Relations between France and NATO

France is one of the founding countries in 1949 of the North Atlantic Alliance to the emergence of which it actively contributed. Since then, France has never called into question its membership of the Alliance in its dual political and military dimensions. It has, however, repeatedly contested its operating methods, particularly in that they give the United States a preponderant role.

France and NATO relations

NATO	France

Under the presidency of General de Gaulle, France asserted a desire for independence and a vision of what Europe should be which are incompatible with American hegemony within the Alliance, particularly for everything relating to nuclear and to the integration of the armed forces of member countries within a unified command. De Gaulle drew his conclusions and France left the integrated military organization of the Alliance in 1966. However, cooperation agreements between the French armed forces and NATO forces were quickly signed, which somewhat attenuated the practical significance of this exit from NATO. This cooperation reinforced Treaty of Paris by presidents Mitterrand and Chirac, until 2009 when Nicolas Sarkozy reinstated France into the unified command of NATO.

Throughout the Cold War, the Atlantic Alliance played a role in defining the political positions of the Western world towards the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Above all on the military level, it defined the means that member countries must provide and their doctrines of engagement. During the most serious crises, such as those in Berlin or Cuba, and more recently on the subject of Euromissiles or after the terrorist attacks of September 11, France demonstrated its Atlanticism solidarity. France's foreign policy, however, led it to frequently disagree with American proposals, even if it meant finding itself isolated within the very European countries with which it was building the European Union in parallel.

Since the 1990s, however, areas of disagreement have become less frequent and France has once again become a major contributor to the Alliance's political and military actions.

Founding of the Alliance (1948–1950)

What collective security for France?

At the end of the Second World War, France could not ensure its security alone; the priority was supply and reconstruction; the Armies were poorly equipped. They must deploy over too vast territories, in the overseas empire, in the occupation zone in Germany and in the Metropolis. The UN was founded in 1945 with the objective of ensuring collective security on a global scale; in practice the decision-making power is concentrated between the permanent members of the Security Council, who have at Stalin's request a right of veto on resolutions put to the vote. At the insistence of de Gaulle, France is one of its five permanent members. It appeared from the vote of the first resolutions that the UN would not be sufficient to guarantee security in Europe, where opportunities for tensions were increasing between the Soviet Union and the West. Though provided for in the Charter of the United Nations, the establishment of international armed forces under the authority of the UN seemed unlikely to materialize. Considering that the UN cannot provide this collective security, France turned to other multilateral security scenarios, on a regional or bilateral scale, as the United Nations charter allows.

Until 1947, the main concern of French diplomacy was to protect itself against any military resurgence of Germany. When it became clear that the Soviet Union constituted the real threat to security in Europe, France actively participated, when it did not take the initiative itself, in the constitution of political and military alliances capable of guarantee its security. However, consensus was not easily established in France itself and between French, British and Americans on the strategy to adopt:

• France wished to extend the policy of dismemberment of Germany resulting from the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, while the Anglo-Saxons agreed from 1949 to 1950 on the necessity both from an economic and humanitarian point of view and from a military point of view to give back to Germany – at least for its part occupied by the West – a full place and the possibility of participating in its defense.
• Though the need for American aid was not contested by anyone, French policy hesitated between a mainly European vision or an Atlantic vision of the country's security. This question remained one of the major subjects of French diplomacy throughout the Cold War.
• If real momentum carried the European idea in the years immediately following the war, the questions were numerous and opinions very divergent in France as in other countries on the model(s), from simple cooperation to the establishment supranational bodies signifying a partial abandonment of sovereignty, through modes of operation inspired by federalism or based on consensus between partner countries.

The fifth meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) of the four former allies ended in London on December 16, 1947, with an acknowledgment of failure. The break was complete between Molotov and the three Western ministers. In the days that followed, Bevin, Bidault and Marshall consulted in pairs to draw the consequences, particularly in terms of European security. From the end of 1947, discussions took place in parallel at two levels: on the one hand, the French and the British worked together on a project for an alliance between Europeans, on the other hand the three Western powers began to secretly discuss the establishment of an Atlantic military alliance to protect Western Europe.

The Treaty of Brussels, a preliminary step

With the support of the United States, the British joined by the French proposed on January 22, 1948 that the Benelux countries form a regional political and military alliance. The negotiations led to the signing of the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948, the foundation of Western Union. Although the potential for threats coming from Germany was still among the subjects being negotiated, the treaty was ultimately clearly concluded with a defensive aim vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, in a context which was suddenly tense with the Prague coup by which the communists took control of Czechoslovakia in February.

The Americans were kept constantly informed of the negotiations, both officially and more secretly via the frequent direct relations between Americans and British to which the French were not invited. Exchanges between the two powers were intense and concerned not only questions of security in Europe, but much more broadly on which kind of Europe to build. The results were limited, which led France to turn from the beginning of the 1950s increasingly towards West Germany, whose rebirth was an established fact that it could only accept. In this context, the Brussels Treaty was more a means of making acceptable the eventual conclusion of a truly operational alliance at the Atlantic level, than as a step in the constitution of a European defense.

France in the founding of the alliance

Negotiating the North Atlantic Treaty

Following the failure of the CFM in London in December 1947, the Americans, French and British secretly agreed on the idea of a Western alliance, associating the United States and the countries of Western Europe in their defense, without anything very concrete being mentioned. The Americans were still hesitant about the form that their concrete participation in the defense of Europe should take: should it consist only of material aid, or should it result in the presence of American troops in Europe? France soon pushed this idea: on March 4, 1948, Bidault sent a note to Marshall in which he underlined the seriousness of the situation in Europe and the need to concretely define the means to be implemented to ensure the security of France and its neighbors. Marshall responded that he shared Bidault's point of view regarding the seriousness of the situation in Europe and the need to quickly define appropriate measures. However, it conditions the involvement of the United States in the defense of the European continent on the signing of the Brussels Treaty.

Secret negotiations were carried out between Americans, British and Canadians, without France, the official reason given a posteriori being the infiltration by communists of the French administration. The contempt in which the American administration held France, still perceived as the country defeated in 1940, also explains this exclusion. The American executive were aware of the inevitability of the direct involvement of the United States in ensuring the security of Europe, but public opinion must be more favorable to this and the law must first be modified to allow the United States to United to conclude alliances outside the American continent in times of peace. The Vandenberg resolution passed on June 11, 1948 removed this obstacle. The first condition was met thanks to the blockade of Berlin launched by the Soviets in June 1948 paving the way for the first official negotiations in July 1948 between the United States and the five European countries signatories to the Brussels Treaty.

France wanted the treaty to strongly commit the Americans in the event of Soviet aggression. It failed on this point: the wording of Article 5 does not include automatic armed intervention but only that each party to the treaty "shall assist the party or parties thus attacked by taking immediately, (...), such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force". On the other hand, France obtained the inclusion of the French departments of Algeria, and Italy joined the Alliance in return for the accession of Northern European countries as wanted by the United States. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949. The US Senate ratified it on July 21, 1949 by 82 votes to 13. The French National Assembly ratified it on July 26 and the treaty entered into force on August 24, 1949.

An embryonic permanent organization

The treaty provided as the sole body the North Atlantic Council, entrusted with the mission of defining subsidiary bodies necessary for the functioning of the Alliance. Intense negotiations took place around the creation of a restricted strategic committee of three, United States, United Kingdom and France, ardently desired by France as a unique opportunity to assert its influence on the Alliance strategy whose definition it otherwise feared would be left entirely to the discretion of the Anglo-Saxons. France obtained partial satisfaction, through the creation of a "Permanent Group" responsible for preparing military plans for the "Military Committee" at the level of chiefs of staff and the "Defense Committee" at ministerial level. The first meeting of the Council, September 17, 1949, ratified this governance at three levels.

The development of the Alliance's activities and the establishment of numerous committees soon revealed the need for a permanent civilian body. In May 1950, the Council established a Council of Deputy Foreign Ministers, to which each member country must appoint a permanent representative. Hervé Alphand represented France.

First definition of NATO strategy

These military authorities immediately begin defining NATO strategy. The challenge for France was to obtain agreement from the Americans on a forward defense strategy for continental Europe in the event of a Soviet attack, and to avoid the adoption of a peripheral defense strategy, in which the English – notably Field Marshal Montgomery – and the Americans believed more, if only because of the enormous superiority of Soviet land forces. NATO's first strategic concept approved at the beginning of 1950 ultimately constituted an acceptable compromise in providing for "stopping and, as soon as possible, repelling enemy offensives", without specifying the terms and conditions. means, and "to proceed quickly with strategic bombings involving the use of all devices without exception", that is to say including nuclear weapons.

Requesting aid and American military presence in Europe

France, a large beneficiary of American military aid

The ratification of the treaty by the National Assembly is accompanied by the vote of a motion which invites the government to use all its authority with a view to obtaining from the Government of the United States the supply of the essential armaments to give the French armies the means of effectively fulfilling the defense obligations entailed by the Atlantic Pact. April 5, 1949, the five signatory countries of the Brussels Treaty sent an official request for military aid to the United States to which the American executive quickly responded positively and began to obtain the necessary funds from Congress. October 6, 1949, Truman signed the Mutual Defense Military Assistance Program Act into law. On January 27, 1950 a bilateral agreement is signed between France and the United States, as well as with 7 other European countries. On March 8, the French aircraft carrier Dixmude took the first delivery of aircraft to the French naval aviation. But the negotiations are difficult and above all in return for the aid granted, the Americans ask for logistical facilities on French soil which raise questions of national sovereignty. France is all the more concerned because at the same time it is waging war in Indochina against the communist nationalists and this war is mobilizing a large part of its military resources, leaving only few forces in the European theater.

For broader coverage of this topic, see France–United States relations § ColdWar.

The Korean War, a catalyst for military integration

June 25, 1950, the North Korean army launches a massive attack against South Korea, the start of a war which will last three years and lead the United States to make a massive military commitment in Korea, but also in Europe to counter to the possibility of a Soviet attack which suddenly became the major concern of Western European governments.

American forces in Europe (1950–1955)

Year	Workforce
1950	120,497
1951	250 601
1952	250 601
1953	380 705
1954	397,029
1955	413 169

France sends two memoranda to the American government, one on August 5, the second on August 17 in which it underlines the importance of its military effort and the resulting need for additional aid, requests more American and British troops stationed in continental Europe, and considers it necessary to reorganize the Alliance in the direction of unification of command and defense plans. The tripartite meeting of American, British and French foreign ministers from September 12, 1950 is an opportunity for Acheson to express the views of the United States: his proposals go in the direction desired by France, except on one major point, the incorporation of German soldiers into Western forces, something to which France remains very hostile.

The emergency situation created by the outbreak of the conflict in Korea and the resulting real fears that it was only the prelude to a Soviet offensive in Europe demands immediate decisions: the Council of September 26, 1950 decides the creation of a unified force for the defense of Western Europe within the framework of NATO, place the Treaty of Paris under the direct authority of a supreme commander, who it is understood will be American. The decision on Germany's participation was postponed and the study was entrusted to the Defense Committee. Although isolated, France obtained a period of time which it would use to formulate counter-proposals which would materialize in a European army project, the Treaty of Paris. At its next meeting in December 1950, the Council appointed Dwight Eisenhower as the first Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe. The military organization of the Brussels Treaty merges with that of NATO. Eisenhower chose to establish his headquarters in France in Yvelines at Rocquencourt, quickly known as SHAPE. The command structure put in place by Eisenhower ensures an acceptable participation of French officers, since out of twenty-one general officers of the high command five are French and at SHAPE 25 positions out of 242 are assigned to French officers.

Mutual doubts and disappointments (1951–1958)

France played a leading role in the creation of the Alliance, in its evolution into a permanent and integrated military organization, and in the realization of the American security guarantee through a strong presence of its troops in Europe. But from the beginning of the 1950s, the often crisis situations that successive governments of the Fourth Republic had to face were sources of tension between France and the United States on a whole set of questions affecting the functioning, NATO strategy and means.

German rearmament and the Treaty of Paris crisis

The question of German rearmament remains very sensitive for France. Three paths are considered for the future of Germany: neutralization, Atlanticization or Europeanization. The first, accompanied by security guarantees on a European scale, favored by the left, is that which Moscow is trying to obtain during the Conferences of the four former allies; but a new failure during the conference held in Berlin at the beginning of 1954 demonstrated its inaccessibility. In the Atlantic solution, proposed by the Americans, and to which all NATO member countries are gradually joining, the French see a risk of dilution of their influence within the Alliance and of a complete absence of control of the scale of German rearmament. The European solution is a third middle way, which does not demobilize all those who continue to refuse any idea of German rearmament, but which is making headway in a large part of the French political world.

France's failed proposal for a European army

Pushed in June 1950 by Jean Monnet, by analogy with the Schuman plan at the origin of the ECSC, it was presented to the National Assembly on October 24, 1950 by the President of the Council, René Pleven, who proposed the creation of a European Defense Community (EDC) with supra-national structures and with the participation of West Germany (FRG). Initially perceived by the United States as a delaying tactic, this idea was finally adopted during the Atlantic Council meetings in December. The Treaty of Paris conference opened in Paris on February 15, 1951. The continental European countries, members of the Brussels and North Atlantic treaties, finally signed the treaty on May 27, 1952. However, it remained to define the relations between the Treaty of Paris and NATO. The political parties in France continued to differ deeply on this issue and France continued to demand ever more aid from its allies, particularly the Americans – in the midst of the Indochina war- while wanting to minimize the German contribution to the defense of Europe. The Americans supported the Treaty of Paris and insisted on its ratification by the French parliament. After two more years of external and internal negotiations, the treaty was finally rejected on August 30, 1954 in the National Assembly.

Accepting Germany's entry into the Alliance

France no longer has any other choice but to accept the entry of the FRG into the Atlantic Alliance, in return for a commitment from the British and the Americans to maintain their forces assigned to NATO. The extension of the Brussels Treaty to Germany and Italy led to the creation of the Western European Union (WEU), which for a long time was not very active in practice, but which, from 1984 on wards, was largely France's initiative, support for the establishment of an embryonic European defense policy, not integrated but articulated with NATO. The Atlantic Council of October 22, 1954 approved the protocol of accession of the FRG to the status of occupation which was terminated by the Bonn–Paris conventions. Symbolically turning a first page in the history of the relationship between France and NATO, Hervé Alphand was repl? Treaty of Paris on this same date as permanent representative of France on the NATO Council by Maurice Couve de Murville, future Minister of Foreign Affairs under General de Gaulle. The ratification of these agreements by the French parliament was obtained not without difficulty. December 1954 putting an end to four years of crisis.

The reorganization of the Alliance in 1951–1952

The Alliance is functioning poorly, a complete reorganization is necessary in everyone's eyes. The kick-off of the reflections was given by the Council meeting in Ottawa in September 1951 and the new organization validated by the Council meeting in Lisbon in February 1952. Jean Monnet represented France on the Temporary Committee responsible for formulating proposals, chaired by an American, A. Harriman. Agreement is reached on the need to establish permanent civil structures gathered in a single location and to provide the Organization with its own budget and legal personality. France and the United Kingdom want a strong Director General to be put at the head of all civil organizations and to chair the Council. But the United States imposes its point of view: a post of Secretary General responsible for the civilian functioning of NATO is created, but the presidency of the Council remains separate; on the other hand, to the satisfaction of the French, it was Paris and not London which was chosen to be the headquarters of NATO, a decision supported in particular by Eisenhower. This reorganization does not invest the NATO structure with any supranational authority. The North Atlantic Council remains the sole final decision-making authority and makes its decisions unanimously. He sits at the level of permanent representatives (who have the rank of ambassadors), at the level of ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, and at the level of heads of state and government. In the latter case, the session takes the name of the NATO summit.

Dependence on the United States, US Go Home

Map of NATO bases in France before the withdrawal of the integrated military command in 1966.

American military aid to France within the framework of NATO is constantly growing. This aid, ongoing since the Second World War, reached a peak in 1953–1954. The United States, itself engaged in the Korean War, supported France in the Indochina War with increasingly large deliveries of equipment and ammunition.

In the mid-1950s, France's image was deeply damaged among its allies, who saw it as a country incapable of adopting a foreign policy and a relationship with NATO that was stable and coherent over time, which ranged from ministerial crisis after ministerial crisis, regularly poses new demands and expects ever greater aid from the United States without compensation. On the French side, there is also great bitterness towards the United States which most often imposes its views on its allies, sometimes but not always in good agreement with London, in all important decisions affecting the external interests of French security without much spirit of partnership, and who interfered in French internal politics, particularly in economic matters, and intervened too late, too little and clumsily in Vietnam to avoid the disaster of Diên Bien Phu in the spring of 1954. Anti-Americanism was at its strongest and Franco-American relations were at their lowest in the summer of 1954. In the 1950s and 1960s, several tens of thousands of American soldiers, but also British and Canadian to a much lesser extent, however, were present in around twenty NATO bases in France. The majority of the French population does not react very well to what is felt to be or at least behave like a quasi army of occupation, whose personnel enjoy a higher standard of living than the French. The PCF, which still obtained significant scores in the elections, strongly contributed to the establishment of this anti-American feeling and popularized the slogan "US Go Home". In 1958, Henry Bonniere directed At Your Service, a documentary commissioned by the United States Information Agency, aimed at promoting cohabitation between the military of NATO countries and French civilians.

American military personnel in France under NATO

1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
802	22,876	22,876	44,950	47,187	55,270	59,615	71,531	50,417	43,933	40,059	40,045	53,074	41,331	33,503	31,049	22,333	1,491

American hegemony and the Suez crisis

The years 1953 and 1954 marked an important turning point in France's relationship with NATO. In the USSR, Stalin died and the new collegial leadership expressed its desire for peaceful coexistence, while in the United States, Eisenhower marked the beginning of his mandate by maintaining a very anti-communist posture and the adoption of 'a military strategy focused on nuclear deterrence and massive retaliation, particularly with the aim of achieving savings in military spending. France fears that this policy will miss an opportunity for détente in Europe and that this strategy will mean abandoning the defense of the front of the European continent and a strong risk of its destruction by nuclear weapons. The French military are kept little informed of nuclear plans by the American officers stationed at SHAPE for fear of communist infiltration, in a context of McCarthyism and espionage affairs.

But from 1954 Algeria quickly became the new and main concern of the French government. The Algerian territory, organized into French departments, is included in the geographical perimeter covered by the Alliance, whose jurisdiction is limited to external aggressions only. The French tried without success to convince their allies that Algeria, like Indochina, was an important issue in the fight against communism. The Americans see France as a state always tempted to pursue a colonialist policy to which they are very opposed and they do not wish to compromise their relations with the countries of the Middle East and the Third World by helping France in Algeria. France sends troops to Algeria taken from those it has committed to providing to the NATO command, to the great discontent of the Allied staffs.

The Suez Crisis in 1956 further highlighted within the Alliance the deep differences that the Americans had with the French, but also to a certain extent with the Europeans: the United States demanded an immediate end to the Franco-British military operation launched without their knowledge and using the UN and NATO to increase their pressure. For the Treaty of Paris to comply with American demands and against a backdrop of nuclear gesticulation from Khrushchev, France drew the conclusion that it must accentuate its independence and continue its nuclear research effort.

The nuclearization of NATO's strategy, in reality of the United States, became in 1957 both more concrete and more worrying for France: thanks to the successful launch of Sputnik, the Soviets began to make their nuclear capabilities credible, The British chose to get closer to the Americans for the pursuit of their nuclear program, and the Americans did not grant nuclear aid to the French but asked to install tactical nuclear weapons over which they would keep control on French territory. The French government hesitated on this question and no decision was taken when de Gaulle returned to power in May 1958. This geo-strategic conjunction also greatly worried the Germans, which led to a Franco-German rapprochement and the signing of secret nuclear agreements, subsequently extended to Italy.

France and the Alliance until the end of the Cold War (1958–1989)

De Gaulle: the Alliance without integration (1958–1969)

The topics of debate between France and the United States regarding the Alliance are largely a continuation of what they were during previous years. The big difference is that little by little, de Gaulle France is finding room for maneuver and can translate its policy towards the Alliance into clear positions and concrete actions. The policy relating to the Alliance will consist of two main phases: firstly, the idea is to find common ground on France's place in the leadership of NATO, then secondly, failing having obtained satisfaction, the guideline is that France regains its full decision-making capacity in matters of security without leaving the Atlantic Alliance. Without delay, upon his return to power, de Gaulle launched a program to create a French nuclear deterrent force to make himself autonomous. The first French nuclear tests took place two years later in February 1960, in Reggane (Algeria).

Give France its place in the leadership of NATO

As soon as he returned to power, de Gaulle set his course of action on the question of NATO. He states that "our place in the NATO organization must be reconsidered. The Americans have an overwhelming preponderance in the organization of commands. We are completely kept away from the plans drawn up by the SAC (...). SACEUR has resources whose use is completely beyond our decision". The nuclear question is central. These remarks by de Gaulle are in fact part of the context of the proposal made by Eisenhower during the NATO summit of December 1957to install in Europe within the framework of NATO a stock of nuclear weapons and medium-range missiles (IRBM), which de Gaulle refuses to accept without France being co-decision maker with the Americans and the British in nuclear matters within NATO. By proposing the deployment of nuclear weapons on French territory, the Americans hope that France will place its nuclear program within the framework of NATO and renounce independent deterrence. The other major reason why de Gaulle believes that NATO does not meet France's security needs is that threats must be understood and managed on a global scale, and not on a regional basis from the North Atlantic to which NATO is circumscribed. Summer crises 1958 in the Middle East and the Far East finally convince him of the Treaty of Paris.

After three months of intense diplomatic exchanges and hesitations, "de Gaulle raises the colors" in the words of Frédéric Bozo by sending on September 17, 1958 a confidential memorandum to Eisenhower and MacMillan in which he requested the creation of a tripartite NATO directorate, to put France on an equal footing with its allies. The document opens with a diagnosis: “The Atlantic alliance was designed and its implementation is prepared with a view to a possible zone of action [the North Atlantic] which no longer responds to political and strategic realities. (...). On the other hand, the radius of action of ships and planes and the range of the machines make such a narrow system militarily obsolete. It is true that it was initially admitted that atomic weapons (...) would remain the monopoly of the United States for a long time, which could seem to justify that on a global scale decisions concerning defense were practically delegates to the government in Washington. (...) such a fact previously admitted no longer holds true in reality. », then continues with a precise proposal: “It seems necessary [to France] that at the global political and strategic level an organization be established of which it is a direct part. This organization would have, on the one hand, to take common decisions in political questions affecting global security, and on the other hand to establish and, where appropriate, implement strategic action plans, particularly in this regard. which concerns the use of nuclear weapons".

Reactions are strong in Europe where NATO members do not appreciate this initiative which puts them out of the game. For all, if discussions must take place on the changes to be made to the functioning of NATO, they must be held within the framework of the North Atlantic Council, with all its members. The official response from Eisenhower which reachedOctober 20, 1958constitutes a polite dismissal, which does not surprise de Gaulle. Pragmatic, de Gaulle knows that he cannot yet enter into a logic of rupture, having to first resolve the Algerian question and not yet possessing the atomic bomb. It will endeavor to take advantage of international tensions to establish this tripartite cooperation as much as possible and thus test the true intentions of its Atlantic partners.

In 1963, de Gaulle explained to Alain Peyrefitte the aim of his 1958 approach: “This memorandum was only a process of diplomatic pressure. I was then looking for a way to get out of NATO and regain my freedom, which the Fourth ^Republic had alienated. So I asked for the moon”.

The following four years were punctuated by crises, of which for Europeans that of Berlin was the most serious. It is in the treatment of this crisis in which France plays a crucial role that there will be real cooperation between the three major Westerners; but for de Gaulle, it is more linked to the post-war agreements and the commitment of the three Western allies to defend Berlin than to NATO, and does not prevent significant differences from emerging at several levels. moments during this long crisis. On most other subjects, de Gaulle notes that Western solidarity plays little role and that the Americans take little consideration of France's interests. The Americans do not want this tripartism which would endanger the overall cohesion of the Alliance. To illustrate his determination, de Gaulle withdrew the Mediterranean Fleet from NATO command on March 11, 1959. Then in 1962, he withdrew the Atlantic and Channel fleets from NATO command.

Regain your full decision-making capacity

Nuclear weapons

The nuclear question is at the heart of Gaull's vision of France's rank in the world and its legitimate independence. The Americans do not want to enter into in-depth discussions on NATO's nuclear strategy and moreover their aid to the French nuclear program does not materialize, both for lack of political will and for legal reasons. De Gaulle and Eisenhower maintained close relations in 1959 and 1960; the two men met on several occasions and exchanged numerous letters, the tone of which was always respectful and even warm in form. In substance, if de Gaulle very clearly states his differences on the subject of NATO, he no less clearly recalls his attachment to the Western alliance, for example by writing in his letter of May 25, 1959 to Eisenhower "that I do not have never been more convinced Treaty of Paris that, in the present situation, the alliance of free States is absolutely necessary. (...). Fa? Treaty of Paris with Soviet ambitions and forces, in anticipation of what the power and imperialism of the enormous totalitarian China could become, (...) France belongs, without doubt, to the camp of freedom (and) that by adopting on its behalf measures which are not “integrated" into NATO, France in no way intends to alter our alliance. ». However, de Gaulle constantly returns to the charge, as in his letter of October 6, 1959, to obtain from the Americans that they agree "that the launching by the West of atomic war anywhere in the world would require the decision jointly between the United States, Great Britain and France".

Concerning the tactical nuclear weapons that Eisenhower proposed to store in France, de Gaulle noted that the Americans did not reconsider their refusal to leave them to France within the framework of an employment plan adopted jointly and therefore confirmed to Eisenhower on May 25, 1959 his refusal. During the second half of 1959, SACEUR transferred the 200 F-100 fighter-bombers based in Toul, Étain and Chaumont to England and the FRG. Via this first spectacular decision, de Gaulle shows not only his resolve on sharing control of NATO's nuclear weapons, but also his doubts about the merits of NATO's nuclear strategy, which he fears will increasingly exposes European countries to becoming a devastating nuclear battlefield and makes the strategic commitment of the United States less automatic.

Always pragmatic, de Gaulle adopted a different position regarding the French Forces in Germany (FFA) under NATO command. An agreement was signed in September 1960 by which the Honest-John and Nike tactical missiles were equipped with nuclear warheads which remained under American control until the employment decision. A similar agreement was signed in 1963 for the aircraft of the 1st CATAC operating on FRG soil. Concerned about maintaining links and effective cooperation capacities with the allies, in 1960 the Minister of Defense Pierre Messmer took the initiative of creating the Association of Tiger Squadron, renamed the NATO Tiger Association, to strengthen relations between NATO air units.

Exit NATO

September 9, 1965, de Gaulle announced the Treaty of Paris that "at the latest in 1969, the subordination described as integration which is planned by NATO and which hands over our destiny to foreign authority" will cease. The year 1969 is that of the twentieth anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty, concluded for this duration. De Gaulle casts doubt on French intentions: denunciation of the Treaty or just cessation of French participation in NATO's integrated military activities? In his letter to Johnson of March 7, 1966, de Gaulle confirms that France will remain a member of the Alliance because "France measures to what extent the defense solidarity thus established between fifteen free peoples of the West contributes to ensuring their security and, in particular, what essential role they play in this respect the United States of America. Therefore, France plans, from now on, to remain, when the time comes, party to the Treaty signed in Washington on April 4, 1949.", but also that "France considers that the changes accomplished or in the process of being accomplished, since 1949 (...) no longer justify, as far as it is concerned, the military arrangements taken after the conclusion of the "alliance" and that consequently France "proposes to recover on its territory the entire exercise of its sovereignty, currently undermined by the permanent presence of allied military elements or by the habitual use which is made of its sky, of cease its participation in "integrated" commands and no longer place forces at the disposal of NATO. This distinction between the Alliance formed by the 1949 treaty and the civil and military organization subsequently established will remain the foundation of relations between France and NATO during the following decades.

For de Gaulle, it was indeed an exit from NATO: “We no longer belong there, so to speak,” he confided in 1964 to Peyrefitte; in front of the same interlocutor, the president became more explicit on October 13, 1965: "The Alliance is desirable as long as a threat remains in the East! The Alliance, yes, but not NATO, not the military organization integrated under American orders".

The FGDS (Federation of the Democratic and Socialist Left), filed unsuccessfully in April 1966 a motion of censure against the Pompidou government, defended by Guy Mollet. Maurice Faure (of the Democratic Rally) then declared "if each of our allies behaved as you do and took the decisions that you have just decreed, it would mean nothing other than the withdrawal of all American forces from the European continent". For his part, René Pleven accuses the executive: “you deceived us about your intentions, you did not tell them to the nation”.

Evacuate NATO bases

In 1967, the NATO bases in France, mainly American, were evacuated by their occupants: around thirty bases in total, as well as 27,000 soldiers and 37,000 civilians. The organization's headquarters left Yvelines to settle in Belgium.

Cooperation agreements

The implementation of France's exit from the integrated organization was carried out quickly in 1966 and was accompanied by a review of the NATO organization. At the highest decision-making level, France remains a full member of the North Atlantic Council, but it participates neither in the Defense Planning Committee nor in the newly created Nuclear Planning Group.

An exchange of letters between the French and German governments dated December 21, 1966 defines the status of French forces stationed in Germany (FFA). In the military field, the modalities according to which the French forces would be brought in the event of crisis or conflict to make their contribution to the defense of Europe are the subject of several months of negotiation which conclude on August 22, 1967 by the Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreements. These agreements greatly attenuated the practical significance of the French withdrawal and made it possible to clarify the role of the FFA in the defense of Western Europe. The pipeline network in Central Europe is not affected by these events.

Confirm France's membership in the Atlantic Alliance

The normalization of Franco-American relations, begun in 1968, was confirmed with the arrival of Nixon. The intervention of Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia, the increasingly strong autonomy of the FRG which takes the lead in the policy of détente with the East and the internal difficulties of France do not favor new coups. brilliance to try to impose a transformation of the organizational model of the entire Atlantic.

France's allies are adapting well to the French strike force which has become a concrete reality and note that the military cooperation established in principle by the Ailleret-Lemnitzer agreement is being put in place on an operational level to the satisfaction of all parties and is even the subject of a certain publicity by senior French military officials.

In the last month of his presidency, de Gaulle accomplished two acts which testify that the relationship with the United States remains an intangible foundation of France's foreign policy, one of a symbolic nature, when he went to the funeral from Eisenhower to Washington where he met Nixon again, the other important for the future of the Western world when he had Michel Debré confirm the renewal of France's membership in the Atlantic Alliance.

The political and strategic rapprochement of the 1970s and 1980s

Until the end of the Cold War, three Presidents succeeded one another who managed the legacy left by de Gaulle without modifying it in depth, but taking into consideration the ups and downs which will alternate in East-West relations and the developments in the situation in Europe. National independence is consolidated, the French nuclear deterrent force continues to be developed in the 1970s and the link between strategic and tactical nuclear means and conventional forces is well in place thanks to the unity of command of the armies French. On the other hand, during these two decades France had to put up with the Atlantic status quo, its European partners being in no way willing to distance themselves from the United States, especially since the détente of the years 1969–1975 followed. a new phase of tensions with the Soviet Union.

In December 1980, Édouard Balladur recalled two obvious facts in a column published by Le Figaro: "France is a member of the Atlantic Alliance" and it "is not part of NATO, under American command". A few months later, the election of François Mitterrand marked an "Atlantic shift" in France's foreign policy, according to Paul-Marie de La Gorce.

First socialist president of the Fifth Republic, François Mitterrand confirmed on numerous occasions his loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance, while excluding the reintegration of France into the integrated military structure: “France has not left the Atlantic Alliance. It has not left the Atlantic defensive military alliance. It has left the NATO integrated command and, therefore, there is no question of returning under the orders of the integrated command".

Strengthening cooperation

Unable to transform it in depth, France chooses to strengthen its cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance. Consistent with the NATO concept of forward defense which consists of resisting a Soviet offensive as close as possible to the eastern border of the FRG and in a manner compatible with the reorganization of the French armies after the end of the war of Algeria, the French forces become NATO's strategic reserve, with terms of employment which are clarified as their operational capabilities are strengthened.

Military strength of the Atlantic Alliance in Central Europe (1988)

Country	Military personnel	%
Benelux	137,000	12%
Denmark	21,000	2%
France	267,000	24%
FRG	352,000	31%
United Kingdom	141,000	12%
United States (in Europe)	216,000	19%
TOTAL	1,134,000	100%

The agreements concluded in July 1974 between Generals Valentin and Ferber extended the scope of cooperation between France and NATO to the entire ^1st Army, while leaving France alone to decide on the commitment of its forces. This cooperation is seen as a necessity on both sides: France cannot envisage winning the battle for the defense of its soil alone after the battle in Germany has been lost, and NATO needs the strategic reserve that constitutes the French forces, especially since their level of equipment, very low until the beginning of the 1970s, then improved significantly. The nuclear issue, however, remains a subject of disagreement: deprived of tactical nuclear capabilities by the withdrawal of 1966, the French army found them again in 1973 with the AN-52 bomb carried by plane then in 1974 with the Pluton missiles, but the doctrine of The use of these weapons poses a problem. NATO adopts a strategic concept of flexible response which aims to raise the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons to reduce the risks of nuclear escalation, which implies that its conventional forces are able to engage in battle with those of the NATO Pact. Warsaw at least long enough to be certain of Soviet intentions. France, on the contrary, closely associates the maneuver of the FFA units with the early use of its tactical nuclear weapons, which constitutes a final warning before resorting to the strategic component of the deterrent force.

The period of relaxation ended at the end of the 1970s: East-West relations were again tense at the beginning of the 1980s, notably with the question of Euromissiles and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, leading to a political rapprochement between France and its allies as was already the case in the years 1958–1962 with the Berlin crisis. Throughout the Cold War, in times of crisis, France always demonstrated its Atlantic solidarity. However, it is not envisaged by Paris to reverse the decisions of 1966, but the cooperation which intensified in the 1980s makes it possible, both in terms of theories of employment of French forces in addition to the integrated forces of the NATO only on the concrete level thanks to numerous combined exercises, to make France's contribution to NATO more credible. Representing approximately 15% of NATO's integrated forces, French forces are quantitatively significant and their quality is regularly improved now that the effort made for nuclear power can decrease. They represent in fact the only directly operational strategic reserve in the event of a surprise attack carried out by the armies of the Warsaw Pact.

East-West negotiations

In June 1968 in Reykjavik the Alliance called the Warsaw Pact for negotiations on the mutual and balance Treaty of Paris reduction of conventional forces in Central Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Brezhnev gives an agreement in principle on May 14, 1971. France is opposed to this because it does not want block-to-block discussions which are contrary to its policy of independence and its vision of détente in Europe. In practice, negotiations began in 1973 and continued – without France – throughout the 1970s without achieving a result.

In the mid-1970s, the Soviets began deploying the SS-20 missiles, capable of hitting any target in Europe, much more modern than the old SS-4 and SS-5 models that they replace Treaty of Paris, thus opening the euromissile crisis. Concerns about these theater nuclear weapons in Europe Treaty of Paris take presence over the reduction of conventional forces. At the end of 1977, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group – in which France did not participate – launched the modernization of intermediate-range nuclear weapons deployed by NATO as part of its flexible response strategy, itself never accepted by France. December 12, 1979, the decision was taken by the Atlantic Council, with France, and the Defense Planning Committee to deploy new intermediate-range missiles (Pershing II and American cruise missiles) from 1983 in Western Europe in the event refusal of the USSR to withdraw its own.

François Mitterrand, elected on May 10, 1981, will continue on the path of France's support for the Alliance's decision, bring about a rapprochement with the United States and demonstrate greater firmness towards Moscow than his predecessor at the Élysée, Valéry Giscard- d'Estaing. For their part, the Soviets declared themselves ready to negotiate, provided that a possible agreement included the British and French nuclear forces. François Mitterrand categorically rejects this prospect which would amount to placing the French deterrent force under the influence of an American-Soviet agreement. François Mitterrand summarizes the reality of the balance of power in Europe in a now famous formula: “pacifism is in the West and Euromissiles are in the East. I think this is an unequal relationship”. Open since October 1980, the INF negotiations on these intermediate-range nuclear weapons bogged down, and NATO carried out the first deployment of Pershing II in Germany in 1983 as planned. In response, the Soviets put an end to these negotiations as well as those on conventional forces.

Gorbachev rise to power in March 1985 profoundly disrupts East-West relations and gives new impetus to negotiations on nuclear and conventional weapons in Europe:

• In January 1986, Gorbachev proposes to the Americans a comprehensive program of nuclear disarmament, which includes the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, in accordance with the "zero option" which was favored by Reagan, and leaves the British and French nuclear weapons outside the INF perimeter. From then on, serious negotiations resumed and concluded with the signing of the INF Treaty in December 1987.
• In June 1986, the Soviets and the other States parties to the Warsaw Pact propose to resume negotiations on conventional forces in Europe on more ambitious bases than the MBFR. Within a framework defined by the OSCE, which suits France which joins it, the FCE negotiations open in Vienna on March 9, 1989 between the 23 states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They came to fruition quickly, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in Paris on November 19, 1990 by 22 NATO countries, including France, and the Warsaw Pact.

France and the Alliance from 1990 to the present day

The fall of communist regimes in Europe and the dislocation of the Soviet Union that followed marked the end of the Cold War and thereby raised the question of the future of the Atlantic Alliance designed to ensure the defense of the Europe facing the Soviet threat. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved on July 1, 1991. The Atlantic Alliance took a different path, succeeding in redefining its role and later welcoming the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. France accepts this transformation of NATO and reintegrates its military organization in stages.

France supports the transformation of the Alliance (1990–1995)

The NATO summit held in London on July 5 and 6, 1990 took note of the end of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany and the need to renovate the Atlantic Alliance. François Mitterrand declares "the Alliance which has remarkably ensured our security (...) must today adapt to the new situation in Europe. (...) our Alliance must maintain its cohesion. She showed this by reaffirming the need for the presence of American forces in Europe and by supporting the membership of a unified Germany in NATO. (...) the time has come to establish new relationships in Europe, where everyone is interested in the security of this continent. It seems to me that NATO, by adapting, can play a very useful role in this evolution".

NATO's new strategy

With the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the transformation of the Alliance accelerated. At the Rome summit in November 1991, NATO defined a new strategic concept and increased openings towards the countries of Central Europe and also attempted to redefine its relations with European organizations and to influence the role they could play. in matters of security and defense of Europe. François Mitterrand continues to provide France's support for maintaining the Alliance and for a new strategic definition of its role on the grounds that the disappearance of the Soviet bloc does not mean the end of all perils. Mitterrand, however, distances himself from the exercise of a political role by the Alliance, which he reserves for each country and for the European Union (EU) which is taking shape with the Treaty of Maastricht.

European defense policy and NATO

The end of the Cold War leads to questions about the respective roles of the United States and European states in security in Europe. The question of increasing Europe's role in its defense, at the heart of Gaullian policy in the 1960s, is therefore raised again. The final declaration of the Rome summit affirms that "increasing the role and responsibilities of European members constitutes an important foundation for the renovation of the Alliance" while affirming the pre-eminence of the Alliance by specifying that "we intend, at the same time the emergence and development of a European security identity and Europe's role in defense, consolidate the fundamental transatlantic link, of which the Alliance is the guarantor, and fully maintain strategic unity and indivisibility of the security of all Allies".

NATO therefore takes note of the fact that the Maastricht Treaty of February 1992 establishes a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which includes "all issues relating to the security of the European Union, including the long-term definition of a common defense policy (ESDP), which could lead, when the time comes, to a common defense. Traditional differences between European states prevent a real defense policy specific to the European Union from being put in place in the short term. Also, by the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, the Western European Union (WEU) continues to exercise its role of defining the defense policy of Europeans and NATO remains the only operational military structure in Europe, until the lessons of the failure of the Europeans in resolving the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia changed points of view in the years 1998–1999. In June 1992, the WEU published the “Petersberg Declaration" which limited future European interventions to peacekeeping missions.

The deadly conflicts which broke out in the former Yugoslavia in 1991 were the opportunity for NATO to carry out military operations for the first time as the armed arm of the UN: military operations carried out under the aegis of the UN from 1992 quickly showed the limits of the WEU and the EU and required increasingly significant intervention from NATO. France, very present in these operations, in particular because it exercises command of UNPROFOR, realizes that there is no alternative to the use of NATO resources. Closer cooperation between NATO and the WEU was established at the NATO summit in January 1994 in Brussels: to avoid a costly duplication of resources, it was decided that NATO would make its collective resources available, after consultations within the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations carried out by the European Allies in application of their common foreign and security policy, in situations which have an impact on European security but do not concern the NATO. This Brussels summit marks the appearance in NATO's vocabulary of "European identity in terms of security and defense" without, however, any revision of NATO's operating methods, especially since François Mitterrand maintains until the end of his mandate May 1995 his refusal to consider the reintegration of France into military command, despite the multiplication of exchanges and collaborations between French and NATO officers for operations in former Yugoslavia.

Return of France to NATO decision-making bodies (1995–2008)

With the arrival of Jacques Chirac as president, France is moving closer to NATO to be able to influence the decisions taken from within, in particular to further Europeanize its decision-making structures. During the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (CAN) in December 1995, France announced the return of its Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (CEMA) to the Military Committee and of the Minister of Defense to the Atlantic Council, but without the French forces being subordinate to NATO command. In return, France tried to obtain command of the southern theater of operations (AFSOUTH) between 1995 and 1997, which the Americans refused. From March to June 1999, Chirac engaged the French army in NATO bombings on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, even though this operation was not authorized by the UN.

France's participation in NATO decision-making bodies and structures

Category	Instance	Creation	1949–1950	1951–1966	1967–1995	1996–2003	2004–2008	2009–2016
High-level decision-making bodies	North Atlantic Council	1949	F	F	F (1)	F	F	F
	Defense (Plans) Committee	1949	F	F	X	X	X	BORN
	Nuclear Plans Group	1966	BORN	BORN	X	X	X	X
Military structures	Military Committee	1949	F	F	X	F	F	F
	International military staff	1951	BORN	F	X	F	F	F
	Cdt. ally Europe (ACE)	1951	BORN	F	F	F	BORN
	Cdt. Ally Transformation (ACT)	2003	BORN				F	F
	Cdt. Allied Operations (ACO)	2003	BORN				F	F
Civil structures	Committees reporting to the Board	1950	F	F	F (2)	F	F	F
	International Secretariat	1951	BORN	F	F	F	F	F
Legend and notes (1) The Minister of Defense does not participate in ministerial meetings (2) France continues to participate in most Committees						F	= Full participation of France
						F	= Partial participation of France
						X	= No participation from France
						BORN	= Not existing at this time

The difficult Europeanization of NATO

Forty years after the failure of the European Defense Community, France is trying to set up a European defense within the framework of the WEU and the EU. But France's partners do not want to go beyond consultation between Europeans, the multilateral construction of certain weapons, and symbolic decisions such as the formation of the Franco-German brigade.

Symmetrically, France is opposed to the enlargement of the Alliance desired by the United States to countries which do not belong to Europe. At the Riga summit in 2006, Jacques Chirac blocked any progress in this direction: “in certain cases, NATO associates certain countries with its contribution for military operations, by mutual agreement. This is what is happening in Afghanistan. But there was never any question of extending NATO to Asia, any more than elsewhere. (...) NATO can only function properly as a military defense structure between the United States, Canada and Europe”.

Return of France to the integrated military organization (2009 -)

Nicolas Sarkozy takes the final step by organizing the reintegration of France into NATO: prepared since 2007, definitively voted on by Parliament on March 17, 2009, it was ratified at the NATO summit of April 3 and 4, 2009. France, however, did not join the Nuclear Plans Group, wishing to maintain its independence in matters of nuclear deterrence.

In practice, this decision results in the deployment of several hundred French soldiers in the fifteen headquarters of the NATO military structure and the obtaining by France of two positions of responsibility: the supreme allied command in charge of NATO Transformation (SACT) based in Norfolk (United States) and the joint command based in Lisbon, a structure which has authority in particular over the rapid reaction force (NRF). France contributes significantly to this force in terms of personnel and resources.

France's contribution to the defense effort

Main contributing countries to the NATO budget

Country	Country's contribution as a % of the total NATO budget for 2016 and 2017	% of GDP (est. year 2016)
France	10.6339	1.78
United States	22.1446	3.61
United Kingdom	9.8485	2.21
Germany	14.6500	1.19
Italy	8.4109	1.11
The Netherlands	3.1804	1.17
Canada	6.6092	0.99

France is ranked 3rd among countries contributing to the NATO common budget. The contributions of the 29 member countries are calculated according to a cost-sharing formula based on their gross national income. France also bears the direct costs linked to NATO operations in which it chooses to participate. Since 2006, the Alliance has set a long-term objective for each member country to devote 2% of its GDP to defense. In 2016, this objective is far from being achieved since only 5 countries respect this standard. France is getting closer to this objective, unlike many EU countries from which it regularly asks to contribute more to the defense of Europe and to external operations of which it considers to assume a disproportionate share. The United States continues to be at a level of military spending much higher than that of all the major Western industrialized countries, which maintains both its preponderant weight within the Alliance and its demand that the Europeans do so. more for their safety.

The specific positions of France in the Atlantic debates

Although the display of Alliance unity is still the rule, France disagrees more or less strongly with some of NATO's policies and operational orientations. The American project to set up an anti-missile shield in Europe has thus posed a problem from the outset for France, which does not want to see its nuclear deterrence competed or relativized by this other defense system, including on the industrial and financial plan, since anti-missile requires heavy investments. The declaration from the July 2016 summit in Warsaw on transatlantic security thus recalls, in careful language, the "appropriate combination" on which "NATO’s deterrence and defense system" must be based, namely "nuclear capabilities, conventional capabilities and missile defense capabilities".

In November 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron declared in an interview with The Economist newspaper that NATO was in a state of "brain death", following the Turkish intervention in northern Syria, launched against opinion of other NATO members.

France's contribution to NATO military resources and operations

The broadening of NATO's field of intervention to new missions beyond the strict defensive framework of the territory of its members against the pre-designated Soviet enemy quickly results in the commitment of its military assets outside their borders. This intervention by NATO beyond the borders of its member states ratifies the new role of maintaining peace in the world that NATO has self-assigned since the interests of its members are concerned.

It is in this logic that, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the North Atlantic Council for the first time in its history invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty by declaring that the attack against the United States was an attack directed against them all, including France.

Tensions in 2021 and questioning of French participation

In September 2021, a contract worth $56 billion for the sale of diesel submarines from Naval Group was canceled without notice by Australia in favor of the purchase of American nuclear-powered submarines. This episode, which follows the Swiss decision to buy American F35s instead of French Dassault Rafale or Eurofighter Typhoons, revives the opposition of part of the French political class to the country's participation in command of the organization.

During the campaign for the presidential elections of April 2022, the question of relations between France and NATO is addressed by all the candidates, while Russia's invasion of Ukraine has already begun. Four candidates wish to remain in NATO (Macron, Pécresse, Hidalgo, Jadot), three wish to leave NATO military command (Le Pen, Zemmour, Dupont-Aignan), five wish to leave NATO (Mélenchon, Roussel, Poutou, Arthaud, Lassalle).

France's participation in the main operations carried out by NATO

Start year	Year end	Operation area	Operation name	Mandate UN	Participation of the European Union	Participation of France
1993	1996	Adriatic	"Sharp Guard”	#820 No. 943		Under the joint control of NATO and the WEU, a vast naval blockade operation, in which 14 nations including France are participating.
1993	1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina	"Deny Flight”	#816		Overflight ban operation in which France is participating. A Mirage 2000 is lost due to damage.
1995	1995	Bosnia and Herzegovina	"Deliberate Force”	coordinated with UNPROFOR		Massive bombing of Bosnian Serb positions. France participates with planes – of which a Mirage 2000N will be lost – and artillery pieces.
1996	1996	Bosnia and Herzegovina	IFOR	#1031		Succeeding UNPROFOR, deployment of a force of 60,000 men, including around 7,500 French soldiers, acting as part of "Operation Joint Endeavor"
1997	2004	Bosnia and Herzegovina	SFOR	#1088	Takeover by EUFOR Althea	SFOR takes over from IFOR, with resources reduce Treaty of Paris to 32,000 men.
1999	1999	Kosovo (Serbia)	"Allied Force”	–		Aerial bombings on Serbia carried out by NATO in the context of Kosovo gaining independence against Serbia's wishes. France participates by carrying out approximately 3% of the bombing missions carried out by several hundred NATO aircraft.
1999	–	Kosovo	KFOR	#1244		Since the beginning, France has contributed to this force, the largest contingents of which are provided by Germany, Italy and the United States
2001	2016	Mediterranean	Active Endeavor (OAE)	–
2001	2003	North Macedonia	"Essential Harvest”	–	"EUFOR Concordia" takes over	NATO's intervention results from a request from Maonia and consultations with the OSCE and the EU. France contributes significantly to the Task Force of around 3,500 men. The lesser operations "Renard Roux" and "Allied Harmony" followed before the EU took over.
2003	2014	Afghanistan	ISAF	#1386		France participates in the ISAF throughout its existence. In 2011–2012, when the ISAF reached its highest level of strength with around 130,000 men, the United States contributed 90,000 men, the United Kingdom 9,000, Germany 5,000 and the France for 4,000
2015	–	Afghanistan	Resolute Support	#2189		In 2015 and 2016, France did not provide troops to this training and supervision operation for the Afghan army which mobilized around 12,000 men from NATO and partner countries
2009	2016	Somalia	"Ocean Shield”	#1814 #1816	"Atalanta" conducted in parallel	Naval anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia, completed in November 2016. France is participating in the EUNAVFOR Atalanta operation of the same nature extended in November 2016 by the EU until 2018.
2016	–	Mediterranean	Sea Guardian			Naval operation which follows on from Ocean Shield. In 2016, France did not directly engage its ships there.
2011	2011	Libya	"Unified Protector”	#1970 #1973		France is, via Operation Harmattan, one of the main players in the air-naval intervention in Libya coordinated by NATO.

Notes and references

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External links

• "Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l'OTAN". otan.delegfrance.org. Retrieved 2024-04-24.
• "Reference website of the Charles de Gaulle Foundation" (in French). Retrieved 2024-04-24.
• "Research and documentation site on the history of European integration, containing numerous historical documents relating to the Cold War in Europe, including around a hundred relating to Ostpolitik". www.cvce.eu. Retrieved 2024-04-24.