Storming of the presidential palace in Grozny

The assault on the presidential palace in Grozny  is a combat episode of the First Chechen war (1994–1996), which occurred during the assault on Grozny by Russian federal troops.

Storming of the presidential palace in Grozny
Part of First Chechen War
Date 31 December — 19 January 1995 Location Chechnya, Grozny Result Capture of the Presidential Palace by the Russian Troops
Belligerents
Chechnya	Russia
Commanders and leaders
Aslan Maskhadov	Lev Rokhlin
Units involved
Chechen Fighters	Armed Forces
Casualties and losses
Unknown	Unknown

Background

After the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria declared independence, the former building of the Republican Committee of the CPSU CHI ASSR in the city of Grozny began to be used as the residence of the leader of the Chechen separatists, President Dzhokhar Dudayev, as a result of which it became known as the “presidential palace” . During this period, the building was also used for the work of the government of Ichkeria.

On December 26, 1994, at a meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, a decision was made to storm Grozny. The plan to capture the city on the night of January 1 provided for the actions of groups of federal troops from four directions: “North” (under the command of Major General K. Pulikovsky ); “West” (under the command of Major General V. Petruk); "North-East" (under the command of Lieutenant General L. Rokhlin ) and "Vostok" (under the command of Major General N. Staskov). The emphasis was on surprise and complete superiority in the quality of weapons. The groups were given a goal: to take administrative buildings, including the presidential palace and government building, radio, and railway station . From the northern direction, two assault detachments of the “North” group of troops and an assault detachment of the “North-East” group had the task, advancing in the zone allotted to them, to block the northern part of the city and the presidential palace from the north. From the western direction, two assault detachments of the “West” group of troops, advancing in a designated zone, were supposed to capture the railway station, and subsequently, moving in a northerly direction, block the presidential palace from the south  .

For the defense of Grozny, the Chechen command created three defensive lines. The internal border, with a radius of 1 to 1.5 km, was located around the presidential palace. On the internal line, the defense of the Chechen formations was based on the creation of continuous resistance centers around the presidential palace using capital stone buildings. The lower and upper floors of the buildings were adapted for firing from small arms and anti-tank weapons. Along Ordzhonikidze, Pobeda and Pervomaiskaya streets, prepared positions were created for direct fire from artillery and tanks.

New Year's assault

Federal troops "West" entered Grozny at 7:30 a.m., but during the operation the task of capturing the station was canceled and the forces were sent to the presidential palace. The main task of capturing the Presidential Palace of Dudayev (formerly the Republican Committee of the Chechen Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic) went to the “North” group. The overall command of the North group was exercised by Major General Konstantin Pulikovsky ( 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment, 276th Motorized Rifle Regiment). Almost without a fight, the 1st Battalion of the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment reached the railway station (by 13.00) and Dudayev's presidential palace (by 15.00). Until 12 noon, the Dudayevites did not offer resistance, as subsequent events showed - not by chance. Later it became known that Aslan Maskhadov, who was appointed in March 1994 as the Chief of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, and who led the defense of the presidential palace in Grozny in December 1994 - January 1995, developed a plan according to which the Chechens deliberately let tanks into the city center, after which with the onset of darkness they struck. From buildings along the streets, infantry and armored vehicles were shot at point-blank range. Classic counteraction was organized to the movement of armored columns along the narrow streets of Grozny: usually the leading and trailing vehicles in the column were first destroyed, after which multi-tiered (floor-by-floor) fire was opened from the surrounding buildings on the rest of the armored vehicles. The battalions of the 81st Motorized Rifle Regiment and the 131st (Maikop) Motorized Rifle Brigade, standing in columns along the streets near the railway station and Dudayev's presidential palace, did not take care of organizing the defense and dispersing the units. Without covering the equipment, without setting up checkpoints along the route of movement and without conducting reconnaissance, they allowed the Chechens to secretly concentrate a strike force there, numbering up to 3.5 thousand militants, 50 guns and tanks, 300 grenade launchers, and suddenly attack with the onset of darkness. The battle began at about 19:00 and lasted all night on January 1. The soldiers and officers retreated to the station, where they tried to gain a foothold, but the building, which had huge windows and many entrances, was unsuitable for defense. Therefore, at night, at about 24 hours, the remnants of the Maykop brigade, with the support of two tanks, tried to break out of the city along the railway. Since 1 am on January 1, contact with them has been lost. As it turned out later, the group was surrounded on one of the station streets and was completely killed during the battle. Along with her, the commander of the 131st brigade, Colonel Savin, and almost the entire command of the brigade died in battle. In total, during the “New Year’s assault,” the Maikop brigade from the “North” group lost 189 people killed, captured and missing, 20 T-72 tanks out of 26, 102 infantry fighting vehicles out of 120, all 6 Tunguska air defense missile systems of the anti-aircraft division.