Karakhan Manifesto

The Karakhan Manifesto was a statement of Soviet policy toward China dated 25 July 1919. It was issued by Lev Karakhan, deputy commissioner for foreign affairs for Soviet Russia. The manifesto offered to relinquish various rights Russia had obtained by treaty in China, including Chinese territories seized during Tsarism, extraterritoriality, economic concessions, and Russia's share of the Boxer indemnity. These and similar treaties had been denounced by Chinese nationalists as "unequal." The manifesto created a favorable impression of Russia and Marxism among Chinese. It was often contrasted with the Treaty of Versailles (1919), which granted Shandong to Japan.

Soviet diplomat Lev Karakhan (1889–1937) issued a manifesto in 1919 concerning relations with China.

The manifesto was prompted by the Bolshevik advance into Siberia, which created a need to establish a relationship with China. The Bolsheviks saw the Chinese as one of "the oppressed peoples of the East" and therefore a potential ally against the imperialist powers.

The manifesto is addressed to, "the Chinese people and the Governments of North and South China." Because both Russia and China were in a state of civil war at this time, diplomatic exchanges were often delayed. Although the document was published in Moscow in August 1919, it was not formally presented to Chinese diplomats until February 1920. The version presented at this time includes the passage, "the Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people, without any compensation, the Chinese Eastern Railway."

Six months later, Karakhan personally handed the Chinese a second version of the manifesto, one that did not include this remarkable offer. In fact, the Soviet authorities denied ever having made it. The railway offer had been included by "mistake," they explained. The Soviets may have hoped the offer of the railway would generate an enthusiastic response in Beijing, leading to a Sino-Soviet alliance against Japan. The warlords in Beijing, closely tied to Japan, responded hesitantly. When the hoped-for alliance proved unattainable, the Russians withdrew their offer. In any event, traditional Russian interests and rights in China, including control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, were reaffirmed in a series of secret agreements made in 1924–1925.

The manifesto came at a crucial time in the development of Chinese communism. It encouraged interest in Marxism and thus played a role in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921.

Question of continued validity

First, let's cover a little prehistory. In 1858, the Governor-General of Siberia, Muraviev sailed down the Amur River with several gunboats. He demanded from the Qing government the land from the Stanovoy mountains to the Amur River. This is the land west of the Amur. The Qing who were preoccupied with other possible invasions (Britain, France) was in an indefensible position (with its army far away) and thus, conceded the land, signing the Treaty of Aigun on May 28, 1858. Muraviev repeated this maneuver just two years later (gunboats down the Amur) and forced the Qing to ratify the Treaty of Aigun and sign a new treaty the Treaty of Beijing (Nov. 14, 1860) ceding the land east of the Amur River until the Pacific Ocean. This land which was formerly northern Manchuria now became the Priamur and the Primorye of the Russian Far East. Of the different narratives about how the Russians (and Soviets) usurped control of this region and continued to rename and create a new, modern history and nomenclature through the 1970s, Stephan's The Russian Far East is perhaps the best. See the improvised map of China and total territories lost to Russia/USSR from 1858 to 1921 (see map).

This is a map showing all of the territories that Russia and Soviet Russia took from China from 1858 to 1921

Now, we return to the question, "Why were the Karakhan Manifestos (declarations) made to China?" The Soviets and their representative, Lev Karakhan, the Soviet Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs, offered China quite a bit without requiring China to give back anything in return. So, why were they made? From 1918 to October 1922, the Russian Civil War raged between the Bolsheviks (the Reds) and the White movement (the Whites). The Whites or White Guards were backed by the Allied Forces. The Allies in 1918 consisted of over 12 countries (Japan, Poland, China, the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia, India, South Africa and several others—all of who sent troops, Japan sent the most, 73,000 soldiers.) who sought to remove the Bolsheviks and the ideology of communism from the former Russian Empire. These were heady and uncertain days for the Bolsheviks. At the time in Manchuria, there were over 150,000 former Russian (Tsarist) citizens most of whom were anti-Bolshevik. Thus, the Bolsheviks wanted to return the Chinese Eastern Railway and other territories to China to gain China's allegiance and to protect Russia from another Allied front based in Manchuria.

Karakhan Manifesto I (signed July 25, 1919) courtesy of Allen S. Whiting's Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924.

The Karakhan Manifestos of July 25, 1919 and September 27, 1920 offer to return to China "everything that was taken by the Tsarist government independently or together with the Japanese and the Allies (p. 270)." This is an offer to return northern Manchuria, that is, a large part of the Russian Far East to China in 1919 and 1920. The USSR made several claims to withdraw, retract or annul the two Karakhan Manifestos (declarations). But the declaration was signed by Lev Karakhan himself while he was in office as a Soviet diplomat. The first Karakhan Manifesto offered:

The Soviet Government has renounced the conquests made by the Tsarist Government which deprived China of Manchuria and other areas.... The Soviet Government returns to the Chinese people without compensation of any kind the Chinese Eastern Railway and all mining concessions, forestry, and gold mines which were seized from them by the government of the Tsars...

— Whiting, Soviet Policies, p. 270

The Karakhan Manifesto II of 1920

The second Karakhan Manifesto was written one year, two months later in September 27, 1920. It read:

The Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics declares as void all the treaties concluded by the former Government of Russia with China, renounces all the annexations of Chinese territory, all the concessions in China, and returns to China free of charge, and forever, all that was ravenously taken from her by the Tsar's Government and by the Russian bourgeoisie

— Whiting, Soviet Policies, p. 273

However, Karakhan was the Soviet People's Deputy Minister (also called Commissar) of Foreign Affairs. He made a unilateral offer to China, signed only by himself and presented this signed declaration to the Chinese in 1919 and 1920. Therefore, only the Chinese have the legal right to accept or reject the offer. Thus, the answer to whether the Karakhan Manifestos are valid depends on the point of view. The current Russian Federation does not see them as valid and for good reason, it's territory they have held for over 150 years regardless of the documents. In contrast, Taiwan sees the "manifestos" as valid while China has yet to state an official position. China did however redraw its map of the Russian Far East in February 2023 calling Vladivostok, "Haishenwai" and Khabarovsk, "Boli." These were the old Chinese names for both settlements. The Russians consider that the Russia-Border Treaties of 1991 and 2004 have set the Russian-Chinese borders where they stand on the current map of 2024.

Nevertheless, two American historians, Bruce A. Elleman and Jon K. Chang, believe that the Karakhan Manifestos are valid and still extant, as unilateral, legally binding declarations. They are not treaties nor accords which need to be signed by both parties. Chang and Elleman added a further article to emphasize their point. Lai's "challenge" was extraordinary, a blunt, straight-forward declaration for the Chinese (ROC and PRC) to Russia that they want the territories returned to PRC-China (the territories were taken from China and must return there, not ROC Taiwan).

Furthermore, Elleman's Diplomacy and Deception provides an additional document, a secret protocol signed by Lev Karakhan, the Soviet deputy minister of Foreign Affairs and C.T. Wang, the Chinese representative in charge of negotiations with the USSR in 1924. This secret protocol according to Elleman simply ruled that the previous agreements (the manifestos) "were not abolished, they were simply not enforced." The decision to accept or annul the Karakhan Manifestos would depend on future conferences and negotiations (pp. 100–102). There are those that disagree, namely Sergey Radchenko, a scholar in international relations. When President Lai of Taiwan made a quip (Sept. 2, 2024) about China invading Russia to take back the "lost territories," Radchenko said that Lai was "seriously misguided." Radchenko then spoke for China saying "China fully recognizes Russia's sovereignty over these territories." This might also be called "misguided" as he has never been a Chinese citizen, but rather a former Soviet and then Russian citizen (post-1991, per open sources).

The next day, Sept. 3, 2024, TASS, the Russian state-run news agency issued an article entitled "Russia, China officially confirm renunciation of territorial claims, diplomat says." The article purported to be citing Maria Zakharova, the spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry. What Zakharova actually said was quite telling. She said, "We are confident that our friends in Beijing share the same position." This statement acknowledged some doubt as she was "confident," but not completely sure. Zakharova also threw in some disparaging comments about Lai (referring to him as a "fringe politician"). Radchenko's earlier statements about the validity of China recovering its "lost territories" mirrors that of TASS.