Joseph Melia is a philosopher working in the areas of philosophy of mathematics, modal logic and possible worlds. He has made important contributions to the debate over the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument, where he argues for a "weaseling" approach to mathematical nominalism.[1][2][3] He has also argued against modalism and the modal realism of David Lewis.[4][5]
References
edit- ^ Daly, C.; Langford, S. (2010-10-01). "Two Anti-Platonist Strategies". Mind. 119 (476): 1107–1116. doi:10.1093/mind/fzq074. ISSN 0026-4423.
- ^ Raley, Y. (2012-10-01). "Why the Weasel Fails". Philosophia Mathematica. 20 (3): 339–345. doi:10.1093/philmat/nks017. ISSN 0031-8019.
- ^ Knowles, Robert; Liggins, David (2015). "Good weasel hunting". Synthese. 192 (10): 3397–3412. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0711-7. ISSN 0039-7857. S2CID 31490461.
- ^ Forbes, Graeme (1992). "Melia on Modalism". Philosophical Studies. 68 (1): 57–63. doi:10.1007/BF00354469. ISSN 0031-8116. JSTOR 4320343. S2CID 170085162.
- ^ Paseau, Alexander (2006). "Genuine Modal Realism and Completeness". Mind. 115 (459): 721–729. doi:10.1093/mind/fzl721. ISSN 0026-4423. JSTOR 3840589.
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