Talk:1953 Iranian coup d'état/Archive 13

Latest comment: 13 years ago by JeffGBot in topic Dead link 2
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Amercian goverment propaganda film from 1953: "with the ouster of Mossadeq, Iranian oil may again flow westward"

See it here, it goes on for two minutes. These are archived propaganda films, from the US State Department. Notice the emphasis put on oil, and oil interests. I say this straight from the horse's mouth, proving that oil was proudly proclaimed as a motive by the US at the time of the coup. This should put to rest all apologist attempts at historical revisionism. Kurdo777 (talk) 01:24, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

It's interesting that you would not like government figures such as Eisenhower saying in his book that Soviet influence was a key factor but you readily accept government propaganda as the more reliable source. People hear what they want to hear. Binksternet (talk) 02:59, 26 February 2011 (UTC)
It was an interesting and useful link. Furthermore, it's interesting that while Soviet influence is repeated several times in this discussion, the influence itself which is again related to Iran's Oil is ignored. People ignore what they don't like.--Aliwiki (talk) 02:24, 27 February 2011 (UTC)
This is another issue that's been discussed before. Oil and Soviet influence are anything but mutually exclusive motivations, if you are talking about the geopolitical importance of oil. If you are worried about Soviet expansion you are worried about Soviets having control of 2/3 or so of the world's oil reserves, which is how much oil there was estimated to be in the Persian Gulf in the early oughts (2002). (Only a fraction of that was in Iran but the other gulf states are much smaller and if Iran had come under enough Soviet influence to have given the Soviets a base on the Gulf, ... well their military influence over that 2/3 of the oil reserves would have been serious.) I'm not sure what oil reserves were estimated to be in the 1950s, but there's little doubt both Russians and Westerners both knew it was a geopolitically significant place. --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:01, 1 March 2011 (UTC)
I'm sorry why again are we supposed to be in shock that the natural resources produced by a region are a primary motivation behind our interests there? And why again would such motivation be exclusive to American imperialism and not Soviet expansionism? Oh that's right they are not. Let us duly note that you yourself present this as propaganda, which inherently should leave the viewer with skepticism over its ulterior motives. So since this propaganda as you describe is promoting our interests there for oil, what real motivation are you speculating they were promoting? Perhaps our fear of communist expansion? LOL. Wiki POV pushing Phail. Batvette (talk) 00:07, 3 March 2011 (UTC)

Disingenuous lede

This- The coup launched 26 years of dictatorial rule under Mohammad-Rezā Shāh Pahlavi, who relied heavily on U.S. support to hold on to power until the Shah himself was overthrown in February 1979. would have the reader believe such political situation was unprecedented and not merely the continuation or resumption of 2500 years of monarchy rule over Persia. 2500 year celebration This lede also fraudulently presents that Mossadegh was democratically elected, which that term is linked to an article whose lede begins with this sentance- An election is a formal decision-making process by which a population chooses an individual to hold public office. Which was miles away from what really happened. When will this agenda pushing stop? Note from the same source-The Pahlavi State was all about... Freedom

On the issue of monarchy and freedom: There is no question that there was no political freedom in the Pahlavi state. This has however nothing to do with monarchy, there has never been any political freedom in Iran under any regime.

For that matter, there has never been nor there is any political freedom even close to what it is practiced in the West in any part of the Islamic Middle East, republic or monarchy. The Pahlavi State did however provide for social freedoms which had never existed nor do they currently exist in Iran and are rare in the whole region.

That seems to be a more accurate portrayal than what the article implies, that Iran had a democracy before the west barged in and installed something they never had. Batvette (talk) 23:52, 2 March 2011 (UTC)

Ya, it's a terrible lede. Bloated and loaded with POV. If you want to do anything about it though be prepared for a long slog. But ummm ... we have to be aware of all the subtleties involved.
This lede also fraudulently presents that Mossadegh was democratically elected. The election wasn't so democratic but it was sea change in involving the Iranian middle class and not just the Iranian notables/elite.
there has never been any political freedom in Iran under any regime. Mossadeq did break precident and open up the political system in Iran ... for a little while anyway. He allowed the commies (Tudeh) to run in elections for example. Admittedly by the time of the coup he was accumulating power for himself. --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:40, 3 March 2011 (UTC)
Another troubling thing (and it used to not be written this way) is that the article tells the story in a way that portrays every Iranian who would take to the streets or be dissatisfied wih Mossadegh at all, was paid or recruited by the CIA to do so. The only hint of any rationale for dissent is found in the background section, a small description of people being put out of work. IIRC this article had the more accurate story a couple of years ago. Didn't Mossadegh say himself in his memoirs that his disastrous policies were the cause of his demise? The country ground to a halt, (didn't they declare bankruptcy?) yet according to a reference that isn't even checkable, Mossadegh was a hero? Did they get that reference from the same place the mossadegh page references (53) a page on iranian martial arts to reference a whole passage that reads like a cartoon? I do see what you mean about a long slog changing it, what do you say to editors who believe it was the US who gave WMD to Saddam? I don't have a fraction of the tenacity to stay and wrestle as you do, but please let me know when any polling or RFC's come up on this or related matters. The good people of Iran deserve better than to be portrayed as weak patsies who would sell out their own country for a pittance to the first guy looking for jugglers, acrobats and prostitutes.Batvette (talk) 14:30, 6 March 2011 (UTC)
I'll include you on the list of interested editors when I post questions on those editors' talk pages. --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:21, 8 March 2011 (UTC)

Role of BBC

I understand that the BBC Persian Service broadcast disinformation during the coup. Could someone with the requisite knowledge add a referenced sentence? I think this sub- sub- sub-topic is of interest because (I believe / hope) flat-out lying by BBC external services in the pursuit of foreign policy goals at the behest of a peacetime government is unusual. (If I'm wrong on this, I'm willing to be put right.)

Regards to all, Notreallydavid (talk) 04:15, 19 March 2011 (UTC)

disinformation, black propaganda or selective reporting? Some googling found reference to increased broadcasting during the Abadan Crisis, and some info on the ways both sides put out their story, but what I skimmed may not count as RS. The BBC Persian article could do with its history beefing up whatever is added here. GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:44, 19 March 2011 (UTC)

Recent edits and problems in lead

I recently corrected the lead with what I thought would be non-controversial edits about

  • the fact that Fazlollah Zahedi was appointed by the shah at the behest of the UK and US before the coup not after.
  • deleting repetition in the lead (getting rid of "Britain's single largest overseas investment" while leaving "single most valuable foreign asset")
  • changing "Mosaddegh nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC)". to "the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was nationalized by Iran's parliament, led by Mosaddegh" (Mosaddeq was not the Prime Minister at the time).

This was reverted a couple hours later by Kurdo.

After a bunch of edits the article now makes the part of Mosaddeq and nationalization accurate (if pretty detailed for a lead) but the repetition and the error about when Zahedi was appointed is still there. --BoogaLouie (talk) 14:43, 31 March 2011 (UTC)

Yes, your version is the more accurate one.
  • "In the wake of the coup, Britain and the U.S. selected Fazlollah Zahedi to be the next prime minister of a military government." vs.
  • "The Central Intelligence Agency (sucessfully) pressured the weak monarch to dismiss Mosaddeq and appoint General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister... In the wake of the coup, Shah Pahlavi ruled as an authoritarian monarch for the next 26 years, until he was overthrown in a popular revolt in 1979."
It's a mistake to say Zahedi was chosen after the coup. Binksternet (talk) 15:53, 31 March 2011 (UTC)

Where is the repetition in the current version? I don't see any. Also, Zahedi was hand-picked by the American coup-plotters before the coup, there were even alternative plans to bypass the Shah, and make Zahedi the president of a republic, so Shah's "appointment" was a merely formality, which itself is the subject of a dispute, as many saw it as an illegal and unconstitutional act. Zahedi did not become the prime minster before the coup, he became the prime minster after the coup. Your wording implied that Zahedi was the prime minster at the time of the coup, that would be a controversial assertion, one in line with those `counter-coup` fringe theories. I believe we had discussed this issue in the past. Regardless, I just moved the Zahedi episode to the previous paragraph, in order to address your concerns about the time line. But we should stick with what the cited sources say, not what some of us may think is more accurate. Kurdo777 (talk) 18:57, 31 March 2011 (UTC)

  • Where is the repetition in the current version? I don't see any.
First sentence, second paragraph of lead. "the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was at the time Britain's single largest overseas investment."
Same paragraph third sentence: "Despite Mosaddegh's popular support, Britain was unwilling to negotiate its single most valuable foreign asset..."
(I've complaining about that repetition at least since 23 November 2010)
  • Zahedi was hand-picked by the American coup-plotters before the coup, there were even alternative plans to bypass the Shah, and make Zahedi the president of a republic, so Shah's "appointment" was a merely formality, which itself is the subject of a dispute, as many saw it as an illegal and unconstitutional act.
Two questions: where is the evidence for this? (What WP:RS says there was a plan to make Zahedi president? or that the Shah's "appointment" was a merely formality?)
Second, your most recent change to the lead adds a sentence and a phrase: "Britain and the U.S selected Fazlollah Zahedi to be the prime minister of a military government that was to replace Mosaddegh's government. Subsequently, the Central Intelligence Agency pressured the weak monarch to get on board, while bribing street thugs, clergy, politicians and Iranian army officers ..."
What's this "get on board"? Instead of a vague "get on board", why not just tell what happened. At the insistance of the US/UK the shah issued a proclamation (Firman) appointing Zahedi prime minister. --BoogaLouie (talk) 23:30, 31 March 2011 (UTC)
Check the new version. Kurdo777 (talk) 07:20, 1 April 2011 (UTC)
After Kurdo's latest edit the three changes I wanted to make are pretty much made, though the lead is getting longer and longer as more anti-shah anti-imperialist comments are crammed in (e.g.The coup saw the transition of Mohammad-Rezā Shāh Pahlavi from a constitutional monarch to an authoritarian dictator who relied heavily on U.S. support to hold on to power)
Next up, less non-controversial edits. --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:55, 1 April 2011 (UTC)

Battleax86's edits

An edit war has broken out between a red editor (Battleax86) and Kurdo and his supporters. Battleax86 keeps trying to change the lead to say that the coup "orchestrated by the intelligence agencies of the United Kingdom and the United States and carried out by the Iranian military." He shouldn't be edit warring of course, but I think Battleax's edit is correct in that the main execution of the coup was by the military and not by demonstrators. Right now the lead says essentially nothing about the military use of force during the coup:

On August 19, a pro-Shah mob, paid by the CIA, marched on Mosaddegh's residence.[1] According to the CIA's declassified documents and records, some of the most feared mobsters in Tehran were hired by the CIA to stage pro-Shah riots on the 19th. Other CIA-paid men were brought into Tehran in buses and trucks, and took over the streets of the city.[2]

But Ervand Abrahamian (one of the leading political historians on modern Iran) dismisses the demonstrations as "mostly sound effects" and credits "32 Sherman tanks" with overthrowing Mosaddeq ....

The planned coup came on 28th Mordad (August 19). While gangs from the bazaar zurkhanehs [gymnasiums] - encouraged by preachers linked to the royalist Ayatollah Bahbehani and probably Ayatollah Kashani - provided mostly sound effects, thirty two Sherman tanks rolled into central Tehran, surrounded key positions, and, after a three-hour battle with three tanks protecting Mosaddeq's home and the main radio station, proclaimed Zahedi to be the shah's designated and lawful prime minister. According to eyewitnesses, the `motley crowd` of five hundred was augmented with some two thousand military personnnel wearing civilian clothes. [footnote 67] The New York Times estimated that the battle had left more than three hundred dead. [footnote 68] ...

Consequently, I've tagged the sentence above,
Other CIA-paid men were brought into Tehran in buses and trucks, and took over the streets of the city "[dubiousdiscuss] --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:54, 2 April 2011 (UTC)

Reply

First of all, please do not label other editors "my supporters", this is rude and uncivil towards others who do not share your point of views. You don't see me saying "BoogaLouie and his neo-con supporters" when addressing you, do you? Secondly, a coup is by definition an action taken by the military and paramilitary forces. So not only "carried out by the Iranian military" is redundant, it's also misleading, as it implies that entire Iranian military establishment was involved in the coup, when only a segment of the military was involved, and most of the cracking heads and skulls so to speak, was done by plain-clothed CIA-hired thugs who ruled the streets of Tehran that day. Finally, you're pushing your luck here, I provided sufficient evidence before that "by CIA" generates the most results among academic sources, but I decided to compromise with you and settle for "orchestrated by", but now you want to further downplay the US role by adding "done by Iranian military" to it. This why comprising with you is so hard, because you don't treat a compromise as a settlement of a dispute, you treat it as a momentary tactical gain and a new starting point for further bargaining , and then return to recycling the same disputes and discussions, in order to gain more and more, and eventually get your way, exactly as you wanted it. If you want the issues here resolved, you need to learn to compromise with others and stick by it. "Kurdo and his supporters" as you put it, are not going anywhere. Kurdo777 (talk) 01:33, 3 April 2011 (UTC)

I am opposed to Battleax86's edit as it simplifies a complicated issue. The military alone, did not carry out the coup, shaboon bi mokh and his gang hired by new crisp one hundred dollar bills each, were the main culprits on the ground. --Wayiran (talk) 02:05, 3 April 2011 (UTC)

Reply to replies

  • I apologize to anyone who was offended by my refering to them as Kurdo's supporters. No offense was intended. Don't see why it's considered some kind of insult
  • I am not now, nor have I ever been, a neocon.
  • Not sure describing military action in the coup is redundant. From the first sentence of the Coup d'état article: A coup d'état (English: /ˌkuːdeɪˈtɑː/, French: [ku deta]; plural: coups d'état) .... is the sudden, extrajudicial deposition of a government,[1][2][3] usually by a small group of the existing state establishment—typically the military—to replace the deposed government with another body; either civil or military.
  • agreed "carried out by the Iranian military" is simplistic. I'm not defending Battleax86's edit per se, just the inclusion Battleax86's edit could be more nuanced but we need to include in the lead something like what Abrahamian said about military involvement.
  • Don't think anyone checking this will agree with your claim that you provided sufficient evidence before that "by CIA" generates the most results among academic sources, but I decided to compromise with you and settle for "orchestrated by" ...,
  • As for "why comprising with you is so hard, because you don't treat a compromise as a settlement of a dispute, you treat it as a momentary tactical gain and a new starting point for further bargaining", there are many many things wrong and inaccurate with the article and I'm going to work on them. Don't see how this is somehow manipulative or sinister or something.
  • Whether something downplay[s] or up plays the US role in the coup should NOT be the criterea for what's in the article. It should be whether something is true, accurate as far as we know from WP:RS!!
  • What WP:RS says shaboon bi mokh and his gang hired by new crisp one hundred dollar bills each, were the main culprits on the ground in carrying out the coup?
  • I'll do another RfC on the military involvement in the coup when I have time. But my proposed edit will be more nuanced than Battleax86's edit. --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:02, 4 April 2011 (UTC)
  • Well, anyone anyone checking this, will tell you that "by the", generates the most results of all the options. That's a fact. What part of that, are you actually disputing?
  • Pretty much all the sources agree that the pro-Shah gangs were instrumental in the execution of the coup, again not sure what you're disputing here?
  • Yes, we should abide by the consensus of the WP:RSs available.
  • Military`s role is obvious. As I said, a coup is by definition an overthrow by military forces. If you think that is not clear enough, we could change `coup` to `military coup` to make it more clear. So I really don`t see what the problem is here. Any overemphasis on CARRIED OUT by Iranian military, is neither accurate nor supported by most WP:RSs, as the Iranian military had more than one faction at that time (pro-Shah, pro-Mossadegh, pro-Tudeh etc), and many divisions were not involved in the coup. Also, the majority of the street fighting was done by militants and thugs, not by the military units. The classic military coup actually failed, it was only when the agents and hired thugs got involved, that the coup succeeded. That`s a fact.

Kurdo777 (talk) 18:52, 4 April 2011 (UTC)

No, the military's role is not obvious to the reader. These things should be made plain, and if it involves splitting hairs about which military formations were involved, so be it. The military aspects of the coup have too long been absent from this page.
On 18 August, the CIA was laying low, wondering what to do. Whatever CIA money had been spent was already in the recipients' hands. Donald Wilber says the CIA's 18 August was "a day featured by depression and despair".[1] The turning point in the coup is when the clerics filled the streets with their supporters on the morning of 19 August, and hundreds of thousands of citizens joined them. Gasiorowski and Byrne wrote that "In 1951 the clerics had helped Mosaddeq to power; they now played a vital part in his fall. Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Borujerdi said to his more activist clerics, "the nation must have a king". This allowed Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani and others to organize street mobs for 19 August morning. Your "fact" is flawed. Binksternet (talk) 22:21, 4 April 2011 (UTC)
Well, what you call facts, are selective, loaded half-truths. Ayatollah Borujerdi had no significant role in the coup, Kashani is a different story. But Borujerdi`s declaration that "the nation must have a king", does not prove anything, Mossadegh had said the same thing over and over. In reality, only a small faction of National Front, advocated establishment of a republic, and that was only after the failed coup attempt, Mossadegh remained a royalist till the very end. Regardless, none of what you said, had any relation to this particular dispute. We are getting off-track here. The military aspects of the coup have not been absent as you claim, the details are covered within the article body, a reader coming to this page, can easily see that this is about a military coup, if you think otherwise, we can insert the term military coup into the lead. That though, is different than saying the coup was carried out by the Iranian military, when the majority of the dirty work was done by`a few thousand CIA-paid thugs, or as you call them "hundreds of thousands of citizens" (apparently, you are unaware that Tehran only had 155,000 residents back then). Kurdo777 (talk) 23:06, 4 April 2011 (UTC)
You have no sources describing Borujerdi as having no role. I have sources saying that his quiet pronouncement was very influential, that its timing was critical in releasing activist clerics such as Kashani to foment rioting in the streets.
There is no discussion of the movement of military units during the critical hours of the coup. There is no discussion of the coup as a military operation; none at all. No description of units, locations, troop movements, orders and times. And yet we start the article with a "Military operation" infobox template.
The "majority of the dirty work" was not done by anyone with CIA payments dating from 17–18 August. The CIA had not paid anybody to do anything after their first attempt. If money was found on thugs, it was money already in circulation. It could have been paid by secondary persons who received the money from the CIA earlier... but "CIA-paid thugs" on 19 August does not stand up to scrutiny, and there are sources in conflict about that assertion. It cannot be stated as simple fact when that fact is so well challenged.
I got "hundreds of thousands" from Zahedi's version of events. Perhaps he was excited, perhaps he was thinking that Tehran was swelling from Iranians of other cities. I don't know. The exact number is not important to me as we all agree the strength of the people in the street was enough to topple the government. It was enough to make the coup take place. Binksternet (talk) 03:27, 5 April 2011 (UTC)
"Zahedi's version of events" pretty much sums it up. I don't think I need to add anything to that. Kurdo777 (talk) 00:12, 7 April 2011 (UTC)
Sums it up indeed. It shows you dismiss without objective review, the side of this issue which opposes your own POV. This statement reflects the candid admission of an editor who is so wholly incapable of NPOV editing he thinks mocking the opposition's testimony merely because it comes from the opposition is a salient talking point to stand on. In other words, if a democrat were to dismiss the statements of a republican merely by replying "well he's a republican, consider the source!" that might fly in a room full of democrat syncophants. In any other less sheltered forums he just disqualified himself as an objective voice on the underlying issues.
On the issue at hand you stand on points of an incredibly disingenuous nature. Did the one million man march on Washington DC not happen because you can not document one million black male adults within the city limits of Washington DC? Angry citizens came from all over to Teheran because it was the capital! With Iran's entire economy in shambles due to its largest source of revenue in a virtual shutdown, are you insisting the only citizens with reason to be upset with its current leadership would have to be paid by the CIA to do so? This consistantly absurd portrayal of Iranians as weak and easily purchased for a small sum by outsiders to act in ways contrary to their own interests is a nonsensical pattern maintained by agenda pushing ideologues on this issue. It's just silly, stop insulting Iranians as well as our intelligence. There were PLENTY of Iranians who were frustrated by the current state of affairs as Mossadegh's disastrous policies unfolded, they didn't need to have a few dollars thrown at them and as your own side frequently portrays them as so fiercely nationalistic they were willing to allow Mossadegh to temporarily destroy their petroleum industry to reject outside influence, this puts the story that they then accepted a pittance from Kermit Roosevelt to sell it out again in an impossible light. Batvette (talk) 01:40, 16 April 2011 (UTC)

Proposed change in lead (military in the coup)

(RfC not properly closed) Collect (talk) 17:00, 13 April 2011 (UTC)

Below is a (proposed) change in the wording of the article's lede that includes mention of military action during the coup. I'm posting it here before doing a Request for comment. I've italicized text that is either being deleted (in the Current wording) or added (in the Proposed change). All the added stuff is from the two quotations below in Reason for proposed change.

IMHO this is one of the most obvious/common sense edits imaginable for this article .... but others disagree. --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:24, 6 April 2011 (UTC)


WP:CANVASS appears to cause this RfD to be of no value. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] appears to go beyond neutrsl notice to all possible parties. Collect (talk) 15:17, 9 April 2011 (UTC)

Collect, could you please expect how you arrived at this conclusion. TFD (talk) 05:23, 10 April 2011 (UTC)
WP:CANVASS is clear. A substantial number of notifications were made. They did not seem to encompass everyone who has been active on this article. I suspect that I arrived at the conclusion by reading English. I know of no reason for your question whatsoever. Cheers. Collect (talk) 11:47, 10 April 2011 (UTC)
User:Collect does have a valid point. User:BoogaLouie has a history of WP:CANVASSing like-minded editors, and he's been warned about this in the past. From what I see, this time around, he has messaged 6 editors, and with the exception of User:The Four Deuces and User:Wayiran, everyone else he has targeted, more or less shares the same POV as him. He has conveniently left out several active editors who would have opposed him, yet he has included a couple of problematic editors whose contribution to this topic, is limited to a a few drive-by attack/soapbox comments or blind reverts. Regardless, this whole "solicitation" business is bad practice in my opinion. If an editor is truly interested in this topic, he or she shouldn't be invited here for a yay or nay, this is not the house of commons. Kurdo777 (talk) 12:47, 10 April 2011 (UTC)
I just noticed this thread looking at talk edit history, otherwise I would have missed it completely! comments on talk page are supposed to be added at the bottom to avoid people missing them. The point may me be moot now as I just did a RfC, but Collect if I missed any editors please tell us who they are so that I may notify them! And Kurdo, what I have is a history of personal attacks by you with little evidence to back them up. Who are the "several active editors who would have opposed" me that I "have conveniently left out"?? --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:30, 13 April 2011 (UTC)
Notify all editors who have posted in the article or talk page within the past year would be a start. Collect (talk) 16:52, 13 April 2011 (UTC)
Note that without solicitation I have requested Boogalouie notify me of RFC threads on this article, if Kurdo77 believes this would result in the article becoming POV against his approval, he is cordially invited to also notify me when he has an RFC in this article as well. I'd further note that because some wikipedia participants do not enjoy the edit warring and article owning games inherent to becoming a primary editor on a controversial article, this does not mean they should be dismissed as "problematic" or "drive by attack" editors. House of commons? No. Community? Absolutely. Batvette (talk) 01:52, 16 April 2011 (UTC)

Current wording

"At first, the coup appeared to be a failure when on the night of August 15–16, Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri was arrested while attempting to arrest Mosaddegh. The Shah fled the country the next day. On August 19, a pro-Shah mob, paid by the CIA, marched on Mosaddegh's residence.[3] According to the CIA's declassified documents and records, some of the most feared mobsters in Tehran were hired by the CIA to stage pro-Shah riots on the 19th. Other CIA-paid men were brought into Tehran in buses and trucks, and took over the streets of the city.[4] Mosaddegh was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. ...."

Proposed change

"At first, the coup appeared to be a failure when on the night of August 15–16, Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri was arrested while attempting to arrest Mosaddegh. The Shah fled the country the next day. On August 19, a pro-Shah mob, encouraged by Shia preachers[5] and paid by the CIA, marched on Mosaddegh's heavily fortified residence.[6] Other CIA-paid men were brought into Tehran in buses and trucks, and took over the streets of the city.[7] 32 tanks, led by General Zahedi[8], surrounded key positions in central Tehran, and after a three-hour battle with three tanks protecting Mosaddeq's home and the main radio station, "proclaimed Zahedi to be the shah's designated and lawful prime minister.".[9] Mosaddegh was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. ...."[10]

(ref list)

  1. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv
  2. ^ Zulaika, Joseba (2009). Terrorism: the self-fulfilling prophecy. University of Chicago Press. p. 139.
  3. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv
  4. ^ Zulaika, Joseba (2009). Terrorism: the self-fulfilling prophecy. University of Chicago Press. p. 139.
  5. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
  6. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv, 256
  7. ^ Zulaika, Joseba (2009). Terrorism: the self-fulfilling prophecy. University of Chicago Press. p. 139.
  8. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
  9. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv, 256
  10. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.280

Reason for proposed change

The change attempts to make the lead follow more closely what two of the leading sources on Iranian political history and the coup in particular (the book Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran and historian Ervand Abrahamian) have to say about how the coup transpired:

The decisive battle between pro- and anti-Mosaddeq forces occurred at Mosaddeq's home, which had been heavily fortified by loyalist troops. Early in afternoon of August 19, a General Nakhi, who was apparently an agent of the CIA station, assembled members of the Imperial Guard and attacked Mosaddeq's home, which was defended by pro-Mosaddeq army units backed by three tanks. Bloody fighting ensued. Six tanks that had been involved in the seizure of Radio Tehran drove to Mosaddeq's home and joined the fighting. The two groups of tanks exchanged fire for two hours, using armor-piercing shells, and the three defending tanks were destroyed. The anti-Mosaddeq forces then destroyed the walls surrounding Mosaddeq's home and attacked the house itself. The defenders were eventually overwhelmed, in a fierce battle that reportedly took 200 lives. One hundred other people were killed in fighting elsewhere in Tehran that day." (Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Ed. by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.256)

Note Mosaddeq's residence was "heavily fortified by loyalist troops" which including three tanks.

The planned coup came on 28th Mordad (August 19). While gangs from the bazaar zurkhanehs [gymnasiums] - encouraged by preachers linked to the royalist Ayatollah Bahbehani and probably Ayatollah Kashani - provided mostly sound effects, thirty two Sherman tanks rolled into central Tehran, surrounded key positions, and, after a three-hour battle with three tanks protecting Mosaddeq's home and the main radio station, proclaimed Zahedi to be the shah's designated and lawful prime minister. According to eyewitnesses, the `motley crowd` of five hundred was augmented with some two thousand military personnnel wearing civilian clothes. [footnote 67] The New York Times estimated that the battle had left more than three hundred dead. ... (Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, 1982, p.280)

I've pasted this quoted from above.--BoogaLouie (talk) 18:24, 6 April 2011 (UTC)

Other sources on involvement of military in the coup

Ali Gheissari

"It would be mistaken to view the coup as entirely a foreign instigation with no support - albeit tacit - among various social and political groups in Iran. In many regards the Iranian military was more important to the coup than was the monarchy. The military moreover manipulated British apprehensions and used CIA assets just as much as they used the Iranian military .... Most Iranians were sympathetic to Mosaddeq's idealism, but by the summer of 1953 they had grown wary of the wisdom of his rejectionism and the political and economic risks that it would have entailed. Although popular perceptions in later years would deny this, in the summer of 1953, the monarchy and the military's realism resonated with many Iranians, whose personal interests and perceptions of national interest had diverged from Mosaddeq's platform." (Gheissari, Ali Democracy in Iran: history and the quest for liberty, Ali Gheissari, Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (Oxford University Press, 2006), p.54)

Stephen Kinzer

"Military units led by anti-Mossadegh officers had already begun converging on the house [of premier Mosaddeq]. Inside, loyal soldiers built fortifications and prepared for battle. They were armed with rifles, machine guns, and Sherman tanks mounted with 75-millimeter cannons. Late in the afternoon the assault began. Defenders beat back wave after wave, leaving the sidewalks littered with bodies. Then after an hour of one-sided combat, the assailants gave a great cheer. Friendly army units had arrived with tanks of their own. A close quarters artillery duel soon broke out. ... Fighting at Mossadegh's house raged for two hours. After the firing from insde stopped, a platton of soldiers stormed in. They found the house empty. Mossadegh had escaped at the last moment, ..." (All the Shah's men By Stephen Kinzer],(p.182-3, 5)

Responses

  • I understand the urge to use quotes in an attempt to resolve issues of non-agreement as to how exactly the lead should read. Both of the quotes above, however, seem to go into a bit more detail than necessary for a lead, i.e., do we really need to go into detail as to who surrounded which position or Moaddegh's house in the lead? I would suggest that the lead use the quotes as a source of who was involved in the coup and use the more direct quotes in the body of the article. --RossF18 (talk) 15:13, 9 April 2011 (UTC)
Agreed the lead is too long and detailed. Unfortunately any edit of the article is charged with controversy and rvts. (Try trimming the lead and see what happens.) But quotes and detail aside do you have any preference for either the current version or proposed change? --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:53, 9 April 2011 (UTC)
Given that we agree that the current lead is too long and detailed, it would seem that preference for either current version or proposed change is irrelevant as either making the change or keeping the current version would not change the problem. That said, if the choice is between not making any change and making a change that's more in line with cited material, I would of course support a change that's more in line with cited material. But, again, it has been my understanding that we cannot even agree on which source is considered authoratative enough to use as a source. If we are in agreement that the two sources you use are acceptable to all for use, then a change in line with those two sources is of course preferable to me than a lead without those two sources. --RossF18 (talk) 18:10, 9 April 2011 (UTC)
I hoped to fight one battle at a time, the most important one (to me) being inaccuacy/bias rather than bloat. The facts about the coup in the proposed version maybe a little longer than ideal, but ... this is an article about a coup after all. I'd trim from all the background on "Popular discontent with the AIOC began in the late 1940s...."
As for agreement "on which source is considered authoratative enough to use as a source," well I cannot remember Kurdo or Wayiran bad mouthing historians Gasiorowski and Abrahamian (Bayandor is another issue). It's just that claims/accusations are made ("shaboon bi mokh and his gang hired by new crisp one hundred dollar bills each, were the main culprits on the ground") ("you're cherrypicking!"), but sources aren't provided. --BoogaLouie (talk) 23:18, 9 April 2011 (UTC)
  • Opposed. Overlooking the selective, out-of-context, weasel-worded WP:POV nature of the proposed lead, a WP:Lead is suppose to be summary of the events covered in the article body. The small trivial/tactical details about 32 tanks positions, or what the radio station said, etc... are not even mentioned in the article body to begin with. Kurdo777 (talk) 13:01, 10 April 2011 (UTC)
Do you have any source to back this? Do you have any reply to sources above?
That "[t]he decisive battle between pro- and anti-Mosaddeq forces occurred at Mosaddeq's home, which had been heavily fortified by loyalist troops" which goes on to talk about the "imperial guard" and "army units," and numbers of "tanks", and "armor-piercing shells" .... but not demonstrators?
Or Abrahamian's remark dismissing the "gangs from the bazaar" as "provid[ing] mostly sound effects"?
If these quotes are selective, where are the "representative" quotes? the "in context" quotes?
What historian even suggests the demonstrations, not the military, were the primary event of the coup? --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:51, 10 April 2011 (UTC)

RfC: Changing wording in the lead to include mention of role played by military

Should the article lead wording be changed to include mention not only of demonstrators but also of tanks attacking and defending coup targets? Supporter(s) of change (the writer of this request) argue WP:Reliable Sources have mentioned the miltary action and one prominent source has dismissed the demonstrations as "sound effects" (see Reason for proposed change above) Criticisms of the change (offered above) include the statement that "a coup is by definition an action taken by the military and paramilitary forces" so mentioning it would be redundant, and "most of the cracking heads and skulls so to speak, was done by plain-clothed CIA-hired thugs who ruled the streets of Tehran that day" (no source given) --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:17, 13 April 2011 (UTC)

Below is the (proposed) change with text that is either being deleted (in the Current wording) or added (in the Proposed change) italicized. All the added stuff is from the two quotations below in Reason for proposed change above.

Current wording

"At first, the coup appeared to be a failure when on the night of August 15–16, Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri was arrested while attempting to arrest Mosaddegh. The Shah fled the country the next day. On August 19, a pro-Shah mob, paid by the CIA, marched on Mosaddegh's residence.[1] According to the CIA's declassified documents and records, some of the most feared mobsters in Tehran were hired by the CIA to stage pro-Shah riots on the 19th. Other CIA-paid men were brought into Tehran in buses and trucks, and took over the streets of the city.[2] Mosaddegh was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. ...."

Proposed change

"At first, the coup appeared to be a failure when on the night of August 15–16, Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri was arrested while attempting to arrest Mosaddegh. The Shah fled the country the next day. On August 19, a pro-Shah mob, encouraged by Shia preachers[3] and paid by the CIA, marched on Mosaddegh's heavily fortified residence.[4] Other CIA-paid men were brought into Tehran in buses and trucks, and took over the streets of the city.[5] 32 tanks, led by General Zahedi[6], surrounded key positions in central Tehran, and after a three-hour battle with three tanks protecting Mosaddeq's home and the main radio station, "proclaimed Zahedi to be the shah's designated and lawful prime minister." Mosaddegh was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. ...."[7]

(ref list)

  1. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv
  2. ^ Zulaika, Joseba (2009). Terrorism: the self-fulfilling prophecy. University of Chicago Press. p. 139.
  3. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
  4. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv, 256
  5. ^ Zulaika, Joseba (2009). Terrorism: the self-fulfilling prophecy. University of Chicago Press. p. 139.
  6. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
  7. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.280

Responses

  • A lede entirely based on a single source's version is pretty much improper by WP policy. Add other sources with differing versions of the events to have a chance at being seen as conforming with WP:NPOV. Unless no different sources exist? Collect (talk) 16:59, 13 April 2011 (UTC)
    • But there are two sources not one, and they are two of the leading authorities (Abrahamian, and Gasiorowski and his Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran), on recent Iranian history. I've just added two more sources also mentioning the importance the military played in the coup. --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:30, 13 April 2011 (UTC)
  • Opposed per WP:LEAD which states that a lead should "summarize the body of the article with appropriate weight". The proposed changes do neither. --Wayiran (talk) 17:46, 13 April 2011 (UTC)
    • How can adding a mention of the forces that executed a coup in an article about a coup, be giving "inappropriate weight"???? A long four-paragraph lead with stuff about "Popular discontent with the AIOC began in the late 1940s" and "According to the CIA's declassified documents and records, some of the most feared mobsters in Tehran were hired by the CIA to stage pro-Shah riots on the 19th", but mentioning the tanks that did the actual overthrowing is "inappropriate weight"???? --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:58, 13 April 2011 (UTC)
  • Opposed as per my previous comment. I should add that the proposed version is not in line with WP:LEAD, or WP:Cherry , as certain trivial aspects of the coup (number of tanks in the streets, a radio announcement etc) which are not even covered in the article's body, have been quoted out of context or cherry-picked, and given inappropriate weight in the lead. WP:Weasel is another policy that comes to my mind, when I see wording like "Mossadegh's heavily fortified residence" or "three-hour battle with Mossadegh's tanks", which are loaded statements taken from a single source, namely Joseba Zulaika's "Terrorism: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy" , a book which is not a specialist book about the coup, and talks about the coup in passing as a secondary subject, and is full of unsubstantiated claims and new fringe theories such as "Khomeini's participation in anti-Mossadegh mob actions organized by the CIA" when most historians report that Khomeini was merely a religious scholar in Qom at the beginning of the 1950s and had been uninvolved in politics between 1951 and 1953. In short, BoogaLouie's main "source" is a non-specialist book from an author who is neither an Iran expert, nor a historian of modern Iranian history. Kurdo777 (talk) 18:17, 13 April 2011 (UTC)
    • As I've asked you before, if these are "cherry picked" quotes where are the "representative" quotes? the "in context" quotes? What historian even suggests the demonstrations, not the military, were the primary event of the coup?
    • As for "loaded statements taken from a single source", at least we agree Joseba Zulaika's "Terrorism: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy", isn't worth using. But it's the source for "Other CIA-paid men were brought into Tehran in buses and trucks, and took over the streets of the city", not for anything in the proposed change.
    • "Mossadegh's heavily fortified residence" and "three-hour battle with Mossadegh's tanks", comes from Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, the most recent and most scholarly book on the coup. see here. Two other sources mention "three tanks protecting Mosaddeq's home" and "loyal soldiers built fortifications and prepared for battle. They were armed with rifles, machine guns, and Sherman tanks mounted with 75-millimeter cannons". What's wrong with "heavily fortified"?
    • As for how long the battle lasted, one source says: "tanks exchanged fire for two hours", another says "after a three-hour battle with three tanks protecting Mosaddeq's home," and another says, "Then after an hour of one-sided combat, the assailants gave a great cheer. Friendly army units had arrived with tanks of their own. A close quarters artillery duel soon broke out. ... Fighting at Mossadegh's house raged for two hours." I'd be happy to change the wording from "after a three-hour battle" to "after a two to three-hour battle" if that would satisfy you.
    • I would be happy to add more detail to the main article from the sources I've provided. Would that satisfy you? --BoogaLouie (talk) 20:46, 13 April 2011 (UTC)
  • Support Without going into unnecessary detail I think this puts things in more proper perspective in showing a more factual depiction of these events. If an argument can be made it's where these details are more appropriate to appear, the lede or the detailed section. Batvette (talk) 01:11, 16 April 2011 (UTC)
  • RFC Comment: The present version of the article makes no mention e.g. of "32 tanks". The lead shouldn't be as detailed as the article body, and certainly not more detailed, so if the tank battle is to be mentioned in the lead, it should be get some space in the article, too. Having said that, the section of the article that deals with the coup itself, as opposed to the background or aftermath, is quite short and could use some more colour. --Dailycare (talk) 18:17, 16 April 2011 (UTC)

Discussion

Consider [8] Eisenhower believed, unlike Truman, that Mossadegh would be unable to resist a coup, should it be attempted by the Tudeh (Communist) Party in Iran. indicating a belief that a Communist coup was quite possible.
demonstrators took to the streets in support of the Shah, and were soon joined by military personnel. with no claim that they were paid by the CIA at all. In fact, this work appears to give Britain a major role in the coup. I found no independent sources agreeing with the "thugs" bit etc. at all ... most simply state that the CIA primarily furnished money to the Royalists.
[9] might also be interesting. Broaching this sensitive subject, Truman wrote to British Prime Minister Clement Atlee: I am sure you can understand my deep concern that no action should be taken in connection with this dispute which would result in disagreement between Iran and the free world… it is essential to maintain the independence of Iran and the flow of Iranian oil into the economy of the free world. may be of interest as well. Which is not absolutely in line with the claim that Truman specifically opposed any coup. Lots of stuff to be sure -- much of which is substantially different from the proposed language. Collect (talk) 22:36, 13 April 2011 (UTC)

Two questions:
The lede should only summarize the content of the entire article. Placing details which are not supported by every source is problematic at best. I generally view articles on edu sites as being from a "review" as being reasonably RS , even if he is not a doctor in the field - did you find a problem with it? I am sure Goldsmith is fine. Shorter is generally better. Collect (talk) 15:25, 14 April 2011 (UTC)
Agree "The lede should only summarize the content of the entire article." However before trimming the lede I thought it might be important to make it accurate and NPOV, which it is currently not. The coup is a major event in third world history (not to mention Iranian history) and there are several books on the coup or that period of Iranian history by notable authors. We should use those and not whatever article you find on edu sites searching key words that you're "sure" are "fine". Neither Danny Garret‐Rempel or Daniel Goldsmith show up in google scholar or google books, i.e. they are not notable. --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:14, 14 April 2011 (UTC)
Articles from peer-reviewed journals outrank most popular newspaper articles, if you care to look at WP:RS. The peer-reviewed journal is RS. BTW, before you say someone is not found on Google scholar, you should run the search. [10] for example. First listing. [11] First listing. Sorry if you failed to do the search. Collect (talk) 21:20, 14 April 2011 (UTC)
OK I missed those two hits. Daniel Goldsmith (1 hit) shows up in Google Scholar if you add Mosaddegh, and there is also one article by Garret‐Rempel. Does that make them notable? If we include everyone who wrote a term paper about the coup in the sources .... that would be too much. --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:26, 14 April 2011 (UTC)
"Peer-reviewed" is the gold standard, not "notability of every author as well." We are not writing articles on the authors, but on what appears in peer-reviewed journals at this point. And I suggest few "term papers" get into "peer reviewed journals" and if they do - then, yes, we should use them! Collect (talk) 01:22, 15 April 2011 (UTC)
"The Clearihue Review" is not a peer-reviewed academic journal, though. It's a student-run journal at the University of Victoria, publishing undergraduate essays with minimal oversight and no substantial editing by the (undergraduate) board. While it looks like a worthy project, I'd very much not consider this a reliable source.--Stephan Schulz (talk) 18:24, 19 April 2011 (UTC)
...and similarly, the "McGill Journal of Middle East Studies" is not a proper academic journal, but published by the undergraduate Middle East Studies Students' Association at McGill university. Again, a very worthy endeavor, and probably with interesting viewpoints, but not a reliable source in the Wikipedia sense. --Stephan Schulz (talk) 18:30, 19 April 2011 (UTC)
  • Comment about focus on lead. Several times in this article we have focused on trying to fix the lead. This was the case in June 2009 when I came here in response to a noticeboard post. I submit that Wayiran is correct in saying that WP:LEAD must be followed—that the article must be improved first, before the lead is changed. When the lead gets changed it should be in response to changes in the article body, not in response to new sources saying new things.
    That said, I still support a more military focus on the article, with more text describing which officers and units did what when, how many casualties, notable battles, etc. This should all go in the body of the article. Binksternet (talk) 03:13, 15 April 2011 (UTC)
I can't really disagree that working from the bottom (sections) up to the top (lead) is better, it's just that many people just read the article lede and it was so difficult to get any changes made at all. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:04, 19 April 2011 (UTC)
Comment - In my past readings of WP:LEAD I was left with the impression that, since the lead is a summation of the article body, that the article body needed to be established first. Looking over that guide right now I don't see an explicit recommendation that that is the preferred practice(?), nonetheless I still think that is the case. However I've been in violation of that practice most of the time (that's how I ended up here, after my own attempts to re-write a lead were rebuffed). I've had the rationalization that in articles where content was going to be disputed, the possibility of achieving consensus on a few, high-level, sentences would be easier than many detailed ones. But also, as BoogaLouie stated, part of my desire to do so was also based on what would achieve the most immediate impact, which might not have been the best motive. Cheers! LoveUxoxo (talk) 22:27, 19 April 2011 (UTC)

Ardeshir Zahedi's rebuttal to the 2000 NY Times article

Ardeshir Zahedi, a prominent figure in US/Iran relations in his own right, penned a rebuttal to the 2000 Times article which the article here repeatedly references, without a balanced opposing view. See- http://www.ardeshirzahedi.com/cia-iran.pdf The times did in fact publish his letter so we can consider this an acceptable source. Shouldn't this appear in the article as a balance to some of the Times' claims? Batvette (talk) 13:47, 16 April 2011 (UTC)

Appears to qualify as "op ed" and is RS for his opinions on matters. as a minimum, and for factual statements about hinself. Collect (talk) 16:46, 16 April 2011 (UTC)
NYT cites: [12] et seq for narrative account written in 2000. Also [13]. All from a period long after 1953. Collect (talk) 16:56, 16 April 2011 (UTC)
Ardeshir Zahedi is the son of the Army General who led the coup, and he himself was one of the coup plotters, an involved party who served the Shah's regime until the very end. As an involved party, using him goes against WP:COI, and WP:FRINGE too, given that his positions on the the coup are out of touch with the mainstream academic research, and contradict most historians' accounts of the coup . Kurdo777 (talk) 13:15, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
I.e. "His recollections do not agree with what I 'know'" is the argument? Sorry - that is not a valid argument on Wikipedia. Collect (talk) 13:29, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
There are multiple policy issues here, Fringe Theories (given his revisionist point of view) is not the only issue here. Conflict of Interest is another relevant policy, since he was an involved party in the coup. In short, Ardeshir Zahedi is as much of a reliable source on this topic , as Joseph Goebbels would be on a topic dealing with Nazi war crimes. Kurdo777 (talk) 13:48, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
"Fringe" I think you should reread the pages on that topic. It does not apply to saying "first person accounts are wrong." Nor does "COI" apply to such cases -- amazingly enough, that would disallow almost every history book written by participants, including Churchill's books on WW II, etc. So COI is a non-starter here. And the Godwin's Law invocation you make is sufficient to show the weakness of your argument. Although it is interesting that you would allow apparent hatred of a person to dictate your position on his words in Wikipedia. Collect (talk) 13:52, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
I disagree, both COI and fringe apply here. Zahedi doesn't even admit that there was a coup, he calls it a "popular uprising", a "revolution" etc, that's the classic definition of a fringe theory. As for his involvement in the coup, the Economist calls Ardeshir Zahedi "one of the last surviving coup-makers [from 1953 coup]". Your Churchill analogy is irrelevant, as Churchill is not cited as a source on pages dealing particular war crimes he may have been involved in, for that very reason. By the way, what "hate" are you talking about? Please avoid such personal comments. I don't "hate" anyone, I opposed citing a paper written by a Mossadegh associate, for the same reasons. "Comment on the content, not the contributor" as it's the standard for Wikipedians. Thanks. Kurdo777 (talk) 13:59, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
COI has nothing to do with Zahedi's views, nothing at all. It is written about Wikipedia contributors, not figures on the world stage.
WP:FRINGE includes this bit: "One important bellwether for determining the notability and level of acceptance of fringe ideas related to science, history or other academic pursuits is the presence or absence of peer reviewed research on the subject." Bayandor's book Iran and the CIA: The Fall of Mosaddeq Revisited was published by Palgrave Macmillan, a respected scholarly imprint. In his introduction to the book Bayandor thanks and names those who gave the book its peer review, including Mark Gasiorowski and Ervand Abrahamian; two well-respected scholars who are the cornerstones of this article's references. Gasiorowski uses Zahedi interviews as source material for his book, weighing that material for its value. Similarly, Bayandor uses many sources including Zahedi, validating Zahedi's viewpoint at several key junctures, and dismissing it elsewhere such as in regard to Zahedi's August 17–18 mission to get military assistance from Isfahan and Farzegan. Bayandor says that this effort was useless considering the distance from Tehran and the poor condition of the roads; the Isfahan, Farzegan and Kermanshah garrisons could not have driven to Tehran by August 19. Binksternet (talk) 15:11, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
Bayandor and his revisionist book, are another topic. I am talking about Ardeshir Zahedi's "rebuttal to the 2000 NY Times article" in particular, and using Zahedi as a source. Kurdo777 (talk) 15:51, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
I think you are perhaps suffering from POV-itis. Have a cup of tea and a break from the article. WP has an annoying policy called WP:NPOV which you likely ought to review in its totality. WP:RS, by the way, does not say "and of course, any 'revisionist' opinions must be excluded." Collect (talk) 16:21, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
I think you need to cut the personal attacks. Wikipedia also has an annoying policy called WP:NPA, "comment on the content, not the contributor". For the record, this is the second time I have asked you to tone it down. And calling a revisionist book, a revisionist book, has nothing to do with NPOV. Kurdo777 (talk) 19:02, 17 April 2011 (UTC)

Darioush Bayandor interviewed Ardeshir Zahedi while writing his 2010 book Iran and the CIA. More of Zahedi's views can be found in that book, balanced and filtered by Bayandor, a lifelong diplomat who worked with the United Nations on humanitarian aid for two decades following the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Binksternet (talk) 03:38, 17 April 2011 (UTC)

(out) Before using Zahedi's letter to the editor, we would need to establish the degree of acceptance it has received. If it has been ignored then WP:WEIGHT means we should ignore it too. We can of course report on his views as described in Bayandor's book, but again must assign appropriate weight. Because Bayandor's book is a reliable source, we can determine from that book what weight scholars have assigned Zahedi's views. Note that this may not be the same weight that Bayandor personally believes these views have. TFD (talk) 16:43, 17 April 2011 (UTC)

The book appears to meet WP:RS. The letter/op-ed appears to meet WP:RS for op-eds. Op-eds are not required to have "received acceptance" from anyone. Some sources may be considered reliable for statements as to their author's opinion, but not for statements asserted as fact without an inline qualifier like "(Author) says...". A prime example of this is Op-ed columns in mainstream newspapers. When using them, it is better to explicitly attribute such material in the text to the author to make it clear to the reader that they are reading an opinion. appears to be WP policy hereon. The New York Times is pretty certainly a "mainline newspaper." Collect (talk) 17:53, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
One could create a website presenting one's unique understanding of the world and it would be a reliable source for one's views. But that would not mean that it should be used as source accross all the topics on which one holds an opinion. TFD (talk) 18:08, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
If one had no basis for having opinions - maybe. The person at issue, however, has access to a great deal of information, and is thus "expert" as far as WP is concerned. The RS book, indeed, reinforces his status as an expert on the matters at hand. Collect (talk) 19:44, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
Nonsense. Being a scholar does not make everything one writers notable or even scholarly. They are scholars not oracles. The leader of the Liberal Party of Canada, Michael Ignatieff for example is a leading scholar used as a source for many WP articles, but that does not mean that his political speeches have special standing. One might question too why basic information about the coup, which is received extensive coverage, needs to be sourced from letters to the editor. TFD (talk) 16:11, 19 April 2011 (UTC)
Any fact can be cited from any WP:RS (WP:MEDRS for medical cites) per that page. It is not up to us to second-guess the WP policies and guidelines on it. Collect (talk) 17:48, 19 April 2011 (UTC)

User:Collect's unilateral changes - the WP:Lead

User:Collect has re-written the lead in a sluggish and POVish way, and moved the previous lead under a new section titled overview. These are major changes, for which he has no WP:Consensus. I've restored the original lead. [14] Kurdo777 (talk) 19:24, 17 April 2011 (UTC)

The "lede" which you favor is not a lede at all. I removed absolutely zero material. Kindly revert your unsupportable change. In the meantime - who here supports Kurdo's positionon this? I submit that he does not have consensus on his side on this in any case. Cheers. Collect (talk) 19:42, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
There is no consensus here to change the lead. You or Bink cannot just change the lead out of the blue, when there have been many discussions about it in the past. --Wayiran (talk) 20:12, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
Consensus is dynamic; it doesn't solidify like wet cement into concrete. Kurdo777's reliance on the "no consensus" argument is one I noticed as early as mid-2009. He continues to use that argument but it does not stand up to a re-reading of WP:CONSENSUS.
The short lead, moving the earlier bloated lead into the article, is an improvement in my opinion. Binksternet (talk) 20:17, 17 April 2011 (UTC)

Posted at NPOV/N as well in order to get fresh eyes here. Collect (talk) 20:19, 17 April 2011 (UTC)

Dynamic or not, one user cannot unilaterally re-write/re-work the lead. That's not how the process works. Kurdo777 (talk) 20:24, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
That is certainly wrong. One user can unilaterally rewrite the lead, if he is not reverted. The "process" you describe is the one you have created and enforced, where your continual reverts throw up a barrier to involvement by others. Binksternet (talk) 20:45, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
Yes, one user can unilaterally rewrite the lead, in a page where there are no disputes or ongoing discussions, and an RFC about the lead. That's not the case here though. It's like moving pages unilaterally, it's just not done on controversial topics. Kurdo777 (talk) 22:13, 17 April 2011 (UTC)
Well at least we have three editors who think Collect's new lede is an improvement (i'm the third), so no consensus there. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:02, 19 April 2011 (UTC)

Comment - Does everyone agree that regardless of which version of the lede stays up there now, eventually it will be re-written based on the changes to the body of the article? Consequently, I was wondering if it might be better for those who like it to have it moved down per Collect, so that its contents are then more easily considered for inclusion in the main body. Cheers! LoveUxoxo (talk) 02:06, 20 April 2011 (UTC)

Yes I agree the lead should eventually be re-written based on the changes to the body of the article. I'd prefer a trimmed and de-POVed lead, but barring that collect's version is better. --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:35, 20 April 2011 (UTC)
Also (I don't see this mentioned elsewhere), the article right now is 48 kB (7717 words) "readable prose size", which is quite large. So not just the lead, but within the main body of the article as well, trimming is necessary (agree?) Cheers! LoveUxoxo (talk) 19:07, 20 April 2011 (UTC)
The "readability index" (Flesch-Kincaid grade level) is 16 (first 2 paragraphs). This is extremely difficult for people with less than a college degree to comprehend. "Reading ease" is 12. Horrid legalese gets down to a 10. So it is unreadable per [15]. Collect (talk) 22:29, 20 April 2011 (UTC)

Proposed change in lead (military in the coup) 2.0

Again there have been complaints about the proposed change that I'm going to try to incorporate in it.

  • Collect's complaint that it's "based on a single source's version" (it's not based on only one, but the "32 tanks" are from one source so that's removed)
  • Dailycare's complaint that "The lead shouldn't be as detailed as the article body, and certainly not more detailed"
  • Kurdo777's complaint that "Joseba Zulaika's Terrorism: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy contains "loaded statements" and is "a book which is not a specialist book about the coup, and talks about the coup in passing as a secondary subject, and is full of unsubstantiated claims and new fringe theories ..." and that 3 hours is too detailed
  • and mostly Binksternet's complaint that the sections of the article should be changed before the lede is.

I hope everyone will agree it is pretty dumb in a long article on a coup to leave details of what actually happened in the coup to one line:
After a short exile in Italy, the CIA completed the coup against Mossadegh, and returned the Shah to Iran.

So here are changes (mostly additions) in the article body based mainly on the most recent and scholarly book about the coup, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran,. I've also made a few changes in the proposed changes in the lede. As before I've put in italics text added or subtracted.

Current wording in the article body

Execution of Operation Ajax
Having obtained the Shah's concurrence, the CIA team headed by Roosevelt executed the coup. Firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mosaddegh and appointing Zahedi were drawn up by the coup plotters and signed by the Shah. On Saturday August 15, Colonel Nematollah Nassiri, the commander of the Imperial Guard, delivered to Mosaddegh a firman from the shah dismissing him. Mosaddegh, who had been warned of the plot (probably by the Tudeh party) rejected the firman as a forgery and had Nassiri arrested.[1] Mosaddegh argued at his trial after the coup that under the Iranian constitutional monarchy, the Shah had no constitutional right to issue an order for the elected Prime Minster's dismissal without Parliament's consent.[2] The action was publicized and the Shah, fearing a popular backlash, fled to Rome, Italy. After a short exile in Italy, the CIA completed the coup against Mossadegh, and returned the Shah to Iran.

Proposed change in article body

August 15 attempted coup
Having obtained the Shah's concurrence, the CIA team headed by Roosevelt organized the coup. Firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mosaddegh and appointing Zahedi were drawn up by the coup plotters and signed by the Shah. On Saturday August 15, Colonel Nematollah Nassiri, the commander of the Imperial Guard, delivered a firman from the shah to Mosaddegh dismissing him. Mosaddegh, who had been warned of the plot (probably by the Tudeh party) rejected the firman as a forgery and had Nassiri arrested.[3] Mosaddegh argued at his trial after the coup that under the Iranian constitutional monarchy, the Shah had no constitutional right to issue an order for the elected Prime Minster's dismissal without Parliament's consent.[4]

In Tehran, the next day pro-Mosaddeq army units arrested soldiers and others suspected of being part of the coup, but failed to find General Zahedi.[5] Details of the coup attempt were published and in demonstrations and newspapers the shah was denounced. Paniced, he fled by plane to Rome, Italy. The coup plotters decided to "rally the army and public opinion to their side" by distributing copies of the shah's dismissal of Mosaddeq to the press. They also gave provided agents with $50,000 to created fund a "black" (fake) Tudeh mob which created chaos the next two days looting shops, destroying pictures of the Shah, and ransacking offices of royalist groups. Sincere supporters of Mossedeq also joined in the rioting.[6][7]

August 19 coup
On the morning of August 19, a mob marched north from the south Tehran bazaar attacking and burning Tudeh and pro-Mossadeq newspapers and buildings. At the encouragement of the CIA team it seized Radio Tehran where Zahedi later broadcast a statement that he was the legal prime minister. The mob was joined by Bakhtiari tribesmen[8] and other trucked-in civilians and later by military tanks and soldiers. "By noon, anti-Mosaddeq army and police officers had largely taken over leadership of the crowds." [9] The "decisive battle" between pro- and anti-Mosaddeq forces took place at Mosaddeq's home, which though "heavily fortified" defended by loyalist troops and three tanks, was overwhelmed after a two to three-hour battle."[10][11] 200 reportedly died at Mosadeq's house and another 100 in fighting elsewhere.[12]

Current wording in lede

"At first, the coup appeared to be a failure when on the night of August 15–16, Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri was arrested while attempting to arrest Mosaddegh. The Shah fled the country the next day. On August 19, a pro-Shah mob, paid by the CIA, marched on Mosaddegh's residence.[13] According to the CIA's declassified documents and records, some of the most feared mobsters in Tehran were hired by the CIA to stage pro-Shah riots on the 19th. Other CIA-paid men were brought into Tehran in buses and trucks, and took over the streets of the city.[14] Mosaddegh was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. ...."

Proposed change in lede

"At first, the coup appeared to be a failure when on the night of August 15–16, Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri was arrested while attempting to arrest Mosaddegh. The Shah fled the country the next day. On August 19, a pro-Shah mob, encouraged by Shia preachers[15] and paid by the CIA[16], marched on Mosaddegh's heavily fortified residence.[17] Joined by other forces[18][19] including a column of tanks,[20] they surrounded key positions in central Tehran. After a two to three-hour battle with tanks protecting Mosaddeq's home, and some 200 dead, Zahedi was proclaimed "to be the shah's designated and lawful prime minister."[21] Mosaddegh was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. ...."[22]

(ref list)

(The {{Reflist}} doesn't work since it gives the same 10 cites as for this old suggested change above. So to check the citations go into edit mode. Anything from "Joseba Zulaika's Terrorism: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy has been removed. The cites in the proposed changes are all from these books:)

  • Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003) p.175, 211
  • Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 1982, p.280
  • Elm, Mostafu (1994). Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath, p 333. Syracuse University Press
  • Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv, 256

Comments

Far too long. "Paid by the CIA" is not shown. The sources appear to state that the organization of the initial coup was planned and paid for by the US and Britain, but the final mobs are not shown to be "paid for" by the CIA. "Shah's military court" is odd as every court is under the head of state. Further if one wishes to assign blame for the sentence, one should also show the commutation of the sentence by the Shah. Lastly, the stuff about "two to three hours" is pretty much not proper in the lede which should be as general as possible. Lots of POV - none of which belongs in the lede. Look back at my totally non-POV proposed lede. Which could be written in less stilted language even then. Collect (talk) 21:55, 22 April 2011 (UTC)

The changes are a compromised trying to make minimal changes in what's already there. Which (as you have seen in your attempt to change it), are carefully and aggressively defended. Any coment about the changes to the article body? --BoogaLouie (talk) 22:12, 22 April 2011 (UTC)
Claims based on a single source (Zulaika) are too weak for a lede. Ledes should be as completely neutral in wording as possible. [16] based on CIA documents shows a substantially different picture. Nor does [17] appear to back the POV expected to be in the lede. Where such disparate soucres exist, relying on the most POV one seems unwise. Collect (talk) 22:29, 22 April 2011 (UTC)
As for proposed changes to the article body I read through it twice and did like the proposed version. It seems like the distinction of events of the 15th and the 19th makes sense. As for specific wording issues, such as "executed" vs. "organized", or describing Mosaddeq's home as "heavily fortified" there has got be a many ways of wording these, some of which will be palatable, if not loved, by all. I think discussing the lede now isn't productive. LoveUxoxo (talk) 22:45, 22 April 2011 (UTC)
One thing: add "Royalist" (is that the right word?) before "mob" under the events of the 19th, we have mobs, counter-mobs and fake mobs and its hard for the unfamiliar reader to keep them apart. Cheers! LoveUxoxo (talk) 22:55, 22 April 2011 (UTC)
  • Claims based on a single source (Zulaika) are too weak for a lede. Please read more carefully. Zulaika's cite has been removed in the proposed change per Kurdo's complaint.
  • nytimes based on CIA documents shows a substantially different picture. What? where? please explain.
  • Nor does all the shah's men appear to back the POV expected to be in the lede. What's wrong with it? Kinzer was a journalist, is a professor (last time I checked). I made sure stuff from his book source jived with my main source Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran.
  • LoveUxoxo, I incorporated most of your suggestions.
  • replace "executed" with "organized". Why? Well, the CIA was not driving the tanks that attacked Mosaddeq's house. They may have orchestrated or organized or planned or plotted the overthrow, but they did not execute it. --BoogaLouie (talk)
"plotted" probably is the best description, no? I'd use that in the first instance, maybe the next sentence you then change from "coup plotters" to "coup organizers". Cheers! LoveUxoxo (talk) 22:36, 25 April 2011 (UTC)

Kurdo777: you didn't like BoogaLouie's sentences "Mossadegh's heavily fortified residence" or "three-hour battle with Mossadegh's tanks", which you described as loaded statements and mentioned WP:WEASEL. I don't feel that a description such as (ex.) "heavily fortified residence" is inherently un-encyclopedic or weasely in any given article as long as there is consensus as being appropriate. I am assuming that you do have a problem with the statements in terms of WP:RS and WP:WEIGHT however. That having been said, BoogaLouie, when I read an article and seemingly straightforward statements of fact above are in quotations (which you did in your new version), that sends up warning flags for me. It seems like just what it is, that a seemingly straightforward statement in fact is/was dispute, and I get worried about how reliable it is. I KNOW you did that in an attempt to make it more palatable to others, but I think is this case that's not a compromise I like. Either those phrases or some other, but whatever statements of facts that do get put in I'd like to drop the quotes. That might be just crazy talk, dunno. LoveUxoxo (talk) 19:11, 23 April 2011 (UTC)

Crud, it does read like crazy talk, but yeah, I don't like it when a sentence in an article has to do this: The "decisive battle" between pro- and anti-Mosaddeq forces took place at Mosaddeq's home, which though "heavily fortified"... Just my opinion of course. LoveUxoxo (talk) 19:18, 23 April 2011 (UTC)

To LoveUxoxo, the "heavily fortified" claim., has one source, and that's Zulaika, who is neither an Iran specialist, nor a historian, and whose claims are contradicted by other more reliable sources, as documented by User:Collect above. Kurdo777 (talk) 06:18, 25 April 2011 (UTC)
Well yes! statements in fact "seemingly straightforward" (I think they are straightforward!) are is/was in dispute in this article. I have been trying to add information about to the article (mainly about US coldwar fears and criticism made of Mosaddeq) unsucessfully for over three years! I have been blocked several times, once permenently due to a obscene message someone sent to an admin in my name (it was lifted), at least two other editors have been blocked also in regard to the article.
And there have been a number of (unsuccessful) Arbitration and Mediation requests about the article:
... so that is why I put in the quotes. This is not like most wikipedia articles, it's heavily contested. What you saw with Comments attempt to change the lede is just the tip of the iceberg!
So I guess I use the quotes to give the statement authority, but I would have no problem with not using them if everyone agreed on it (when hell freezes over!)--BoogaLouie (talk) 21:29, 23 April 2011 (UTC)
There is another reason I should have mentioned! When you are trying to be exact and use the same term as the source you want to give them credit/avoid any possibility of copyright infringement. --64.131.23.62 (talk) 02:15, 25 April 2011 (UTC)

Opposed The changes are cosmetic and, BoogaLouie is going in circles, as usual. My objections remain, a lead is suppose to be summary of the article body, not a platform for new information (selective ones too, from questionable non-specialist sources like Zulaika, which are cherry-picked by BoogaLouie, and meant to influence and mislead the reader...but that's besides the point here). Kurdo777 (talk) 06:03, 25 April 2011 (UTC)

I keep asking you to explain your objections and never get a reply. The 2.0 proposed change incorporates suggestions from complaints such as yours. It starts with a change to the body, which is summarized in the proposed change in the lede. There is nothing from Zulaika. I've removed it all, at your suggestion. What is from a "non-specialist" source? What "misleads" the reader? --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:32, 25 April 2011 (UTC)
have just deleted "heavily fortified" from The "decisive battle" between pro- and anti-Mosaddeq forces took place at Mosaddeq's home, which though "heavily fortified" defended by loyalist troops and three tanks, was overwhelmed after a two to three-hour battle."[23][24] in proposed change in article body. I still would like to keep the phrase in the lede but right now we are working on the article body. --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:36, 26 April 2011 (UTC)


RfC: 2nd attempt to change wording in article to include mention of role played by military

Should the article wording be changed to include mention not only of demonstrators but also of military attacking and defending coup targets? Supporter(s) of change (as before the writer of this request) argue that currently all the body of the article has to say about the execution of actual overthrow is, After a short exile in Italy, the CIA completed the coup against Mossadegh, and returned the Shah to Iran, (which sounds like the CIA was in exile in Italy but never mind). And the lead itself mentions demonstrators marching on the PMs house, but nothing about the miltary action that all WP:Reliable Sources mention, (including one author who dismisses the demonstrations as "sound effects" (see Reason for proposed change above))

Made this RfC before and have tried this time to satisfy criticisms of first proposal by:

  • adding a couple of sentences of detail to the article body and much briefer changes to the lead;
  • eliminating a citation and editors didn't like (Zulaika, Joseba (2009). Terrorism: the self-fulfilling prophecy. University of Chicago Press. p. 139.) and
  • getting rid of some detail that wasn't mentioned in some other sources ("32 tanks").
  • deleted some phrases: "heavily fortified" (from body), "two to three-hour" (from lead)

Criticisms of the change, both the old and the new improved one (see above), include the statement that "a coup is by definition an action taken by the military and paramilitary forces" so mentioning it would be redundant, "the changes are cosmetic", and "most of the cracking heads and skulls so to speak, was done by plain-clothed CIA-hired thugs who ruled the streets of Tehran that day" (no source or further explanation given)

Below is the (proposed) change with text that is either being deleted (in the Current wording) or added (in the Proposed change) italicized. All the added stuff is from the quotations in Reason for proposed change above. --BoogaLouie (talk) 21:06, 27 April 2011 (UTC)

Current wording in the article body

Execution of Operation Ajax
Having obtained the Shah's concurrence, the CIA team headed by Roosevelt executed the coup. Firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mosaddegh and appointing Zahedi were drawn up by the coup plotters and signed by the Shah. On Saturday August 15, Colonel Nematollah Nassiri, the commander of the Imperial Guard, delivered to Mosaddegh a firman from the shah dismissing him. Mosaddegh, who had been warned of the plot (probably by the Tudeh party) rejected the firman as a forgery and had Nassiri arrested.[25] Mosaddegh argued at his trial after the coup that under the Iranian constitutional monarchy, the Shah had no constitutional right to issue an order for the elected Prime Minster's dismissal without Parliament's consent.[26] The action was publicized and the Shah, fearing a popular backlash, fled to Rome, Italy. After a short exile in Italy, the CIA completed the coup against Mossadegh, and returned the Shah to Iran.

Proposed change in article body

August 15 attempted coup
Having obtained the Shah's concurrence, the CIA team headed by Roosevelt organized the coup. Firmans (royal decrees) dismissing Mosaddegh and appointing Zahedi were drawn up by the coup plotters and signed by the Shah. On Saturday August 15, Colonel Nematollah Nassiri, the commander of the Imperial Guard, delivered a firman from the shah to Mosaddegh dismissing him. Mosaddegh, who had been warned of the plot (probably by the Tudeh party) rejected the firman as a forgery and had Nassiri arrested.[27] Mosaddegh argued at his trial after the coup that under the Iranian constitutional monarchy, the Shah had no constitutional right to issue an order for the elected Prime Minster's dismissal without Parliament's consent.[28]

In Tehran, the next day pro-Mosaddeq army units arrested soldiers and others suspected of being part of the coup, but failed to find General Zahedi.[29] Details of the coup attempt were published and in demonstrations and newspapers the shah was denounced. Panicked, he fled by plane to Rome, Italy. The coup plotters decided to "rally the army and public opinion to their side" by distributing copies of the shah's dismissal of Mosaddeq to the press. They also gave provided agents with $50,000 to created fund a "black" (fake) Tudeh mob which created chaos the next two days looting shops, destroying pictures of the Shah, and ransacking offices of royalist groups. Sincere supporters of Mossedeq also joined in the rioting.[30][31]

August 19 coup
On the morning of August 19, a mob marched north from the south Tehran bazaar attacking and burning Tudeh and pro-Mossadeq newspapers and buildings. At the encouragement of the CIA team it seized Radio Tehran where Zahedi later broadcast a statement that he was the legal prime minister. The mob was joined by Bakhtiari tribesmen[32] and other trucked-in civilians and later by military tanks and soldiers. "By noon, anti-Mosaddeq army and police officers had largely taken over leadership of the crowds." [33] The "decisive battle" between pro- and anti-Mosaddeq forces took place at Mosaddeq's home, which though heavily fortified defended by loyalist troops and three tanks, was overwhelmed after a two to three-hour battle."[34][35] 200 reportedly died at Mosadeq's house and another 100 in fighting elsewhere.[36]

Current wording in lede

"At first, the coup appeared to be a failure when on the night of August 15–16, Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri was arrested while attempting to arrest Mosaddegh. The Shah fled the country the next day. On August 19, a pro-Shah mob, paid by the CIA, marched on Mosaddegh's residence.[37] According to the CIA's declassified documents and records, some of the most feared mobsters in Tehran were hired by the CIA to stage pro-Shah riots on the 19th. Other CIA-paid men were brought into Tehran in buses and trucks, and took over the streets of the city.[38] Mosaddegh was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. ...."

Proposed change in lede

"At first, the coup appeared to be a failure when on the night of August 15–16, Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri was arrested while attempting to arrest Mosaddegh. The Shah fled the country the next day. On August 19, a pro-Shah mob, encouraged by Shia preachers[39] and paid by the CIA[40], marched on Mosaddegh's heavily fortified residence.[41] Joined by other forces[42][43] including a column of tanks,[44] they surrounded key positions in central Tehran. After a two to three-hour battle with tanks protecting Mosaddeq's home, and some 200 dead, Zahedi was proclaimed "to be the shah's designated and lawful prime minister."[45] Mosaddegh was arrested, tried and convicted of treason by the Shah's military court. ...."[46]

(ref list)

(The {{Reflist}} doesn't work since it gives the same 10 cites as for this old suggested change above. So to check the citations go into edit mode. Anything from "Joseba Zulaika's Terrorism: The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy has been removed. The cites in the proposed changes are all from these books:)

  • Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003) p.175, 211
  • Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, 1982, p.280
  • Elm, Mostafu (1994). Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath, p 333. Syracuse University Press
  • Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv, 256

Responses

  • Comment. Just a small one. Was Mossadegh's house "fortified" to any degree - if not "strongly"? Had been made defensible to some extent (sandbags, barricades?) and if so were these in quick response to events or longer standing? GraemeLeggett (talk) 21:54, 27 April 2011 (UTC)
I think BoogieLouie changed "fortified" to "defended" in an attempt to make it more agreeable to others. Kurdo777 (I am only guessing, so tell me if I am wrong) but part of the reason you didn't like that description because it seemed to portray Mossadegh as more well-prepared for a military action than he was? But I think Graeme raised an important point - if in anticipation of a possible coup preparations were made in advance. LoveUxoxo (talk) 22:43, 27 April 2011 (UTC)
Reporter Kennett Love wrote in The New York Times on August 20, 1953, that there was a "fierce last-stand battle at Dr. Mossadegh's heavily fortified home." He wrote that, "Dr. Mossadegh's home had been fortified with machine-gun nests on the roof and a high defensive wall outside his bedroom window." The next day, Love wrote, "Dr. Mossadegh surrendered just twenty-four hours after he had fled his fortified home, which fell to Royalist attackers at the end of a two-hour street tank duel." Binksternet (talk) 23:05, 27 April 2011 (UTC)
please see some of the quotes from sources here:
"Mosaddeq's home, .... was defended by pro-Mosaddeq army units backed by three tanks."
"three tanks protecting Mosaddeq's home and the main radio station"
"[at] the house [of premier Mosaddeq]. ... loyal soldiers built fortifications and prepared for battle. They were armed with rifles, machine guns, and Sherman tanks mounted with 75-millimeter cannons."
I haven't read anything saying whether it was in quick response to events or longer standing. --BoogaLouie (talk) 23:10, 27 April 2011 (UTC)
  • Oppose. This whole discussion is silly. Which president or prime minster's residence is not defended? This is a silly trivial matter that certain editors , want to put undue emphasis on, by highlighting it in the lead, in order to mislead the reader into believing that this was somehow a civil war like the one in Ivory Coast, and Mossadegh was not a civilian democratically-elected head of the government, but rather a warlord of some sort on equal footing with the Zahedi's army units and the CIA mercenaries. The status of Mossadegh's house, fortified or not, is nothing but a footnote in this historical event, that may or may not warrant inclusion in the article body. But it's certainly not a significant enough issue for the lead of the article which is suppose to be summary of the single most importnat events. To put this differently, the core issues here are undue weight and cherry-picking. For example, one notable historian has written a 500-page book about the 1953 coup, yet BoogaLouie has decided that one word or one line about Mossadegh's house, mentioned in passing in one chapter of this book, which would make a nice soundbite for BoogaLouie's preferred narrative of the coup, is significant enough to warrant inclusion in the lead of this 1-page article. This is where all the relevant polices on WP:UNDUE and WP:Cherry kick in. If that historian truly believed that the Mossadegh's house was such significant topic of the coup, he would have devoted an entire chapter to it, not just one line. Kurdo777 (talk) 09:52, 28 April 2011 (UTC)
Does a two/three hour tank battle sound like a civil war? The "one notable historian" who has written a 500-page book about the 1953 coup says "The decisive battle between pro- and anti-Mosaddeq forces occurred at Mosaddeq's home, which had been heavily fortified by loyalist troops." Is a decisive battle "nothing but a footnote in this historical event"?? Are two sentences about a decisive battle in the lead "undue wieght"???? Is a paragraph about this battle in a long article full of detail about when Popular discontent with the AIOC began, or what happened after World War I, or how the 1952 Majlis election went, excessive??? - BoogaLouie (talk) 16:19, 28 April 2011 (UTC)
Nothing wrong with discussion. The information adds flesh to the events of the coup. It may need more context to be understood eg why was there only 3 tanks to defend the residence (and the radio station - always a popular objective in coups). Why did it take as long as it did to overcome three tanks if the Army was better equipped. One historians focus may be on the events causing and resulting from the coup, anothers may be on the events of the day and what happened to the people there - so that one source devotes little attention to that incident does not necessarily make it insignificant in a broader sense to historians. GraemeLeggett (talk) 11:23, 28 April 2011 (UTC)
Except, this is not an issue of one historian putting emphasis on one aspect of the coup, and another historian putting emphasis on a another aspect of the coup. No historian has put any emphasis on Mossadegh's house, so this is indeed a silly discussion about a trivial issue, only mentioned in passing by a few sources. Bring ANY book written about the coup that devotes a chapter or a page to the condition of Mossadegh's house, and we can say this event is noteworthy enough to have two lines devoted to it, in the lead of a one-page article. Otherwise, this is a clear violation of WP:UNDUE and WP:Cherry. Kurdo777 (talk) 17:15, 28 April 2011 (UTC)
GraemeLeggett, I'm not sure you are going to find the level of detail about the coup you are looking for from WP:RSs. The coup happened over 50 years ago and all of the principles in it are dead. I have read many books on the coup or on Iranian history dealing with the coup, and have yet to find anything on why there were 3 tanks and not four or two or whatever to defend the residence or the radio station, or why it took three hours and not two or one to overrun Mosaddeq's house. --BoogaLouie (talk) 16:28, 28 April 2011 (UTC)
The phrase "decisive battle" should tell us that some detail is permissible; details such as machine-gun nests on the roof and a new wall erected outside Mosaddegh's bedroom. Binksternet (talk) 18:21, 28 April 2011 (UTC)
In defense of BoogieLouie it doesn't appear obvious to me that his motivations for wanting these details in the main body are in bad faith. As a reader I am curious about details of the coup once it was put into action. My layman's perception of most coups are that they involve relatively small groups of key military personnel, sometimes paramilitaries, and control of key locations, often with the end result in doubt as both sides try to sway the "undecided". The narrative that BoogieLouie proposed seems to specify these particulars to a degree that I would want, after all, its always different. Sometimes its the lone SVN air force pilot bombing the palace, other times its Yeltsin standing on a tank in front of parliament, and the iconic image (to me at least) of the coup of Allende is him personally defending the Presidential Palace in his last stand. I don't think that a reader would take these statements as implying that the events were a civil war or that Mossadegh was not a civilian democratically-elected head of the government. Actually "heavily fortified" and "decisive battle" probably aren't my favorite words to use, but regardless the nature of the "last stand" I think certainly deserves mention; as a reader I want to see - on the level of the street - how this coup succeeded. LoveUxoxo (talk) 22:44, 28 April 2011 (UTC)
  • Support. for reasons explained above. --BoogaLouie (talk) 19:47, 28 April 2011 (UTC)
  • Support. This, like all military actions, should have information about the fighting. Binksternet (talk) 00:15, 29 April 2011 (UTC)
  • Oppose The coup was primarily political and economic. Collect (talk) 01:10, 29 April 2011 (UTC)
    • Mr. Collect, what WP:RS do you have that says, "The coup was primarily political and economic"? Even if you do, even if it was, even if all WP:RS agree it was (I can't remember seeing a single one saying so), why shouldn't there be a short subsection of one or two paragraphs about what happened to physically remove Mosaddeq from power? --BoogaLouie (talk) 14:04, 29 April 2011 (UTC)
      • Actually, it is you who would need one claiming that it was essentially military. The turning point appears to be the publication of the Shah's decree removing Mossagegh - which was a political act, not a military one. [21] refers to "political coup." And is RS. [22], [23] Gen. Zahedi announces that he is the prime minister. To support this claim, C.I.A. agents disseminate a large quantity of photographs of the royal decrees dismissing Mossadegh and appointing Zahedi. The shah announces that he indeed signed the decrees. Several Tehran newspapers publish the Shah's decrees. As a result, supporters of the Shah begin gathering in the streets, and another coup begins. Gen. Zahedi comes out of hiding to lead the movement. By the end of the day, the country is in the hands of Zahedi and members of the Mossadegh government are either in hiding or incarerated. A classic "political coup." Collect (talk) 18:23, 29 April 2011 (UTC)
        • Collect, your sources clearly state "political coup", and I don't doubt your good faith in wanting the article to be clear about that. But the sources you gave all seem to give some weight to describing the specific actions and strategies when AJAX was put into play. Prophets has only two paragraphs, but includes the bombing campaign. You quoted from the timeline in the NYT article, but from the main page of that series I see seven "chapters", one of which is titled "The Coup". And that chapter goes into all the detail of events over the period from the 15th to the 19th. Considering the vast size of the article right now, and BoogieLouie's proposed changes being expansion to three paragraphs of detail, that ratio just doesn't seem to me to be WP:UNDUE. LoveUxoxo (talk) 19:15, 29 April 2011 (UTC)
        • Collect, you searched `mossadegh and "political coup"` from among the millions of books in Google Books and found a hit in a book about "Christianity and Justice" and in a booko on American history. They don't say the 1953 coup "was primarily political and economic" or "political and economic rather than military", one says "America's seven major oil companies eventually barged their way into Iran's oil pool
          But not before the CIA pulled off its political coup." (pretty ambiguous)
          and the other says "In Iran Eisenhower authorized the CIA to engineer a political coup when its nationalist prime minister, Mohammed Mossadeq, nationalized the oil fields ....".
          From this you conclude it's wrong to include a short paragraph telling what exactly happenbd on the day Mosaddeq was overthrown? (The proposed change does not use the phrase "military coup" or a "political coup", it does not say the coup was "essentially military", it simply tells what happened.) I put it to you that Wikipedia is not interested in whether it "appears" to you that, "the turning point appears to be the publication of the Shah's decree removing Mossagegh". It cares about what WP:RS say, and you haven't found any that say what you claim they say. --BoogaLouie (talk) 02:12, 30 April 2011 (UTC)
          • Amazinggly enough the other sources agree it was essentially political in nature. Including the New York Times review of the CIA involvement. Adding such stuff as is here in the lede is like mentioning what Washington had for breakfast in 1776. It is information overload of material which is more about the purported mechanics of the coup than of the reason for the coup. Wikipedia ledes are supposed to summarize articles, not be polemic articles in themselves. And material substantially from a single source is very poor for a lede in any article at all. The lede should show what is substantially agreed upon by reliable sources, and way too much of the lede fails that simple test. Collect (talk) 12:54, 30 April 2011 (UTC)
            • What other sources? Who says "political" but not "military"? Adding: "After a two to three-hour battle with tanks protecting Mosaddeq's home, and some 200 dead, Zahedi was proclaimed "to be the shah's designated and lawful prime minister", is like "mentioning what Washington had for breakfast in 1776"? It's not substantially agreed upon by reliable sources? Well what sources disagree with it? --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:35, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
              • You asked for sources. I gave them. Argumentation is now silly. Look up the word "tendentious" to see what is occurring. Collect (talk) 18:48, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
                • Let the record show when you search `mossadegh and "political coup"` in Google Books (as Collect did), you get "7 results". When you search `mossadegh and "military coup"` in the same place, you get "About 932 results." --BoogaLouie (talk) 23:25, 2 May 2011 (UTC)
                  • You asked for sources - I gave them. I think you seem intent on making this an article about everything except the actual reason for the coup. Using Google Books I get 645 results, not your purported "7 results" for "political coup" and "mossadegh". As the coup did involve the military, it was, perforce, a "military coup" but that does not mean the emphasis belongs on military action - the "military" part is because generals etc. were involved. Last I checked, most generals were, in fact, in the military. The reason behind the coup was, however, clearly political in nature. Which the sources all agree on. Collect (talk) 00:13, 3 May 2011 (UTC)
                    • 645 results huh? Well good luck anyone duplicating that search. I double checked and got 7.
                    • "The reason behind the coup was, however, clearly political in nature. Which the sources all agree on." Well coups are about power and power is politics, what I don't understand is how do you get from "political coup" to excluding a short paragraph about the military action that removed Mosaddeq from power in a long article with all sorts of tangents? --BoogaLouie (talk) 23:46, 3 May 2011 (UTC)
                      • So we settled on "political coup" - thanks. Now we have to deal with characterization of a court as the "Shah's military court" where every court in Iran was the "Shah's" and characterization of his rule as a "royal dictatorship" etc. And the commutation of Mossadegh's sentence by the Shah should be added into the main article along with most of the current "lede." All directly contrary to WP:LEDE and WP:NPOV for starters. Go back to the short and accurate lede, and stop the insistence on too much material, POV in nature, based on a couple of sources. Then, maybe, this can be worked into a responsible article. Cheers. Collect (talk) 11:31, 4 May 2011 (UTC)
  • Comment. OK, I'm regretting saying "military" - here is a quote from Edward Luttwak from the coup de tat main article" "A coup consists of the infiltration of a small, but critical, segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder" That seems like a good description. It is that mechanism that I want to see portrayed in the article; the current version has just 3 sentences in the Operation Ajax section describing the events of the 15th, and just in passing mentions the events of the 19th with "...the CIA completed the coup against Mossadegh..." That hardly seems adequate. LoveUxoxo (talk) 01:48, 29 April 2011 (UTC)
  • Comment. I'd like to thank editors, particularly Binksternet and the ever diplomatic LoveUxoxo, who've taken time to read all this stuff and make comments.
I'd also like to beg you to step back for a moment, take a break from the task of bending over backwards to resolve conflict. Ask yourself if you don't find something a little absurd going on here. We're arguing about whether a paragraph describing how a prime minster was physically removed from power included in a long article about the coup detat that removed that prime minister from power.
Is this "a silly discussion about a trivial issue"? Or something that should have been done long ago?
Is it "a clear violation of WP:UNDUE and WP:Cherry" to add this sentence to the body (not the lede) of the article?
The "decisive battle" between pro- and anti-Mosaddeq forces took place at Mosaddeq's home, which though defended by loyalist troops and three tanks, was overwhelmed after a two to three-hour battle."[41][42]
because no "book written about the coup that devotes a chapter or a page to the condition of Mossadegh's house"? Note that the three major source here all mention Mosaddeq's house, they just don't devote a page to it. --BoogaLouie (talk) 14:38, 29 April 2011 (UTC)
Yes he traveled to Baghdad and from there to Rome. --BoogaLouie (talk) 17:10, 4 May 2011 (UTC)

Propaganda

This article reads like Iranian propaganda. I suggest a major rewrite to make the article less hostile towards the Shah, and more criticial of Mossedegh (who was in fact unelected and clinging to power illegally). —Preceding unsigned comment added by 124.197.15.138 (talk) 08:20, 21 May 2011 (UTC)

That's rich coming from you. I assume you got tired of defending/white-washing Franco, Mussolini, and the "legitimate democratic Vichy Government", so now you've picked a new hobby in the Shah. Kurdo777 (talk) 17:32, 23 May 2011 (UTC)
Read WP:AGF and WP:NPA. All you are doing is making Godwin's Law comparisons of the Shah to WW II figures. What it does is weaken your own case. Collect (talk) 17:46, 23 May 2011 (UTC)
First of all, AGF does not extent to trolls. Read WP:Spade. Secondly, I was talking about the IP's own edits/obsessions, which you could yourself examine to see my point. On the same day that he shoved dictator in front of Mossadegh's name here, he removed Franco's Fascist regime from military dictatorships, and argued that the Vichy regime was "the legitimate government of France supported by the majority". The guy is obviously a troll. And that's not my judgment alone, look what an arbitrator/administrator said on his block log. Kurdo777 (talk) 18:23, 23 May 2011 (UTC)
And the comment of "Jew hating troll" is pretty meaningless here -- I do not recall Mossadegh being Jewish, was he? Sorry fella - even if you know the WP:TRUTH[ a bit of Assume Good Faith is called for. Have a cup of tea. Collect (talk) 19:12, 23 May 2011 (UTC)
It's not meaningless at all. That little fact coupled with his editing history, shows that he is a far-right ideologue who has a history of trolling, POV-pushing - hence, not someone you AGF with. Kurdo777 (talk) 23:13, 23 May 2011 (UTC)
You know I went to this person's talk page and while he hardly has a stellar editing history here, I found the edit that assumedly caused someone to label him a "Jew hating troll" and it was a comment on the talk page of the article for Jew's Harp. his comment was spot on and the accusation is groundless. Batvette (talk) 04:02, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

Proposed change to add information about events leading up to the coup

No consensus reached in the last RfC, so let's go on to another proposed change: Add something about important political events in the year or 13 months before the coup, putting them in the 1950s section of the article.

Events such as the Siyeh-i Tir (or July 1952) uprising that strengthened Mosaddeq position by leading to him being granted emergency powers; the extension of Mosaddeq's emergency powers six months later; and details of the August 1953 referendum that dissolved parliament and granted a further extension of emergency powers to Mosaddeq.

Lest anyone think this is less than relevant, bear in mind the article currently has a section on Nineteenth century, Early petroleum development, Post-World War I, World War II, Post-World War II. Amongst other filler, it includes detail about wars fought with Czarist Russia in 1802, the 1907 sale of William D'arcy's shares in the AIOC to the Burmah Oil Company government.

Current version

While the National Front, which often supported Mosaddegh won handily in the big cities, there was no one to monitor voting in the rural areas. Violence broke out in Abadan and other parts of the country where elections were hotly contested. Faced with having to leave Iran for The Hague where Britain was suing for control of Iranian oil, Mossadegh's cabinet voted to postpone the remainder of the election until after the return of the Iranian delegation from The Hague.[47]

By mid-1953 a mass of resignations by Mossadegh's parliamentary supporters reduced parliament below its quorum. A referendum to dissolve parliament and give the prime minister power to make law was submitted to voters, and it passed with 99 percent approval, 2,043,300 votes to 1300 votes against.[48]

Proposed change

[changes in italics]

While the National Front, which often supported Mosaddegh won handily in the big cities, there was no one to monitor voting in the rural areas. Violence broke out in Abadan and other parts of the country where elections were hotly contested. Faced with having to leave Iran for The Hague where Britain was suing for control of Iranian oil, Mossadegh's cabinet voted to postpone the remainder of the election until after the return of the Iranian delegation from The Hague.[49]

In July 1952 Mosaddeq resigned after the Shah refused to accept his nomination for War Minister, a position traditionally filled by the Shah. Mosaddeq appealed to the general public for support and recieved an overwhelming response. After five days of mass demonstrations, 29 killed in Tehran, and "signs of dissension in the army," the Shah backed down and asked Mosaddeq to form a new government.[50][51] This was an enormous personal triumph for Mosaddeq vis-a-vis the Shah and Mosaddeq capitalized on it by asking the majlis (parliament) for "emergency powers for six months to decree any law he felt necessary for obtaining not only financial solvency, but also electoral, judicial, and educational reforms."[52]

Mosaddeq dealt his opponents "not only at the Shah and the military but also at the landed aristocracy and the two Houses of Parliament ... a rapid succession of blows." [53]In early 1953 Mosaddeq successfully pressed Parliament to extend his emergency powers for another 12 months. With these powers, he decreed a land reform law that established village councils and increased peasants' shares of production. [54]

By mid-1953 Mosaddeq's struggle with Parliament had resulted in a mass of resignation by his parliamentary supporters reducing parliament below its quorum, and a referendum to dissolve parliament and give the prime minister powers to legislate law. The referendum passed with 99% approval, 2,043,300 votes to 1300 votes against,[55] but was criticized by opponents for its placing of separately ballot boxes for yes or no ballots at different places[56] and a requirement that "each ballot must be clearly inscribed with the full name of the voter and the number and place of issue of his identity card."[57]

Reason for proposed change

Assuming it's that the material about the uprising and Mosaddeq's reforms are not particularly controversial I'll offer WP:RS for detail on the referendum being important, here are what some of authors of books on the coup and/or recent Iranian history have to say about the referendum and its importance and relevance:
"The transparent unfairness of this referendum was more grist for the anti-Mossadegh mill. Mid-August found Roosevelt and his team of Iranian agents in place and ready to strike." (Kinzer, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, p.165)

”Dissolving the Majles through a referendum, justifiably described as Mosaddeq's political masterpiece, was an ingenious countermeasure adopted by him to deprive his opponents of a quasi-legal vehicle for his ouster. The opposition capitalized on the referendum, denouncing it as another blatant violation of the Constitution. ... Kashani declared it religiously impermissible and called on the faithful not to take part in it." (Azimi in Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, p.95)

"Mosaddeq's decision to conduct a controversial referendum to close Parliament gave the CIA's precoup propaganda campaign an easy target, probably helped persuade the shah to support the coup, and undoubtedly turned some Iranians against Mosaddeq." (Gasiorowski, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.266)

"To ensure victory at the polls, positive and negative ballot boxes were placed in different places. As expected, Mossadeq received an overwhelming vote of confidence ... Mossadeq, the constitutional lawyer who had meticulously quoted the fundamental laws against the shah, was now bypassing the same laws and resorting to the theory of the general will. The liberal aristocrat who had in the past appealed predominantly to the middle class was mobilizing the lower classes. The moderate reformer who had proposed to disenfranchize illiterates was seeking the acclaim of the national masses." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.274)

More generally the added factoids concern Mosaddeq's loss of (some) domestic support, which played a part in the coup according to Abrahamian and others: "The easy success of this coup can be explained by two factors, the widening gap between the traditional and middle classes within the National Front; and the increasing alienation of the whole officer corps from the civilian administration." (Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.273-4)

"The coup could not have succeeded without significant internal disaffection or indifference, but without outside aid it would not have occurred." (Keddie, Nikki R., Roots of Revolution, Yale University Press, 1981, p.140)

Responses

  • reply. Well its nice to have even conditional support from Kurdo but there'r some problems.
    • First is sources, either not being there or having nothing to do with the sentences they supposedly support:
      • "constitutional prerogative of the prime minister [was] to name a Minister of War and the Chief of Staff." Do we have any WP:RS saying so? Usually in a constitutional monarchy this is the way its done. But do we have anything reliable, scholarly, saying the Iranian constitution said it was done this way? i.e why did the Shah name a Minister of War and the Chief of Staff before Mosaddeq? Was it an issue on which the constitution was vague?
      • "Ahmad Qavam ... was appointed ... prime minister [then] announced his intention to resume negotiations with the British to end the oil dispute, a reversal of Mosaddegh's policy. Mass protests and major strikes broke out in all of Iran's major towns, with the Bazaar closing down in Tehran." (source given is Abrahamian, [Iran Between Two Revolutions] (1982), p. 271.) So the uprising was in response to his talk of negotiating with the UK? But Abrahamian says nothing about Qavam "announc[ing] his intention to resume negotiations with the British", let alone that the protest followed such an announcement. Do you have any WP:RS for this?
      • "With his emergency powers, Mosaddegh tried to strengthen the democratic political institutions by limiting the monarchy's unconstitutional powers." (source given is Zabih, Sepehr. The Mosaddegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution, p. 65.) Not what the source says at all. I got the book and read page 65 and it talks about a discussion between the Shah and Mosaddeq after the uprising. The Shah wants Mosaddeq to settle the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute and get on with socio-economic reforms, Mosaddeq says that the oil settlement must be equitable. Mosaddeq says that an above-politics, non-meddling shah will be more popular and in tune with contemporary Iran, the Shah says that instability, weak government and pressing foreign and domestic problems require his involvement. IOW about what Mosaddegh thought was important, not what he was trying to do.
    • Then there's the question of WP:UNDUE.
      • Why expand the stuff on the spontaneous uprising of support for Mosaddeq ("Mass protests and major strikes", officers cowering in fear, "over 250" casualties, "More popular than ever, a greatly strengthened Mosaddegh ..."); but not the un-secret ballot of the referendum? ("gave the CIA's precoup propaganda campaign an easy target".) Well? was it not only an easy target but rather unfair as well? ("transparent unfairness" was the phrase Kinzer used. "The results of the Aug. 4 referendum were clearly rigged in his favor" was what the NYT.com Secrets of History. CIA in Iran said.)
      • "By mid-1953, Mosaddegh became aware of the plots against him and grew increasingly wary of conspirators acting within his government". (source: NYT.com Secrets of History. CIA in Iran) "In early August, Iranian CIA operatives pretending to be socialists and nationalists threatened Muslim leaders with `savage punishment if they opposed Mossadegh,` thereby giving the impression that Mossadegh was cracking down on dissent, and stirring anti-Mossadegh sentiments within the religious community."
        • Important issue in the coup, but what about support Mosaddeq lost before August 1953? The same source that talks about the false flag attacks (NYT.com Secrets of History. CIA in Iran) says that circa March 1953, "The coalition that elected Dr. Mossadegh was splintering, and the Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh, had become active." Another book (the most recent and most scholarly book on the coup) lists "The main defectors from the ranks of Mosaddeq supporters," Kashani, Makki, Baqa'i and Ha'erizadeh, who "played an important role in the in the formation of the civic nationalist movement and a far more significant role in its destruction. ... Their defection could be portrayed or seen by the British and the Americans as indicating that the civic nationalist movement had disintegrated and was vulnerable to Tudeh Party challenge." They're "significant" in the destruction of the National Front and the Mosaddeq government. So if you're gong to expand why nothing about them? (one other thing, the article does include mention of Kashani but only at the end in the Historical viewpoint in the Islamic Republic section. The first time the article reader hears about Kashani is in this sentence: "The mass media elevate Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani as the real leader of the oil nationalization campaign, depicting Mosaddegh as merely the ayatollah's hanger-on." OK, what did he do?
    • Repetition.
      • The article already talks about Wilber and the savage punishments: "In 2000, James Risen at The New York Times obtained the previously secret CIA version of the coup written by Wilber .... In early August, the C.I.A. stepped up the pressure. Iranian operatives pretending to be Communists threatened Muslim leaders with savage punishment if they opposed Mossadegh, seeking to stir anti-Communist sentiment in the religious community. In addition, the secret history says, the house of at least one prominent Muslim was bombed by C.I.A. agents posing as Communists," in this section, using the same source. Repetition in the article is a problem. Compare the Blowback and Aftermath sections. --BoogaLouie (talk) 18:36, 27 May 2011 (UTC)
  • Opposed to the BoogaLouie's version. It has too many quotations, and it's full of half-truths and loaded factbits meant to twist and spin the events in question. I found Kurdo's version as more unbiased. So, I support Kurdo's version as the basis to compromise. --Wayiran (talk) 00:07, 1 June 2011 (UTC)
    • What exactly are the "loaded factbits meant to twist and spin the events in question"? Everthing in the rewrite comes from a book on Iranian history, books that no editor has complained about previously - they are used as sources throughout the article. I used quotations because of all the disagreement between editors over this article to avoid problems with accusations of "half-truths and loaded factbits" Would you be satisfied if the quotes were paraphrased? --BoogaLouie (talk) 15:55, 1 June 2011 (UTC)
  • Oppose It stretches the topic of the article to encompass a vast part of Iranian history far beyond discussion of the coup proper. This article ought to be restricted to its logical contents per its title. Collect (talk) 00:09, 1 June 2011 (UTC)
    • "a vast part of Iranian history far beyond discussion of the coup proper." What??? The event added happened 13 months before the coup!!! You have a problem with that but nothing to say about the sections on Nineteenth century, Early petroleum development, Post-World War I, World War II, Post-World War II; the stuff about wars fought with Czarist Russia in 1802, the 1907 sale of William D'arcy's shares in the AIOC to the Burmah Oil Company government?? Do you have any reply to the Reason for change I gave? -- BoogaLouie (talk) 15:55, 1 June 2011 (UTC)
  • Support Boogalouie's version and while I respect any editor's right to an opinion, stating it encompasses a vast part of Iranian history is rather disingenuous in light of the aforementioned sections of far earlier events. I feel Boogalouies's proposed edit has good flow and contributes positively to the whole of the article. I think Kurdo's modification has a more disjointed feel as the reader goes through it. Batvette (talk) 03:35, 1 June 2011 (UTC)

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  1. ^ Gasiorowski, Mark J. (1991). U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, Building a Client State in Iran. Cornell University Press. p. 17. ISBN 0801424127, 9780801424120. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)
  2. ^ Elm, Mostafu (1994). Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath, p 333. Syracuse University Press
  3. ^ Gasiorowski, Mark J. (1991). U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, Building a Client State in Iran. Cornell University Press. p. 17. ISBN 0801424127, 9780801424120. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)
  4. ^ Elm, Mostafu (1994). Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath, p 333. Syracuse University Press
  5. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.249
  6. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.249, 50
  7. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003) p.175, 211
  8. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Gasiorowski, p.255
  9. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Gasiorowski, p.255
  10. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Gasiorowski, p.255
  11. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003) p.175, 211
  12. ^ Gasiorowski, p.256
  13. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv
  14. ^ Zulaika, Joseba (2009). Terrorism: the self-fulfilling prophecy. University of Chicago Press. p. 139.
  15. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
  16. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand, History of Modern Iran by Ervand Abrahamian, Columbia University Press, 2008
  17. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv, 256
  18. ^ Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
  19. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv, 255
  20. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
  21. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv, 256
  22. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
  23. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Gasiorowski, p.255
  24. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003) p.175, 211
  25. ^ Gasiorowski, Mark J. (1991). U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, Building a Client State in Iran. Cornell University Press. p. 17. ISBN 0801424127, 9780801424120. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)
  26. ^ Elm, Mostafu (1994). Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath, p 333. Syracuse University Press
  27. ^ Gasiorowski, Mark J. (1991). U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, Building a Client State in Iran. Cornell University Press. p. 17. ISBN 0801424127, 9780801424120. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: invalid character (help)
  28. ^ Elm, Mostafu (1994). Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil Nationalization and Its Aftermath, p 333. Syracuse University Press
  29. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.249
  30. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.249, 50
  31. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003) p.175, 211
  32. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Gasiorowski, p.255
  33. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Gasiorowski, p.255
  34. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Gasiorowski, p.255
  35. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003) p.175, 211
  36. ^ Gasiorowski, p.256
  37. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv
  38. ^ Zulaika, Joseba (2009). Terrorism: the self-fulfilling prophecy. University of Chicago Press. p. 139.
  39. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
  40. ^ Abrahamian, Ervand, History of Modern Iran by Ervand Abrahamian, Columbia University Press, 2008
  41. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv, 256
  42. ^ Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
  43. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv, 255
  44. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
  45. ^ Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Edited by Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, Syracuse University Press, 2004, p.xiv, 256
  46. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.280
  47. ^ All the Shah's Men p. 136–37 2008 edition ISBN 978-0-470-18549-0
  48. ^ Abrahamian, Iran between 2 Revolutions, 1982, (p.274)
  49. ^ All the Shah's Men p. 136–37 2008 edition ISBN 978-0-470-18549-0
  50. ^ Abrahamian p.270
  51. ^ Mackey p.187-210
  52. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.273
  53. ^ Abrahamian, 1982, p.272
  54. ^ Abrahamian p.273
  55. ^ Abrahamian, Iran between 2 Revolutions, 1982, (p.274)
  56. ^ Abrahamian, Iran between 2 Revolutions, 1982, (p.274)
  57. ^ New York Times, July 28, 1953, p.6, "Mossadegh Voids Secret Balloting : Decrees `Yes` and `No` Booths for Iranian Plebiscite on Dissolution of Majlis" by Kennett Love
  58. ^ All the Shah's Men p. 136–37 2008 edition ISBN 978-0-470-18549-0
  59. ^ Abrahamian (1982), p. 270–1.
  60. ^ Abrahamian (1982), p. 271.
  61. ^ Abrahamian (1982), p. 272.
  62. ^ Abrahamian (1982), p. 273.
  63. ^ Zabih, Sepehr. The Mosaddegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution, p. 65.
  64. ^ Abrahamian p.273
  65. ^ Trying to Persuade a Reluctant Shah, New York Times Dec. 7, 2009.
  66. ^ Abrahamian, Iran between 2 Revolutions, 1982, (p.274)