Talk:Allied submarines in the Pacific War

Title

Seems a bit redundant to me. Why not just "Allied submarines in the Pacific War"? Gatoclass (talk) 16:13, 12 June 2008 (UTC)

That sounds good to me - it's simpler that the current title and covers the same scope. Any objections? Nick Dowling (talk) 11:38, 13 June 2008 (UTC)

Not from me. Trekphiler (talk) 11:32, 18 June 2008 (UTC)

OK, I just made the move. Nick Dowling (talk) 11:56, 18 June 2008 (UTC)

Is that a fact?

While I generally found Parillo reliable, there's a contraditcion in that table of losses. It implies a handful of RN & RNN boats sank about 300K tons of shipping. Blair (p.360) credits the SubForce with 725K tons by JANAC. He credits Japan with 5.4 million tons shipping plus 575K tons tankers at war's start, loss of 725K, a net increase in tankers of 111K, for a net tonnage loss of only 89K. The 1943 & 1944 figures seem off, too. Trekphiler (talk) 11:32, 18 June 2008 (UTC)

I just double-checked the table, and I'd typed it up accuratly. That said, it's not consistent with his table of causes of Japanese shipping losses on the next two pages of the book! (each table is from a different source, which probably explains the problem) I agree that it should be noted that there are multiple credible assessments of Japanese shipping gains and losses - could you add Blair's figures? Nick Dowling (talk) 11:55, 18 June 2008 (UTC)

Done. Also, re fratricide, poor dispositions (compared them to tracking commuters at home rather than at Grand Central Station), & losses to Mk14 circulars, they're in Blair somewhere--just not in the index... Trekphiler (talk) 01:26, 19 June 2008 (UTC)

"Command Error" Loss

This is in regards to the last paragraph in the opening section, where the claim is made that 3 boats were lost to bad torpedoes and at least one boat (Robalo) to command error. The source referenced, Silent Victory, says the following:

"By [the time Robalo was lost], the codebreakers had given Christie at least four intercepted messages regarding Japanese minefields in Balabac Strait, containing specific details on which waters were mined - or likely to be mined. Kimmel's Operations Order contained specific information on how to transit the strait and what to avoid. Since the Japanese mined the strait in March 1943, it had been used about forty times by U.S. submarines. In 1944 Crevalle, Tinosa, Puffer, Ray, Bluefish, and Lapon (among others) had passed through safely. Kimmel himself in Robalo had passed through it in April, westbound to Indochina on his first patrol." (Silent Victory, pg. 687)

Blair speculates that either Robalo strayed off course into shallow water and struck a mine (perhaps he had sighted the enemy and was making an approach), or that the Japanese may have moved the minefields (which is what Kimmel's brother, Thomas, believed). Thomas also "doubted Christie's wisdom in continuing to use Balabac Strait this late in the war. Wrote Thomas, 'The Japanese were obviously in retreat and the urgency for transiting a dangerous strait with known minefields was certainly greatly reduced if not non-existent.'" (Silent Victory, pg 688). Be that as it may, an investigation into the loss of Robalo and Flier (also lost to a mine in Balbac about 3 weeks after Robalo) cleared Christie and his staff and found no fault with their operations; the investigation was headed by Admrial Daubin, COMSUBLANT, a rival of Christie who wanted his job (Silent Victory, pg 716). Following the loss of Flier, Christie stopped using Balbac strait. He probably would have stopped using it after Robalo was sunk, except that he didn't know where or how the boat went down until Flier's survivors made it back to Australia (Silent Victory, pg 715).

The point is, sending Robalo into the Balabac Strait was a calculated risk that had paid off in the past. Christie was aware of the minefields, but he had good intelligence on their location and 40 other boats had successfully made the trip. You can debate if it was worth the risk, but that's not the same as stating as fact that Robao was lost to a "command error." If that's the case, why not list the four boats that Fife lost in 1943? Or arguably you could list Bonefish, lost in the Sea of Japan raid in 1945: with Japan essentially defeated, why risk submarines in such confined waters? What about the controversy over Christie sending Sam Dealey and Harder out on patrol 5.5? Or the boats that were run aground and lost? Take Darter: she hadn't had a fix in 24 hours and was navigating across an area marked as "Dangerous Ground" on the chart, strewn with shoals and rocks (Silent Victory, pg 755). Was Darter lost to "command error"? The list goes on and on.

These were command decisions where real risk had to be weighed against potential gain. Sometimes it paid off. But when it didn't you can't simply call it "command error," a vague statement that could encompass a whole range of decisions. If that was the case, nearly every loss could be attributed to command error.

On another note, I know of only 2 boats definently lost to poor torpedoes, Tullibee and Tang, which are also the only two that the footnote mentions. If it is known that a third boat was lost to a circular run, it needs to be added in the footnote. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 128.151.230.9 (talk) 14:14, 28 October 2008 (UTC)

Christie was cleared in this particular case, but it was part of a pattern of indifference & placing his boats at undue hazard, as Blair makes clear ("'playing chess' with submarines" & elsewhere). It's not the calculated risk generally I take issue with, it's wrong ones. Should Morton have been sent on his last (fatal) patrol? I don't think so; I think he should've been sent to new construction. Could Lockwood afford to do that? Maybe, except he wouldn't (I don't think) have been willing to give Wahoo to O'Kane (yet, anyhow). A bad call, but not a wrong call (if you see the distinction); Christie had a habit of wrong calls (sending boats into known minefields being just one), which I'm trying to summarize as "command error". Would you prefer explicit examples?

Blair also supports 2 boats probably lost to Mk14s (whence his cite, &, IIRC, the "probable"), I just can't find the 2d (I did when I went thru to put that in, & couldn't do it again...). TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 14:37, 28 October 2008 (UTC)

Blair's "playing checkers" chapter referred to Fife, not Christie (Silent Victory, pg 371). I'm not a fan of Christie by any means, but I certainly don't think he was indifferent to his boats and men: look at how hard he fought for Dealey's MoH, for example. As far as "undue hazard", again that's a very fine line you are trying to draw. One man's undue hazard is another's calculated risk: Lockwood could be charged just as easily as Christie, except that "Uncle Charlie" generally has a better reputation than the champion of the magnetic exploder, and some of his riskiest decisions paid big dividends (Hydeman's Hell Cats, for example). The point is to be objective and present the facts: the fact is you can debate Christie's decision to send Robalo through the straits, but it's far from fact that he caused Robalo's loss.

On a related note, the opening paragraph may be an inappropriate time to talk about losses. You can break it down by any number of catagories: 2 lost through bad torpedoes, 1 lost by enemy submarine, so many lost due to air attack, etc. It may just be better to say that the U.S. lost 49 boats in the Pacific due to all causes (52 total in the war; good point on that, BTW) and give losses it's own section, where they can be broken down by specific cause. If you want to mention the specific controversies around Christie (Robalo, Flier, Harder, etc.) it might be best to do that in his biography article.

I'll acknowledge I'm no fan of RWC, not least because he refused to listen to complaints about the Mk14 (& the Mk6, which he was on {head of?} the design team of), & probably that's coloring my judgement. (And a more careful reading of Blair does show Kimmel had orders to avoid known minefields. Serves me right for skimming.) Penetration of SoJapan was (given QLA) less a hazard than it might look, & yeah, my approval of Lockwood is probably biasing there, too (tho he didn't do near enough on the Mk6).

Badly placed? I disagree, tho yeah, the detail maybe is inapt. My hope is to summarize the important points, & saying the torpedoes were so bad, they sank their own, IMO, merits mention. It's awkwardly & badly done, yes....

Too fine a line? Maybe, whence I left it out. Given the subject matter, tho, I don't think including it (somewhere) is a bad idea, along with Morton, unproductive skippers, ignoring the Mk14 problems, refusal to use younger men, "guerrilla" missions, bad targeting priorities, basing in Oz (& Exmouth Gulf, for chr*st's sake!), & Nimitz's questionable dispositions.

I'm not sure counting losses to all causes is sensible, 'cause it counts (just offhand) Darter grounding. Agreed, it means you can't just look at the "52 lost", but IMO, 42 is the fairer #; AFAIK, IJN sub losses only count those in combat. (I stand to be corrected; I haven't read Dull, & IJN sub training was a bit defective, FWI have read, so they may well be counting quite a few operational casualties.)

And, on getting rooked, I confess it's been a few years since I've read Blair. Looks like it's time again, or I'd know better... TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 22:14, 28 October 2008 (UTC)

Submarine Warfare

Offensive submarine warfare against the merchant fleet of an island (= depending on merchant fleet for all trade in 1940s) has been conducted earlier...twice. Not as successful, mainly due to stiff resistance. I included it in 'prelude'. Because, the development of the doctrine to use submarines not as fleet submarines but for 'unlimited' warfare against all shippings was certainly influenced by those who did it way before the allies. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Xiaozhouzhou (talk • contribs) 12:25, 20 March 2009 (UTC)

I've removed the text you added as it was inaccurate. The effectiveness of submarines had been demonstrated in World War I, and Britain established convoys as soon as World War II broke out. The Germans did not cut Britain's supply lines at any time during the war. Moreover, the USN's pre-war submarine doctrine placed little emphasis on using submarines to attack merchant shipping, and the US submarine fleet was designed and trained to support the battle fleet, so it's not the case that the USN aimed to emulate the Germans at all. Nick-D (talk) 03:08, 21 March 2009 (UTC)

Allies

A cartoon in the NYT at the end of WWII said "We couldn't have done it without allies like Britain and Texas" I found this page informative about the Dutch and the British submarine activities during WWII, but very uninformative about the role of the USN. Unless one already knows something about this area of the war, a skim through this article tends to leave one thinking that three allied submarine forces were of a similar size. I think that the size of text on the the relative efforts made by the three allies should be reflected in the relative size of the entries on those efforts. A mention should also be made about other allies such as Australia not having any boats (Royal Australian Navy Submarine Service).

I think that much of the lead should be moved down into sections and the lead should become an overview of the article. So for example if the lead information on the interdiction of ships in and out of the Japanese homeland was moved into a section, it could then include more on the debate about how effective the he blockade was, and could it have won the war?

Another question is the legality of the operations. Did any/all of the three navies have a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare? If so was it zoned (what about Soviet and other neutral shipping etc). If it were unrestricted submarine warfare, what are the expert opinions on the legality of that (see for example unrestricted submarine warfare#Post-WWII concept. --PBS (talk) 06:28, 7 September 2009 (UTC)

The only reason the British and Dutch efforts have disproportionate coverage at the moment is that because they were smaller they were easier to write about. The sections on the U.S. submarines are marked as requiring expansion. A better solution would be to expand the coverage of the U.S. effort; the article obviously isn't close to a 'finished' state. Nick-D (talk) 06:51, 7 September 2009 (UTC)

Nick I understand that, and I don't want you to read what I wrote in a negative way. I would like my comments to be taken as constructive, (I was just hoping to add a little ginger) and perhaps treated as a prioratised "to do list". As I am not going to do it myself, I will not be pressing this and any editors who do actively contribute to this article may like to list another set of priorities which they think more relevant. --PBS (talk) 10:09, 7 September 2009 (UTC)

You raise really good points on legality (I'm embarassed to admit I didn't see the lack, myself... :( ) & imbalance. (FYI, CinCPac issued an "Execute unrestricted submarine warfare" order on the first day, IIRC, & there was testimony offered on Dönitz's behalf, since he'd done nothing USN hadn't equally done.) Can somebody say how many boats the Brits & Dutch had? I'll take a quick tally from Blair & see how many Nimitz & Carpender had. (It ran around 70 on station at any given time, IIRC.) For what it should look like, is this approximately what you want? I don't want to be simply rewriting Blair, even into a real Reader's Digest version; unless you're a buff, that would get old awful fast. If somebody wants to take a stab at a first draft somewhere, let me know, & I'll put in as much or as little of Blair et al. as you want. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 01:08 & 01:11, 8 September 2009 (UTC)

My recollection is that the "Execute unrestricted submarine warfare" order was considered justified by the Americans on two grounds. The first was that the Japanese had shown contempt for international law by starting the war with a surprise attack, in violation of the Hague Conventions. The second justification offered was that it was lawful retaliation for unrestricted submarine warfare on the part of the Japanese, who had sunk Cynthia Olson off Hawaii almost simultaneously with the opening of the Pearl Harbor attack. Accounts of the sinking are at odds with each other, but there were allegations the crew were machine gunned after abandoning ship. I don't have my copy of Blair handy, but this is discussed by Roscoe (which I don't have my own copy of.) If we're going to state in the intro that the Allied submarine campaign appeared to violate international law, it seems only fair (e.g. NPOV) to mention the justifications offered for it. Yaush (talk) 16:35, 29 March 2011 (UTC)

I don't recall Blair or Roscoe mentioning Cynthia Olson, tho Holwitt makes a point of it. Ultimately, it makes no difference, because the law only protected unarmed merchantmen, & Japanese merchantmen were either armed or escorted (or both). The case is clearer here, & as it now stands, the lead is so awkward, it needs fixing anyhow, so let me have a stab at it. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 21:47, 29 March 2011 (UTC)

I'd say it's a substantial improvement.Yaush (talk) 22:04, 29 March 2011 (UTC)

Thx. The embarssing part is, I wrote them both, & didn't fix it to begin with. :( TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 22:57, 29 March 2011 (UTC)

Defense of British Malaysia

Alright, I'm aware that the defense of British Malaysia was unsuccessful, but I think more is needed to elaborate on this point. For instance *how* was it unsuccessful? To what extent, and why?

You can't just call something "unsuccessful" (a nebulous and *relative* term by itself) without some sort of justification for using that term. And please don't assume bad faith on my part by referring to my calling for citation as "you're being ridiuclous". I just think more information is needed, that's all. 75.45.238.87 (talk) 16:12, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

British Malaysia fell to the Japanese ahead of their own timetable and with lower casualties than their own estimates. That seems like a pretty good definition of "unsuccessful defence."

But the real question is why a citation is needed for that specific statement. The sources cited for the paragraph as a whole would seem sufficient to establish the assertion. There is such a thing as burdening the reader with too many footnotes. I think a specific footnote is needed for this specific statement only if there is some question whether it is correct. I doubt anyone seriously regards the defense of British Malaysia as anything but unsuccessful.

Perhaps this is a reasonable compromise: Simply link "unsuccessful defense of British Malaysia" to the article on the Malaysian campaign. That brings in all the information on that campaign, and the associated citations, by reference. Will that settle the dispute? --Yaush (talk) 16:33, 2 May 2011 (UTC)

A couple of points

The "War of attrition" section has:
"the Japanese never successfully developed a cost-effective destroyer escort better suited for convoy duties"
I'm pretty sure that's incorrect; the IJN developed and built the Kaibokan type escort vessel in large numbers (here, and here, for example) which compared pretty well in armament, range and speed with the DE's.
Also, the Introduction is at some pains to point out that the Allies were operating "exactly as the Germans did" by engaging in an unrestricted submarine war. That may be so, but it looks pointy as it is; that stuff should be in a separate section, not occupying half the Intro, which is supposed to offer an overview of the subject.
My two-pennyworth...Xyl 54 (talk) 23:29, 31 January 2012 (UTC)

IDK about pointy, but I'd agree on misplaced. Where to put it is the question, & the same one I had when I first put it in... :( TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 04:10, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

What I find slightly "pointy" about it is that the Japanese engaged in unrestricted submarine warfare from the first, so the comparison with German rather than Japanese practice seems a bit odd. The comparison with Germany is relevant mainly in connection with Doenitz' defense at Nuremberg, which may point (heh) to where this really belongs. --Yaush (talk) 15:46, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

IJN sub ops were mainly Mahanian, & their attacks on commerce were trivial. The comparo to Germany is because it's BdU that usually takes the heat, & unjustly. It does bear on Dönitz, but his page already mentions Nimitz's letter in defense (&, IIRC, the armed merchantman issue, too), so I'm not sure any more needs to be said there. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 16:23, 1 February 2012 (UTC)

Trek: I had thought moving to it's own section would work, but yeah, what to call it... "Legality" really would be pointed, n'est-ce pas? Though a wider discussion of the matter might be useful; I thought I'd seen a counter-argument in the article (that Japan hadn't felt bound by such niceties, which released the USN from it's obligations) but I can't find it now.

On the other subject, though, the failure-to-build-excorts passage needs changing. It links to a page on the Matsu class destroyers, (which has the scholarly opinion “the Japanese really ought to have built a couple of hundred of these puppies”) and can be contrasted to the story of Kaibokan development (here) and the comment here, which suggests the Japanese didn't feel paticularly threatened until quite late (and when they did they reacted quite properly; as the Allies had done, in fact). Xyl 54 (talk) 22:56, 2 February 2012 (UTC)

♠"'Legality' really would be pointed, n'est-ce pas?" It could be "Illegal action by Germany". ;p What about "Hague Convention" or "Cruiser rules", with a touch lifted from said page, explaining the position of neutral &/or unarmed merchants vis a vis armed &/or convoyed ones? It would IMO puncture the fiction oft held against Germany of being in the wrong: armed merchants weren't protected, nor were convoyed ones, nor ones who reported contact with subs or raiders (& that was standard practise for Brit merchants; not "orders", exactly, but certainly sailing instrctions, which IDK if the Admiralty could make binding).

♠On kaibokan, I take your point on Japan's response, but I tend to feel 50 or 60 ships really isn't a lot, when the U.S. built 300 DEs alone, & the Allies about as many 'vettes. IIRC, it was Parillo who said the Japanese never built enough of any class; he may've had DDs in mind (& there's no question on that; as few as 6 or 8, & no repeats...)

♠On kaibokan, too, IJN didn't feel particularly threatened with reason, but bear in mind, IJN ASW doctrine was a joke & even convoy & shipping control was an afterthought until very late (again, per Parillo).

♠On IJN & niceties, that really never arose AFAIK. The number of IJN sub attacks on commerce can be counted on one hand; IIRC, IJN attacks on commerce by any means can be, certainly less than 15 (<12?) in all. The only issue in play is IJN sub skippers massacring merchant sailors, & that's known to have happened, but it's not strictly on point for u.s.w. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 03:24, 3 February 2012 (UTC)

How about entitling the section “Unrestricted submarine warfare”, plain and simple?

With the niceties comment I was thinking of the general disdain the Japanese military had for the Geneva convention and such like (bombing civilians, attacking neutrals, rape, enslavement, the odd massacre). I know the IJN didn't do much commerce raiding, but when they did they they ran true to form.

But "fiction oft held"? The notion that armed merchant ships, or ships in convoy were fair game comes from the German Prisenordnung, not the Convention; the source for the statement in the article here is Donitz's memoirs. I’m pretty sure the Convention allowed (or at least, didn't forbid) merchant ships to carry arms for self-defence (against piracy and the like): What made them combatants was if they engaged in hostile acts (like running, or using the radio, or firing, or trying to ram). But the rules put the burden of evidence on the warship making the challenge. Blockading warships were given the option of policing the sea-lanes for contraband, not declaring free-fire zones; they could stop and search, not shoot on sight. In a policing situation the suspect is given the benefit of the doubt; this is what Donitz (and the prisenordnung) threw out the window, as his Nuremburg hearing made clear. Donitz, "pursuant to the German view,...ordered his submarines to attack all merchant ships in convoy" and when British ships were being armed "to attack....without warning, (as) resistance was to be expected". And if he wasn't held accountable it was because of Tu quoque, not because his defence was accepted.

Still, is that pertinent here? That's the German position with regard to the convention; the article here should be discussing the American (and Allied) position, which was .a) they were all signatories to the Conventions, and .b) they presumably had some reason for binning them.

On the Kaibokan, they actually built about 170 of them; that's a fairly tidy number, though a lot were too late. My impression is that Japan was in a similar situation to Britain's in WWI; complacent to start with, then at a bit of a loss as the enemy got better and their remedies weren't working. The difference being the Americans were in a better position towards the end than the Germans had been in 1917-18. Xyl 54 (talk) 00:27, 4 February 2012 (UTC)

♠"'Unrestricted submarine warfare'” I find that uninformative as a header, since the issue is less the "unrestricted" & more the laws governing. The other options may be POV, however.

♠"niceties" Noted & agreed.

♠"What made them combatants was if they engaged in hostile acts (like running, or using the radio, or firing, or trying to ram)" Or being armed or under escort. Being in convoy meant the escort was armed, & therefore they weren't strictly civilian vessels anymore. Read Holwitt. He goes out of his way to say this. He then proceeds to ignore the fact for the bulk of his paper. :( (You can find it at Google Scholar, I think. If you can't & you really want to read it, I can email it.) It's evidently inconvenient in some way: when armed merchantmen are unprotected by the Convention, defending u.s.w. is much easier. (The thesis adviser missed this somehow...)

♠"pursuant to the German view" Well, no. Read Holwitt. The Convention prohibited armed merchants from claiming immunity. Yes, arming was still allowed, but since piracy was virtually nonexistent, the only reasonable excuse for a gun was to defend against subs. Everybody knew it. And because the Convention placed armed (or convoyed) merchants beyond the protection of the cruiser rules, the cruiser rules were effectively nullified by Allied actions, not German ones, from the very start.

♠As to why Nuremburg didn't accept Dönitz's argument, it's victor's justice, don't forget. Yamashita got railroaded. Hirohito got a walk. English & others, who did exactly what Dönitz did, & confessed to it in his defense, were never charged.

♠"actually built about 170" That's more than I'd counted in all. Thus, I'll agree with you; it was a case of caught out & unable to catch up. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 02:17, 4 February 2012 (UTC)

I found Holwitt on Google scholar; thanks, it’s an interesting read. Whereabouts is the comment you were referring to ("...being armed or under escort") BTW? The Second London Naval Treaty page sources it on p6 (though it also gives the actual source as Donitz, again), but it isn’t there; p6 is about Grotius, a little earlier in the story! Xyl 54 (talk) 00:43, 5 February 2012 (UTC)

♠"being armed or under escort" I wish I could tell you. :( It's in there somewhere, because he talks about armed &/or convoyed ships throughout. It's been too long since I read it to say exactly, & I am terrible at finding things a second time... :( Even with an index. :( (I came across a pair of Mk 14 circulars sinking boats in Blair; could I find it again? Not on your life. :( ) I can only suggest a careful reading. especially a couple of pages above or below the cited page (IIRC, the numbering was a bit dubious). If it turns out I've misread him (not impossible...), do fix it. It'll also be here. (That said, I'm still very confident it's in there; the idea even convoyed ships were protected surprised me.)

♠About citing Dönitz, I wouldn't put too much weight on it. Von der Poorten was writing on the KM, so I'd say he's reasonably reliable, & being Dutch, unlikely to be pro-German; Milner, being Canadian, is unlikely to buy the German line, either. (I'd also say Prof Milner would have gotten his sources right.) TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 02:45, 5 February 2012 (UTC)

OK, I'll see what I can find...Xyl 54 (talk) 22:39, 5 February 2012 (UTC)

Thx. If it does turn out I'm wrong, I'll be deeply embarassed. :( You won't regret reading it, tho. :) TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 02:05, 6 February 2012 (UTC)

Concerning Boats Lost in Action

Rather than continuing back and forth with more edits and undos, I thought I'd take the discussion of how many boats were "lost in action" in the Pacific to the talk page. Trekphiler, it seems we have a difference of opinion on what constitutes being "lost in action". I feel the last sentence of the "Strategic Implications" section should state 48 boats rather than 42 were lost in action, and that you are under-counting for two reasons. The first is that any boat lost on a war patrol was, by definition, "lost in action" regardless of the cause. The second is that by deciding to not count certain kinds of losses (BTW, at least four boats, not one, were lost to strandings: S-39, S-36, S-27 and Darter (I assume by "wrecks" you meant strandings since all 52 boats we lost were wrecks)), it is impossible to arrive at a definitive number as we cannot be sure of the exact way some boats were lost. Indeed, the Navy, in the Naval Historical Division's publication "United States Submarine Losses in World War II" made it clear that we would probably *never* know for sure how and where (beyond a rough geographic area) some of the boats were lost. Because of this, the authors of the same book lumped all the boats lost during war patrols in the Pacific together: "The ... 48 [boats] were lost either directly or indirectly as the result of enemy action, or due to stranding on reefs during combat operations" (page 1). Note also that in the table summarizing the losses on page 8, the cause of loss for five boats is shown as "unknown" and the level of certainty of the causes for a further 14 are listed as merely "Possible to Probable" (out of the total 52 boats lost in the war). While new information has come to light since the war, notably the location of the wreck of GRUNION a few years back, in some cases we are in no better position to make a solid determination of what happened to these boats.

I understand well the point you are trying to make, but I do not think one can or should state a definitive-sounding number in the way you have when so many of the facts are regrettably obscured by the fog of war. Perhaps a compromise would be to end the paragraph with wording such as "Poor torpedoes claimed at least two U.S. submarines out of 48 lost on war patrols in the Pacific." This would take the interpretation of which boats were lost in action out of the equation.Tpmcnamara (talk) 03:33, 6 October 2013 (UTC)

♠I don't entirely disagree with that. I'm counting the 42 directly to enemy action. If we were to say that, would that suit you?

♠Note, I'm not saying any of the missing boats weren't lost due to enemy action, I'm only discounting the ones known not to be or not happening in PTO, which includes (offhand) S-51, R-5, & Dorado (Atlantic), Seawolf (friendly fire), & Darter, plus Tang & Tullibee (mishap); you've mentioned S-39, S-36, & S-27, & I'd include them as "mishap" or "stranding", so not due to enemy action, either.

♠In short, I don't think we're too far apart. I hope not. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 04:04, 6 October 2013 (UTC)

I think that claiming 42 boats were lost directly to enemy action is impossible to verify. While you have assumed it to be the case, it does not necessarily follow that a submarine whose loss you don't know to have been due to causes other than enemy action was therefore lost to enemy action. Our knowledge concerning the losses of some of these boats is sketchy at best. As a result, attaching a unqualified number to this is misleading. While you may feel confident those 42 boats were lost to enemy action (and I don't disagree that this is most likely what happened), we can't be sure in some cases based on the facts we have at hand. Indeed, two of the boats you include in the 42, GRAYLING and KETE, simply disappeared; they could just as easily have gone down due to other causes such as battery fires, mechanical failures, etc. This ambiguity leads me back to the wording I suggested above.Tpmcnamara (talk) 22:17, 6 October 2013 (UTC)

Fair point, & given the conning tower weaknesses of some boats, not impossible. Operational casualty, I'd count a low chance, but not zero. Go ahead & change the wording (not least because IMO at least two more deserve to be counted lost to circulars), but if you're changing to 48, I do want to know why you'd include the strandings, which weren't, strictly speaking, operational losses, as well as Tang, Tullibee, & Seawolf. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 00:08, 7 October 2013 (UTC)

While we are free to break out the data in different ways, I think the Navy's historians were right to break down our losses in the way they did: by counting all boats lost during war patrols together. I have no doubt that the level of uncertainty surrounding the fates of many of our losses I discussed above played a big part in the decision to count the losses that way.

While there is no uncertainty surrounding the strandings since the crews were rescued and provided eyewitness accounts, I concur with their inclusion as part of the 48 "due to stranding on reefs during combat operations" ("United States Submarine Losses in World War II", page 1). Picking and choosing which boats deserve - to use your term - to be counted as operational losses is problematic. Where does one draw the line? DARTER ran aground while attempting to get into position to finish off an enemy warship damaged during a previous attack. Clearly DARTER's loss was a direct consequence of trying to destroy a specific enemy ship she was actively tracking. The other strandings, while not occurring during an engagement, nevertheless took place while patrolling for the enemy.

I also concur with the Navy's inclusion of TANG, TULLIBEE and SEAWOLF with the other 48 as they were "lost either directly or indirectly as the result of enemy action". The reason for counting TANG and TULLIBEE is that eyewitness accounts report both boats were lost to circular runs by their own torpedoes during attacks on the enemy. Even if they were not directly lost to enemy fire, sinking in battle is as operational as a loss gets. As for SEAWOLF, she basically disappeared. Assuming the most likely scenario (and the one the Navy chose to attribute, with reservations), a blue-on-blue engagement, I have no doubt the only difference between being sunk by American depth charges and Japanese ones would have been the sense of frustration felt by the crew at their inability to identify themselves as friendly to their attackers. As a point of reference, consider that the Purple Heart is awarded not only to those killed or wounded by enemy fire, but also to friendly fire victims as long as the "friendly" fire was made with the intent to destroy the enemy.

At the end of the day, the fact that we are having a debate to define "operational loss" and "lost in action" only serves to affirm the Navy historians' decision to take these terms out of the discussion and use broader category. In any case, since you have concurred, I have made the change to the article as discussed.Tpmcnamara (talk) 05:30, 8 October 2013 (UTC)

♠Unfortunately, your numbers don't add up. Taking the 3 boats from the Atlantic, Darter, Seawolf, Tang, & Tullibee, not counting the other strandings & accidents, doesn't give 48. Allowing Tang & Tullibee still doesn't, because that discounts the Sugar boats.

♠I happen to disagree with characterizing a stranding as the same as a war loss, & if we're going to include them, IMO they should be clearly distinguished.

♠Furthermore, Seawolf didn't "just disappear". It's pretty certain, whether the Navy wants to admit it, she was sunk by Rowell in a designated safety lane; look at Blair. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 07:41, 8 October 2013 (UTC)

Trekphiler, my numbers add up perfectly. As I explained above, since I agree with the Navy's methodology, I counted all boats lost except the two lost in the Atlantic, one lost off Panama (technically in the Pacific, but not considered on a war patrol as she was conducting local ops) and one lost in a training accident in Hawaiian waters. That's 48. While you may disagree with me over the nuances of definitions and categorizations, there is nothing wrong with my arithmetic.

I concur with the wording of the latest edit you have submitted as it addresses my (admittedly pedantic) concerns for accuracy. Explaining your methodology in a footnote is a legitimate approach. I do feel this may not be optimal since most Wikipedia readers are unlikely understand your nuanced approach as few will be scholarly types who check footnotes. But that is a mere quibble.

However, I'm afraid that you yourself have made an arithmetic error. By explicitly not "counting those lost to friendly fire, stranding, accidents, and known losses to circular runs, nor those lost in the Atlantic" the final number is back to the 42 you stated originally, not 46. I recommend you either change the number or change the list of exceptions in the footnote.Tpmcnamara (talk) 15:05, 8 October 2013 (UTC)

Substandard Citations

Too many assertions are substantiated with substandard citations. Some examples: 1. "For instance, their destroyers had deficiencies in sonar and radar compared to equivalents of other navies, despite their impressive night fighting capabilities, even though these warships formed the bulk of convoy protection." This is supported by a link to some blog that lists Japanese destroyers and their specifications. I'm not sure what the relevance is. More importantly, I'm not sure why it is acceptable for an assertion to be supported by a random irrelevant citation. 2. "Moreover, Japanese Navy doctrine in relation to commerce defense was derisively bad[;]""reinforced Japanese overconfidence." Citations for these assertions do not carry page numbers. There are many other such "shotgun" sources in this article. Any assertion thus substantiated should be deleted. 3. One citation is given as "Blair, Silent Victory, pp.509 et al.." et al is used to group several authors, not for pages. An assertion so poorly sourced should be deleted.

173.77.3.250 (talk) 02:17, 14 February 2016 (UTC)

Statistics: Japanes losses of merchant ships

Roughly more than half of the losses have been caused by submarine. The rest has been sunk by mines, aircraft or ordinary risks at sea. Figures and good descriptions for the submarine warfare can be found in Naval Blockades in Peace and War in the Chapter The American Submarine and Aerial Mine Blockade. 5glogger (talk) 04:59, 23 October 2022 (UTC)