Talk:Adverse selection/Archives/2016
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Dr. Berliant's comment on this article
Dr. Berliant has reviewed this Wikipedia page, and provided us with the following comments to improve its quality:
A couple of comments. First, it would be good to contrast adverse selection with moral hazard (with a link to the Wikipedia article), and talk about it as asymmetric information about type. Second, I'm not sure that the example in financial markets is a good idea. If the market knows that managers are buying stock (perhaps this is required in company reports?) then the market price will capitalize this information.
We hope Wikipedians on this talk page can take advantage of these comments and improve the quality of the article accordingly.
Dr. Berliant has published scholarly research which seems to be relevant to this Wikipedia article:
- Reference : Berliant, Marcus & Kung, Fan-chin, 2010. "Can Information Asymmetry Cause Stratification?," MPRA Paper 21395, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Dr. Jeitschko's comment on this article
Dr. Jeitschko has reviewed this Wikipedia page, and provided us with the following comments to improve its quality:
Captures the idea of a "rigged" trade? No. It captures the idea of inefficiently low volume of trade because those that are worried about rigged trades exit the market, causing a knock-on effect and unraveling of the market. An implication of this potential for market collapse is that it can work as an entry deterrence that leads to high margins without additional entry.
We hope Wikipedians on this talk page can take advantage of these comments and improve the quality of the article accordingly.
We believe Dr. Jeitschko has expertise on the topic of this article, since he has published relevant scholarly research:
- Reference : Anthony Creane & Thomas D. Jeitschko, 2012. "Endogenous Entry in Markets with Unobserved Quality," EAG Discussions Papers 201206, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.