Libyan–Syrian Union

(Redirected from Libyan-Syrian Union)

The state union of Libya with Syria proposed by Muammar al-Gaddafi in September 1980 was one of the numerous Libyan-Arab unification projects and part of the pan-Arab unity quest. The proposed union was considered a failure as early as December 1980, but at the latest in August 1981.[1][2]

History

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As early as April 1971, Libya and Syria had formed a Federation of Arab Republics with Egypt, but just like the United Political Leadership of Egypt and Syria agreed in 1976, the Egyptian-Libyan-Syrian Federation also finally broke apart with the trip to Jerusalem by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in November 1977. Gaddafi and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad then dismissed the Presidential Council of the Federation by decree on 5 December 1977, and initially moved the headquarters of the Federation to Tripoli. In December 1977, Gaddafi invited Arab heads of state there to form a front of steadfastness against the Egyptian-Israeli separate peace agreement of Camp David concluded in 1978.[3] Another aspect of this front formation orchestrated by Libya was Gaddafi's efforts to obtain military protection against an Egyptian invasion. The brief Egyptian-Libyan border war of July 1977 had already revealed the hopeless inferiority of the small Libyan army to the ten times larger Egyptian force; in 1980, new fighting threatened on the Libyan-Egyptian border.[1] In addition, the US and France had tried to overthrow the Libyan regime in 1980. Gaddafi hoped that the other "steadfast countries" would send troops to protect his regime if necessary and thus cover Libya's back during his intervention in the Chadian civil war.[4]

After the loss of its military ally Egypt, Syria initially sought a replacement in Iraq, which had concluded a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Under pressure from the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in April 1978, a temporary Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation was achieved on October 26, 1978, and a unification of the two Baathist states was even agreed. However, after Saddam Hussein came to power, Iraq terminated the union in July 1979. An initial uprising by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iran-Iraq War, which had been looming since July 1980, further worsened the military situation in isolated Syria. In a hasty bid to support Iran, Syria had "lent" numerous Syrian fighter planes to the Iranian Air Force (which was cut off from supplies and spare parts from the USA), and over 1,000 Syrian tanks were threateningly positioned on the borders with Iraq and Jordan. The Soviet Union then suspended the delivery of further military equipment until Syria's debts were paid. Fearing a two-front war, Syria turned its attention back to Libya.[5][6]

Organic Union

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Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi (1976)
 
Syrian president Hafez al-Assad (1977)

On September 1, 1980, on the 11th anniversary of the Libyan revolution, Gaddafi proposed to Assad that Libya and Syria should merge into a socialist unitary state. Assad agreed to the proposal, and on September 10, a 13-point agreement was signed, which provided for an "organic union" [7] or a complete merger of the two states. [5] [2] Within just one month, the leadership of Libya and Syria was to meet again to present a concrete plan and take the first steps. Within just one year, a new government and a "Revolutionary Congress" were to be formed and the unification process completed.[1][2][7]

The Libyan-Syrian unified state was also to be open to all other "progressive" states that were prepared to confront Israel and the regimes allied with the US, and thus become the core of a pan-Arab union . [9] Gaddafi promised that he himself would fight as a Fida'i (partisan) in Galilee (Palestine) if the union failed.

The Libyan revolutionary leader immediately paid off Syria's debts to the Soviet Union amounting to one billion US dollars and provided Syria with another 800 million. The Soviet Union's role behind this diplomacy remained unclear, but after the Union's announcement, the Soviet Union signed a friendship treaty with Syria in October 1980.

Instead of meeting again after a month, the Libyan and Syrian leadership did not meet again until December. At a Libyan-Syrian summit meeting from 15 to 17 December 1980 in Benghazi, cuts were made to the timetable for unification, which effectively meant that the project failed. [10] [11] Gaddafi and Assad only decided to set up a supreme committee or commission that would first develop a common constitutional framework.

Questions such as a common head of state, a common capital and the form of a common government or common state bodies remained unanswered. In March 1981, Assad declared that the two governments were still looking for the right formula to achieve the greatest possible popular approval for the unification project. While Gaddafi pushed for a full union, Assad only wanted a loose federation. The differences between Syria and Libya made a unification fundamentally difficult. In contrast to 1971, the establishment of the Libyan Jamahiriya was already well advanced in 1981. Despite a common "socialist orientation", this form of government was hardly compatible with the military-bureaucratic civil service state of Syria, and Assad was not prepared to dissolve the Syrian Baath Party or the National Progressive Front . By the end of the agreed one-year period, no progress had been made. During a visit to Damascus in August 1981, Gaddafi therefore blamed bureaucrats, regionalists and splitters for the failure of the unification.

Criticism

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Criticism came primarily from Libya and Syria's previous federation partners Egypt and Iraq. While Sadat derided the planned union as a "union of children", after previously calling Gaddafi and Assad "dwarfs", Iraq's Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz described the union as "a unity in which appearance outweighs reality". Aziz questioned the usefulness of a Libyan-Syrian union in particular and pointed out in 1981 that the planned union had little military or geostrategic value. As the wars of 1967 and 1973 had taught, in the event of a war against Israel, weak Syria would need a strong hinterland, which of course could only be Iraq, not the far-away and militarily weaker Libya.

" The area of Libya plays no role in the Arab-Zionist conflict, only if Libya is used as a strategic depth for Egypt. But Egypt, mind you, has a large land area and does not need this depth in its fight against the Zionist enemy. This is very different from Syrian-Iraqi relations, for example. Due to the small population and the low level [...] of technological development of Libya, it is hardly in a position to set up a military force that can have a decisive significance [...]. "

– Tariq Aziz : The Iraqi-Iranian Conflict, p. 57 Only Libya's rich financial resources are useful, but Gaddafi hardly uses them. Aziz also recalled Gaddafi's broken promise to

" [...] either to form a unity with Syria [...] or to go to Galilee as a guerrilla [...] Gaddafi said these beautiful words last September. Now we are in February 1981. More than five months have passed since Gaddafi said these beautiful words, but Gaddafi has not yet gone to Galilee. "

– Tariq Aziz : The Iraqi-Iranian Conflict, p. 58

Aftermath

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In the face of the confrontation between Libya and the US fleet in the Gulf of Sirte in August 1981, Assad again declared his solidarity with Libya, and Gaddafi was still negotiating the union in Syria, but militarily Libya was just as alone in this conflict and in the civil war in Chad as Syria was in the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights in December 1981 and in the uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama and the Lebanon War in 1982 .

Nevertheless, on 3 October 1984, a preparatory committee for the Libyan-Syrian Supreme Political Committee (agreed in December 1980) met for the first time, and on 20 May 1985, the Supreme Political Committee finally met for a (first and last) joint session. Some agreements on economic and cultural cooperation were concluded, and on 7 July 1985, a military cooperation agreement was added. At this time, however, Libya was already part of another union, the Arab-African Federation with Morocco. A renewed Libyan-Syrian alliance in 1986 also ended this federation: after Morocco's King Hassan II received the then Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres for (unsuccessful) talks in Morocco on 22 July 1986, Gaddafi and Assad strongly condemned the Moroccan-Israeli meeting during a visit by the Syrian president to Tripoli on 24 August 1986. Hassan then terminated the federation by telegram on 28 August 1986, and Gaddafi reiterated his desire to form a union with Syria on 31 August instead.

Since then, Syria has not participated in any further unification projects. Unlike most other union projects with Libya's neighbouring states, the failure of the Libyan-Syrian project did not lead to a deterioration in relations between Libya and Syria - not even during the Kuwait War in 1990/91, when Syria joined the anti-Iraqi coalition but Libya took a pro-Iraqi stance.

References

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  1. ^ a b c Robin Leonard Bidwell: Dictionary of Modern Arab History, S. 251f ("Libyan-Syrian Union"). Routledge, New York 1998
  2. ^ a b Ronald Bruce St. John: Historical Dictionary of Libya, Seite 203 ("Libya-Syria Union"). Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 2014
  3. ^ Johannes Berger, Friedemann Büttner, Bertold Spuler: Nahost-PLOETZ – Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Welt zum Nachschlagen, S. 78–82. Verlag Ploetz Freiburg/Würzburg 1987
  4. ^ Adel Elias, Bernhard Müller-Hülsebusch (1980), "Spiegel-Gespräch: "Dann drehe ich den Ölhahn zu." Der libysche Staatschef Muammar el-Gaddafi über seinen selbständigen Kurs", Der Spiegel, 21 July 1980, no. 30, pp. 92–99
  5. ^ Martin Stäheli: Die syrische Aussenpolitik unter Präsident Hafez Assad. Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2001, Seite 172f, p. 172, at Google Books.
  6. ^ Die Zeit 39/80 vom 19. September 1980: Eine neue Union
  7. ^ Gustav Fochler-Hauke (Hrsg.): Der Fischer Weltalmanach '81, Seite 930 (Libyen/Syrien). Fischer, Frankfurt (Main) 1980