; Elek, Christina Griessler and Fanni (22 October 2021). "Quo vadis media pluralism in Europe? A contextualization from an Austrian perspective". Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik (in German). Retrieved 28 June 2024.
  22. ^ Bieber, Florian (2 July 2024). "Why Serbia's President Is a Threat to Europe". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 28 June 2024.
  23. ^ "North Macedonia's center-right leader given official mandate to form government after election win". Associated Press. 6 June 2024. Archived from the original on 6 June 2024. Retrieved 6 June 2024.
  24. ^ "The new Government was elected, whose president is Hristijan Mickoski". Sloboden Pecat. Archived from the original on 25 June 2024. Retrieved 24 June 2024.
  25. ^ "North Macedonia's parliament approves new gov't-Xinhua". english.news.cn. Retrieved 28 June 2024.
  26. ^ "Greece claims neighboring North Macedonia broke historic name deal, warns its EU hopes may suffer". Associated Press. 25 June 2024. Archived from the original on 25 June 2024. Retrieved 25 June 2024.
  27. ^ AI (24 June 2024). "Mickoski: Such a Bulgarian diktat under such circumstances while I am prime minister will not pass and there will be no constitutional changes". European Newsroom. Retrieved 28 June 2024.
  28. ^ "Съобщение". www.mfa.bg (in Bulgarian). Retrieved 28 June 2024.
  29. ^ "Close Allies, Fewer Albanians and a Moscow Fan – North Macedonia's Govt Takes Shape". Balkan Insight. 20 June 2024.
  30. ^ Sinisa Jakov Marusic, PM’s Attack on North Macedonia-Bulgaria ‘History Commission’ Members Condemned. 04,09,2024, BIRNS.
  31. ^ "Mickoski - Orban: Agreement reached on special financial cooperation with Hungary". MIA. 11 July 2024.
  32. ^ "North Macedonia Opposition Condemns Loan from Hungary". Balkan Insight. 12 July 2024.
  33. ^ Филипче: Кредитот на Мицкоски е политичко заложништво. 12.07.2024, Deutsche Welle.
  34. ^ Tzimas, Stavros (22 June 2024). "Will North Macedonia become Orban's Balkan gateway?". Kathimerini.
  35. ^ Bozinovska, Zhana P. (8 August 2024). "Orban and the Hungarians are getting deeper and deeper into the Balkans - Free Press". Sloboden Pečat.
  36. ^ Николова, Деси (5 August 2024). "Историк обясни защо Виктор Орбан има интерес да даде огромен заем на РСМ". Bulgaria ON AIR (in Bulgarian).
  37. ^ "Доц. д-р Милен Михов: Конституция или коридор ни трябват". Epicenter (in Bulgarian). 20 July 2024.
  38. ^ North Macedonia's PM: Corridor 8 Project Infeasible, Urges Funds to Bypass Bulgaria and Upgrade Corridor 10, infoBalkans.com, 07/23/2024.
  39. ^ Северномакедонските железници: Мицкоски лъже за проблемите на Коридор №8. Factor.bg., 30.07.2024.
  40. ^ София: Мицкоски манипулира, има план и подсигурени над 2 млрд. лв. за изграждането на Коридор 8 от България. БГНЕС, 10.08.2024.
  41. ^ "National Railway Infrastructure Company refutes Skopje's claims about Corridor No. 8". Bulgarian National Radio. 8 August 2024.
  42. ^ „Военен Шенген“ – Румъния, България и Гърция създават коридор за военна мобилност. 13.07.2024 БТА.
  43. ^ От кабинета на Мицкоски: Не се отказваме от Коридор 8, но няма да го строим. BGNES, 10.08.2024.
  44. ^ Разузнавач од ВМРО-ДПМНЕ: Мицкоски работи за Будимпешта и Белград, кои се синоним за Москва на Балканите. March 3, 2024
  45. ^ Журналистът Николай Кръстев: Чрез кабинета на Мицкоски ще се чува думата на Москва, Будапеща и Белград. FROGNEWS, 24.06.2024.
  46. ^ Чираци на Кремъл и Белград окупират Македония на Мицкоски. BGNES, 25.07.2024.
  47. ^ China Increasing Its Bets on Hungary and Serbia. July 22, 2024, GIS Reports.
  48. ^ Заемът от 500 млн. евро за РС Македония бил китайски. 14.09.2024, Сега.
  49. ^ Briefing: North Macedonia media say PM's pro-Trump stance could harm country. BBC Monitoring, 15 August 2024.
  50. ^ Петровски от Скопие: Мицкоски сърбизира Македония. 20.09.2024, БГНЕС.
  51. ^ Любчо Георгиевски: Мицкоски атакува България, за да прикрие празненствата за сръбската окупация на Македония. 25 септември 2024, Actualno.com.
  52. ^ Росен Тахов, Мицкоски, класическият българомразец. 18.09.2024, Труд.
  53. ^ Александър Йорданов, Мицкоски е назубрил комунистическото "македонско малцинство" в България насадено от Тито и Георги Димитров. Неудобни думи: за антибългаризма няма място в ЕС. 28.06.2024, 168 часа.
  54. ^ Калоян Методиев: Една антибългарска ос по вертикала - Орбан, Вучич и Мицкоски спира Коридор №8. Tribune, 20 септември 2024.
  55. ^ Sinisa Jakov Marusic, BIRN, September 20, 2024; North Macedonia PM Voices Frustration Over ‘Humiliating’ EU Accession Demands.
  56. ^ Restelica, Bleona (26 September 2024). "EU Separates Albania's Accession Path From North Macedonia". SchengenNews. Retrieved 26 September 2024.
  57. ^ Over 7,000 People Identify as Bulgarians in Last Census in Albania. Bulgarian News Agency, 28.06.2024.
  58. ^ North Macedonia's Foreign Ministry Voices Concern over Albanian Census Data. Bulgarian News Agency, 29.06.2024.
  59. ^ Mickoski Comments Albanian Census: Bulgaria Used Vacuum Left by Previous Skopje Government. Bulgarian News Agency, 04.07.2024.
  60. ^ ЧЕТИРИСТОТИН ТРИДЕСЕТ И СЕДМО ЗАСЕДАНИЕ София, петък, 11 декември 2020 г. Открито в 9,04 ч.
  61. ^ Мицкоски: Македонците ще скъсат българските си паспорти веднага щом влезем в ЕС. NOVA, 29 юли 2024.
  62. ^ Milen Ganev, Mitkoski: Only 800-900 identify themselves as Bulgarians in our country. Oct 22, 2024, Факти.бг.
  63. ^ Mickoski to Bulgaria: There were no administrators but occupiers, 13.11.2024, English Republika.
  64. ^ "Military realities, however, made this incident look very ironic indeed, for Skopje was liberated by Bulgarian forces, while the Macedonian Partisans remained in the surrounding hills, and came down only to celebrate their entrance to the city. Similar scenes occurred in many other towns of Macedonia and Serbia, pointing to the fact that, from a military perspective the Russians were right: the Bulgarian army was the only force capable of driving the Germans quickly from Yugoslavia. Needless to say, the official Macedonian historiography, written mainly by Apostolski himself, understandably played down the crucial role of the Bulgarians. The glorification of the Partisan movement, an essential component of the post-war Yugoslav political culture-and more personal Partisan considerations left little room for such 'technicalities' ... For information on the military situation in Macedonia and Serbia and the role of the Bulgarian army see FO 371/43608, R17271, 24/11/1944; FO 371/44279, R16642,14/10/1944; FO 371/43630, R19495, 24/11/1944; WO 208, 113B, 12/9/1944. The sources, which contain intelligence reports from BLOs, confirm the decisive role of the Bulgarian army in the liberation of Skopje, Nis, Prilep, and the Morava Valley." For more, see Dimitris Livanios, The Macedonian Question: Britain and the Southern Balkans 1939–1949, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008; ISBN 9780199237685, p. 134.
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