Talk:Baconian method

I can't find the exact wording and stuff, but isn't this missing the most important part of Bacon's method? ie, the thing that actually makes it a form of the scienfic method? Specifically, the step I believe he called "return the hypothesis to nature." (ie, make a prediction from your hypothesis and then observe to see if it's actually consistent with nature... if not, revise your hypothesis and try again. Maybe I'm missing something, but isn't that the single most important part of the thing?)

The above paragraph isn't signed, so it's not possible to reply directly, but what you wrote is the opposite of what Bacon said. He advocated AGAINST making a prediction (a hypothesis) in advance of an experiment. That's the whole basis of the 500 year dispute between people like Bacon and Newton vs Descartes, Hume, Popper.Gacggt (talk) 07:28, 25 November 2011 (UTC)

Can you find a source which says Hume was in a "dispute" with Bacon and Newton about this?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:31, 27 November 2011 (UTC)

Yes, In "Treatise on Human Nature", Hume wrote (for example): 1739, David Hume wrote a Treatise of Human Nature, and

introduced “radical skepticism” - a rejection of probability derived from past experience as predicting the future.

“Your appeal to past experience decides nothing in the present case; and at the utmost can only prove, that that very object, which produced any other, was at that very instant endowed with such a power; but can never prove, that the same power must continuein the same object or collection of sensible qualities; much less, that a like power is always conjoined with like sensible qualities. Should it be said, that we have experience, that the same power continues united with the same object,and that like objects are endowed with like powers, I would renew my question, why from this experience we form any conclusion beyond those past instances, of which we have had experience.”

Thus rejecting Inductive reasoning. In contrast, Bacon advocated the opposite - that one should use the inductive method.

See also my peer reviewed published articles on this:

Cell. 2008 Aug 8;134(3):378-81. A brief history of the hypothesis. Glass DJ, Hall N.

and

Clin Chem. 2010 Jul;56(7):1080-5. Epub 2010 May 28. A critique of the hypothesis, and a defense of the question, as a framework for experimentation. Glass DJ.

Can you please provide a citation supporting your claim that Hume voiced support of Bacon??

Thanks, David Gacggt (talk) 22:49, 27 November 2011 (UTC) (David Glass)

Hi David, the citation does not clearly say anything about Bacon, nor about his proposed methods of conducting science. Both Hume and Bacon were sceptical about trying to come up with metaphysical explanations of what happens between two events such that one is a cause and one is an effect. Hume is well known for pointing out that one simply comes after the other, and we can never see anything more than that. But this does not mean Hume saw any alternative way of making predictions based on experience. He did not literally think that the sun would not come up each morning, he just said you can't prove it 100% based on induction, and induction is all we have according to him. Secondly, you are asking me for a citation which shows Hume said he was not in a dispute with Bacon about this matter, which of course would be an odd thing for him to have to say, unless it was something he was frequently accused of in his own lifetime. He did call himself a follower of Bacon but presumably that is not going to meet your requirements?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 07:22, 28 November 2011 (UTC)

I have a little more time, so a little more comment:-

• I did not address your peer reviewed citations. But in order to comment on them you should quote from them to tell me what they say? Anyway I think you should consider a bigger issue. When you deal with an author like David Hume, there will be literally thousands of peer reviewed sources. WP does not aim to use all of them, and many of them will be by people who are not Hume specialists, and not writing a work specifically about Hume, so these are sources which are likely to be ones we should not use, especially if they happen to disagree with more specialized literature.
• Concerning what Hume said about Bacon, I should perhaps mention that there is an online resource which makes it relatively easy to search for all his comments: http://oll.libertyfund.org/ . If you search for Hume as an author, you can then search within his works. But strangely it does not work for the Treatise, because his mention of Bacon there is a footnote attached. (See below.) Please note therefore that the full title is "A TREATISE OF Human Nature: BEING An Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into MORAL SUBJECTS", and this is how he explains it:-

There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz’d in the science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and observation. ’Tis no astonishing reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy to moral subjects should come after that to natural at the distance of above a whole century; since we find in fact, that there was about the same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and that reckoning from Thales to Socrates, the space of time is nearly equal to that betwixt my Lord Bacon1 and some late philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public. So true it is, that however other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in some other agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and philosophy can only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty. Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of man will do less honour to our native country than the former in natural philosophy, but ought rather to esteem it a greater glory, upon account of the greater importance of that science, as well as the necessity it lay under of such a reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its different circumstances and situations. And tho’ we must endeavour to render all our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest causes, ’tis still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and chimerical.

Let me know if this answers your questions or not.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 08:31, 28 November 2011 (UTC)

The issue is that the most lasting and central tenet of the Essay is Hume's rejection of inductive reasoning (captured in the quote that I posted previously). This was the thing which inspired Kant, and it is also the entire basis of Karl Popper's attempt to construct a scientific philosophy based on pure hypothesis falsification, as opposed to verification. In the articles I've cited, that I wrote, I also reference Kuhn and Nozick, who are professionals who came to the same conclusion - so this is not just me saying this. So yes, Hume also wrote that you should do experiments, but he then said you can't make conclusions about the future based on them. This claim represents a pure rejection of inductive reasoning, and is in direct opposition to Bacon and Newton. If you don't allow this to be put in the article, you're shielding readers from the biggest issue of contention in the history of the philosophy of experimentation over the last 500 years. Gacggt (talk) 15:02, 4 December 2011 (UTC)

WP is not really the place to be publishing contentious ideas. The quote you used does not support your contention in any straightforward way. (I am thinking you misunderstand Bacon, if you think this is obviously in conflict with him. That would not be unusual, as he is not widely read today. But Hume read him, and I quoted Hume above about how he saw the connection between his approach and Bacon's. Neither Hume nor Bacon believe in perfectly certain predictions, but both reject extreme scepticism, and actually this is a natural way of thinking if you believe all knowledge of nature comes from experience.) Furthermore you should really not be putting material into WP if you published it yourself, at least not without special discussion. See WP:COS. If you wish to report comments by Kuhn and Nozick about the Baconian method, that might be interesting, as long as the comments really mention Bacon or Baconian method.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 15:23, 4 December 2011 (UTC)

Andrew, the issue of Hume rejecting inductive reasoning is not what is contentious. The issue of whether or not inductive reasoning is acceptable is what is contentious. For example here is what Evan Heit wrote, in his article "Properties of Inductive Reasoning", PSYCHONOMIC BULLETIN & REVIEW Volume 7, Number 4, 569-592, "Perhaps the best known analysis from philosophy is Hume's (1748/ 1988) argument against the logical justification of induction. Hume argued that, unlike deductive inference, there is no basis for establishing the validity of a method for drawing inductive inferences." In contrast, you have this description of Bacon's philosophy, establishing it as a pillar of support for inductive reasoning, From John R. Platt, writing in Science in 1964 (Vol. 146, No. 3642. (Oct. 16, 1964), pp. 347-353.): "In its separate elements, strong inference is just the simple and old- fashioned method of inductive inference that goes back to Francis Bacon." This is just a fundamental fact: Bacon is the original proponent of inductive reasoning in science, whereas Hume is the opposite - the best known critic of this type of reasoning. Gacggt (talk) 20:23, 4 December 2011 (UTC)

And yet Hume said he was using Bacon's method. Let's keep in mind that this is an article about that method. What you inserted was a remark which contradicted Hume's own statement, saying they were in opposition, and also you put quotes around "inductive reasoning" implying that this term appears in Bacon when I think it does not? You did this in the lead, as a passing remark, as if it can be assumed to be an uncontroversial consensus. There are possibly more nuanced remarks which can be made if they are properly spelled out in the body of the text. Hume criticized people who thought induction leads to knowledge via anything more than simply expecting the same causes to lead to the same effects. Nothing he says about this actually directly conflicts with Bacon I think, but you are right that Bacon is associated with promoting "true induction" as a possible way to learn the truth of things, while Hume is associated with explaining why induction does not ever lead to certainty in the way syllogisms can, but nothing can when it comes to nature. Bacon also specifically distinguishes true induction from using syllogisms and logic, so your term "inductive reasoning" might be misleading. Bacon was of course defending the use of plain old experience and experiment, (which was considered too uncertain by philosophers before him), not a new kind of "reasoning". Bacon was writing against dogmatic Scholasticism. Hume was writing by his own account as a person bringing Baconianism to its next phase. I count the word "induction" once in his works? But the idea that syllogism and logic can not give certainty, and that experience and experiment are the best tools we have, is the same. Please do look at the quote above.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 20:51, 4 December 2011 (UTC) EDITED--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:16, 5 December 2011 (UTC)

A second attempt. Hume did not criticise induction. He hardly mentioned it by name. By his own account he criticized what he referred to as a recent trend amoungst philosophers to try to explain how experience works as some kind of way of perceiving the connections between causes and effects. His basic answer was, shockingly, that you can't really say much about it apart from the fact that it generally works and everyone does it. Bacon had not even addressed this question that I recall. He did use the word induction, but as mentioned above he specifically contrasted it with logic and syllogism. Also, as far as I recall he did not explain how experience and experiment actually work in order to create a reliable perception in the mind. He left it as something people just happen to know. As Hume says in the quote above, to complete the explanation required the more controversial second step of turning Bacon's approach to humanity itself, and for example the question of how people understand things.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:16, 5 December 2011 (UTC)

Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. SECTION IV.: sceptical doubts concerning the operations of the understanding

It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants—nay infants, nay even brute beasts—improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretence to refuse so equitable a demand. You cannot say that the argument is abstruse, and may possibly escape your enquiry; since you confess that it is obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner, give up the question, and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to appearance, similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar; since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle.

That quote just shows Hume was not consistent, which is true. He also contradicts himself in his essay on miracles, where he rejects some claims on the grounds that they violate natural law. Ironically, my position is supported in Wikipedia's own article on David Hume (which I did not write or edit, by the way). This seems to sum it up well (from that article)...

Induction The cornerstone of Hume's epistemology is the so-called Problem of Induction. This may be the area of Hume's thought where his skepticism about human powers of reason is most pronounced.[36] Understanding the problem of induction is central to grasping Hume's philosophical system. The problem concerns the explanation of how we are able to make inductive inferences. Inductive inference is reasoning from the observed behaviour of objects to their behaviour when unobserved; as Hume says, it is a question of how things behave when they go "beyond the present testimony of the senses, and the records of our memory".[37] Hume notices that we tend to believe that things behave in a regular manner; i.e., that patterns in the behaviour of objects will persist into the future, and throughout the unobserved present. This persistence of regularities is sometimes called Uniformitarianism or the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature. Hume's argument is that we cannot rationally justify the claim that nature will continue to be uniform, as justification comes in only two varieties, and both of these are inadequate. The two sorts are: (1) demonstrative reasoning, and (2) probable reasoning.[38] With regard to (1), Hume argues that the uniformity principle cannot be demonstrated, as it is "consistent and conceivable" that nature might stop being regular.[39] Turning to (2), Hume argues that we cannot hold that nature will continue to be uniform because it has been in the past, as this is using the very sort of reasoning (induction) that is under question: it would be circular reasoning.[40] Thus no form of justification will rationally warrant our inductive inferences. Hume's solution to this problem is to argue that, rather than reason, natural instinct explains the human ability to make inductive inferences. He asserts that "Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable [sic] necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel". Although many modern commentators have demurred from Hume's solution,[41] some have notably concurred with it, seeing his analysis of our epistemic predicament as a major contribution to the theory of knowledge. For example, the Oxford Professor John D. Kenyon writes: Reason might manage to raise a doubt about the truth of a conclusion of natural inductive inference just for a moment in the study, but the forces of nature will soon overcome that artificial skepticism, and the sheer agreeableness of animal faith will protect us from excessive caution and sterile suspension of belief.[42]

Now that article also prefaces this with what you said, that Hume didn't reject inductive reasoning. This is then contradicted by all the text I just copied and pasted. So maybe this is what you call a more nuanced way of phrasing this? But I'm in agreement with what is written in that article.Gacggt (talk) 15:58, 5 December 2011 (UTC)

Oh... also by the way, check out this wikipedia article... Problem of induction Gacggt (talk) 16:48, 5 December 2011 (UTC)

I don't believe you've proven Hume to be inconsistent, but we are not here to debate that, so more importantly, nothing you have yet cited mentions any clear contrast between Hume and Bacon. They are remembered for different things, and yes of course I know that in university courses they are sometimes fitted into opposing camps for learning about, but the edit I reverted is not justified by anything you have mentioned so far. You seem to think I am ignorant of Hume's criticism of some people's descriptions of how induction works. I am not. I think in order to examine the differences between our reading you need to look at Bacon more, not so much Hume.

• Where is the proof that Bacon really was the source of the kind of description of induction that Hume was critical of? And do you have a third party reliable source for this? (If you do I am really interested, because in fact I've found it hard to find good secondary sources for Bacon.)
• Where is the proof that Hume, despite his criticism of how some people thought induction worked, did not propose the use of what Bacon calls induction? Whereas you refer to "inductive reasoning" Bacon referred to "common induction" and even building up from something like "vulgar notions" - very similarly descriptions to Hume's frequent and I would say consistent defense of using experience even if there is no syllogistic proof concerning why we should.

Compare your quotation "Hume's argument is that we cannot rationally justify the claim that nature will..." etc with Bacon's various remarks that the kind of induction he was talking about was not to be stand or fall based on syllogism or logic. I believe Hume may well have known a thing or two about whether he followed Bacon or not.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 19:12, 5 December 2011 (UTC)

Your revision is in opposition to the David Hume section on Inductive Reasoning, and to the Inductive Reasoning page I cited, and to the published references I cited. I will not continue this - but you simply don't know what you're talking about. Your quotation from Hume citing Bacon has nothing to do with this issue.

If you have no source apart from Wikipedia itself, then you'll need to get one in order to make this discussion worthwhile, because on this talk page we write as WP editors with a limited mission. None of the third party sources you have named mention Bacon or his method at all, only Hume. You have not proven that anyone worthwhile has ever published anything to say that Bacon was the opponent of Hume on this. That is the most important thing for WP, and so really I could restrict my answers to just this point of policy.

...But putting aside WP policy, here is my reading of where this probably comes from, just in case it helps: Both Hume and Bacon defend the use of induction from everyday experience in practice, but this is most famously associated with Bacon. On the other hand neither of them, but most famously Hume, give any credence to anyone seeking a logical proof of why it works. Both insist that it just does work, even for children, and all our ways of judging it rely on it. There is nothing inconsistent about having both of these two positions, but the combination has always created disturbance and confusion, especially when Hume turned Bacon's method upon induction itself and described this contrast in such clear and unapologetic terms. To repeat my more general opinion: you seem to know Hume OK, but I honestly doubt you have read much Bacon. To make the contrast you want to make you need to know both of them. In most university courses today, Bacon is a stick figure, and more interesting because of his political career than what he wrote. Hardly anyone feels the need to actually read Bacon, or even any specialist works on Bacon. In the 18th century when Hume wrote he was considered a giant by virtually every great philosopher or scientist. --Andrew Lancaster (talk) 21:16, 5 December 2011 (UTC)

Merge with Novum Organum

I suggest we merge this article with Novum Organum. It seems like this article will be incomplete without a full discussion of the contents of the Novum Organum, and if that is the case, it might just as well be the Novum Organum article. --Chris 00:37, 21 January 2007 (UTC)

I notice no one has answered. For my own part I find it difficult to have a strong opinion. This proposal makes sense if we look at the current state of both articles, but in the longer term of course one is about a well-known particular book, and one is about a method which discussed in more than one book. So I think on reflection it is better to aim to improve both articles by expanding them.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:46, 29 November 2011 (UTC)

I'm going to go ahead and merge these. Need something to do today and the page just popped up on the cleanup page for the skepticism project. Rap Chart Mike (talk) 14:47, 7 August 2018 (UTC)

As done as I can be for the day. Hope this sparks other editors to help me polish it off a lot better. Rap Chart Mike (talk) 16:18, 7 August 2018 (UTC)

Please, looking at the previous discussion, do not go ahead with any such merge until we have some consensus and a rationale.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 16:48, 7 August 2018 (UTC)

Why was there a new tag stating merge needed? Those don't just appear. It makes a great deal of sense to merge them since it's literally the same topic. Also, in step for of the merger page it clearly states that if there are no objections within 30 days it may be performed. Since the discussion was brought up with no one other than the proposer and you as an assent chiming in how is this a problem? Rap Chart Mike (talk) 17:35, 7 August 2018 (UTC)

See Talk:Novum Organum#Merge with Baconian method and Wikipedia:Merging#Step 4: Close the merger discussion and determine consensus Rap Chart Mike (talk) 17:39, 7 August 2018 (UTC)

Note that the discussion petered out in 2011, and the last comment looking at both talk pages was: "This proposal makes sense if we look at the current state of both articles, but in the longer term of course one is about a well-known particular book, and one is about a method which discussed in more than one book. So I think on reflection it is better to aim to improve both articles by expanding them." That does not seem like a good point to then jump to merging?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 08:38, 8 August 2018 (UTC) Trying to set-up a discussion, or at least get some points on record.

• I think Novum Organum needs a real article because it is quite a notable work. I would say it is not necessarily most notable for the specific method it describes in some parts, but for the arguments concerning why a sceptical method is needed more generally, including arguments against metaphysical explanations of natural phenomena.
• I think Baconian Method, or whatever Francis Bacon's specific proposed scientific methodology is most often called, is a separable and notable subject, which has some amount of published discussion about it?--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:32, 8 August 2018 (UTC)

I strongly contend that the articles are not different enough to have two of them. Rap Chart Mike (talk) 12:40, 8 August 2018 (UTC)

Yes, but see the original concern I posted years ago about that rationale.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 17:09, 8 August 2018 (UTC)

I want to get an RfC tag on a new thread or this one to try and get some consensus. Which categorization tag do you think would be appropriate? I'm leaning toward sci but it's kind of history and kind of philosophy as well. Rap Chart Mike (talk) 17:38, 8 August 2018 (UTC)

All of them I guess, but of course anyone coming to an RFC will want to see a definition of the rationales being proposed. So you still need to consider whether it is enough to say that the existing articles overlap significantly at a specific moment. Also, if that is accepted, what rationales do we have concerning which should be the destination article? Above, I've explained why I think that Novum Organum needs an article, but I am not 100% certain about Baconian Method.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 10:21, 9 August 2018 (UTC)

OK. At some point I will put up a new discussion here with a rationale and tag it. I'll also convert it to a merge of this article into Novum Organum. That does appear to be the more noteworthy and more precisely defined of the two topics. As such it'll clearly be a differently organized and written article then my previous attempt at a merge. Although I did it as Novum into Baconian because that was how the header tag states the proposal. Rap Chart Mike (talk) 12:30, 9 August 2018 (UTC)

IS HUMBOLDTIAN SCIENCE A FRINGE IDEA?

I have studied science my whole life (i.e. I am a scientist). This is the first time I heard of von Humboldt or whatever. Are there more than 3 references for this claim? 101.110.53.90 (talk) 21:59, 10 January 2017 (UTC)

I've reverted the edit that introduced Humboldtian science since a couple of people have questioned it and it has been reverted once before and reintroduced without any discussion. For the user who is eager to see a mention of Humboldtian science I suggest arguing for its relevance here. -- ChrisSteinbach (talk) 11:58, 3 February 2017 (UTC)

Alexander von Humboldt was certainly very notable and influential concerning how natural science can be seen and practiced. Whether he developed a Humboldtian science or not I'll leave to whatever sourcing can be found, but it would ridiculous to argue that he was not notable or influential.--Andrew Lancaster (talk) 09:25, 8 August 2018 (UTC)

' able to reveal the injustice of effective procedures '

This sentence (below) appears under the heading Baconian Method and is either a mistake or it requires elaboration or clarification, thank you.MH

'able to reveal the injustice of effective procedures' — Preceding unsigned comment added by 37.126.173.27 (talk) 08:18, 27 January 2019 (UTC)