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Questions on A/C

I'm having a little trouble understanding how "property" can exist in a state that doesn't have government, since no one can be legally entitled to anything. Likewise, there can be no such thing as stealing, since no one legally own anything. If a corporation claims ownership of something, and enforces this ownership, and can legitimately use force to protect this property, isn't that the same thing as allowing each corporation to act as an individual state? If not, why not? Sarge Baldy 19:25, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

Anarcho-capitalists start with the assumption that everything on Earth was initially unowned --not owned by individuals and not owned collectively. Now, there are mainly two competing property theories among anarcho-capitalists. One is the natural law theory of property which says that something becomes property by "mixing" one's labor with what nature provides. Then there is the contractual theory, which says that mixing of labor with resources doesn't create property --there is no such natural right; rather, it says that property can only come about by contract --by mutual agreement to treat the produce of labor as property --in other words the creation of a legal right. (Both of these theories are followed by the labor-value individualist anarchists as well, except that in the case of land (though there are exceptions such as Warren and Andrews who allow for land ownership). If a "corporation" just seizes fresh unowned land without using it, then yes that would be like a "state." That would be in opposition to the anarcho-capitalists conception of obtaining property. Rothbard explains: "If Columbus lands on a new continent, is it legitimate for him to proclaim all the new continent his own, or even that sector 'as far as his eye can see'? Clearly, this would not be the case in the free society that we are postulating. Columbus or Crusoe would have to use the land, to 'cultivate' it in some way, before he could be asserted to own it.... If there is more land than can be used by a limited labor supply, then the unused land must simply remain unowned until a first user arrives on the scene. Any attempt to claim a new resource that someone does not use would have to be considered invasive of the property right of whoever the first user will turn out to be." (Rothbard is natural law proponent for property) After property has been created (though labor or contractual recognition of property through labor) then it can only be legitimately transferred through trade or gift. RJII 19:55, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

I guess I'm looking more at how anarcho-capitalism asserts that businesses can "use physical force...in defense of...property against aggressors." (according to the Wikipedia article) and how a state (as defined by Max Weber) is "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." If it's legitimate for businesses to defend property, and illegitimate for other people to take that property over by force, then doesn't the business effectively have the monopoly of legitimate force over that area, and thereby constitute a state? Sarge Baldy 20:27, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

Sarge> "I'm having a little trouble understanding how "property" can exist in a state that doesn't have government, since no one can be legally entitled to anything."

First note that law/legality and State are two different things. Anarchist law is basically common law - the rules and/or processes that "the neighbors" have agreed to or negotiated. Traditionally (e.g. Anglo-Saxon Common Law or the Xeer system) it's often the result of rulings by wise judges, judges chosen by disputants. In modern times, it may be anything from a neighborhood mediation service to a private court firm. For anarchists, the point is that arbitration and rules - legal services - should not be supplied by a monopoly entity such as a State. So your assumption that "no one can be legally entitled to anything" in a free society is mistaken - it confuses "legal service" with "State."

In this respect, anarcho-capitalism is no different than most other schools of anarchism. If a Bakuninite steals another Bakunite's clothes or iPod, it is regarded as wrong and, if necessary, a council may judge, and a posse may use (proportional retaliatory) force to return the goods. Bakunin would not oppose this.

Sarge> "...doesn't the business effectively have the monopoly of legitimate force over that area, and thereby constitute a state?"

You are right that a business (or workers' factory syndicate) does have a monopoly over its property, and every right to defend its property. Where the Weberian definition of "State" fails is that it doesn't satisfy the "community" part. A community is a number of property owners; thus a State has an effective monopoly regardless of property claims.

I note that your argument, if it worked, would "prove too much," as they say: It would annihilate not only anarcho-capitalism, but also anarcho-syndicalism and mutualism and possession property and ... (I assume that a workers' factory would not let a capitalist-wanna-be come in run them out, and consider it legitimate. If the workers ran the usurper off, they do not become a State!)

Where ancaps and ansocs disagree is not whether it is permissable to defend legitimate property; the disagreement is about which particular rules of property are best/legitimate. Hogeye 22:41, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

If it's property, then anyone can defend it that wants to defend it --a business or whatever. An essential difference between a business and a state is that a government taxes and a business doesn't. A government is funded involuntarily and a business is funded voluntarily. And, sure a business could have a technical monopoly in providing security, but only if it was the most efficient in doing so and that's the business consumers choose to support as a result --free market advocates don't oppose such a monopoly. What the anarcho-capitalists mean is that government is a "coercive monopoly," meaning that there's not even the opportunity to try to compete. The state is not providing security because consumers have voluntarily chosen it as the best security provider --the state has chosen itself for them and forces payment to them (so it's not a business). Of course, you can compete to some extent ..there are private security guards, arbitration, etc, but it's generally assumed to be a coercive monopoly --and definitely not a business. RJII 20:46, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

Here's something else that explain how a government is difference from a business: "Rational logic condemns the initiation of force against peaceful people. Furthermore, rational logic holds that the State is inherently and necessarily an invasive institution, whose employees must eventually initiate aggression. A government whose employees were not prepared to use force would soon cease being a government because people would have the option of whether to support it or not. Faced with the loss of patronage and/or financial support, the State would have only two choices: either coerce people into paying up or restrict its services to those who voluntarily agreed to deal with it. Both history and theory tell us that this never has and probably never will occur. Government employees are the only group of people in society who regularly and routinely use physical force or its threat to collect funds to sustain themselves." That's by Carl Watner, editor of the Voluntaryist newsletter. RJII 06:13, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

"Rational logic condemns the initiation of force against peaceful people." -- Machiavelli would disagree. If you're in a priveledged position, using force to preserve that position might be immoral, but it's certainly not irrational. Chris Acheson 17:20, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

I agree that it's not necessarily true. If you can dominate the world and have a good probability of getting away with it, then it 'might be rational. Of course, there's a lot of factors to take into consideration. RJII 17:32, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

It is irrational if you have a "universality" premise - the premise that all people are equal in authority ("all men are created equal" as TJ put it. Hogeye 17:42, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

But then the rationalist has to subject the universality premise to rational scrutiny --whether it is rational to regard other individuals in that way. That is, if it's in one's self-interest to adhere to such a principle. RJII 17:49, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

"Government employees are the only group of people in society who regularly and routinely use physical force or its threat to collect funds to sustain themselves." I don't think that's true. I would also put non-legal protection racketeers in that group, and not a few multinationals who rely on armed force to protect their interests in places where inhabitants would rather see the back of them. It is rather simplistic to pin all organised use of force, and 'coercive monopoly', on the state. For me the relationship between capital and the modern state is a chicken and egg question - historically, indeed, they grew up together. Capitalists use state force to protect their interests, and capital helps build up the state. Although when necessay there are also non-state forces you can turn to. In the 'propaganda of the deed' era we've been discussing, US capitalists used private force for hire such as the Pinkerton thugs. Similarly in Catalunya, where the violence was hottest of all, factory owners had little trust in the state and used hired gangs of pistoleros to break strikes and execute labour leaders. Nowadays we have the proliferation of private mercenary armies such as Executive Outcomes. If tomorrow we woke up and found all states had withered away over night, would BP and Shell stop defending their oil monopolies?

Is this what anarcho-capitalism means (if you can supply the gallows too): "The Molly Maguire trials were a surrender of state sovereignty. A private corporation initiated the investigation through a private detective agency. A private police force arrested the alleged defenders, and private attorneys for the coal companies prosecuted them. The state provided only the courtroom and the gallows."Bengalski 15:56, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Anarcho-capitalists would also put "non-legal protection racketeers in that group." The anarcho-capitalist definition of a state is an organization that engages in systematic institutionalized initiatory coercion. Anarcho-capitalists define anarchism as absence or, or opposition to, initiatory coercion (coercion they define as the use of physical force or threat of initiating physical force). Yes, an anarcho-capitalist society would have private policemen (unless for some reason human nature changed and no one had a desire to initiate coercion). And those policemen would be limited, by contract, to only using force to defend individuals and private property from aggression. And, of course there would be private court systems (I would assume most anarcho-capitalists would want jury trials) in the case where someone is brought to justice for initiating coercion. The idea is unless human nature changes, it's going to be a really violent world unless you have a system in place to protect people and their property from thugs. And, for such a system to be consistent with anarchism (opposition to initiation of coercion), then it can't fund itself through taxation. RJII 16:14, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Would these "police" have legitimate authority, or could they just be treated like any other street gang? I mean, you can't really call paid thugs "police" unless they have some sort of official authority. Or is the idea that corporations take over the role of the state, managing de facto laws which these police can "legitimately" pursue? Really I'm having a hard time seeing anarcho-capitalism as opposed to the state so much as just to state intervention (taxation, the draft, etc). Rothbard might define these as being the same thing, but I doubt that many other people would. Sarge Baldy 19:44, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

I don't know much about the Molly Maguires, Sarge, but apparently their organization was a PDA (private defense agency) which evolved from the Ancient Order of Hibernians, but eventually degenerated into a terrorist group. Pinkerton Detective Agency might also be considered a PDA.

As for the famous trial: it doesn't seem to be very anarchist, since (as far as I can tell) the murderers were charged under statist law and tried under statist procedures. Better examples of anarchist law from that time period were seen out west, since the State's law had not reached there yet. Mutual defense associations provided protection against aggression according to local law. Claims associations and cattlemen's associations are two good examples. See An American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not So Wild, Wild West (PDF)

Sarge> "Would these "police" have legitimate authority?"

Legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder. A PDA would certainly have legitimacy to its customers. Generally, most PDAs would have a measure of legitimacy to most people, just as a shopping mall's security guards have more legitimacy than a random gang of thugs.

Sarge> "Is the idea that anarcho-capitalism has de facto laws which these police can "legitimately" pursue?"

You need to get the idea out of your head that there would be only one legal system or legal code. For customers who join the Southern Baptist Protection Association, it may be legitimate to arrest and hang pot-smokers among their customers (but not among non-customers.) If you agree to a contract that submits yourself to such laws, then you are subject to those laws (until/unless you opt out for reasons other than evading what you've agreed to.) For the Happy Hippy Defense Mutual whose only agreed restriction is not to initiate force, it would be totally illegitimate to arrest someone for smoking the nobel weed.

Sarge, you seem to be concerned about jurisdictional disputes between PDAs with different codes. Suppose a customer of a possession property PDA moves into an unoccupied house, and a member of an anarcho-capitalist PDA comes home from traveling to find the mutualist squatter in his house. In this case, there are two main possibilities: either the PDAs battle it out violently or they negotiate. As discussed in a previous message, there are several reasons why PDAs are more likely than a State to opt for a negotiated resolution. (See the list of reasons in that message.) One more reason I don't think I mentioned before: if members of these two PDAs live in close proximity, then the issue will be anticipated or have come up before, and a solution will have been already worked out and understood by members of both PDAs (e.g. adverse possession laws, or a simple agreement that one can vacation for 3 months before your property is deemed abandoned, or the understanding among ancaps that one must leave a house-sitter or caretaker, or ...) Hogeye 20:51, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Do you really need "authority" to step in and protect someone that's being mugged? All you would be doing in that case is protecting the authority of the individual being mugged to rule himself, by preventing mugger from ruling him. If that's all a cop is doing, then he's simply protecting anarchy --by preventing a person from ruling over another. Now, he wouldn't have an obligation to protect you, unless you had a contract with the company he works for (it wouldn't be consistent with anarchism for him to be coerced into defending you). If you weren't a customer, maybe a good samaritan would step in to help you. For a real-world example, there actually are private police in Mogadishu, Somalia. The businessment in the city teamed up and funded private police to prevent petty street crime ..they guard marketplaces, etc. [Return to Somalia [Ayn Rand Comes to Somalia Of course, if any of the police do anything other than restrain aggressors and become agressors themselves, then they're no-longer acting in an anarchist mode, and have crossed the line from police preserving anarchy to thugs initiation coercion. RJII 20:04, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Why would the "police" stop to help someone getting mugged? I mean, I guess they could, but so could anyone else on the street. Policing in anarcho-capitalism becomes a service, and stopping to help someone on the street makes only as much sense as a cable guy passing by your apartment and deciding to hook you up. If anything, it might only put her in danger of losing her job. And I can't see how these corporate thugs are not practicing coersion. Can they detain people? Can they utilize force? If so, can't anyone? If not, then these "police" are being treated as special entities with special authority, monopolizing that authority, and effectively acting as agents of a state. Sarge Baldy 20:29, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

They would stop people from being mugged because they would be fired if they didn't. That's their job. And, sure it's no different than anyone on the street doing the same thing except they're getting paid for it. But, they're not funded through coercion --they're not tax-funded. And, no they're not a monopoly on protection. Any another business is free to compete by offering lower price (or fast response, or whatever they adverstise) for police services. And, of course they're using "coercion," but anarchism isn't opposed to coercion per se --it's opposed to INITIATORY coercion ("aggression"). What anarchists says you wouldn't have the right to use physical force (coercion) to defend yourself from an aggressor (or to ask/pay someone to do it for you)? RJII 20:39, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

I would think it a mismanagement of resources for a private security force (they're of course not "police", unless employed by a state) to come to the aid of people that haven't paid for such a service. Also, you euphemize their services as "protection" and "defense". Does this mean they do not detain individuals or hurt them? These of course are means of violent coercion. These forces would be operating on a formal rule of law, and coercing the moral aspects of that law onto someone in "violation" of it through a physical means. You could say that the person in violation of their policy initiated, but initiated what? One security force might be ordered to kill any individual sighted shooting up heroin. Another might not accept this definition of initiation, and consider the shooting itself the initiation. My biggest questions are:

• Can security forces legitimately enforce "laws"? If so, can anyone on the street do so? If not, why not, and why do corporations have a monopoly on law enforcement?
• How can you define "initiation" without a common social contract?
• Is there any limitation on the power of these laws? If so, how is this limitation actually enforced? Sarge Baldy 05:50, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

Sarge> "I would think it a mismanagement of resources for a private security force (they're of course not "police", unless employed by a state) to come to the aid of people that haven't paid for such a service."

Not at all; for the same reasons that a volunteer fire department might put out fires near customer's houses. Capturing a burgular or mugger in a neighborhood with some of your clients indirectly protects your clients. And then there's good PR, the same reason a fireman might get a cat out of a tree. PDA's look efficient and gain good will for capturing aggressors.

Sarge> "Can security forces legitimately enforce 'laws'?"

As I wrote before: Legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder. A PDA would certainly have legitimacy to its customers. Generally, most PDAs would have a measure of legitimacy to most people, just as a shopping mall's security guards have more legitimacy than a random gang of thugs. People should be suspicious of legitimacy - the unthinking legitimacy which flaghumpers give their States is disgusting to any anarchist.

Sarge> "If so, can anyone on the street do so? If not, why not, and why do corporations have a monopoly on law enforcement?"

Yes, everyone had a right to self-defense. Any individual or voluntary association may provide arbitration or security services, just like any other service. It doesn't matter whether organized self-defense is done by a mutual, commune, coop, partnership, or joint stock company. It doesn't matter if it's for-profit or not. Most anarcho-capitalists doubt that large corporations would be competitive in this endeavor, and hope they won't. We think many/most corporations wouldn't exist if not for government power.

Most people don't realize that polycentric law was the historical standard i.e. pre-1500. Only with the rise of the modern State has decreed/legislated monopoly law - statist law - become the norm.

Sarge> "How can you define "initiation" without a common social contract?"

Good question, although I see "aggression" as the contentious term. What usufruct property people see as aggression, sticky property people may not. And vice versa. The answer is: there is no common definition of "aggression" - the initiation of force.

What can be done when ethical systems collide? The statist solution is to have territorial monopolies maintained by force. We anarchists don't want that. Utopian anarchists tended to deny that self-defense service was needed or desired. Most of us realize however that, though reduced, aggression will not totally vanish among mankind, and that people will never be unanimous even on what aggression is.

The best solution to different ethical and property systems is to let them all be; let them compete in the marketplace, as economists might say. Rather than authoritarian planned order, we anarchists prefer the emergent order of a pluralist ecosystem of security providers. If you want liberty, balance of power beats central rule.

Sarge> "Is there any limitation on the power of these laws? If so, how is this limitation actually enforced?"

By "limitation on power" you may mean jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a PDA would, generally speaking, be the combined land property of all its customers/clients/members. Mutualist PDAs don't mess with capitalist's property; their jurisdiction is their customers' property. Objectivist PDAs don't mess with mutualist property for the same reason. Meta-aggression like this doesn't require aggreement on what aggression is - it only requires agreement on jurisdictional boundaries.

Speaking more generally about power, a major limitation on a PDA is getting customers/members. E.g. Violence is expensive and loses customers, so excessively violent PDA would probably go out of business. Rogue PDAs would meet coalitions, and in short, be much easier to put down then statist empires and rogue states. (Nirvana is not an option.) Hogeye 20:46, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

I don't see how, in the end, anarcho-capitalism is proposing the abolishment of the state; it seems simply to be proposing the privatization of the state. It sees the functions of the state as necessary, and people as incapable of ruling themselves; it only splits from capitalist miniarchism in that it goes on to apply the principles of the free market to the state, i.e. allowing governments to compete so that people are not "coerced" into a single option. Sarge Baldy 03:11, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Sarge> "I don't see how, in the end, anarcho-capitalism is proposing the abolishment of the state; it seems simply to be proposing the privatization of the state."

There's no territorial monopoly, ergo no state. Jurisdiction, which changes according to customer desires, should not be confused with territorial monopoly.

Sarge> "It sees the functions of the state as necessary, and people as incapable of ruling themselves."

On the contrary, it sees some services that are currently provided by a monopoly state, as better and more morally provided by the people through voluntary society. Sarge, do you consider an anarchist syndicate which owns/manages a factory (and defends it against preditors) to be a state? I don't. That would be one good example of a PDA.

Sarge> It only splits from capitalist miniarchism in that it goes on to apply the principles of the free market to the state..."

Yes!! Now you're getting it. That was the insight that Molinari had in 1849. (See his essay "The Production of Security.")

Sarge> "... allowing governments to compete so that people are not "coerced" into a single option."

Except it's not a state if there is competition and no territorial monopoly, i.e. if people could opt out and switch security providers. I would agree that panarchy is essentially the practical "foreign policy" of anarchism.

How can any person, group of people, or organization doesn't initiate coercion be a "state"? The essence of a state is an organization that initiates coercion on a regular basis. Are you a state when you fend off a mugger? If no, does your body guard, who you pay to fend off muggers constitute a state? If anything has any resemblance to a state, it's the mugger. Private individuals who voluntarily protect you from aggressors, if they were successful, would be protecting you FROM the state. If they were successful they would protect you from that anyone that tried to agress against you, including the tax man. I don't understand how you define anarchism. In your idea of anarchism, is no one allowed to defend themselves from aggressors? Or do you have a utopian conception where human nature radically changes and no one has any inclination to agress against anyone? RJII 03:49, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Coercion is a bad way to define the state, especially when it relies on your highly specialized definition of coercion. Chris Acheson 16:33, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Ok, smart guy. What's your definition of a state? RJII 16:35, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

I don't have a hard-and-fast definition of it. Anarchists are opposed to hierarchy in general, so we don't need to rigidly define the state in order to oppose it. The state is simply the most central manifestation of hierarchy in our society.

If you really need such a clear definition, I've always thought that "monopoly on the legitimate use of force in a given area" was adequate. In fact, if you replace "monopoly" with "oligopoly", then you've got a pretty accurate description of the concern that Sarge Baldy is raising with the idea of Private Defense Agencies. Chris Acheson 17:23, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

It looks like you're failing to understand some basic "monopoly" concepts, like Sarge Baldy. Let's say you start manufacturing a good. You're the only one making this type of a good. You therefore have a monopoly. It's not the anyone is prohibited from competing --it's just that no one has gotten around to competing. Let's say that later on others start makng similar goods, but you're able to keep making your production process so efficient that you're able to lower your costs so much that consumers are only willing to buy your product. In that case, you would a monopoly would result too, but there would be no coercion involved. When someone says government is a "monopoly on the legitimate use of force," they're talking about a "coercive monopoly" --meaning no one is allowed to compete. In anarcho-capitalism, with the case of private defense, anyone can compete that wishes. There can be multiple private police forces. For example, if someone breaks in your home, call the company of your choice to respond to the scene. If one firm became such a great and low cost service provider that no one else could compete, then sure that's a monopoly, but it's not a coercive monopoly. In the case of a state, the state takes your money whether you want to pay them for a service or not. RJII 17:45, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Hey, it's Max Weber's definition, not mine. Like I said, I don't need to rigidly define what the state is and is not. I understand monopolies well enough. I understand that those in a monopoly position will seek to defend that position when it is threatened by any means necessary, coercive or otherwise. This is of special concern when we're dealing with agencies that are in the business of using force. Chris Acheson 18:26, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

If they use coercion to protect a monopoly position, then they're no longer acting in a free market mode, but in a governmental mode. RJII 18:31, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Exactly! A monopoly position is valuable enough to defend through coercion, so a monopolist PDA becomes a government once their position is threatened by competitors. Our problem then obviously becomes one of how to avoid ending up with a PDA in a monopoly position. Chris Acheson 19:19, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

That's like asking how the abolition of all coercion would be acheived. So, in other words you're asking how you would change human nature. Assuming human nature does not change (that people like to coerce others), there's always going to be business trying to move away from a pure business position to a governmental position, just as there will always be individuals with an inclination to mug people on the street. Anarcho-capitalism isn't a utopian conception. To answer your question, the only way that a PDA could be prevented from using coercion to prevent competition is to have a stronger PDA defending against that PDA (the initiator of coercion would no longer be a PDA but more like a government). Anarcho-capitalists do not assert that the initiation of coercion will disappear from the Earth, but that it's simply unethical. They think a major source of that coercion is governments --entities that engage in institutionalized aggression and fund themselves through taxation. So, if you put PDA's into being, you've eliminated a huge source of coercion. There is no guarantee that a PDA won't try to cross over to governmentalism, just as there's no guarantee that in a society without PDA's that people will suddenly stop aggressing against others. The anarcho-capitalist position is simply that they oppose such a thing (aggression). If you don't have PDA's, how is any society going to protect itself from governments? Wouldn't such a society just be a sitting duck waiting for a government to come in and take over? With PDA's at least there is the chance of protecting the anarchy from government, right? RJII 19:33, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

The failure of your ideology is showing. We're talking about a monopolist PDA. I thought it was self-evident that in that scenario, there would be no bigger, stronger PDAs than the monopolist. Try again, keeping that in mind. Chris Acheson 20:57, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

First of all, I've never claimed to be an anarcho-capitalist, so don't assume it's my ideology. I'm just trying to explain it to you. For people that want to reduce or eliminate statism, given that people like to set up governments and initiate coercion against each other, there are two choices --either set up a benevolent government (that keeps coercion to a minimum ..low taxes, etc) or voluntarily funded businesses that protect liberty and property (PDA's). What's to stop a PDA from being a coercive monopoly? Well, of course there is no guarantee of utopia, but I suppose you could set up a system of "checks and balances" and seperation of powers, etc. to help reduce the probability of a PDA from becoming a government. What choice does an anarchist have if human nature doesn't change? Somehow the anarchy has to be protected from aggression. It might as well be a PDA that does it instead of a tax-funded government, right? RJII 21:06, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

If you support the ideology, it's yours. I understand it well enough, which is why I don't support it. In fact, I thought it was a decent idea until I better understood it.

I'm not supporting it. I'm explaining it. I could also give you an explanation of communist anarchism if you wished. I contribute whatever I know to the article, whether it's labor-value individualism, anarcho-capitalism, anarcho-communism, whatever. RJII 22:05, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

"I suppose you could set up a system of "checks and balances" and seperation of powers, etc. to help reduce the probability of a PDA from becoming a government." -- I think we're getting somewhere now. The more participants there are in a market, and the more equal those participants are, the less likely it is that a monopoly will form. In order to make sure that one PDA doesn't become more powerful than all the others, all of the lesser participants should cooperate in order to compete against the greater ones. The logical conclusion of this is that each person becomes a one-man PDA. Chris Acheson 21:59, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Logical? Maybe, but how about practical? What if a hundred people decide to form a government. How are you going to protect yourself them? Would be difficult with "one man PDA's" wouldn't it? RJII 22:17, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Yeah, the whole idea of people cooperating with each other against a common threat is pretty ridiculous, isn't it? Maybe we should just call this whole "anarchy" thing off? Chris Acheson 17:06, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

A PDA *is* people cooperating with each other against a common threat --the threat of coercive interference into anarchy. " "defense is a service like any other service; that it is labor both useful and desired, and therefore an economic commodity subject to the law of supply and demand; that in a free market this commodity would be furnished at the cost of production; that, competition prevailing, patronage would go to those who furnished the best article at the lowest price; that the production and sale of this commodity are now monopolized by the State; and that the State, like almost all monopolists, charges exorbitant prices" (Benjamin Tucker) RJII 19:26, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

To clarify my own personal impression, I would maintain that if an anarchy needs to be "actively maintained" to ensure it does not "relapse" into a government again, then you're basically back to an authoritarian system. I would argue the same thing occurs if an anarchy needs to be forced via revolution. However, I see these as simply practical problems with the implementation of the ideas of some anarchists, and do not see it as inherently necessary for a system to actually function be considered an anarchist philosophy.

If PDA security forces had the power to enforce any form of authority against anyone who had not specifically agreed to a social contract with that organization, then you're effectively initiating coercion against them, applying a rule of law to individuals who have not specifically agreed to it. There is no difference between this and the ability to force taxes or laws on individuals who have not specifically agreed to them. Or does anarcho-capitalism state that PDAs have no authority towards individuals who have not granted it? In which case these forces would be too powerless to do anything, since it's unlikely that people without means would choose to subscribe to a government they would be better off without. If an individual does not accept the laws of a PDA, then that PDA has no jurisdiction over that individual without coercing upon her liberties. If she steals a purse from a subscriber to a certain PDA, and she maintains that as a lawful act, then what can a PDA do except to force its own laws onto a nonsubscriber, coercing a set of values onto someone who did not accept them, in the same way a formal state would pursue the act as a crime regardless of the values of the individual? Sarge Baldy 23:40, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

If a PDA initiates coercion, then it's not acting in the capacity of a PDA --but as a government. A PDA would not initiate force on anybody --it would do the opposite --protect people from being ruled over by other individuals or governments by using defensive force. If you don't sign up for an account with a PDA, fine. No PDA is going to force anything on you, but it *IS* going to stop you from mugging people, killing people, etc. If you think stealing pursus is consistent with anarchism, but protecting people from purse thieves is not then I don't know what to tell you. RJII 00:04, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

And so by defense, you mean that the PDA would not enforce anything on the "perpetrator"? If an independent, for instance, killed the president of a PDA, then clearly any further action against that assassin would not be for the purpose of defense, it would be unnecessary aggression against someone who has not made any commitment to forsake assassination. If an independent took a purse, that independent is outside of a PDA's jurisdiction, and any action taken against such an individual is an initiation of force against an entity foreign to their system, and their rules. She did not grant any of her rights to that PDA, and if pursued by that PDA then that organizaton would be infringing upon her liberties.

And of course I don't think stealing purses is consistent with anarchism. That's why I wouldn't need to propose a program to prevent such an incident from happening. Participation would be voluntary, and those with any severe need would have that need satisfied by a community perceiving a shared human nature. People wouldn't need to steal food; they could just simply ask for it. Sarge Baldy 05:34, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Forcefully restraining a person from taking someone's purse is initiation of force on him because he didn't agree to refrain from stealing purses? That makes no sense at all. If someone doesnt't agree to refrain from assaulting others then he's not initiating force when he does it, and that therefore you would be initiating force on him by stopping him? Are you really cognizant of what you're saying? Whether or not you agree to not initiate force against others, you're still initiating force against someone when when you initiate force against them. If you walk down the street and start shooting people you're initiating physical force against them --it has nothing to do with contracts. If someone else takes you down, they're not intitiating physical force --YOU initiated it --they're RESPONDING with physical force. Contract doesn't even enter the picture. RJII 19:59, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

My example was in the case of an individual who had already successfully taken a purse. Would the PDA have the right to apprehend this individual? Would they have the right to enter her home and take it by force? If they have this right, who has granted them this right? Or are PDAs simply limited to preventing "criminal" action against their clients? That was one of the questions I was posing above. Sarge Baldy 21:38, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Ok, I see your question. If someone steals a purse and gets away, he's still forcefully depriving the owner of the purse from having it. If you, me, or a paid agent of you or me (a PDA), breaks into the thief's house to get the purse back, that's not initiation of force at all. The force has already been initiated by the thief and is continuing as long as he has the purse. Surely you can see that, right? We would be using force in response to an initiation. Now, as far as going beyond that and punishing the thief, such as jailing him or something, I think is when things become a bit problematic. After you've gotten the purse back from the thief, are you then initiating force against him if you put handcuffs on him and take him into the judiciary system? Or, is it still a matter of defense by taking him off the streets because, after all, he was the one that initiated the coercion? What if it's a murderer? Should he reallly be allowed to roam free just because the crime is over and there's no way to give the victim his life back? Is it consistent with anarchism to take him to court and put him away, or do you have to leave him roaming free because you're a "true anarchist"? If a version of anarchism allows known violent individuals to roam about waiting to prey on the next person, what's it good for? Punishing criminals can be argued to be a continuation of defensive force from an anarcho-capitalist perspective (and Tuckerite individualist perspective). Victor Yarros (one of the Tuckerite individualist anarchists) addressed your concerns.: "Anarchism means no government, but it does not mean no laws and no coercion. This may seem paradoxical, but the paradox vanishes when the Anarchist definition of government is kept in view. Anarchists oppose government, not because they disbelieve in punishment of crime and resistance to aggression, but because they disbelieve in compulsory protection. Protection and taxation without consent is itself invasion; hence Anarchism favors a system of voluntary taxation and protection." And, " "The anarchists, as anarchists, work directly, not for a perfect social state, but for a perfect political system. A perfect social state is a state totally free from sin or crime of folly; a perfect political system in which justice is observed, in which nohting is punished but crime and nobody coerced but invaders." Perhaps you have a utopian definition of anarchism where no one has any inclination to harm anyone else, and that's ok. But, individualists don't. RJII 01:37, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Sarge> "If an individual does not accept the laws of a PDA, then that PDA has no jurisdiction over that individual without coercing upon her liberties. If she steals a purse from a subscriber to a certain PDA, and she maintains that as a lawful act, then what can a PDA do except to force its own laws onto a nonsubscriber, coercing a set of values onto someone who did not accept them..."

Right. That's why RJ's definition of state (in terms of aggression) is deficient. What is and is not aggression depends on your property rules.

Sarge> "Of course I don't think stealing purses is consistent with anarchism. That's why I wouldn't need to propose a program to prevent such an incident from happening. Participation would be voluntary, and those with any severe need would have that need satisfied by a community perceiving a shared human nature. People wouldn't need to steal food; they could just simply ask for it."

If you are saying that bad conduct would never happen (and it appears you are), then I have to say that's totally utopian. It's like those people who want to abolish drug use - "win the war on drugs." It's a fact of human nature that people like to feel good, and that some people behave badly sometimes. The only question for those living in the real world is how to minimize the harm. Harm-reduction for drug use is legalization rather than prohibition; harm-reduction for human aggression is voluntary organization of self-defense (PDAs) rather than a state.

Sarge> "My example was in the case of an individual who had already successfully taken a purse. Would the PDA have the right to apprehend this individual?"

Yes, an individual has the right to reclaim stolen property. Yes, people may defend their rights by mutual aid, aka organized self-defense, e.g. via a PDA.

As I've explained, aggression is defined relative to a property system, so the legal code of PDA's may conflict. In a stateless society, these clashes are handled through competing PDAs with ample incentive to negotiate (a strategy that emphasizes harm-reduction) rather than by territorial monopolies (states) and their proclivity for war. The conflict between clashing notions of aggression is "solved" by a notion of meta-aggression called "jurisdiction." Hogeye 23:36, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Two interpretations of Stirner

I was cogitating on the difference between individualist anarchism in Europe and AngloAmerica, especially with regard to attitudes on "propaganda by deed," so I read up on Max Stirner and "The Ego and Its Own" (another translation is "The Individual and His Property".) My conclusion is that Euro anarchists tended to interpret Stirner's egoism as moral skepticism, while Americans tended to interpret it as any meaningful "morality" must be based on egoism. Thus the Stirnerite European "illegalists argued that their actions required no moral basis - illegal acts were taken not in the name of a higher ideal, but in pursuit of one's own desires." OTOH the Tuckerites maintained, alongside their Stirnerism, Spencer's Law of Equal Freedom; they simply changed the justification of the LEF from "spook" natural rights to egoist contractarianism.

Does anyone agree or disagree with this? Hogeye 23:26, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

You are probably correct. It is also worth noting, however, that many post-left anarchists who are influenced by Stirner have adopted what you are calling the European interpretation. I believe that this article from Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed and this article from Green Anarchy (both American publications) illustrate this interpretation. Nihila 00:30, 15 December 2005 (UTC)

I think your first article (and Stirner himself) is quite convincing that one should reject irrational constructs in your head that impair your life. But I don't agree with the stronger (and unsupported) claim they sneak in - that there exist no moral principles general to humankind. I think that there are some things that can be deduced from empirical observation of man, and his requirements for survival and living. I remain a natural rights" guy. Hogeye 06:40, 15 December 2005 (UTC)

I think the Americans like Tucker just took Stirner's position that there are no such thing as natural or moral rights, then added the idea of contracts creating legal rights. As far as I know Stirner doesn't talk about a right of contract (I would think that Stirner's position on that would be that there's not even a moral obligation to adhere to a contract one makes). Tucker says: "These two rights -the right of might and the right of contract -are the only rights that ever have been or ever can be. So-called moral rights have no existence." Whereas, for Stirner there is only the right of might. So, if you're into Stirner but you haven't built upon it by adding the idea of engaging in contract to to create legal rights, I would think anything goes. That may explain the violence of European fans of Stirner. RJII 05:41, 15 December 2005 (UTC)

Tucker's terminology is confusing, i.e. the use of the spook word "right" after rejecting the concept. I suppose he meant that people have the ability to use force and the ability to contract. Turner may have agreed with Stirner that there is no moral obligation to adhere to a contract - that an egoist respects a contract if it is in his rational self-interest. (But I doubt it.)

I think this difference between (most) European IAs and American IAs (and between Nietzche and Rand for that matter) in interpreting egoism is the universality principle - the categorical imperitive. Without the universality principle egoism leads to amoralism or moral skepticism; with the universality principle it leads to the Non-Aggression Principle (or Law of Equal Freedom). Hogeye 06:40, 15 December 2005 (UTC)

"Sanction" has contradictory meanings

In the discussion of black anarchism, "However this does not indicate that he would sanction the collaboration of some white national anarchists with openly racist and fascist groups like the British National Party and the Eurasians."

Unfortunately, dictionaries give contrary definitions of sanction. Sometimes it means an "authoritative permission or approval," sometimes it means a penalty -- perhaps, in a situation like this, a boycott as a "sanction". The ambiguity of the word combined with my own ignorance of this particular writer/activist, leaves me confused about this sentence. --Christofurio 13:44, 15 December 2005 (UTC)

Proudhon picture

Anyone have a Wiki-legal picture of Proudhon? We lost our last one. Hogeye 01:22, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

wHy are you rving the anarchism page using a IP address instead of signing in? -max rspct 17:25, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Back to Tit-for-tat

We're back to deleting schools of anarchism we don't agree with. Note that I can do this without reverting! Hogeye 18:02, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

No were not.. You can't just go about "replacing a school I do consider anarchist" and declare that this is an 'edit war' - thats POV . Anarcho-capitalism is not sourcable as a school of anarchism - I have never seen any reference to a notable academic or historical book. You and RJII have consistantly used the article as a political campaign since JUNE -max rspct 18:14, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Anarcho-capitalism is a form of anarchism according to virtually all dictionaries, most encyclopedias, and even the majority of anarchist theorists.[1] And you know that good and well. Hogeye 18:32, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Dictionaries? (*snicker*) --TelemachusSneezed 19:20, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Only if you pre-define "anarchist theorists" to include "anarcho-capitalist theorists". Chris Acheson 22:15, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

What is "The State"?

Yeah, I'm back, after a short hiatus. I've been reading Bengalski's contributions to this page, and they got me thinking about a few things.

When we discuss "the State," it seems to me that we are all using widely varying interpretations of the term. Hogeye has mentioned the "Weberian state," the definition of which is "a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force." This definition is not necessarily equivalent to the Westphalian state. Other contributors -- the so-called "an-socs" primarily -- appear to interpret "the State" in a more varied manner, as institutionalized domination/exploitation within human society. I myself tend to define "the State" as any collection of institutions that explicitly or implicitly promotes the centralization of wealth and power, but that's NPOV and I realize it's not valid here. Finally, I don't think there is any consensus as to the meaning of "the State" in the writings of Proudhon, Godwin, Tucker, et al. Their definitions appear to be implied by their writings, not by any explicit reference. The most I can grasp is that their viewpoints are at times completely anti-government, and at other times just simply pro-"just government."

My point: It would benefit this discussion page to have a usable -- but not necessarily concrete nor abstract -- definition of "the State" before we start trying to define anarchism in terms of said phrase. Suggestions?

I can give you a way Rothbard defined it: "What anarchism proposes to do, then, is to abolish the State, i.e. to abolish the regularized institution of aggressive coercion." RJII 19:28, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Rothbard's definition combines Weber and Oppenheimer:

"The State is that organization in society which attempts to maintain, and is generally successful at maintaining, a coercive geographical monopoly over ultimate control of the law (i.e., on the courts and police, etc.)--this is a feature of all governments; as well, historically speaking, it has always been the case that it is the only organization in society that legally obtains its revenue not by voluntary contribution or payment for contracted services rendered but by coercion." The Anatomy of the State

Hogeye 21:10, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Justification Theory and Profit

I split these comments into two separate sections just because the above applies to the following only indirectly.

Ahem... a few observations:

Justifications: Ends-Justifiy-Means or Means-Justify-Ends... or something else?

There was an interesting discussion above, Voluntary - What does it mean?. Not much was resolved, but it was illuminating nevertheless. Hogeye's basic point was that anarcho-capitalist's tend to emphasize "entitlement theory," a version of means-justify-ends thought; and that non-capitalist anarchists tend to emphasize "end-state theory," a version of ends-justify-means thought.

Thoughts:

(1) Let's suppose that a complaint is brought against a defendant by a plaintiff (pretty typically set-up, eh?). The plaintiff knows his current (i.e. "bad") state and believes the defendant to be involved in one or more ways in the realization of this state. The defendant however knows his actions to have been legal or "just," and the evidence clearly shows this to be true. The case is thrown out eventhough the defendant is in fact responsible for the plaintiff's current state. The point: because the "end-state" is ignored, there is no basis on which to evaluate the validity of the "entitlements" that lead to it. Thus, from the very beginning, injustice is institutionalized and there is no way to undo it because the "end-state" must be ignored. Violence becomes the only recourse, disolving the very civilization that anarcho-capitalists hope to live in.

(2) The people that are lauded by anarcho-capitalists -- Proudhon, Godwin, Tucker, Spooner, Warren -- did not simply birth their ideas out of nothing, unlike Ayn Rand's Objectivists, for instance. They critiqued the societies in which they lived, and came to conclusions that argued for less governmental interference in human interactions. In other words, they observed the "end-state" and then searched for the abusive "entitlements" from which it originated. They emphasized neither "end-states" nor "entitlements" in their analyses, but sought to balance both in coming to their conclusions.

(3) Looking at (1) and (2), one sees that there is a bogus simplifcation being made concerning "justification theory." The vast majority of noteable thinkers (anarchist or not) have taken on a combination of both "end-state" and "entitlement" analysis, and any stable society -- let alone any society worth living in -- must be able to take on both continually; that is, to reevaluate its assumptions in order to adjust to mistakes and inadequacies. This appears to be a deep flaw in anarcho-capitalist thought: a bureaucratic, rationalistic emphasis on legalistics and procedure with no ability to self-examine nor to self-correct. I would like to hear a response from one of the many pro-capitalist folks on this discussion page.

Point (1) is very muddled and self-contradictory. If, as you stipulate, the defendant's actions are just, then how can he be "in fact responsible?" But the main error is the misunderstanding of the entitlement theory: it does not ignore the end-state at all. On the contrary, it is usually by looking at the end-state that we realize that something has gone wrong. What the entitlement theory does say is that the end-state is just iff the steps leading up to that end-state are just.

All those people you mention in (2) are end-state theorists. "They observed the end-state and then searched for the abusive [historical interactions] from which it originated," like all good entitlement theorists. Again, you mistakenly assume that entitlement theory must be blind to end-states. Point (3) suffers from the same faulty assumption.

About profit - I think your (Telemachus) definition of capitalism is better than RJ's. I define it as an economic system where sticky (neo-lockean) property is permissable. (Thus rent, profit, and interest are permissable.) Some might say that this makes me an agorist, but I prefer the term "anarcho-capitalist" or "market anarchist" (for those who think capitalism is a dirty word.) BTW Gustave de Molinari wrote the anarcho-capitalist equivalent of "What is Property" in 1849 - The Production of Security.

As pointed out, most anarcho-capitalists are not egoist - most base it on natural law like Rothbard. Some are contractarian, but even these do not necessarily consider themselves egoist. Me? I'm all three - a natural rights contractarian egoist. (I see these as buttressing each other rather than conflicting.) Hogeye 22:00, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Profit

In "Free-markets" vs. "capitalism", RJII made an interesting statement: "I think what makes a system capitalist is that profit is involved." This was in response to a possible flub I made, when I said: "'Capitalism,' in the general sense, is simply the private ownership of 'capital' by a party." While I believe my interpretation of capitalism is more correct in the traditional sense -- which is the only reason capitalism might be justified in an anarchist society -- "Capitalism" (note capital-c) is now what reigns in modern capitalist thought, and is represented more effectively by RJII's interpretation.

What distinguishes anarcho-capitalism from most other anarchist varieties -- including individualist thought -- is the acceptance of the primary tenets of modern capitalism: profit and wage labor. But if you read the people referenced by anarcho-capitalists, over and over again you see derision for profit and wage labor as unearned income and forced slavery, respectively. The only link I see between conventionally recognized anarchist thought and pro-capitalist thought is Max Stirner and his egoism. A disregard for the well-being of others in favor of "rational self-interest," is the only logical place within which a link between Capitalism and anarchism can be placed.

The debate now becomes: do we list as precursors those who are seen as precursors by the interested party; or, do we categorize influences in terms of similarity between world-views? In other words, do we list "cats" under the heading of "elephants" because cats insist they are elephants, or do we categorize them under "felines" because they share obvious genetic links? Probably both, but I would emphasize the latter lest my cat become afraid of mice rather than eating them.

I maintain that all mentions of anarcho-capitalist thought would be more appropriately located here: Egoism. Would the AC's be happy with this? Thoughts? --TelemachusSneezed 19:19, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

The essential differences between the labor-value individualists and anarcho-capitalists stem from one basic difference. The labor-value (anti-profit individualists) think that the value of a good is how much labor was put into creating it, and anarcho-capitalists (also individualists) think that the value of a good is subject to opinion --the most someone is willing to offer in trade for something. I think it's ludicrious to claim that holding a subjective theory of value disqualifies someone as an anarchist. (Note that individualist anarchists that did not subscribe to labor-value theory existed back then as well --the term "anarcho-capitalist" just wasn't coined yet; I suspect there would not be so much objection to anarcho-capitalism as being a type of anarchism if the term was never coined but the philosophy remained the same). RJII 21:00, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

About egoism, I'm not sure if most anarcho-capitalists are egoists. I think most are natural law based. A lot of the classical labor-value individualists are egoists. Benjamin Tucker was an egoist who was heavily influenced by Stirner. Tucker said: "These two rights -the right of might and the right of contract -are the only rights that ever have been or ever can be. So-called moral rights have no existence." Also, Steven T. Byington, the labor-value individualist anarchist who translated Stirner's Ego and His Own was an egoist. Others, like Lysander Spooner were natural law based. RJII 21:11, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Hello, Telemachus. Cool name, BTW. Anyway, I just popped in to say that I am an anarcho-capitalist who is not in an philosophical sense an egoist and would very much object to treating the one view as a subhead of the other. In my own view, which isn't necessarily representative but isn't unique either, the soundest ethical-philosophical foundation for anarcho-capitalism is value-pluralism in the sense popularized by Isaiah Berlin but anticipated by William James. Neither of those gentlemen was an anarcho-cap, but both are admired by some of us, for creating the premises upon which we reason. Consider, for example, Berlin's stress on negative liberty and how it is related to his belief in the irreducible plurality of ideals. --Christofurio 22:14, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Can you elaborate further on this? Are you saying that the AC position has value because it cannot be proven otherwise? Chris Acheson 18:44, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

Glad to. No. As for "proof otherwise," I don't think that moral philosophy is subject to proof in the way that geometry is, but I also don't regard ignorance as evidence for anything. But we might begin our reasonings this way: what is value? We might then notice that in a world of only rocks and water there would be no good or bad. A world with one thinking being in it would have plenty of good and bad -- some things would work out as that being wanted them, others wouldn't. It could even have moral conflict of a sort, as that one thinker may have trouble rendering his own ideals consistent with one another.

From such considerations, I suggest, we should conclude that value -- good and bad -- are intimately bound up with the subjective desires of thinking beings.

Wherever there is a want, there is a good and a bad -- it is good that the want be satisfied, it is bad that it be frustrated. Of course, wants come into conflict. Some wants are different from others, because they are conceived of as ideals, deserving not only of pursuit but of sacrifice, and conceived of as the pillars on top of which one builds ones life. Yet narrowing our concern to ideals doesn't help us very much, because ideals are still subjective, and the plans to actualize them are helplessly in conflict with one another.

Accepting this situation, without judging any of the contending conflicting idealists to be in any way deluded, makes us value pluralists. It doesn't make us egoists, because in saying what I've just said I haven't put myself in any central position. You and I and any chosen Smith or Jones are all in the same boat -- all with subjective wants which we can form into still-subjective ideals which we can act upon only by coming into conflict with one another.

Here's where the tricky part comes in. A value pluralist can use this very situation to create his/her ideals, by recognizing that human history is an experiment in the reconciliation of all these conflict-requiring ideals, that there is a direction of progress within this experiment, and by siding with that direction.

William James, "Since victory and defeat there must be, the victory tobe philosophically prayed for is that of the more inclusive side,-- of the side which even in the hour of triumph will to some degree do justice to the ideals in which the vanquished party's interests lay. The course of history is nothing but the story of men's struggles from generation to generation to find the more and more inclusive order. Invent some manner of realizing your own ideals which will also satisfy the alien demands, -- that and that only is the path of peace!"

Speaking only for myself, I am an anarcho-capitalist because I believe that by advocating this view I am serving that goal. --Christofurio 21:05, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

Don't get me wrong, I'm all for pluralism. Diversity is strength, and all that. However, that does not mean that we should not be constantly testing ideas, and discarding those which we do not find worthwhile. In fact, if we do not do this, then we are discarding the value of pluralism itself, turning it into a purely aesthetic philosophy.

Why then, is "anarcho-capitalism" worthwhile? Whose interests does it serve? Why does it appeal to you, besides that it might appeal to someone? Chris Acheson 16:56, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

I would think it would appeal to anyone who thinks thinks that an overall free market economy is the most conducive environment to increasing the wealth and happiness of a society. And, it would appeal to anyone that doesn't want to be taxed, but would rather be allowed to decide for himself who he pays his money to and for what service. RJII 17:16, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

That sounds like a good argument for mutualism or some other individualist strain of anarchism, but not capitalism. Why cling to anti-competitive property rules? Why stubbornly refuse to engage in any sort of power analysis? Chris Acheson 17:31, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Sure, it could be the attraction to labor-value individualism as well. Why someone would choose anarcho-capitalism over mutualism, is if they thought that value was subjective and that therefore there is nothing wrong with profit. Or, from a practical perspective, that profit generation is a good thing that leads to increased wealth and happiness for society. RJII 17:47, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Economic value theories have nothing to do with it. Subjective, objective, whatever. Why would you support capitalist property rules (ownership is forever, etc.) if not in your own interest (that is, it is in your interest to have others follow those rules)? If they are in your interest, then why seek to abolish the state which ensures that everyone must abide by those rules, instead of choosing to operate by another set of rules? And again, why refuse to engage in power analysis which would help to inform you of how to best pursue your interests? If you're not advocating your philosophy out of self-interest, then what does motivate you to do so? Chris Acheson 18:55, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Economic value theories a has a lot to do with it. Either you think profit is exploitative or you don't. They prefer an anarcho-capitalists system because they believe such a system is intrinsically moral, or it has the best consequences (including the best consequences for themselves). They think that individual property rights is a good thing --either morally or practically (or both). RJII 19:05, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

RJ you don't need to hold a labour theory of value to believe that capitalism is exploitative or unjust - can I refer you to my discussion with Hogeye above. There I outlined a concept of exploitation using a bargaining notion without any value theory. I tend to think outrage at exploitation and injustice in capitalism was the primary motivation of most socialists of that era, the labour value theory was a theoretical add-on. You don't even need to agree with LTV to recommend 'cost the limit of price' as a normative model: you can just say it would make for a better, more fair or equal society if people adopted that principle. Actually I don't think eg. Tucker's position would be changed or diminished by cutting out the LTV.Bengalski 22:50, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

"I tend to think outrage at exploitation and injustice in capitalism was the primary motivation of most socialists of that era." What the labor-value individualists were outraged about was not capitalism as it is sometimes defined today. What they were outraged about was government intervention in the economy that reduced competition, and resultingly, reduced the bargaining power of the little guy leaving him to accept to accept what would ordinatily be bad deals (such as someone paying him less for his labor than what it would be worth in a free market). As the labor-value individualists define capitalism, anarcho-capitalists also oppose capitalism. Tucker thought the main problem was government protecting the "banking monopoly" --he thought you shoulnd't have to have permission from the goverment (a charter) to establish a bank and issue you're own money. Tucker thought that if this protection was eliminated that interest rates would be reduced to at or near zero. Anarcho-capitalists also want an end to government-backed banking monopoly. It's very tricky to assert that the labor-value individuals were outraged at capitalism when they did not use a modern definition of capitalism. Now, this is not to say they didn't oppose capitalism as it is sometimes defined today, because they did --the reason being they opposed profit. But again, they thought profit would be impossible in a truly laissez-faire system. The prime enemy for them was not trades that included profiting, but government which enabled trades that included profiting to take place because of governemnt intervention preventing competition. They fully supported private ownership of capital; rather they opposed it being concentrated in the hands of a few because of government intervention and mercantilism. Look at the definition of capitalism from back in 1909 in the Century Dictionary: " "1. The state of having capital or property; possession of capital. 2. The concentration or massing of capital in the hands of a few; also, the power or influence of large or combined capital." When you see an old individualist anarchist using the word "capitalism," he's defining it in a similar way as (2). Capitalism means something different that it used to mean. Today it means a laissez-faire system: " "an economic system characterized by private or corporation ownership of capital goods, by investments that are determined by private decision rather than by state control, and by prices, production, and the distribution of goods that are determined mainly in a free market." (Merriam-Webster). The old labor-value individualists would have no problem with that whatseover. (If the definition included, as some definitions do, profiting then they would have some problems with it, but again they didn't think profit would be possible in laissez-faire.) RJII 02:10, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Tucker thought the main problem was government protecting the "banking monopoly" -- This is an oversimplification of his position. The banking monopoly was one of his "big four", another one being absentee landlordism ("land titles which do not rest upon personal occupancy and cultivation"). Chris Acheson 15:44, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

If you think profit is exploitative (and have a problem with that), then you obviously wouldn't be a capitalist. If you don't think profit is exploitative, however, it doesn't necessarily follow that you are a capitalist. Personally, I'm not sure how much I buy into the labor-value stuff, but I still object to capitalist property rules. As for morality, why is capitalist property moral and the state not moral? On practicality, the ideology still fails. Other ideologies advocate individual property in a much more practical way. Chris Acheson 20:07, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Individualist anarchism (both labor-value individualists and subjective-value individualists (anarcho-capitalists)) advocates private property; collectivist anarchism (anarcho-communism, etc) doesn't. To your question as why "capitalist property" would be moral but not property of the state, let's look at what Rothbard says on that, since he's a natural law anarcho-capitalist: ""If Columbus lands on a new continent, is it legitimate for him to proclaim all the new continent his own, or even that sector 'as far as his eye can see'? Clearly, this would not be the case in the free society that we are postulating. Columbus or Crusoe would have to use the land, to 'cultivate' it in some way, before he could be asserted to own it.... If there is more land than can be used by a limited labor supply, then the unused land must simply remain unowned until a first user arrives on the scene. Any attempt to claim a new resource that someone does not use would have to be considered invasive of the property right of whoever the first user will turn out to be." So, for the natural law anarcho-capitalist, property is not legitimate if it's simply claimed (as a state does), but can only come about through labor. RJII 20:14, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

So what if I'm an individualist anarchist who doesn't subscribe to the labor theory of value, yet opposes capitalist property rules? Why would property remain legitimate after the first user has left it? Isn't that also invasive of the property right of those who show up later? What if I cultivate some land, then leave it and go cultivate some more? Is all of it mine, even though I can only use part of it? If these rules are moral, then why is it not moral to have a state to uphold them? Chris Acheson 20:46, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

If you abandon land that you worked, it's no longer yours. If you simply leave land that you worked to rest for a few years then came back to it, natural law theorists such as Rothbard would still say it was yours in the interim. On the other hand, if you're an anarcho-capitalists who bases his philosophy in contractualism, then what the maximum amount of time land would be considered abandoned would be a mattter of contract --it could be as little as 1 year or 50 years, or whatever is agreed to. The reason it would be moral to protect your property but not moral for a state to protect property, lies not in the fact that property is being protected but that the state coerces money out of people (taxation) to fund protection. RJII 20:58, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Why is the property owner's use of force in defense of the property not coercive? Chris Acheson 21:12, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

By "coercive" I hope you mean initiated coercion as opposed to defensive coercion. The reason why protecting property wouldn't be agressive (initiatory coercion) is because anarcho-capitalists think that the Earth (all the land on it) was originally owned by no one. It was just there. If you take what belongs to no one and protect it against others, you can't be stealing from anyone or aggressing against them. You would be defending it against others who wanted aggress. (If you're an anarcho-communist you think somehow, a priori, all land on Earth originally belonged (and still belongs) to everyone). RJII 21:22, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

You're using your property rules to justify themselves, though. Why is it more moral for ownership to last forever than for use to determine ownership? Why is it wrong to claim all land and deny it to others who might use it in the future, yet not wrong to retain claim to land that you do not use, denying it to others who might use it? Chris Acheson 22:14, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Because from an natural law anarcho-capitalist perspective, once you've mixed your labor with something, it's yours. This not only applies to land. Consider if you went into an unowned forest and chopped down a tree and fashioned a dinner table for yourself out of it. That table continues to be your property even if you put it in the garage and never use it again. Likewise, if you work the land and plant corn, but then leave your farm to deteriorate, it's still yours --because you mixed your labor with it. (Again, remember, not all anarcho-capitalists have a natural law theory of property. Others are contractualists --they say property can only come about by contract --that mixing labor with something doesn't naturally create property. So, any rule could apply that people contract to in regard to land --they could even contract with other to not protect idle land.) RJII 23:21, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

This is easier to discuss in the context of contract. Let's say that you and a neighbor contract with each other to protect the other's land in their absense. There is no reason to assume that your neighbor will continue to uphold the contract (or enter into it in the first place) if you are absent significantly more than he is, as he would be giving you more protection than he would be receiving from you. If you wish for your neighbor to retain your property for an extended period of absence, you must provide him with some sort of incentive (payment) to do so. The property rules that emerge in this situation are either mutualist (property is abandoned when owner ceases to use it), georgist (property is abandoned when owner ceases to pay for it), or some mixture thereof, rather than capitalist (property is never abandoned). Chris Acheson 18:58, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Yes, if you were to purchase something in a capitalist system, it would be considered your property until you decided to relenquish title. Those who support capitalism think it's a better policy (either moral or having good consequences) than a system that allows others to take your property when you wish leave it unbothered for awhile. Note the the mutualists also hold this private property policy for the produce of labor (just not for land itself --though I must note there were some labor-value individualist anarchists that supported ownership of land too). RJII 19:17, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

We're talking about emergent systems. Questions of what "should" be are irrelevant, in this context. Why would capitalist property rules, rather than mutualist or georgist property rules emerge through contract? Chris Acheson 19:29, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

I'm not talking about "emergent systems." If you're talking about emergent systems, where has capitalism emerged? So far, it's only theoretical. But, why "would" private property "emerge" through contract? Obviously, if people think that they they would be better off if no one takes away from them what they set aside to come back to at a later time, then they're not going to enter into contracts that would allow someone to take those things away from them. A lot of people like the idea of having the freedom to become wealthy, for example. They have no desire to enter to into a contract with others that would allow them to take away the fruits of their labor just because they've put it in storage. RJII 19:38, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

When you talk about "property coming about through contract", you're speaking of an emergent system. When people are given the choice of what property rules they will create through contract, the rules that they choose form a system. You seem to be ignoring the fact that contracts are created by at least two people. Both parties must benefit from the contract, or it will not be created in the first place. Let's look at the example of the storage contract. If you do not enter into a contract with someone to care for the product of your labor in your absense, then it's up for grabs, as property can only come about through contract. Anyone who would enter into such a contract with you will want compensation writen into the terms for the burden that you are imposing on them. If you do not pay, you have broken the terms of the contract, and the product of your labor is once again up for grabs. Chris Acheson 15:37, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

No kidding. That's what police are for. If you're going to be contracting with other people to create property rights, you would want to hire a third (or fourth) party to patrol the neighborhood or whatever when you go out of town. If you store your money in a bank, you'd want to store it in a bank that paid for guards, etc. RJII 15:49, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

So how can one say in any meaningful sense that your property remains yours forever? If you're not personally using it, and you're not paying to retain claim on it, then it's not yours. Chris Acheson 16:12, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

No. Whether anyone is protecting it or not is irrelevant as to whether the right to private property exists. Private property means the right to exclusive use to a thing. For a contractualist, the right to keep others from taking the product of your labor without your consent is created simply by contract --private law --not moral rights but legal rights. For the natural law adherent, property comes about by mixing one's labor with natural resources. The existence of a legal (contractual) or moral right to keep the fruits of your labor is not contingent upon protecting that right. The enjoyment of that right, however, would probably require protection of that right (such as locking your home, hiring security guards, etc) --unless you lived in a really low crime area maybe. RJII 21:58, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

The right is created through contract. If you cease to pay, you are breaking the terms of the contract, and the right that the contract created is nullified. Without the contract, you no longer have a legal right to the property. I'm not talking about enforcement, I'm talking about the rights themselves. Chris Acheson 22:48, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

"Cease to pay" what? If you and I contract with each other to recognize the fruits of each others' labor as private property, then a right of private property is created right then. It has nothing to do with "paying" anything. RJII 00:58, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

The right to hold perpetual claim to property in one's absense is much more valuable to one who makes use of that right than it is to one who doesn't. If I don't leave my home for more than a few days at a time, then a contract granting me the right to perpetual ownership in absence is going to be worth no more to me than one granting me the right to retain ownership as long as I am gone for no more than a week. If you want me to grant you the right of perpetual ownership, offering me the same right in exchange isn't going to do much for me. You're going to have to make a more compelling offer if you want a better contract. Chris Acheson 16:47, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

I have no idea what you're saying here. RJII 18:50, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

Think about recognition of property rights as a service that you buy and sell. How would market forces affect what standard property rules emerge? Consider that each person simultaneously wants their own property claims to be recognized while also wanting other land/resources to be considered unclaimed (such that they may claim it in the future). Chris Acheson 20:36, 24 December 2005 (UTC)

---

"Anarcho"-capitalism doesn't logically follow from egoism. A sufficiently rational egoist would most likely advocate one of the following:

Anarchism -- One's priveleges in the current social order are less than they would be in a flat social order where everyone is equally powerful.

Authoritarianism -- One's priveledges would be greater in a hierarchical social order than in the current one.

Status Quo -- One's relative priveleges in another social order would be uncertain, or would not improve significantly enough.

While moderate classical liberalism might be taken as an endorsement of the status quo, its most extreme form, anti-state capitalism, clearly cannot be. Some also consider it to be a vieled attempt to bring about a more feudalistic economic system, but in that case, it would be smarter to just advocate statist capitalism. Chris Acheson 19:39, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

Why then, is "anarcho-capitalism" worthwhile? Whose interests does it serve? Why does it appeal to you, besides that it might appeal to someone? Chris Acheson 16:56, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

A lot of polemical water has gone under the bridge since you asked me that question, Chris. But let's go back to it. What I've been trying to say is not that anarcho-capitalism is one of the contending ideas within the plurality of contending ideas and is to be accepted as such (which is how you seem to be reading me). What I'm trying to say is that I prize anarcho-cap precisely as the best available mechanism for reconciling the batch of them, the best second-order ideal for making sense out of the conflict among those first-order ideals. That is the interest it serves. The meta-interest of all. Why do I think so? Well, all the familiar anarcho-capitalist arguments might be inserted here, and most of the familiar Austrian economic arguments as well. I don't see why I should have to rehearse them now, since the only reason I got into this at all was that Telemachus asked us anarcho-caps whether we'd object to being reclassified as egoists. I certainly would, and I believe I've offered the sketch of an utterly non-egoistic foundational theory for anarcho-cap.

As to perpetual property in land and so forth, let me say this. Once the state is abolished, a free-market system of law can be expected to develop along the lines outlined by David Friedman especially. If, as a matter of definition, you wish to define "law" as the will of the state, then you will deny this, but we can easily adopt some other phrasing. Once the state is abolished, a free-market system of customs and mores will develop to perform some of its functions, whether we want to give those customs and mores the benefit of the "l-word" or not won't be especially important.

Will that system include perpetual property interest in land? Frankly, I don't know. I'm not competent to second guess the markets. The market system itself, and the laws (mores, whatever) that arise in that context, will be more wise than I am -- I'll be but one neuron in that brain. Whatever the outcome of that market system, whether it accepts or rejects such a perpetual property interest, I will accept the system's verdict as correct.

--Christofurio 01:32, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

I understand and generally agree with this. However, you're not really advocating capitalism. Capitalism means more than just a market economy, it means a specific set of property rules as well. If you're open to the idea that those rules might be rejected if subject to competition in a free market, then why call yourself a capitalist? I believe the semantics of this are important, as mislabeling yourself will tend to put you at odds with those who are otherwise in agreement with you ("violent agreement", as I like to call it). Chris Acheson 16:58, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Just for reference sake, here is the modern definition of capitalism from Merriam-Webster Third International Unabridged Dictionary: ":an economic system characterized by private or corporation ownership of capital goods, by investments that are determined by private decision rather than by state control, and by prices, production, and the distribution of goods that are determined mainly in a free market." (An anarcho-capitalist would take out the word "mainly" for his extreme version of capitalism). RJII

Dictionary definitions aren't all that helpful to us here. They are meant to gain a basic understanding of how words are commonly used, not as an authoritative source which covers theoretical definitions in minute detail. Chris Acheson 18:30, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

I think they're very helpful. That dictionary definition of capitalism is the one most commonly used among us "educated" people. Capitalism is by definition a laissez-faire system. I'm not going to use some antiquated definition. Ever taken a look at the definition from 19th century dictionaries? It didn't use to refer to an economic system. It just referred to a concentration of capital. What we call capitalism today is what used to be referred to as laissez-faire or liberalism. RJII 19:09, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

If we're able to differentiate between mutualism and capitalism, for example, we're past the point where dictionary definitions are useful. Would you say that mutualists are capitalists, simply because the dictionary definition for "capitalism" could apply to them as well? Chris Acheson 19:23, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

No, mutualists are not capitalists. I'm just noting that capitalism is by definition a laissez-faire system. Mutualists support laissez-faire. The difference lies in the fact that mutualists think in a laissez-faire system that the ability to profit would disappear. They think that government intervention is preventing the labor theory of value being followed as the natural result of laissez-faire. Anarcho-capitalists, on the other hand, as far as I know don't think profit would disappear in a laissez-faire system -nor do they have any inclination to be weary of profit since they think value is relative to the observer. RJII 19:32, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

You're oversimplifying the mutualist position. Regardless, you admit that when a mutualist says that he is opposed to capitalism, the dictionary definition is insufficient for gaining an understanding of what he means by "capitalism", correct? Chris Acheson 16:01, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Isn't it obvious that's what I've been saying? Someone in the far past saying they opposed capitalism, isn't the same thing as someone today saying they oppose capitalism (as long as they use the modern common definition --laissez-faire). As Larry Gambone, a contemporary labor-value individualist points out, by "capitalists" the old individualist anarchists were referring to "those who had gained wealth from the use of governmental power or from privileges granted by government." If you define capitalism by that obsolete definition, then anarcho-capitalists also opppose capitalism. RJII 15:01, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

And what of modern mutualists and other individualists who say that they oppose capitalism? Would you say that Kevin Carson, with his "free market anti-capitalism", is actually a capitalist? Chris Acheson 15:20, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

Didn't I just say above that "mutualists are not capitalists"? Like anarcho-capitalists they support laissez-faire, but unlike anarcho-capitalists they think profit is exploitative. And, the mutualists think profit would be rendered nearly impossible in a laissez-faire system. It's funny you bring up Carson, because he's known for making the argument that anarcho-capitalism would collapse into a profitless economic system. Or, in other words, given that he uses the old definition of capitalism (which is unfortunate because it makes contemporary communication unnecessarily confusing), he says that capitalism would be impossible in laissez-faire. "..."no system of exploitation, including capitalism, has ever been created by the action of a free market." For Carson, capitalism is by definition a "system of privilege." [2] RJII 15:34, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

So then my point still stands. The dictionary definition of capitalism is not useful to us. We agree that mutualists (both contemporary and historical) are not capitalists, yet by the dictionary definition of capitalism, they are. It mentions nothing about profit or anything else that would distinguish mutualists from capitalists. Chris Acheson 17:03, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

It's useful to know that when someone using the common modern definition says they favor capitalism, they aren't saying that they favor state control over anything. Like I said, I was providing the dictionary definition for "reference" --to forestall any unnecessary miscommunication. Let's face it --most people don't know what "capitalism" means. It means economic anarchy --the seperation of state and economy where prices and other economic decisions are determined in a free market. Hence, a profitless economy can exist under the umbrella of capitalism for anyone that desires to engage in it. RJII 18:55, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

Chris, I'm glad that you "generally agree" with my observations. As to why I call myself a capitalist ... it is in part as RJ indicates a compliance with dictionary understandings. Also, it is in part a matter of prediction and (in a third and final part -- remembering Caesar's description of Greater Gaul!) it is in part a declaration of sympathies. As to prediction ... my own view is that when my desideratum arrives and the state (in Weber's sense) disappears, it will have been the profit motive and the structures of transferable equity that will have to be credited with producing that great day.

Those structures of transferable equity are imoportant. Finance capitalism and all that. Not really enthusiasms of the mutualists. But this bribngs me to the question of sympathies, and I call myself a capitalist as a way of standing with the kulaks of every age and place against their liquidators or would-be liquidators. You can call me anything else you like, of course. Your labelling isn't my concern. But I offer my views in answer to the question whether it would be fair to classify those of us who call ourselves (with or without your permission) anarcho-caps, as philosophical egoists. It isn't fair; it is extremely misleading. --Christofurio 19:41, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

In calling yourself a capitalist, the kulaks are not the only ones you are standing with. You are also declaring sympathy (intentionally or otherwise) for the oppressors of our age, the authoritarian capitalists, mercantilists, and neoliberal imperialists. I don't call myself a socialist for this very reason -- because the meaning of the word has been abused to the point of uselessness, and because it associates me with my enemies. Granted, you don't need anyone's permission to adopt a label. I don't need anyone's permission to criticize, either. Chris Acheson 16:29, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Ah, until now you weren't criticizing. You were simply asking for explanation. I'm happy that I appear to have provided the latter to your satisfaction so you could move on to the former! As to the criticism, you're entitled to think what you wish of my unintended sympathies. --Christofurio 16:52, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Criticism in the form of questioning tends to be more effective, as it's less likely to trigger thought-stopping techniques (such as the "la la la I don't care" strategy that you are now employing). Chris Acheson 17:13, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

You mean the strategy of honesty? I hope to continue employing that one to my dying day. You seem to acknowledge that I have answered your questions fully, and you seem to have no more to ask. When you do, I'll be easy to find. Christofurio 19:40, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Proudhon's Anti-Capitalism

Proudhon was not an "Anti-collectivist"... Proudhon opposed authoritarians such as Jacobins and corporate robber-barrons. Proudhon was most definatly a socialist, and the definittion of communist you are using is always the bait-and-switch cold war version (in which all communists are described as authoritarian with no anti-authroitarian counterpart that preceeded them.)

Not true. Proudhon was an individualist. He supported private property (individual ownership of the produce of labor) and opposed communism vehmently. That's why Dejacque admonished him in a letter, saying: "it is not the product of his or her labor that the worker has a right to, but to the satisfaction of his or her needs, whatever may be their nature." Anyone who thinks Proudhon was a collectivist really has no clue. RJII 01:14, 18 December 2005 (UTC)

There is simply no way Proudhon was an "individualist market (code word for capitalist) anarchist". Proudhon was a socialist individualist (unlike the capitalist individualists you like to add innapropriately to the Anarchism entry) and the "property" he spoke of was personal posessions, and possesions for individual use. He in no way supported capitalism: ownership of property used by workers to produce goods and profits but not owned by them, the blatent exploitation of workers, capitalist "contracts", the concentration of wealth, and most importantly the use of the state to defend private property (police or the military) from being expropriated by the starving, by the poor, by underprivileged minorities, slaves, sharecroppers, indentured servants, or native/indiginous people kicked off their land.

You really have a lot to learn. The individualist anarchists called themselves "socialists," but by that they didn't mean socialized or collectivized property as it means today. As Benjamin Tucker said of Proudon (whose philosophy he was thoroughly acquainted with, as he translated his works), "Just as the idea of taking capital away from individuals and giving it to the government started Marx in a path which ends in making the government everything and the individual nothing, so the idea of taking capital away from government-protected monopolies and putting it within easy reach of all individuals started Warren and Proudhon in a path which ends in making the individual everything and the government nothing....though opposed to socializing the ownership of capital, they aimed nevertheless to socialize its effects by making its use beneficial to all instead of a means of impoverishing the many to enrich the few." Why are you arguing that Proudhon didn't support capitalism? No one is claiming that he did. He supported the produce of labor as individual property, as well as man-mad means of production as individual property, supported money, and supported trade. Though those things are found in capitalism, that alone isn't sufficient for capitalism (unless you think capitalism is a non-profit system). Proudhon was mutualist --the economic system supported by individualist anarchists. Read up on it. Mutualism is not the same as capitalism', thought it has many similarities, it also has essential differences. RJII 01:14, 18 December 2005 (UTC)

RJ11, you seem to want to control the whole entry and put your right-wing pro-capitalist spin on everything. You selectivly use quotes and bend sentances to make it seem like all individualists supported capitalism, when they did not.. and you have added a host of statists (like Bastiat, Ayn Rand, Bryan Caplan) to the page, calling them "minarchists"... if they were minarchists, then certainly socialists like Albert Einstein or George Orwell belong here too, because they were most certainly minarchists who happaned to oppose capitalism. Radical Mallard Sat Dec 17 12:06:09 EST 2005

You don't know what you're talking about. I never entered anything about Bastiat, Ayn Rand, or Bryan Caplan in the article. Bastiat is mentioned in the mass of text you deleted from the Prouhon section, but I didn't put it in. RJII 01:14, 18 December 2005 (UTC)

Radical Mallard (and Max_rspct), why are you deleting the description of Proudon's philosophy. You said in your edit summary that it makes him look like a capitalist. What does it matter what it makes him look like? His philosophy is what it is. He wasn't a capitalist --he opposed profit. And, he wasn't a communist --he opposed collective ownership, supported private property (individual property), money, and trade. He opposed title to unused or unoccupied land (which he called "property" early on). He was an individualist market anarchist -of course there is some resemblance to capitalism. RJII 21:56, 16 December 2005 (UTC)

Books

Some editors are in obvious disagreement as to which book references should be added. Lets discuss that here. TastemyHouse Breathe, Breathe in the air 23:43, 17 December 2005 (UTC)

Adding books doesn't seem to be the problem. Deleting books is. Hogeye 00:19, 18 December 2005 (UTC)

You know, I doubt anyone is going to read any books anyway (maybe one person in a blue moon). I think that the great majority of editors get all their information (and bias) the easy way --by skimming FAQ's. I wouldn't worry about it either way. Like someone is going to see a book listed and go out and buy it and read it? I can't see that happening. RJII 01:44, 18 December 2005 (UTC)

Hey, man, welcome to the 21st century! Most of those anarcho-capitalist book links go to the online version of the book. There's a few anarcho-socialist books, but the capitalists are clearly better at creating an online gift economy of the classic books. (This is a challenge to you other anarchists to link in your books.) Hogeye 06:43, 18 December 2005 (UTC)

Have you checked Spunk Library? // Liftarn

Link them in, dude! Hogeye 22:14, 18 December 2005 (UTC)

All of them? That would be silly. // Liftarn

I think that here is the place for books written by anarchists, not whole bibliography about anarchism. But if anarchocapitalists still want to put here their version, I can paste here my bibliography of a few hunred or so books about anarchism in many languages. --XaViER 16:22, 18 December 2005 (UTC)

It's an article about anarchism; the books should be about anarchism. You are welcome to add more books, especially if they are available online. Hogeye 17:24, 18 December 2005 (UTC)

Why not simply move the ancap booklist to the appropiate article? // Liftarn

Why not simply move the ansoc booklist to the appropiate article? Answer: Because it is appropriate to have a list of anarchist books in the anarchist article. Hogeye 22:13, 18 December 2005 (UTC)

Because this is the article about mainstream anarchism, not a small fringe group thus the books should be relevant to general anarchism. // Liftarn

I agree, but (50 or so) ancaps think that THEY are mainstream. Put here not only Spencer or Friedman, but Augusto Pinochet too, 'cos he defended freedom, as one an-cap said me once. --XaViER 15:51, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Remember you're on the internet. Anarcho-capitalism is very mainstream among people on the internet. The internet has always been notorious for the large population of libertarians (the capitalist kind). Ever since the early years the internet has had a way larger proportion of libertarians than in the general population. So that's just something you have to contend with on on the internet. Wikipedia was even started by a libertarian. There is no way escaping the barrage of libertarians if you're on the net. PlayersPlace 22:54, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Anarchism Tree v02

File:AnarchismTree02.jpg

Comments? Hogeye 00:01, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Looking pretty good on the individualism side. I wonder who influenced Bakunin in bringing him to differ from Proudhon by advocating collective ownership of the means of production. I read that Bakunin said that he was a Marxist economically but not politically (he did translate Marx's Das Kapital). Maybe Marx was his influence on that then. I guess you only want to include anarchists in the chart though? Too bad we can't have a Wikipedia flow chart article that everyone could work on. (Someone needs to design a Wiki like that. They could call it "Wikichart"). RJII 00:53, 19 December 2005 (UTC) You could put Spooner in there. I don't know how much he influenced Tucker since he worked independenly from Tucker and the other individualists until late in life (Tucker did become familiar with his writings though and used some of his arguments), but he had influence on the anarcho-capitalists. I think Spooner had the same influences as Warren --Thomas Jefferson and the classical liberals. Greene was also a pretty significant influence on Tucker. This all depends on how detailed you want to get. RJII 01:22, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

"In the meantime Bakunin, militant democrat in 1849, had become so impressed with the movement of the workers that he had swung violently to the Left. In 1864 he was in Italy preaching materialism, popular revolution, and free communes, and organizing his "International Brotherhood." By 1868 this had expanded into an International Alliance of Social Democracy, and in 1869, after winning influence in Italy, Spain, and Portugal, he applied for admission into the First International. It was then that Bakunin averred in his letters that he had become a Marxist, but a Marxist in "economics" and not in "politics." (Collectivist-Anarchism). RJII 02:23, 19 December 2005 (UTC) "We know that he had been influenced by the same philosophic currents which had influenced Marx and Engels." [3] RJII 02:39, 19 December 2005 (UTC) But alas, "Bakunin formulated no coherent body of doctrine" (Encyclopedia Britannica) RJII 02:59, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

It´s still an inexcactly chart, ancap is more related (words, terms, labels, institutions, economics, philosophy) to Gustave Molinari than to Benjamin Tucker

Wendy McElroy described Rothbard's influences like this:

In forty-five years of scholarship and activism, Rothbard produced over two dozen books and thousands of articles that made sense of the world from a radical individualist perspective. In doing so, it is no exaggeration to say that Rothbard created the modern libertarian movement. Specifically, he refined and fused together:

• natural law theory, using a basic Aristotelian or Randian approach;
• the radical civil libertarianism of 19^th century individualist-anarchists, especially Lysander Spooner and Benjamin Tucker;
• the free market philosophy of Austrian economists, in particular Ludwig von Mises, into which he incorporated sweeping economic histories; and,
• the foreign policy of the American Old Right – that is, isolationism.

Murray N. Rothbard: Mr. Libertarian

Hogeye 02:00, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

I'd say he also incorporated the labor-value individualist anarchists' labor theory of property as well (the natural law individualists such as Spooner). For Rothbard, property can only be acquired through mixing labor with unowned resources, trade, or gift. RJII 02:11, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

I think this is supposed to be a chart of influence, more than what kind of anarchism is like another kind. The modern narcho-capitalists were influenced by the labor-value individualists (though they differed on theories of value). RJII 01:18, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Molinari was an anarchist?Bengalski 10:14, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Definitely. Hogeye 15:43, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

:: Yeah. And Lenin, and of course Spencer and Burke were anarchists too. BTW, what if I'm anticapitalist-stirnerist? This is very biased diagram, as almost everything what you are putting here. I think that you didn't read half of these books. BTW, do you know that Lenin said: lie, lie constantly, and this will become truth (no, it wasn't Goebels first). You have very good teacher. I'm tired of you and your capitalist-bolshevik crusade and manipulations here. And this is exactly what you want, I think. --XaViER 16:06, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Molinari, and collective goods

You sure Hogeye? In Molinari's wikipedia article he is described as a laissez-faire liberal, and that seems a pretty accurate representation of what he writes in "The Society of Tomorrow". (Apart from guru Rothbard saying that he would have balked at the name anarchist.)

I haven't studied this in great depth, but briefly read part 2 chaps 3-6 where he is setting out his idea of a future desirable system of govt he calls 'the state of peace'. I don't see anything here advocating abolition of government or the state (anarchism under your definition). He seems more like a minarchist - arguing that the state should be scaled back to certain essential roles.

"Nations must either succumb and perish, or there must be a general agreement to replace the present system of expansion by one which will reduce the attributions of the State. Government must confine itself to the naturally collective functions of providing external and internal security. These services, the sphere of government proper, connect with those which attach to provincial and local systems." (last para part 2 chapter 5).

I suppose a large part of his influence on narchocapitalism comes from his idea that some of these defence functions can be contracted out to privately owned companies. But he isn't advocating your PDAs here - these defence contractors are still state-granted monopolies only ones which are sub-contracted rather than directly managed. Just like modern states bid out contracts to run prison services, security services, and in some cases even national defence (see chap 6 on this) - without ever being accused of anarchism.

This brings me back to the earlier discussion we had about PDAs. I think we left it with your contention that the main defence against PDAs becoming monopolies (hence de facto states, and coercive powers) is something like the natural forces of competition. This is something I've heard from other right-libertarians - there seems to be a strong belief that monopolies (or more broadly, oligopolies) don't occur naturally in free markets (without 'artificial' action by governments), or only very rarely.

This is an interesting question but I think basically an empirical one - although we need theory to help sort out how we look at the evidence. The mainstream economic 'theory of the firm' now says the number of suppliers in any market is pretty much determined by the size of entry costs. Roughly - the more firms supplying, the more prices and profits are bid down. If you have entry costs, the first firms to enter will gain from paying entry costs, as available profits compensate. As number of entrants increase, profits are bid down to a point where it is no longer economical for more firms to pay start-up costs: thus a limit to the number of entrants.

These costs can be 'artificially' set by government, but they can also be 'natural'. Typical examples of natural oligopolies are things like extraction of oil and other minerals, or utilities like water, gas, electricity etc. which need expensive distribution networks and hardware.

But there are also less tangible 'collective goods' like security services. One reason is because public goods in general pose a 'collective action' problem - in basic terms, usually either a free rider and/or 'assurance game' problem. Roughly - free rider problems apply to public goods which are non-excludable. That is: if the good (eg. security, the 'rule of law') is supplied, I benefit whether or not I've individually paid for it. Thus I might as well free ride - get the benefit from a crime free environment, and not pay my taxes.

But note there are also collective action problems even for theoretically excludable public goods like your PDA-provided security (if they only protect people who pay in). That is: there is a fixed ('entry') cost to set up the system in the first place. This cost is too great to be met by any one individual - only a number of individuals together can afford it. The 'assurance game' problem is where it seems to be in no one's interest to go first and pay their share because they can't be sure enough others will contribute.

Classic conclusions to such collective action problems are then: that public goods are much more likely to be provided when there are fewer individuals/firms/entities needed to contribute (it's easier to get agreement amongst ten than a thousand); when there are one or a few big, rich agents who can meet the cost - eg. a corporation with a lot of capital already, or a state. (Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action is the classic text.)

Anyway, it seems to me there's a broad correlation between beliefs about how commonly 'natural' oligopolies occur and certain kinds of political views. Keynesian economists, and perhaps left-leaning economists in general, think they are very common. Right-libertarians (includin ancaps) think they are basically non-existent. Mainstream neoclasical economists are in the middle. (My view is I think they are common, and I think it is a major challenge to anarchism to show how they can be overcome by non-hierarchical collective action.)

Molinari seems to have a position pretty much in line with some right-wing neoclassicals I've come across. He does think there are "naturally collective" goods and services, and that they need state intervention - even if that only means paying for them, not directly managing them. But he thinks there are less such collective goods than is commonly accepted - even for his day.Bengalski 21:49, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

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Bengalski> "In Molinari's wikipedia article he is described as a laissez-faire liberal."

This is accurate. He was a radical laissez-faire liberal, which is a type of anarchist. The logic of laissez-faire leads to anarchism; the laissez-fairist reaches the logical conclusion that all services should be done by market rather than coercion.

This is a dubious kind of backwards reasoning. The fact is that 19th century laissez-faire liberals didn't reach the conclusion you see as logical. Many anarchists may maintain that anarchism is the only logically consistent socialist philosophy, but that does not mean that all socialists have been anarchists. Or, for example, you might maintain that logically consistent catholics would obey Humanae Vitae on birth control - but I've met plenty of catholics who don't. There are one or possibly two false clauses in this kind of argument: human beings are not necessarily logically consistent, and so classifying thinkers into groupings should not require logical consistency; and you may just be wrong about what the logical conslusion is.80.102.32.21 13:00, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Bengalski> "I don't see anything here advocating abolition of government or the state (anarchism under your definition)."

Molinari's most radical writings were 50 years earlier. Check out "The Production of Security" and "Soirées on the Rue Saint-Lazare." Like many, from Roger Williams to Pierre Proudhon, he got less radical in his old age.

I'll do that.80.102.32.21 13:00, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Okay I read 'Production of Security' - you're right, that is much more radical than Society of Tomorrow, and advocates what could be your PDAs. To quote guru Rothbard: Unfortunately, in his only work to be translated into English, La Societé Future (The Society of Tomorrow, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904), Molinari had partially retreated to an advocacy of a single monopoly private defense and protection company, rather than allowing free competition.Bengalski 18:41, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Nevertheless, as I read it Molinari still advocated anarchism in "The Society of Tomorrow." Maybe the terminology is throwing you - Molinari (like e.g. Jefferson and Nock) made a distinction between "government" and "state." They used "government" to mean governance in a general (non-statist) sense - pretty much like we might use the term "PDA." The way I read "Society of Tomorrow," Molinari is calling for local PDAs with a loose confederation (similar to Proudhon's and anarcho-syndicalist notions of confederation.)

The following paragraph clearly calls for (what we call) PDAs:

Society of Tomorrow - II.6.3 "The sovereignty of the individual will—to conclude—be the basis of the political system of the future community. This sovereignty no longer belongs to the associated owners of a territory and its inhabitants, slave or subject; nor to an idealised entity inheriting from the political establishment of its predecessor, and invested with his unrestricted claims upon the life and property of the individual. It will belong to the individual himself, no more a subject but proper master and sovereign of his person, free to labour, to exchange the products of his labour; to lend, give, devise, do all things as his will directs him. He will dispose, as he pleases, of the forces and materials which minister to his physical, intellectual, and moral needs. But the very nature of certain of these needs—so essential is security to the human race—cannot be satisfied by individual action. Individual consumers of security must therefore associate to produce this service in an efficient and economical manner. Their association will treat, through agents and in market overt, with an undertaker—be it a "firm" or "company"—possessing the capital and knowledge necessary for the production of this service of assurance. Like any other system of insurance, that of individual life, liberty, and property, is subject to two conditions. The first condition is one of price; a premium must be paid, equal in amount to the costs of production plus a profit. The second condition is technical. The party ensured must submit to such obligations as are indispensable to producing the service assured. These conditions are matter for bargain between agents of the associated consumers and those of the company undertaking risks of the particular class, and a contract, terminable as it may suit the parties to agree, will embody the conditions when arranged."

He calls for the end of the state ("This sovereignty no longer belongs to the associated owners of a territory and its inhabitants, slave or subject; nor to an idealised entity inheriting from the political establishment of its predecessor, and invested with his unrestricted claims upon the life and property of the individual."), freedom for the individual ("It will belong to the individual himself, no more a subject but proper master and sovereign of his person, free to labour, to exchange the products of his labour; to lend, give, devise, do all things as his will directs him."), and security to be provided by voluntary associations, in which the individual can opt out ("Individual consumers of security must therefore associate to produce this service in an efficient and economical manner. ... These conditions are matter for bargain between agents of the associated consumers and those of the company undertaking risks of the particular class, and a contract, terminable as it may suit the parties to agree, will embody the conditions when arranged.".) That's anarchism by the standard dictionary definition (as statelessness).

Bengalski> "But he isn't advocating your PDAs here - these defence contractors are still state-granted monopolies only ones which are sub-contracted rather than directly managed."

Where do you get this idea??? There is absolutely nothing in chapter six (or the book) which advocates state-granted monopolies. Molinari specifically says the opposite in the paragraph above. And what is the following but a definition of PDA: "Their association will treat, through agents and in market overt, with an undertaker—be it a "firm" or "company"—possessing the capital and knowledge necessary for the production of this service of assurance. Like any other system of insurance, that of individual life, liberty, and property, is subject to two conditions. The first condition is one of price; a premium must be paid, equal in amount to the costs of production plus a profit. The second condition is technical. The party ensured must submit to such obligations as are indispensable to producing the service assured." Molinari was about a century ahead of the Tannahills!

Perhaps this is a terminology problem. When Molinari writes "nation," he does not mean a state; he uses the term in its older common language and culture sense. Also somewhat confusing (unless you'd read the whole book) is Molinari's support for (what we would now call) collective security - he anticipated something like the League of Nations or UN - except with nations rather than states. His "State of War" refers to the past; when barbarian hoards might overrun a nation. He sees the state as justified in ancient times, but believes that the danger of barbarian invasion is over, and with his collective security idea, there is no longer a rational excuse for the existence of a state. The "state of war" is over; now is time for a stateless "state of peace."

This is just wrong - he does in fact use the term state, as well as government and nation, to refer to entities existing in the state of peace. Eg. in 2.1.10 the state of peace is not 'stateless' but described as a confederation of states:

Whether the tie were one of compulsion or founded on a voluntary basis, an association of all the States of Europe, with the States of other quarters of the globe, must command superior powers to those of any member of the confederacy. Such a confederacy could compel any member to submit all quarrels to some form of systematic arbitration, and the verdicts of such a tribunal would be sanctioned by irresistible force. Disarmament would then follow as inevitably as the feudal lords abolished their private armies when confronted with an Emperor, chief, or King invested with the exercise of sovereign power and controlling the entire forces of the nation. Each State would reduce its armaments to the exact point necessary to enable it to fulfil their remaining purpose—to fulfil the duties of a guarantor of the common security against attack by peoples still outside civilisation. The proportion of these nations is so small that the force necessary for this task could be reduced within limits similar to those of the apparatus maintaining the internal security of States, since the right of individual justice has been superseded by a system of State-justice vested in an authority emanating from the national entity.

So what we have are minimised states with greatly reduced powers and budgets: as in "there must be a general agreement to replace the present system of expansion by one which will reduce the attributions of the State." Reduce, but not abolish.

And note even in chap 2 when he is talking about 'free constitution of nationality', this is not taken to mean the abolition of states:

A collective guarantee of peace would destroy this subservience to the State of War—a bondage which has appeared peculiarly intolerable since the case of Alsace-Lorraine. Such a guarantee would protect all States from aggression. Large or small, their integrity would be supported by a power superior to that of the most powerful partner, while every constituent part of a State would be free to vary its nationality at will or convenience. Secession could not menace the security of the remainder of a State, and could not therefore be opposed.

Terminology aside, look at what his 'national association' model of state actually involves . First - it is always referred to in the singular: there is no sign of competing PDAs. Parts of nations could secede (there is no sign of individual secession) and form new states with smaller territories, but within these territories there is just one security system. The national association thus seems to have a monopoly on (sub-contracted) violence - just like a Weberian 'state'.

Secondly, the national association state taxes citizens. When he writes against 'imposts' this is not to deny taxation per se - what he is denying is the state's right to unlimited demands on its citizens. (The "unrestricted claims upon the life and property of the individual" in your quote from chap 6 - but not all claims.) I.e., under the state of war states could justify varying and potentially unlimited demands to pay for the costs of war. In the new state of peace this is not the case - there is a definite, and he believes small, cost to maintain the minimum security force needed. (See chap 3):

Under the new order, the charges and services which the requirements of national security demand of the individual, will cease to be uncertain or contingent. They will become capable of valuation and a permanent assessment since they are. Specifically, you will need 100,000 men to maintain the frontiers of the civilised world against all attacks.

But individuals will not be able to escape the duty to pay this reduced cost:

The first duty of government is to ensure internal and external security to nation and citizen alike. Services proper to it differ essentially from those of the private association for they are naturally collective. Armies secure an entire nation from external aggression, and a police force exists for the equal benefit of all who inhabit the district which it serves. It is therefore no less necessary than just that all consumers of these naturally collective services should contribute to their cost in proportion to the service rendered and the benefit received. The failure of one consumer to bear his quota of the costs of such production reacts on the entire community, who are compelled to bear a proportion of his defalcations over and above their own contribution.

He sums up then:

The substitution of a collective guarantee of peace for the individual action of each State must, consequently, restrict the number of functions, which are the natural and essential duty of government, to:— A share in the common defensive apparatus protecting the association from external aggression; A share in the machinery which guarantees internal peace within the association; The provision of internal security within its own State, and the further performance of those services which are naturally and essentially collective.

This is not anarchism in any shape or form. It is classic laissez-faire reductionism of the state, but not anti-statism. I guess Molinari just didn't follow his thinking to its logical conclusion.80.102.32.21 13:00, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Bengalski> "We left it with your contention that the main defence against PDAs becoming monopolies (hence de facto states, and coercive powers) is something like the natural forces of competition."

Yes, along with some other reasons, such as prevailing ideology. History shows that anarchist societies are quite resistent to allowing new states to emerge. It appears that statism and anarchism are both stable equilibria, like driving on the right or left side of the road. David Friedman writes about "the discipline of repeated dealings. A firm that reneges on its arbitration agreement when the decision goes against it will find other firms unwilling to contract with it for arbitration. Violent conflict is more expensive and risky than arbitration, so a firm that can only enforce its clients' rights by violence is at a severe market disadvantage compared to firms that abide by mutual arbitration agreements." - "Do We Need Government?" in the latest issue of Liberty (Dec. 2005).

Bengalski> "There seems to be a strong belief that monopolies (or more broadly, oligopolies) don't occur naturally in free markets (without 'artificial' action by governments), or only very rarely."

Right. Clearly PDAs are less likely to become monopolies than statist provision of security. Without a state there will be human attempts to provide security, since security is a positive value to almost all humans. So no matter how likely or unlikely PDAs are to become a monopoly, it beats the hell out of a state. Again, I emphasize, anarcho-capitalists don't need to show that voluntary organization of self-defense is perfect ("nirvana is not an option"), only that it beats the state and other alternatives. I don't see what alternative you are offering for comparison.

My contention is that PDAs will become monopolies - therefore they will simply become states. We can discuss this further if you like. Basically two reasons: 1) I think there are probably many 'natural' factors which make it much easier to organise security forces as territorial monopolies, and market forces try to find the least costly route. 2) I think the history of conflict - whether between families, tribes, states, street gangs or whatever - suggests organised forces aren't averse to bloody violence and power-seeking in place of negotiation.80.102.32.21 13:00, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Bengalski> "The mainstream economic 'theory of the firm' now says the number of suppliers in any market is pretty much determined by the size of entry costs. Roughly - the more firms supplying, the more prices and profits are bid down."

Yes, we agree here, and so does David Friedman in his article. He writes

"Cartels are hard to maintain if there are many firms and easy entry to the industry. Thus one important issue will be how many agencies there are; the answer will depend upon economies of scale in the rights enforcement industry. ... If a firm with a third of the market can produce a better service at a lower cost than any smaller firm, we will end up with at most three firms - making a cartel agreement in favor of them and against us a likely outcome. If a firm of optimal size serves only one percent of the market, such an outcome is unlikely. So far as the ordinary business of rights enforcement is concerned, the evidence of existing police forces suggests that economies of scale do not go very far - big city forces do not seem to provide better services at lower cost than smaller forces, although that judgement is complicated by [several factors]..."

Bengalski> "Classic conclusions to such collective action problems are then: that public goods are much more likely to be provided when there are fewer individuals/firms/entities needed to contribute."

Right. This is why the market is better than the state - the state is worse at solving public goods problems than voluntary society, as illustrated by the fact that special interest groups (smaller with more concentrated benefits) beat the general public nearly every time in the "political market."

Actually most economists use this point as an argument that sometimes the state beats than the market: uncoordinated decision-making of many 'small' individuals cannot resolve the collective action problem needed to initiate provision; whereas one rich individual or coordinated interest group could afford to step in and provide the good. The state is effectively being seen as such a rich individual (though you could also have eg. a wealthy philanthropist, or a corporation with a large capital which then charged for the good.)

I don't think you can simply dismiss this pro-state argument: there certainly are plenty of examples where public goods were not provided by markets or voluntary society, and where government stepped in to start provision, with real welfare benefits. I think it is wrong to deny that. Anarchists need to demonstrate that free associations could do as well or better.

You need to be careful how you define a 'market' solution here. When a group of individuals associate together to create a new co-ordinated entity which can provide the good, this process of association is an extra-market activity.80.102.32.21 13:00, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Bengalski> "Anyway, it seems to me there's a broad correlation between beliefs about how commonly 'natural' oligopolies occur and certain kinds of political views."

Yes, but as mentioned, much of this is misguided since it often implies a comparison between, not two real alternatives, but with some disliked alternative and utopia.

Bengalski> "He [Molinari] does think there are "naturally collective" goods and services, and that they need state intervention - even if that only means paying for them, not directly managing them."

No, you are mistaken. You are apparently taking a comment (II.6.2, 2nd paragraph) about collective security (which he discusses in depth in part I) out of context, with a misunderstanding of how he uses "nation." To Molinari and all anarcho-capitalists, collective goods can and should be provided on a free market.

See above on his statism. For his belief that there are various naturally collective goods, not just security, there are numerous references - eg 2.6.4 "Similar contracts will supply other naturally collective needs, such as communications, public health, &c." Though yes they wouldn't all need state intervention.80.102.32.21 13:00, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Thanks for the intelligent discussion, Bengalski. If you can find it, I recommend you read that D. Friedman article. I found "Liberty" at a local Barnes & Nobel bookstore. Hogeye 19:00, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

"...a society of perfect freedom, a society disencumbered of every restriction, of every fetter, such as has never been seen in history..." (The Utopia of Liberty, Molinari) Sure sounds like anarchism to me. RJII 02:41, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Sounds like standard rhetoric of any political persuasion to me.80.102.32.21 13:00, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

"Anarchist terrorist" merge

It has been suggested that "Anarchist terrorist" be merged into this article. Shouldn't it be the other way around, as not to make this page too big? Kaliz 20:06, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Reducing the length of the text

Having considered how best to develop this page, I would strenuously argue that it would be better to have a short page with many links, whereby interested readers could access proper information about their interests rather than creating a third rate high school essay which then becomes a political football for different anarchist factions whose most shared characteristic is their sectarianism. Harrypotter 21:29, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

Proudhon again

RJ can we try and reach a consensus here on Proudhon rather than keep alternating our different versions on the page.

We can agree it seems on para one:

It is commonly held that it wasn't until Pierre-Joseph Proudhon published "What is Property?" in 1840 that the term "anarchist" was adopted as a self-description. It is for this reason that some claim Proudhon as the founder of modern anarchist theory.

and on para 3:

Proudhon's vision of anarchy, which he called mutualism (mutuellisme), involved an exchange economy where individuals and groups could trade the fruits of their labor by using labor-backed money (labor notes). The use of labor notes would insure that no one purchased a good with less of his own labor than the labor undertaken to produce the good he was purchasing. Hence, profit would be rendered impossible. Proudhon's ideas began to exert some influence within French working class movements, and his followers were active in the Revolution of 1848 in France.

(Though that sentence on labour notes could do with rewording I think.) The main disagreement is para 2, which sets out his ideas on property. Your version is:

In What is Property Proudhon answers with the famous accusation "Property is theft." In this work he opposed the institution of "property" (propriété) in the special sense of idle and occupied land and other natural resources bestowed and enforced by state privilege. Proudhon opposed the idea of an individual owning land that he was not using, as this would enable the owner to charge rent to others and thereby be paid without laboring. Besides opposing individual ownership of idle land, he opposed the idea of social ownership as well: "instead of inferring from this that property should be shared by all, I demand, as a measure of general security, its entire abolition." For Proudhon, individuals may rightfully "occupy and use" land, but not restrict others from using land or charge rent to use land that they are not themselves putting to use. As Proudhon also oppose community ownership, he also opposes the notion of requiring permission from the community for an individual to put idle land to use.

My version is:

In What is Property Proudhon answers with the famous accusation "Property is theft." In this work he opposed the institution of "property" (propriété) in the common sense where property conveys full rights of use and abuse. However, Proudhon supported what he called possession - property in the more limited sense of individual ownership of the produce of his labor. However, it should be noted that in later works Proudhon modified his ideas on property: in his Theory of Property he argues that property, in the full Roman Law sense he had previously opposed, is a necessary counterweight to the centralising force of the state.

As far as I can tell, he's just changing terminology rather than changing his basic philosophy on what may be owned and not owned. Do you have a source that shows he just just not choosing to use more common terminology? Also, if what you are saying is true, why should that be a "it must be noted" statement and not the other statement? If anything, a person's early ideas should be a "must be noted" remark. It makes little sense to pick early out ideas in the long course of developing a mature philosophy --a person always wants to be recognized for their latest philosophy that is the result of a lifetime of revisions. RJII 16:51, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

My main problems with your version: where does Proudhon (in What is Property) say he is arguing against property only 'in the special sense of idle and occupied land and other natural resources bestowed and enforced by state privilege'? Also why this heavy focus on land? Proudhon isn't talking only about land, so this is misleading.

"The proprietor may, if he chooses, allow his crops to rot under foot; sow his field with salt; milk his cows on the sand; change his vineyard into a desert, and use his vegetable-garden as a park" Obviously, he's talking about land. As far as the produce of labor, he believes in a right of an individual to have absolute dominion over these things (private property) just like the rest of the individualists (including anarcho-capitalists). RJII 01:55, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

In my view there are 4 key points we need to make about P:

- in WIP Proudhon opposes property per se - as commonly understood in the legal systems he knew (which he sometimes refers to explicitly as Roman Law)

- in WIP he distinguishes possession from property per se - this needs to be made clear

- we also need to make clear that his views did not always stay the same - in works other than WIP he used different terminology and changed his ideas, thus the later quotes you put in before and we discussed at length about property as counterweight to teh state etc.

- yes we also need to say that P opposed communism - tho I moved this dowm into 4th para to tie it in with the point about a later divergence in anarchist views on property

I think we need to make these points as succinctly as possible. Any more lengthy discussions - eg. discussions on unused land in particular, or debates with various non-anarchist economists - should be on the Proudhon page.

My changes to para 4 were to add a sentence about P's anti-communism, and to remove the reference to the Bastiat & Molinari debates. I don't see these as important here - if we're trying to keep this succinct, these should be discussed on the Proudhon page. Bastiat and Molinari were not anarchists, and outside of ancapism it is not commonly thought that these debates had much influence on anarchist ideas.Bengalski 11:22, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

Note - in the intro of chap 2 of WIP Proudhon defines his terms, sets out the distinction between propriété from possession, and indicates that he is going to defend possession and repudiate property. There is no mention here of the 'special sense' you talk about. As he says it, there are only two types of property: 1. Property pure and simple, the dominant and seigniorial power over a thing; or, as they term it, naked property. 2. Possession. His mission is to show that all arguments justifying first type are mistaken and indeed logically flawed (which is what he means by 'impossible' in chapter 4); and contrarily to defend type 2 (possession).

You can read Tucker's translation here [[4]]. Given the ongoing troubles we've had over this maybe it's morth me quoting the whole passage here.

CHAPTER II.

PROPERTY CONSIDERED AS A NATURAL RIGHT. — OCCUPATION AND CIVIL LAW AS EFFICIENT BASES OF PROPERTY. DEFINITIONS.

The Roman law defined property as the right to use and abuse one's own within the limits of the law — jus utendi et abutendi re sua, guatenus juris ratio patitur. A justification of the word abuse has been attempted, on the ground that it signifies, not senseless and immoral abuse, but only absolute domain. Vain distinction! invented as an excuse for property, and powerless against the frenzy of possession, which it neither prevents nor represses. The proprietor may, if he chooses, allow his crops to rot under foot; sow his field with salt; milk his cows on the sand; change his vineyard into a desert, and use his vegetable-garden as a park: do these things constitute abuse, or not? In the matter of property, use and abuse are necessarily indistinguishable.

According to the Declaration of Rights, published as a preface to the Constitution of '93, property is "the right to enjoy and dispose at will of one's goods, one's income, and the fruit of one's labor and industry."

Code Napoleon, article 544: "Property is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute manner, provided we do not overstep the limits prescribed by the laws and regulations."

These two definitions do not differ from that of the Roman law: all give the proprietor an absolute right over a thing; and as for the restriction imposed by the code, — provided we do not overstep the limits prescribed by the laws and regulations, — its object is not to limit property, but to prevent the domain of one proprietor from interfering with that of another. That is a confirmation of the principle, not a limitation of it.

There are different kinds of property: 1. Property pure and simple, the dominant and seigniorial power over a thing; or, as they term it, naked property. 2. Possession. "Possession," says Duranton, "is a matter of fact, not of right." Toullier: "Property is a right, a legal power; possession is a fact." The tenant, the farmer, the commandité, the usufructuary, are possessors; the owner who lets and lends for use, the heir who is to come into possession on the death of a usufructuary, are proprietors. If I may venture the comparison: a lover is a possessor, a husband is a proprietor.

This double definition of property — domain and possession — is of the highest importance; and it must be clearly understood, in order to comprehend what is to follow.

From the distinction between possession and property arise two sorts of rights: the jus in re, the right in a thing, the right by which I may reclaim the property which I have acquired, in whatever hands I find it; and the jus ad rem, the right to a thing, which gives me a claim to become a proprietor. Thus the right of the partners to a marriage over each other's person is the jus in re; that of two who are betrothed is only the jus ad rem. In the first, possession and property are united; the second includes only naked property. With me who, as a laborer, have a right to the possession of the products of Nature and my own industry, — and who, as a proletaire, enjoy none of them, — it is by virtue of the jus ad rem that I demand admittance to the jus in re.

This distinction between the jus in re and the jus ad rem is the basis of the famous distinction between possessoire and petitoire, — actual categories of jurisprudence, the whole of which is included within their vast boundaries. Petitoire refers to every thing relating to property; possessoire to that relating to possession. In writing this memoir against property, I bring against universal society an action petitoire : I prove that those who do not possess to-day are proprietors by the same title as those who do possess; but, instead of inferring therefrom that property should be shared by all, I demand, in the name of general security, its entire abolition. If I fail to win my case, there is nothing left for us (the proletarian class and myself) but to cut our throats: we can ask nothing more from the justice of nations; for, as the code of procedure (art 26) tells us in its energetic style, the plaintiff who has been non-suited in an action petitoire , is debarred thereby from bringing an action possessoire . If, on the contrary, I gain the case, we must then commence an action possessoire , that we may be reinstated in the enjoyment of the wealth of which we are deprived by property. I hope that we shall not be forced to that extremity; but these two actions cannot be prosecuted at once, such a course being prohibited by the same code of procedure.

Before going to the heart of the question, it will not be useless to offer a few preliminary remarks.

---

The question seems to be: Which of the following two alternatives is correct?

A. Proudhon opposed the institution of "property" (propriété) as resources bestowed and enforced by state privilege.

B. Proudhon opposed the institution of "property" (propriété) as full rights of use and abuse.

We all agree that Proudhon defines his terms thusly:

1. Property pure and simple, the dominant and seigniorial power over a thing; or, as they term it, naked property.

2. Possession.

Part of the difficulty in understanding Proudhon is his terminology. In modern usage, keeping in mind what Proudhon means by "possession," both of these are "property," i.e. both are types of property. To Duranton, who Proudhon quotes, "possession is a fact." But to Proudhon, that fact is not enough - he petitions for (what we would call) full legal ownership. "It is by virtue of the jus ad rem that I demand admittance to the jus in re," he says. Thus he favors possession property over "naked property."

What is the nature of this "naked property?" Proudhon does not define it in terms of use and abuse (although he does make fun of various authorities' declarations regarding such.) What makes "naked property" bad to Proudhon is its authoritarian basis. The key phrase in his definition is "dominant and seigniorial power."

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary

seignior - 1: a man of rank or authority; especially : the feudal lord of a manor

I conclude that alternative A is correct, and that B is incorrect. Proudhon's argument in chapter 2 above has nothing to do with use and abuse; on the contrary, use and abuse could occur in his possession property system. But I can see how someone might misunderstand Proudhon: he argued that the use and abuse idea could not justify (authoritarian naked) property. But his positive argument about what is property only appealed to possession.

Proudhon's argument is that possession, not authority, should be the basis of property. In this, he's not so different from John Locke, who contended that use was the basis of property. Hogeye 20:45, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

No. I think the easiest approach here is to stick to Proudhon's terms. (Yes it is rather confusing when he calls possession a type of property, but that approach is not taken up elsewhere in the book, where the two are clearly contrasted: eg. 2:3: "inasmuch as possession, in right, can never remain fixed, it is impossible, in fact, that it can ever become property.")

In the intro to chap 2 he is giving four definitions of property 'pure and simple' (or what he usually referes to simply as 'property'), and one of possession. He is not arguing against or ridiculing the three definitions he cites - from Roman Law, 1793 Constitution and Code Napoleon (except that he sees the distinction between use and abuse in Roman Law as unnecessary), and he continues to use these definitions throughout chapter 2. His own definition of 'naked property' is in line with the three cited: the point is that property means an absolute right to do whatever you want with a thing, to "use and abuse" it as you see fit. This is what is meant by 'seigneurial': the feudal seigneur had absolute rights over his estates and chattels. It has nothing whatever to do with the state.

It is this notion of absolute right over a thing that Proudhon is attacking throughout WIP. Possession or 'usufruct', which he allows, is a restricted right to use things within certain limits, and with responsibility to society as a whole (while not a communist, Proudhon is far from an individualist in this sense):

Now, this is the right of the usufructuary: he is responsible for the thing entrusted to him; he must use it in conformity with general utility, with a view to its preservation and development; he has no power to transform it, to diminish it, or to change its nature; he cannot so divide the usufruct that another shall perform the labor while he receives the product. In a word, the usufructuary is under the supervision of society, submitted to the condition of labor and the law of equality.

Thus is annihilated the Roman definition of property — the right of use and abuse — an immorality born of violence, the most monstrous pretension that the civil laws ever sanctioned. Man receives his usufruct from the hands of society, which alone is the permanent possessor. The individual passes away, society is deathless.(chap 2 section 3, towards the end.)

In summary:

1) property is always defined as an absolute right (of "use and abuse") over a thing.

2) possession is very specifically contrasted with this absolute right: "use and abuse" could not occur in a possession system.

3) the state never comes into it.

Bengalski.80.102.32.21 13:58, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Right, property is the right of absolute dominion over a thing (private property when it applies to individual dominion). He opposes property, both private and collective, for natural resources (like land). But, he supports a right of private property for the produce of labor. Since he believes labor is the only source of rightful property, and land itself was not produced by man, then it can't be property but by legal privelege granted by the state. But, of course he supports use and occupancy of land (which he calls "possession"). The distinction between possession and property, is that the latter, of course, entails ownership (absolute dominion). Ownership entails a right to dispose of a thing as one wishes, including requiring payment from others before you give them that thing (or a right to keep it to oneself). Buying and selling land itself is not consistent with Proudhon's mutualism, but buying and selling the produce of labor is --because the latter is property, and hence, entails that moral right. RJII 04:48, 23 December 2005 (UTC)

Wrong, again. Proudhon (in WIP) didn't support property (propriété) of anything: not land, not capital, not the produce of your own labour. He supported only possession. The entire book is written to demonstrate that the very concept of property, in all contexts, is unjust and stands in contradiction with other professed legal and social positions of proprietarian theorists. Chapter 3 specifially argues against, in great detail, your idea that "labour is the only source of rightful property." The first part of the chapter discusses land, but he soon moves on to show that property rights cannot be justified either for produced capital, or at the end even for consumption goods.

He 'proves' this by contradiction. That is, he sets up the proposition (in section 5) that "The laborer retains, even after he has received his wages, a natural right of property in the thing which he has produced.” He is here arguing against Comte, amongst others, who held that the labourer has no rights over his product other than what he's given in his wages. (After using this clause to show contradiction in the theories of Comte and others, he drops it and argues against it in section 8.)

At the end of section 5 he claims to have shown that this proposition leads to a number of conclusions, including that there can be no private property in capital: "3. That all accumulated capital being social property, no one can be its exclusive proprietor."

In sections 6 and 7 he argues that eveything is collectively produced by society as a whole through 'association'. He uses this to take the critique of property further and conclude - not only can there be no justified property of capital, but even what we might call 'human capital' can only be 'possessed'. I don't even have property of my own 'talent':

Just as the creation of every instrument of production is the result of collective force, so also are a man's talent and knowledge the product of universal intelligence and of general knowledge slowly accumulated by a number of masters, and through the aid of many inferior industries. When the physician has paid for his teachers, his books, his diplomas, and all the other items of his educational expenses, he has no more paid for his talent than the capitalist pays for his house and land when he gives his employees their wages. The man of talent has contributed to the production in himself of a useful instrument. He has, then, a share in its possession; he is not its proprietor. There exist side by side in him a free laborer and an accumulated social capital. As a laborer, he is charged with the use of an instrument, with the superintendence of a machine; namely, his capacity. As capital, he is not his own master; he uses himself, not for his own benefit, but for that of others.

As he sums up at the end of section 7:all capital, whether material or mental, being the result of collective labor, is, in consequence, collective property...

That leaves us with consumption goods - which he turns to in section 8. His argument is in two stages. First, the collective nature of production means that any individual producer can't have a claim to any more than his equal share of the total social product:

“Now, this undisputed and indisputable fact of the general participation in every species of product makes all individual productions common; so that every product, coming from the hands of the producer, is mortgaged in advance by society. The producer himself is entitled to only that portion of his product, which is expressed by a fraction whose denominator is equal to the number of individuals of which society is composed.

But then he goes even further and argues that even property, in fact even possession, of an equal 'share' isn't right:

It is true that in return this same producer has a share in all the products of others, so that he has a claim upon all, just as all have a claim upon him; but is it not clear that this reciprocity of mortgages, far from authorizing property, destroys even possession? The laborer is not even possessor of his product; scarcely has he finished it, when society claims it. "But," it will be answered, "even if that is so — even if the product does not belong to the producer — still society gives each laborer an equivalent for his product; and this equivalent, this salary, this reward, this allowance, becomes his property. Do you deny that this property is legitimate? And if the laborer, instead of consuming his entire wages, chooses to economize, — who dare question his right to do so?"

He does deny exactly that. The laborer is not even proprietor of the price of his labor, and cannot absolutely control its disposition. That is, there is not even property in his fair wage or share. Specifically, he has no right to sit on, hoard, accumulate the product of his labour - like in the discussion on land, he has only limited rights over his share in the social product.

Why's that? As I understand it, there are two arguments here (plus more in later chapters):

1) ‘We consume before we produce’. We have taken out from the common pool of human and physical capital in order to produce with our labour. We are thus always working 'in arrears'. Let us not be blinded by a spurious justice. That which is given the laborer in exchange for his product is not given him as a reward for past labor, but to provide for and secure future labor. We consume before we produce. The laborer may say at the end of the day, "I have paid yesterday's expenses; to-morrow I shall pay those of today." At every moment of his life, the member of society is in debt; he dies with the debt unpaid: — how is it possible for him to accumulate?

2) If all capital is collectively owned, as he argued before, then there can be no such thing as individual saving. They talk of economy — it is the proprietor's hobby. Under a system of equality, all economy which does not aim at subsequent reproduction or enjoyment is impossible — why? Because the thing saved, since it cannot be converted into capital, has no object, and is without a final cause. This will be explained more fully in the next chapter.

Bengalski 15:06, 3 January 2006 (UTC)

Anarcho-syndicalism

Anarcho-syndicalism needs only one section. It had two - one in history and a nearly identical one in Contemporary Anarchism. I deleted the latter. Hogeye 23:59, 20 December 2005 (UTC)

How were they nearly identical? Anarcho-syndicalism remains the most popular form of anarchist organisation (with tens of thousands of paid up members in Spain for instance), so it needs an entry in the contemporary part. I agree any duplication between the two sections should be deleted - as I have done before. Bengalski80.102.32.21 14:03, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Minarchism

This anarcho-capitalism... Is it not just a variety of minarchism ? Whats the difference? If Robert Nozick is cited as being within the minarchism field of thought... is it not the true inheritor (and only identifiable, notable, and contemporary) variety of right-wing libertarianism? I reckon that most neo-liberal conservatives (and many Gordon Gekkos) would idenitfy themselves with this. - max rspct leave a message 22:50, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

From the article on Michael Milken>> "Milken's supporters tend to be libertarian, and include such luminaries as Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman" (Friedman is associated with minarchism -check minarchism article) - max rspct leave a message 22:57, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

Minarchists are a subset of libertarians. They don't think defense of liberty and property can happen without taxation. They attempt to approximate pure libertarianism. Anarcho-capitalists are absolute libertarians. RJII 23:53, 21 December 2005 (UTC)

minarchism is more notable than anarcho-capitalism surely. a/c are pure libertarians??? u funny - max rspct leave a message 14:10, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

Minarchism is definitely more notable. Statism is a lot more notable than anarchism. Way more people support the existence of government than oppose it. RJII 14:56, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

Comment from article

Note: There is a disagreement amongst Wikipedia editors as to whether the term "anarchism" refers only to those movements which oppose capitalism, or to any movement that opposes the existence of the state regardless of the proposed economic system.[5]

Hakim Bey picture

As great a fan as I am of Hakim Bey (I've taught TAZ in a college course), it's unclear in the article what his picture is doing in there. The main article text doesn't place Bey anywhere, so the portrait just "floats". The fact he's listed in the references at bottom isn't really enough. If we are to keep Bey's picture in the text, we should really have at least a sentence about him within the article (presumably in the post-left section, though maybe the Pomo one... there's some sense to either). Lulu of the Lotus-Eaters 01:44, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

post left would make sense, and that's where the pic is anyways. funny that there isn't a pic of him in his article, but i'll go put it there. --Heah ^talk 02:33, 22 December 2005 (UTC)