Talk:Battle for Caen/Archive 5

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Review

Despite the arguments above, everyone does seem to have the same goal of improving the article. I acknowledge that the latter sections are the focus of the moment, but with that said I have started going through the article. Today, just the background section; I have a few comments:

• I feel like the "Overlord plan" could be expanded upon to provide the reader with some more detail i.e. the COASSAC Plan.
• The article states that two American divisions would land on Omaha and Utah. AFAIK, didn't the US assault formations include the 1st, 4th, and 29th divisions?
• "Montgomery used a map to show phase lines, a planning device inherited from the COSSAC plan"

  If I am not mistaken, is this not one of the controversial parts of the campaign? Perhaps this can be elaborated on? For example, Cross Channel Attack, p. 188, points out that they were not "The outlined scheme of maneuver and the timetables were not designed as tactical plans; they were frames of reference for future planning, set forth primarily so that he men of the beginning should have some idea of the shape of the end, so that their thinking might be large and heir preparation adequate." Further info can be found at Talk:Operation Overlord/Archive 1

• "I Corps Plan" - Wild Oats seems to be out of place here, unless my understanding of the operation is outdated? My understanding is that while I Corps advanced on Caen, XXX Corps (50th Div and 8th Arm Bde) would strike south in an attempt to capture the high ground in the Mont Pincon area. On 9 June, following this advance stalling and additional developments (51st being in position, the hole in the German lines etc), Wild Oats was discussed/planned and then partially implemented. For example, see Stacey's Can OH and the Battlezone Normandy series.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:10, 30 June 2017 (UTC)

Thanks for taking the trouble, I rather hope that we keep the background, prelude and battle sections to description and leave explanations from the RS for the aftermath. I'm not sure but at the moment I think the article needs to reflect the operational level of war, since the specific articles contain tactical minutiae and the Overlord and Normandy articles the strategic ruminations. The phase lines canard seems a little old fashioned and a matter for the articles devoted to strategy. I only found a couple of weeks ago that Wild Oats was another contingency plan prepared before the invasion if Caen wasn't captured (D'Este) so think it needs a mention with Smock (Doherty). Regards Keith-264 (talk) 19:57, 30 June 2017 (UTC)

I agree that the higher tier articles should cover the bigger picture, and leave articles like this to be more dedicated; but an extra sentence here and there can't hurt otherwise readers will be wondering what COASSAC is etc.

As for Wild Oats, that is new to me but as long as the source says so; okay.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:23, 1 July 2017 (UTC)

• Battle section: I understand the want to leave this section purely to descriptive of events on the more tactical level, but it seems like some context is needed to weave these sections together to give the reader an understanding of how these operations were all linked together in the fight for Caen. For example, we finished reading about D-Day and jump ahead; what happened on the 7th and 8th, why was Perch needed? Likewise, we then just jump into Martlet without any indication of what happened in the preceding week. The same can be said of the Charnwood and Goodwood sections. Furthermore, I feel like some context is needed to explain why Jupiter is included; playing Devil's Advocate, what does hill in the middle of no where have to do with the city that has already fallen?
• "On 18 July, I Corps conducted an advance to secure villages and the eastern flank of VIII Corps and on the western flank, the II Canadian Corps conducted Operation Atlantic to capture the remaining German positions in Caen south of the Orne."

  I found this quite difficult to read.

• Again, I understand the want to leave analysis to the end; but we have gone with the higher tank loss numbers when the likes of Reynolds and Trew state the primary sources do not support them. Can we at least get a range here?
• "During the Battle of Caen, the I SS Panzer Corps had turned the 90-foot (27 m) high ridge "

  What 90 foot ridge?

• Can we get a concluding sentence just to state the battle ended?

• Aftermath section: I have just finished reading this section, and have gone through all of the current talk page comments and some of the recent archive sections. There is a lot of excellent stuff currently in the article detailing the evolution of the views of each of the armies fighting. My two cents, for what it is worth: To me at least, it seems like most of that could be transferred to a different article; a Historiography of the British Army during the Second World War, for example. The 'Analysis' and 'Histories of the Battle of Caen' sections seem to not really talk about the battle and appears to focus more on the British Army was not as inefficient as earlier historians and writers suggested.
• Wdford has made numerous comments about the various Monty debates. I agree that the bigger picture should be set aside for the likes of the Overlord article etc, however I feel like we can insert a compromise into the article. In particular, Epsom. One can end the Epsom section feeling like it was a dismal failure, whereas numerous historians have painted it as a great success due to the "true" intentions of the operation. This can provide a discussion into what Monty intended (i.e. writing off II SS Panzer Korps, wearing out other German units, and keeping German focus around Caen) compared to what he ordered (VIII Corps to launch a deep attack to envelope Caen), and historians take on it. A small case study within a larger discussion about how the battle was conducted.

Well, there is my food for thought for the day.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:23, 1 July 2017 (UTC)

The battle section is the least developed of all, it's just the lead and analysis section of the battle article knocked together with citations, that I parachuted in ages ago. If I hadn't buggered up my IT exam I would have made it look more like by now; I think of it as more of a place holder. I don't think that the tactical minutiae are necessary, the operational threads are more important than overlapping the main articles. I would expect the discussion of means, ends and results to go in the Analysis, possibly with a sub-header for each operation to cater for what you suggest. You're the first one to point out the obvious flaw in the History of the histories section, which is why I decided it would be better as a separate section, well done! ;o) Keith-264 (talk) 15:08, 1 July 2017 (UTC)

Generally, I agree that each battle section should be described in overview only (intended outcome, major events, and actual outcome), with the detail reported in each linked daughter article. However in order to connect the battle sections all together to describe the Battle for Caen as a whole, there needs to be some "evaluation" of each element of the battle. For example, we might start the Battle section with a short Introductory paragraph that goes along the lines of: "Caen and its airfield was intended to be captured on D-Day, but this wasn't achieved. Therefore they attempted Perch a few days later, and that didn't work out either. Therefore … etc etc until eventually etc etc". Then each battle sub-section follows, in order.

Epsom was not the only operation where Montgomery failed to deliver on the apparent objective and then claimed afterwards that his real intentions were actually quite different, and that everything had actually gone according to his "real" plan. The D-Day objective was to capture Caen and the Falaise Plain, thereupon to build airfields and then to hold this ground as the pivot while the US forces swept the Brittany coast and eventually wheeled around to the south. When that failed, the plan "evolved" into the British "threatening" Caen while the US forces did the breakout. However this was obfuscated by Montgomery, and per the RS this dissembling has resulted in on-going controversy. Goodwood was another major manifestation of this problem, and per the RS these "miscommunications" nearly resulted in Eisenhower sacking Montgomery. However all this information has been censored out of the article and buried in a footnote with a very vague gloss, with accusations that I am attempting to convert the article into a "Monty-bashing exercise". Instead, you will see numerous statements that the actual intention of these costly attacks was merely to attract the Germans and engage the Germans rather than to defeat the Germans and capture actual objectives. For balance and neutrality, this should be accompanied by the counterpoint (as per the RS) that Monty caused everyone – including Ike and Tedder – to believe that he was attempting to achieve actual victories, and that his subsequent redactions were a source of controversy both at the time and in the post-war "histories". The issue is – where in the article do we explain this? Certain editors have gone to a lot of trouble to exclude any mention thereof, and already we are seeing suggestions that the Battle section should include "description only".

I think that a separate Historiography of the British Army during the Second World War would be an excellent idea. However it would take time, and until it exists and we can link to it, we should add a few details here to improve NPOV.

The phase lines canard was added by certain editors in a complex but determined effort to distract from the fact that Caen was a D-Day objective for the British Army, which they failed to achieve despite Montgomery's later assertion that everything went according to plan. I would be happy to see this removed.

I am not sure why an "obvious flaw" was built into the article in the first place?

Wdford (talk) 09:03, 3 July 2017 (UTC)

I used Buckley 2014 because it's the most succinct survey I have but it has the flaw that it's about the period from D Day to the end of the war; I thought it was obvious but apparently not. Because of its nature it was separated from the Analysis section with a header to make it explicit that it was a survey. There are three paragraphs in the Analysis section but this is far from complete. I am looking through various sources about casualty data so that the casualty conservation aspect of British operations can be made comparative. What seems clear to me (but isn't clear in the sources I've been checking this weekend) is that British infantry casualties rose the longer an operation continued so the stop-go nature of the attacks seems to be a response to it, yet this took place in circumstances where the strategic necessity was not to stop for long, lest the attrition on the Germans imposed by one attack was vitiated by the arrival of reinforcements, the repair of tanks and that a pause might lead the Germans to reinforce the west end as the First Army threat increased in late July. The history of the history section adequately covers the controversies of the time and since, with due weight to the changing view of writers and historians. Keith-264 (talk) 09:19, 3 July 2017 (UTC)

Excuse the interjection but "The phase lines canard was added by certain editors in a complex but determined effort to distract from the fact... " sounds like an accusation of Wikipedia:Tag teaming. GraemeLeggett (talk) 10:22, 3 July 2017 (UTC)

The history of the history section DOES NOT "adequately cover the controversies of the time and since, with due weight" – in fact it does not address this particular controversy at all. All that has been allowed in here is a single clause tacked onto the end of a long sentence, which reads "and was also condemned for trying to re-write the history of the campaign after the war to glorify himself". True enough, but not an adequate description of the controversy at all. This clause is then massively hedged by making it seem like it's merely the personal opinion of D'Este (although other authors had made the same point), by making it sound like D'Este was basing it on the opinions of people who didn’t like Monty for personal reasons, and by making it sound like the whole thing was an American nationalistic response to Monty's criticisms of Eisenhower. A masterpiece of spin, indeed. The reality is that a number of reliable sources have pointed out specifically that Monty was "specious" about his "true plans". I don’t see why, in all this nine paragraphs of history about history, we can't simply add a few lines to clarify what the controversy actually was.

I have not accused anybody of WP:Tag teaming. I am prepared to assume that it is pure coincidence that two editors happened to be pushing an identical POV, and that at various times each accused me of trying to turn the article into a Monty-bashing exercise despite having zero basis for the accusation. I'm sure these coincidences happen all the time.

Wdford (talk) 15:16, 3 July 2017 (UTC)

I think you are still trying to turn the article into a Monty bashing essay; all this is in his wiki article, it really doesn't need duplicating here, except for the fact that RS opinions differ and have changed since the 1940s. It's all there in the HofH section. As for collusion, I've been on the receiving end lately and wouldn't stoop so contemptibly low, I'm too vain. It seems to me that there are 3-5 editors and 2-4 broadly agree about content. I think that due weight has been given but the subject should get a short mention in the Analysis section too, since relations between Monty and Shaef had some influence on operations. Keith-264 (talk) 15:39, 3 July 2017 (UTC)

Well, gee thanks. So in your opinion, the only part of the controversy that merits inclusion here is the fact that opinions about it differ. Interesting. Almost all of the material in this article is already present in other articles as well, but if you want to have an article about the Battle for Caen, you might as well do it properly. We all "broadly agree about content" – the dispute is about some editors' refusal to allow the article to mention the controversy about Montgomery's misleading statements. Considering WP:NPOV, what is your understanding of "a short mention in the Analysis section"? Wdford (talk) 15:55, 3 July 2017 (UTC)

Monty's interpersonal relationships, or spin efforts have no place in this article unless it can be shown that they interfered with day to day operations on the ground or that Monty was refused support or cooperation from agencies outside his control (and such a refusal on the basis of interpersonal relations would be noteworthy). The goals and results of each offensive have been stated and from that it is clear how far each one went according to plan. If we are to examine Monty's behaviour in detail then we'll have to do that for all the top brass and the whole weight and tone of the article will change away from the Battle for Caen to a article about interpersonal relationships within the high commands, and then we'll have to look at the German high command as well and the whole article will become hopelessly sidetracked, towards a controversy that had nothing to do with the actual conduct of the battle.Damwiki1 (talk) 20:45, 3 July 2017 (UTC)

The problem with your comment above lies in the sentence: "The goals and results of each offensive have been stated and from that it is clear how far each one went according to plan." This is exactly not true. The whole issue of the controversy is that "the goals" are not at all clear, due to Montgomery's subsequent dissembling. Montgomery sometimes claimed after a battle that the outcome was exactly what he had originally intended to achieve, even though this sometimes differed from what he had actually claimed he was aiming to achieve before the battle started. This was particularly serious with Goodwood, where Monty lied to Ike to get more air support than would otherwise have been made available, and he nearly got sacked as a result. The article currently includes only Montgomery's specious rewritten version of the goals, and because this version of reality is contradicted by various reliable sources, retaining this one-sided reflection in the article is not neutral.

In the many places where the article currently states something like: "The battle did achieve the primary intention, which was merely to pin the Germans in the eastern sector" – we need to reword the sentence to read: "Although the battle failed to achieve the specific objectives which Montgomery had originally proclaimed, it did add some value in that it helped to pin the Germans in the eastern sector."

Wdford (talk) 17:27, 4 July 2017 (UTC)

Using the RS to describe what happened is easy, describing what participants, writers and historians have written about it not so much since there are as many myths about the British in Normandy as Tiger tanks. Yet again your comment is another attempt to ignore recent scholarship. Keith-264 (talk) 17:39, 4 July 2017 (UTC)

"Recent scholarship", as you like to call it, cannot alter what actually happened in the past. It is a matter of record that Montgomery sometimes said one thing before a battle but then said a different thing after the battle, and then claimed that everyone had once again managed to misunderstand him. This problem is mentioned by multiple reliable sources. Some authors choose to accept Montgomery's claims, while others accept that Montgomery was lying to cover up his own failures. Unless "recent scholarship" has unearthed a trove of fresh documentation which proves that all the other commanders subsequently confessed to having repeatedly misunderstood the poor guy, then "recent scholarship" is not going to overturn the record. There may well be many myths about the British Army, but there are records which show that Monty said different things at different times, and there are also clear and unambiguous statements from senior British officers who openly stated that Monty was not shy to tell lies when it suited him. What has "recent scholarship" uncovered, that can change this aspect of history? Wdford (talk) 18:07, 4 July 2017 (UTC)

The one thing that jumps out of the current version is "what about the Germans". They were not passive participants but were, at least the first part of the battle, trying to drive the Allies into the sea; eg there is really nothing on 21st Panzer's D-Day attack on the beachhead, or the German dispositions later in the battle, and the impact this had on the campaign.Aber~enwiki (talk) 15:47, 6 July 2017 (UTC)

Quite agree, finding room for them is why I'm thinking that keeping to the operational level might be wise.Keith-264 (talk) 17:13, 6 July 2017 (UTC)

In an attempt to find some sort of middle ground, how about at least the following in the immediate analysis section?

• A brief overview of historians take on the first two weeks of the campaign, i.e. the initial drive on Caen and Perch. One of the Normandy articles quotes a historian stating this marked the end of the first phase of the battle - the scramble for ground - and Caen would need to be taken by direct assault. Some talkpage discussion has been on if Caen was a D-Day objective; was this idle talkpage speculation or do we have sources?
• Their take on the following battles that captured the city.
• Use Epsom and Goodwood as case studies. Both involve Monty saying one thing, and that not necessary being the outcome. Epsom to right-off II SS Panzer Korps vs taking ground to flank Caen; Goodwood as a limited assault as opposed to sold as a breakthrough attempt to get the heavy bombers on board etc.
• An overview of the battle, and how it fits into the grand scheme.

Followed by the other subsections already included. Thoughts?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:36, 6 July 2017 (UTC)

The Allied planners had to prepare for multiple possible outcomes of each offensive, including the initial landings. Caen was an objective, but it was not an overriding target of the initial landings, nor a vital objective afterwards except insofar as it held the German armour away from the centre of the landings and allowed the US Army to expand the beachhead towards Cherbourg. Epsom, Goodwood and Spring did not happen in a vacuum but were part of a coordinated plan to aid the US Army in it's drive towards St. Lo and then the Breakout:

"...attacked Caen head on from the north under an overwhelming tonnage of 'air' which had torn the city apart; and three divisions had come grinding to a halt in the rubble along the line of the water barriers which divided the city in half. He was in Caen, but he had not taken Caen. The real prize, the dominating heights in rear, the plain behind them, and the road to Paris, which tactically were one, remained in German hands. Two minor failures, two major failures; redeemed so far by the success of the primary mission allotted to the British and Canadian Armies - to act as the honey to attract the German wasps. But by the second week in July, yet another failure imperilled everything they had so far done, and turned a serious situation into a critical one. The British and Canadian blood-letting went for nothing if the Americans failed in their part of the plan - to break-out of the bridgehead while the bulk of the German Army was elsewhere engaged, and to swing the whole Allied line through an angle of ninety degrees, with Caen as the pivot, and so push the German Army up against the Seine, where it might be destroyed in a great mobile tank battle. This was the over-riding idea, as originally conceived, but the Americans had failed again and again to break-out. Their last attempt had been timed to coincide with the British and Canadian head-on assault on Caen of July 7th, but by July 10th the Americans too had failed, and General Bradley reported that he would be unable to try again until July 20th at the very earliest; and in fact was not able to do so until five days after. The Allies were therefore pinned in a narrow bridgehead, ten to twenty miles deep, which was barely one-fifth of the area they had planned to occupy, and in fact needed to get, by mid-July. Every field was an arms dump; there was simply no room for many of the follow-up formations and specialized units. Hitler's strategy of not yielding one yard of ground, if it could possibly be avoided, had so far succeeded; and seemed to be on the verge of stabilizing the whole Normandy front altogether. If the bridgehead could be corralled off for another six weeks or so, the onset of autumn, and then winter weather, might well turn stalemate into disaster. Cherbourg was likely to be useless as a port for many months to come; the artificial harbours would probably not stand a winter storm, of twice the force which had smashed the American Mulberry and damaged the British one; and beach unloading would be a desperate and chancy business. In any event, tonnage unloaded would not anything like match tonnage required - for the Allied forces ashore had now grown almost to the strength of two Army Groups, one British and one American, controlling four Armies. But the German forces also had increased. At long last, Hitler and many of his senior commanders had realized that Normandy was the main Allied effort; that the VI bombardment of London had failed to produce a surrender or provoke an attack on the Pas de Calais. German infantry divisions, so far held in reserve, were being moved to the Normandy front; in the period of a few days just before and just after the attack on Caen of July 7th, no less than four German infantry divisions reached the front, three of them going into the line opposite the British and Canadians. Now, at last, much of the strategic armoured reserve - General Baron Geyr von Schweppenburg's Panzer Group West - could be pulled out of the line, to rest, re-fit, and prepare for its proper task; not limited local counter-attacks, but a massive counter-offensive to split the narrow bridgehead in two and destroy the British and Americans separately. The Americans being reckoned much the easier proposition, the German armour began to move away from the cemetery city of Caen and the bloodsoaked Odon stream, towards the American front, where Bradley's drive to take St Lo had collapsed, and where for at least ten days, and in fact fifteen, no major American offensive action was likely to succeed. If those panzer divisions were allowed to re-group in front of the delayed American breakout, there would be at very least no break-out; there might instead be a break-in. It was imperative to hold them, or at least the bulk of them, on the British-Canadian anvil of Caen; and to crack them there. A critical situation required emergency measures, improvised and unorthodox, and therefore open to criticism if it failed in any way. And this is the reason that Montgomery's last battle for Caen, Operation 'Goodwood', has provoked more criticism, much of it biased, and most of it ill-tempered, than all the rest of the Normandy battles put together." [McKee, pp.266-268]... The fiasco was naturally not publicized at the time, nor the terrible drain on the infantry which had reduced battalions to about half-strength. The British and Canadians had been prepared to take punishment for two or three weeks, while the Americans massed for the major break-out around July 1st; they had held the Germans for twice that time, and still the Americans could not get going. For his part, Bradley needed to be sure that his new break-out attempt, Operation 'Cobra', would really go; there was little time left for another failure. It was supposed to have been launched on the heels of 'Goodwood', to take full advantage of the flow of further German reinforcements to the Caen sector which would be the obvious result, win or lose; but the bad weather which set in after July 20 put back the date to July 24th, and then, finally July 25th. Weather was vital to 'Cobra', because the plan was similar to 'Goodwood' - attack on a very narrow front preceded by an enormous air bombardment. The Americans now had nineteen divisions in Normandy, facing a hotch-potch of German forces amounting to nine divisions (with 110 tanks, none of them Tigers). The British and Canadians had fourteen divisions facing fourteen German divisions (with 600 tanks, many of them Tigers). The only way to prevent some transfers to the American front was to make yet another threat to Falaise and the Paris road; this time, a hopeless one, head-on at the strongly-held heights. It was to be launched regardless of weather on July 25th and was called Operation 'Spring'. The infantry and armour of II Canadian Corps attacked at 0330, with the surviving British armoured divisions, 7th and Guards, ready to exploit a breakthrough...[McKee, p.314-315]

We can see that trying to summarize such a complex set of variables, objectives and and opposing opinions in a few sentences will be nearly impossible and will then probably lead to some American editors taking offence, with a then unending edit war of Overlord proportions. Monty's statements, plans and relations with other Allied commanders is exceedingly complex and not germane to the overall story of the Battle for Caen.

I agree that the overall strategy is a complex story that should not be gone into extreme detail in this article, however I feel - considering the length of this discussion and even the points you have made - something can be said.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 07:24, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

I'm thinking that something in the Background section might be better to set the scene since politico-strategic factors affected British operations - all the stuff about realistic planning re:morale, manpower, playing a full role yet still having influence at war's end. In each section, perhaps some numbers and the views of management. If we do the "complex set of variables" each time it will be repetitive but if we lay them out in advance we only have to allude to them (there are enough sources on Second Army casualties but I can only find Army Group B totals rather than PZ G West equivalents). A similar section for the Germans would emphasise dearth and the limited options that flowed from it. Regards Keith-264 (talk) 07:32, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

I've shifted sections around the Background and Prelude so that the extra British strategy section to be written fits logically. I'll try to do that today and find more for the 716th and 21st Pz divs. Keith-264 (talk) 07:56, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

There is a ton of evidence that Caen was a D-Day objective. Even Keith has admitted as much, albeit with much hedging and shuffling about it being merely a minor target of only incidental value. Reliable sources have described it as a vital objective. Montgomery himself, in his memoirs, admits that "Our intention was to assault, simultaneously, beaches on the Normandy coast immediately north of the Carentan estuary and between that area and the River Orne, with the object of securing as a base for further operations a lodgement area which was to include airfield sites and the port of Cherbourg. The left or eastern flank of the lodgement area was to include the road centre of Caen." (pg 200) Certain editors have edit-warred to have that last sentence excluded from the article.

Monty spends many pages of his memoirs assuring the reader that he never intended for the British Army to achieve anything other than to distract the Germans away from the Americans in the west. A number of reliable sources have pointed out that this was written retroactively, based on making the actual outcomes look like they were his initial intentions. It has been called the Caen "controversy", (eg Carafano pg 22), but certain editors have gone to huge trouble over the past weeks to ensure that this is not reflected in the article either.

Carafano (pg 22) writes that before the invasion started, Eisenhower strongly supported Monty's intention for the "early capture of the important focal point of Caen", and that when this plan failed, Eisenhower wrote that Monty had "evolved" the original plan to one which required greater American initiative in unhinging the German defenses. This is a bit different to the version of McKee. Eisenhower was in charge of the final plan, and he knew (along with his senior commanders) what the actual plan was. To have sentences scattered throughout the article which all give the picture that the "distraction away from the west" was the only true plan, is neither accurate nor neutral.

McKee states that the British "redeemed" their failures, and he makes this case by following Montgomery's own excuse – that the British Army did not actually fail, instead it nobly sacrificed itself to distract the Germans away from the Americans, who bumbled around for absolute ages. Other writers give a completely different perspective. This is part of what Baxter called the "Battle of the Books" (pg 70). It is a serious indictment that a senior commander, with the security of the free world hanging in the balance, could be so vague and ambiguous about his intentions that his boss "misunderstood" him and writers for 70 years thereafter could not puzzle it out. However if we by-pass the writers who merely offer a personal opinion, such as McKee, and look at the actual documentation generated at the time by Montgomery, Eisenhower, Bedell Smith, Demspey etc, we get a very different picture – one where Montgomery repeatedly commits to certain intentions, and then claims afterwards that he had actually intended otherwise. To have a coherent article, we need to focus on sources who cite actual evidence – such as quoting actual orders issued and actual memos written. Of course that would not serve certain editors' POV. It is insightful that Keith chose to quote McKee here rather than one of the others ….

I propose that we fix this article as follows:

• The "Histories of the Battle of Caen" section is really applicable to Overlord in general rather than just to Caen. Therefore move this material wholesale to the Overlord article, and let those editors decide how much of it is actually valuable.
• Copy the few sentences from "Histories of the Battle of Caen" that really clarify the Battle of Caen itself, into the Analysis section.
• Add to the Analysis section a few paragraphs explaining the "controversy", and that Monty had "muddied" his real intentions. This material was in the article previously, supported by many reliable sources, but certain editors edit-warred it out using the "Monty-bashing exercise" pretext.
• Amend all mentions of "overall objectives" to ensure balance and neutrality.
• In the Epsom and Goodwood sections, at least, explain (briefly) that Monty told different stories before and after the battles.
• Add to the Background section a paragraph or two on the shortage of British manpower, and their need to appear to be pulling their weight while still having a few divisions left in the field at the end so as to buy themselves a seat at the table with the new super-powers.

Such an approach would meet WP:NPOV, which the current version of the article fails to do. If we have a consensus for these improvements, I can start work immediately. Wdford (talk) 12:21, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

I suggest that we treat your comments as evidence that you are still intent on writing a Monty-bashing article and ignore the verbiage. Keith-264 (talk) 12:38, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

I am attempting to stay neutral here, there is no need for name calling or arguing about editors motivations (not singling anyone out, but a general comment to all concerned).

Per my earlier comments, I should have stressed (but did not at the time), I was referring to the talkpage discussion about if Caen was or was not an objective. Clearly, there is a mountain of evidence that it was. What I was referring to as idle speculation, was is there evidence that this is a controversial position and thus need to be discussed in the article?

In regards to Caen's position in the overall battleplan, it does seem that we keep coming back to the main question of what was the strategy in Normandy. I have been reading through T. Powers, "Battle of Normandy: The Lingering Controversy", Journal of Military History, Vol. 56, No. 3 (July 1992), pp. 455-71, published by the Society for Military History; http://www.jstor.org/stable/1985972

Powers notes that, following the death of the major participants and the initial publication of books in the 1940s-50s, any controversy of the battle plan and Caen faded away until the 1980s. Prior to which, British authors generally supported Monty's claims, whereas American authors went for the picture of a bungled plan. The exceptions appear to be Ike and Bradley. The former, states that his belief was that the British would break out but that due to resistance around Caen the plan was modified, and that flexibility was a key reason for victory. Bradley on the other hand "had no fundamental disagreement with what had already become Monty's version of the battle" and stated that the battle unfolded per the briefing at St. Paul's School.

Powers comments that the 1981 appearance of Weigley, Irving, and Belchem were the initial authors to challenge the prevailing pro-Monty view. I am not going to quote the Irving section, as he has become a disgraced author and we need less controversy not more. Weigley asserts the plan was for a British breakout, and Caen ruined this. Weigley quotes a memo written by Bedell Smith that "indicates that Monty's claim ... was unknown to him until the end of June". Belchem, a member of Monty's Ops and Planning staff, asserts that "Montgomery never intended to do more at Caen than pin down the German[s]" etc. Powers comments that Weigley does not support several of his claims, such as during the St Paul's School briefing (of which he was a participant), that Monty stated he would strike out towards Falaise "only to buy off the RAF's opposition to his master plan".

As the 80s progress: Keegan showed little interest in the controversy, and takes a pro-Monty position. Clay/Bradley's "A Soldiers' Story", argues that despite flaws in execution or more territory captured around Caen, the battle went according to plan. They also argue that Goodwood succeeded, no doubt Monty would have gone big, but also argues that both Monty and Ike over-exaggerated the operation. D'Este argued that the documents show no "21 Army Group defensive stand before Caen" and that Monty wanted breakouts on both flanks, and that a Cobra-esc op does not appear anywhere in the pre-invasion plans. He argues that Monty been more open about his intentions etc, there would probably have been no controversy. Lamb argues a pro-Monty position, and reasserts - based of contemporary letters - that Monty would pretty much say anything to the big brass in order to ensure co-operation.

Powers notes that "one might dismiss the protracted and sometimes bitter arguments over the strategies in Normandy as mere squabbles among old soldiers who were fading away and saw their reputations threatened ... . For the American partisan, it might argue that it all stems from Montgomery's paranoia and monumental ego, his inability to admit that a plan of his design had to be abandoned or modified. Or one might taken the British view, which holds to this day that the Americans were amateurs ... and needed the firm guidance of ... Brooke and Montgomery... and that the American high command never understood Montgomery's Master Plan for the battle."

So, how do we sum all this up in regards to the Battle of Caen? It does seem that, afterall, everything boils down to the "pro-Monty" and the "anti-Monty" camps. Surely, we do not need to go into excessive detail on this? Perhaps, two paragraphs one summing up each camps views as to the Battle of Caens place in the grand scheme of things?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 14:49, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

Please find below referenced material on this very question, which was deleted from the article by certain authors under the "Monty-bashing exercise" pretext. This will answer the question of the controversy – Powers was not alone in this view. The first half of the material relates to the controversy generally, and should go into the Analysis section. The second half is specific to Goodwood, and should probably be included in that section. The edit-war broke out before I could get around to Epsom. The issue does not stand in isolation though – the article currently states certain "objectives" as established fact, whereas the objectives are actually contested in several cases. It would be non-neutral to leave those biased assertions in the article without presenting also the counter-point. Wdford (talk) 16:57, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

Re the Controversy

Controversy still lingers over Montgomery’s original intentions for the city of Caen. The British failure to take Caen at the beginning of the invasion has been the source of an immense historiographical dispute with bitter national overtones. In his memoirs, as well as in other post-war talks and publications, Montgomery claimed that the battle of Normandy had gone exactly according to his pre-invasion plan, and this pro-Montgomery version was accepted as a truism by a number of historians for decades thereafter, although other historians produced contradictory accounts. The "British school" accepts Montgomery's post-war claim that he never intended to take Caen at once and instead that his original pre-invasion "master plan" was for the Anglo-Canadian operations around Caen to be a "holding operation" intended to attract the bulk of the German forces towards the Caen sector, so as to allow the Americans to stage the "break out operation" to the west of the German positions at Caen.

The "American school" argues that Montgomery's initial "master plan" was for the 21st Army Group to take Caen at once, then to move his tank divisions into the plains south of Caen to stage a break-out. They state that it was only after several failed attempts to break out in the Caen sector that Montgomery devised a new "master plan" of having the 21st Army Group hold the bulk of the German forces, thus allowing the Americans to achieve the break out. The D-Day objectives for the 3rd Infantry Division of the British 1st Corps, which landed on Sword Beach, specifically included "The capture of the city of Caen by means of rapid advance, and the establishment of a bridgehead south of the city." Letters written by Eisenhower at the time of the battle make it clear that Eisenhower was expecting from Montgomery "the early capture of the important focal point of Caen", and that when this plan had clearly failed, Eisenhower wrote that Montgomery had "evolved" the plan to have the US forces achieve the break-out instead. A memo summarizing Montgomery's operations written by Eisenhower's chief of staff General Walter Bedell Smith, who met with Montgomery in late June 1944, speaks of Montgomery seeking a "breakout" into the plains south of the Seine. Sir James Grigg, British Secretary of State for War at the time and thus the political head of the British military, observed in his own memoirs that it was undeniably Montgomery's plan to break out into the open around Caen in the first few days after D-Day. Brigadier Bill Williams, Montgomery’s own chief of intelligence, supported the view that Caen was a first-day objective, and that everything did not go according to plan on D-Day.

Re Goodwood

Much of the controversy surrounding the objectives of the battle originates from the conflicting messages given by Montgomery. During the Normandy campaign, Montgomery regularly created unrealistic expectations in the minds of Churchill, Eisenhower and the other senior commanders. In the lead-up to Operation Goodwood, Montgomery deliberately misled Eisenhower into believing that the attack would achieve a breakthrough, in order to attract greater air support for the operation. While his intermittent communications to SHAEF appeared to promise a breakthrough, Montgomery was writing orders to his subordinates for a limited attack. Copies of orders forwarded to SHAEF, called for an armoured division to take Falaise, a town far in the German rear. Three days prior to the attack, Montgomery revised the orders, eliminating Falaise as an objective but neglected to forward copies of the revision; Eisenhower was later furious at the result. Operation Goodwood almost cost Montgomery his job, as Eisenhower seriously considered sacking him.

John Keegan pointed out that Montgomery made differing statements before Operation Goodwood about the purpose of the operation. Keegan wrote that Montgomery engaged in what he called a "hedging of his bets" when drafting his plans for Goodwood, with a plan for a "break out if the front collapsed, if not, sound documentary evidence that all he had intended in the first place was a battle of attrition". Montgomery was known to have a "lack of concern for truth", and after the war Brigadier Bill Williams, Montgomery’s chief intelligence officer, said that Montgomery's "idea of fairness and truth would sometimes chill me inside". Montgomery regularly told Dempsey that "There is no need to tell Ike".

References

Keep your invective to yourself. Keith-264 (talk) 17:10, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

We should also bear in mind that the much-quoted paragraph from Bradley did NOT mean that Bradley assumed Monty would camp indefinitely north of Caen while the US did all the invading. The original plan was very clear that the British would take Caen and then break through to capture the Falaise Plain inland thereof, and would build airfields there to support the invasion, and would then occupy the entire plain as the hinge of the future wheel. The "long roundabout road to Paris" in the original plan referred to a US drive north to Cherbourg, followed by a sweep south down the Bretton coast and then east around to Paris, it did not envisage an Operation Cobra followed by a link-up to finally capture Falaise - the original plan assumed that Monty would have Falaise under control early in the process, and that a Cobra-esc operation so far inland of the "outside flank" would never be needed. Wdford (talk) 17:23, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

Powers' article The Battle of Normandy: The Lingering Controversy reviews the evidence for Montgomery having a firm commitment to capture Caen and doesn't find such evidence. The closest he comes can be summarized in this quote:

"...Weigley managed to squeeze enormous detail about the 1944-45
campaign in the space of 730 pages. (Twenty-five percent of that space
is devoted to the cross-Channel Attack and the Battle of Normandy.) He
asserts that Montgomery, a commander he characterized as "altogether
Britain's ablest general of the war," had originally intended for the
breakout to occur on his 21 Army Group front, where the ground was
decidedly more favorable to the deployment of armor. Although Mont-
gomery carefully removed any obligation for a 21st Army Group breakout
from the COSSAC plans, Weigley believes that he never ceased to
contemplate the possibility. In support of this interpretation Weigley
cites two sources-a memorandum written by Bedell Smith several
months after the landings and the 21 Army Group plans for Operation
Lucky Strike. Bedell Smith's memo indicates that Monty's claim merely
to be drawing the Germans to his left flank was unknown to him until
the end of June. At the same time, 21 Army Group planners were
working on Operation Lucky Strike, which clearly involved a breakout
to the east led by the Second British Army...

So we have no documentary evidence of a pre-invasion plan for a Commonwealth breakout via the Caen route, but instead we only have Weigley's "...interpretation...". As I and others have stated every Allied plan of operations had to prepare for all eventualities including a German collapse. So, of course, each thrust toward or around Caen had to plan for breaking through, yet the balance of forces, which were well known to Monty, via Ultra, made a breakthrough exceedingly unlikely. However, at the same time, those same balance of forces overwhelmingly favoured the US Army because the Germans had concentrated their armour and elite SS divisions to defend Caen, (and there is strong evidence that Monty had expected this). Monty for various reasons, would not interfere with the day to day planning and operations of the US Army in Normandy but it seems pretty clear that any Allied breakout would occur where the enemy was weakest, not where he was strongest; this simple idea seems to have gotten lost somehow but it is probably the oldest and surest maxim of military planning.Damwiki1 (talk) 19:42, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

Again, can all editors please remain civil.

Having just read Powers' essay, I feel the above misuses the source somewhat and liberties are taken. For example, taking Caen on D-Day is not discussed to the degree above (which brings me back to my original point, is there any sources that suggest it was not suppose to be taken on D-Day and thus generating a controversy that needs to be discussed?), asserting Powers claims the pro-Monty sources being about "never intend[ing] to take Caen" seems a little disingenuous to the source, and likewise the treatment on the pro-American camp. I note that Bill Williams is brought into it, but note - considering the extensive use of Powers - that Belchem is missing who provides another "insider" opinion and one that directly contradicts Williams. I can see why the accusation of "Monty bashing" has been leveled; but we all need to work together civilly to come a conclusion on how to adequately address everything.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 20:12, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

It is common cause that the original plan called for the early capture of the Caen-Falaise Plain, as the site for future airfields, and to be used as the hinge etc. Falaise is about 40km inland from Caen, and almost directly behind Caen as viewed from the beaches. You cannot get to Falaise without breaking through at Caen.

The controversy is not about whether or not Caen was a British D-Day objective – it is abundantly clear that it was. The controversy is about Montgomery's subsequent claim that everything went according to plan – and it is abundantly clear that it did not. Apart from anything else, Operation Cobra was never part of the original plan.

Montgomery in his memoirs (pg 230) openly admits that "It had been my original intention to secure the high ground between Caen and Falaise as early as possible, as being a suitable area for the construction of airfields; ..." Montgomery also admits that "It was indeed a fundamental object of my strategy on the eastern flank to establish a force strong in armour to the south-east of Caen in the area about Bourguebus … ". Bourguebus is also inland from Caen. Wdford (talk) 20:51, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

I have the 1958 edition of The Memoirs of Field Marshall Montgomery in front of me and there are no such quoted statements on the pages cited above. There are similar (but quoted out of context above) statements later in the book and I'll present them shortly.Damwiki1 (talk) 21:26, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

Sorry, it was page 228, not pg 230. I read the digital page number rather than the book page number. My bad. Wdford (talk) 21:41, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

I don't see anything on page 228 either. Anyways here's what Monty stated [pages 254-256]:

"...But to return to the campaign. My master plan for the land battle in Normandy I have described already. Briefly, it was so to stage and conduct operations that we drew the main enemy strength on to the front of the Second British Army on our eastern flank, in order that we might the more easily gain territory in the west and make the ultimate break-out on that flank—using the First American Army for the purpose. If events on the western flank were to proceed rapidly it meant that we must make quick territorial gains there. On the eastern flank, in the Caen sector, the acquisition of ground was not so pressing; the need there was by hard fighting to make the enemy commit his reserves, so that the American forces would meet less opposition in their advances to gain the territory which was vital on the west. In this master plan we were greatly assisted by the immense strategic importance of Caen. It was a vital road and rail centre through which passed the main routes leading to our lodgement area from the east and south-east. As the bulk of the German mobile reserves were located north of the Seine, they would have to approach our bridgehead from the east and would thus converge on Caen. To the south-east, between Caen and Falaise, was good ground for airfields. I was convinced that strong and persistent offensive action in the Caen sector would achieve our object of drawing the enemy reserves on to our eastern flank: this was my basic conception. From the beginning it formed the basis of all our planning. Once on shore and firmly established, I began to get this strategy working and after the heavy battles in the Caen area, and the overrunning of the Cherbourg peninsula, it began to take shape. I never once had cause or reason to alter my master plan. Of course we did not keep to the times and phase lines we had envisaged for the benefit of administrative planning, and of course, too, we didn't hesitate to adjust our plans and dispositions to the tactical situation as it developed—as in all battles. Of course we didn't. I never imagined we would. But the fundamental design remained unchanged; it was to that that I pinned my hopes and clung so resolutely, despite increasing opposition from the fainter-hearted. We did not capture Caen, for instance, till the l0th July and we did not finally clear the eastern suburbs till the 20th July. It had been my original intention to secure the high ground between Caen and Falaise as early as possible, as being a suitable area for the construction of airfields; but this was not vital, and when I found it could not be done in accordance with the original plan without suffering unjustified casualties, I did not proceed with that venture. This was not popular with the Air Command. It was indeed a fundamental object of my strategy on the eastern flank to establish a force strong in armour to the south-east of Caen in the area about Bourguebus; this was the key to ensuring that we kept the bulk of the German armour on the eastern flank, and thus helped the American expansion on the west. We did not get on to this high ground until Second Army launched Operation GOODWOOD on the 18th July, with armoured forces. As soon as the armoured advance came to a standstill because of determined enemy resistance, and also because heavy rain turned the whole area into a sea of mud, I decided to abandon that thrust. Many people thought that when Operation GOODWOOD was staged, it was the beginning of the plan to break out from the eastern flank towards Paris, and that, because I did not do so, the battle had been a failure. But let me make the point again at the risk of being wearisome. There was never at any time any intention of making the break-out from the bridgehead on the eastern flank. Misunderstandings about this simple and basic conception were responsible for much trouble between British and American personalities. Here, for example, is an extract from page 32 of Eisenhower's report on the campaign, dated the 13 th July 1945, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff: " Nevertheless, in the east we had been unable to break out towards the Seine, and the enemy's concentration of his main power in the Caen sector had prevented us from securing the ground in that area we so badly needed. Our plans were sufficiently flexible that we could take advantage of this enemy reaction by directing that the American forces smash out of the lodgement area in the west while the British and Canadians kept the Germans occupied in the east. Incessant pressure by the Second Army to contain the enemy was therefore continued by Field-Marshal Montgomery during July." The impression is left that the British and Canadians had failed in the east (in the Caen sector) and that, therefore, the Americans had to take on the job of breaking out in the west. This reflection on Dempsey and the Second Army is a clear indication that Eisenhower failed to comprehend the basic plan to which he had himself cheerfully agreed. All through the fierce fighting which took place in Normandy, there was never any intention of breaking out on the eastern flank towards the Seine; reference to all the orders and instructions which I issued makes that abundantly clear. This false conception existed only at Supreme Headquarters, and none of the senior officers responsible for the conduct of the actual fighting in Normandy, Bradley included, had any doubt about the true plan. The misconception led to much controversy and those at Supreme Headquarters who were not very fond of me took advantage of it to create trouble as the campaign developed. One of the reasons for this in my belief was that the original COSSAC plan had been, in fact, to break out from the Caen-Falaise area, on our eastern flank. I had refused to accept this plan and had changed it. General Morgan who had made the COSSAC plan was now at Supreme Headquarters as Deputy Chief of Staff He considered Eisenhower was a god; since I had discarded many of his plans, he placed me at the other end of the celestial ladder. So here were the seeds of discord. Morgan and those around him (the displaced strategists) lost no opportunity of trying to persuade Eisenhower that I was defensively minded and that we were unlikely to break out anywhere! In all the " curfufle " which developed on this issue Morgan was assisted by the airmen, because most understandably, they wanted the airfields on the eastern flank beyond Caen. And some airmen were only too glad to be able to suggest that something had gone wrong..." [my bolding for emphasis, and italics to show the quotes by Wdford]. On page 257 Monty explains how his GOODWOOD press conference in July gave the impression that GOODWOOD was an intended breakout, but that he and Bradley both agreed that the actual intentions of the operations had to be kept from the Germans.

Monty makes it clear that capturing Caen, the ground beyond Caen and/or breaking out through Caen was never in his plans, except, in the event that German resistance was weaker than expected. The pre-invasion phase lines clearly show the US Army advancing and then wheeling 90 degs, pivoting on Caen/Falaise to advance towards Paris; of course he couldn't possibly have planned COBRA, but it is clear that it would be the US Army that burst out of the Beachhead. The idea that Monty could/would take the Commonwealth Armies on a do, or die, frontal assault straight through the most elite units in the German Army with no superiority of numbers is mind boggling and something out of Churchill's worst nightmares as being a latter day Battle of the Somme, and it was never even a remote possibility. Finally, we can see how complex this all is, how fraught it is with conflicting and contradictory secondary sources. It is better to just leave the controversy regarding Monty out of the article and instead focus on how the planning and resulting battles actually proceeded.

I think I've written three times more on the talk page than in the article, which can't be right. Perhaps WD will find it easier to reach consensus with Enigma or Damwiki but I don't care any more; these exchanges are the Battle of Monty's Ego all over again, on the talk page instead of in the article. Keith-264 (talk) 22:52, 7 July 2017 (UTC)

@Damwiki: Yes, this is the text I was referring to. In my copy it is on pages 227-230, word for word.

As I stated in my post a few lines above, this is Monty's version, written post-event, wherein he tries to explain that it all worked out as per his "real" plans, despite what he said before the time. Monty here uses the phrase "much controversy", so there is really no doubt that the controversy existed even at his time of writing, and was serious enough that he felt he needed to address it.

According to Monty's version of events, somehow the whole of SHAEF, plus the British strategists and the British air commanders, all seemingly misunderstood "this simple and basic conception". The difference between "we shall break out in the east" vs "we shall break out in the west" does not seem to be prone to ambiguity and overlap, but there you have it. In fact, according to Monty there was an actual conspiracy among the British strategists and the British air commanders to gang up on and undermine poor Monty, by influencing all the muddle-headed SHAEF commanders who couldn't even distinguish east from west. I am happy to add a line on this conspiracy into the article as well?

As per Eisenhower in Crusade in Europe, pg 266: "In his more detailed presentation of April 7, Montgomery stated that the second great phase of the operation, estimated to begin shortly after D plus 20, would require the British Army to pivot on its left at Falaise, to "swing with its right towards Argentan-Alencon". This meant that Falaise would be in our possession before the great wheel began. The line that we actually held when the breakout began on D plus 50 was approximately that planned for D plus 5." Argentan is 60km inland from Caen. That plan certainly sounds like a breakout to me, and it probably did to Ike as well. Unless Monty unilaterally changed the plan closer to the time, and somehow once again failed to inform everyone of the change, including his commander?

See also D’Este at pg 546: "However, what Montgomery’s concept of the battle for Normandy never included was a protracted battle of attrition for Caen. Later he sought to deflect criticisms of his generalship by suggesting that his enemies at SHAEF took advantage of the controversy to discredit him". Another mention of the controversy, and another mention of the conspiracy?

Monty had no need to lie to the press in order to mislead the Germans. The Germans were not dependent on American newspapers for their intel, and the battle would have been long over before the newspapers were even published. Monty could have just kept quiet about the details - he had no need to spin tales to the press, and there was nothing to be achieved by doing so. Again, this "explanation" sounds very improbable.

What we are left with therefore is the following:

• The original plan, and the final D-Day battle orders, called for the British Army to capture the Caen-Falaise Plain as early as possible, starting with Caen itself on D-Day, and then penetrating 40km inland to Falaise - seemingly by D+5. Per Eisenhower, as quoted by Monty above: "securing the ground in that area we so badly needed". SHAEF and the air commanders were all on board with this. However when the British Army encountered actual Germans in front of Caen and were repelled, Monty abandoned the plan, and casually dismissed the airfields as "non-vital".
• When Monty gave orders for Epsom and Goodwood, he made it seem like he was planning to achieve big things, and SHAEF backed Goodwood with heavy air support as a result. However when those battles failed to achieve those objectives, Monty claimed that he was actually only attempting to create a diversion.
• We have input from a lot of senior commanders, including Eisenhower, Bedell Smith, Griggs, Williams etc, disagreeing with Monty's retroactive version of the plans. Was Monty right and all those senior commanders wrong? Possible, but not sufficiently probable to allow that the article should reflect only Monty's version of history, while censoring out the fact that some of the reliable sources state otherwise. Per WP:NPOV, all the significant viewpoints from reliable sources should be mentioned.

Do we have consensus on the above? Wdford (talk) 20:04, 8 July 2017 (UTC)

No, you're still waffling about matters relevant to the Monty article. Keith-264 (talk) 20:24, 8 July 2017 (UTC)

We also have Bradley and de Guingand and numerous authors supporting Monty's version of events. This is really best addressed in a separate article.Damwiki1 (talk) 21:25, 8 July 2017 (UTC)

Even de Guingand, Monty's loyal right hand man, admitted that they planned to capture Caen on D-Day and advance past Caen to Falaise (40km inland) to capture ground for airfields. And Bradly did not exactly "support Monty's version of events".

I agree that it is a complicated matter, and that it maybe deserves its own article to ventilate it properly. However we cannot leave out mentioning the controversy completely, as that is specific to the battles for Caen, and it is described by a number of reliable sources. I do not accept "its too complicated" as a valid justification for creating the appearance that the controversy doesn't exist at all. A couple of paragraphs in the Analysis section can cover it quite well, with perhaps one paragraph added to the Goodwood section to describe the "changing of the plan at the last minute without informing his superiors", and a polish at the Epsom section.

Conversely I do think that the "History of the histories" section is substantially off-topic, as planning for future potential Cold War battles does not really relate to the Battle of Caen. Perhaps that belongs in the British Army planning for the Cold War article? About half of that material should be removed, and the topical half folded into the Analysis section.

Four Histories paragraphs out, four new paragraphs in, and we have a neutral and factual article. What do you say?Wdford (talk) 16:10, 9 July 2017 (UTC)

I think you should be barred from editing this article and talk page for nuisance edits, abusive comments, NNPOV, SYNTH, CHERRYPICKING, COAT, etc.Keith-264 (talk) 16:50, 9 July 2017 (UTC)

The Allies planned to do a lot of things on D-Day and didn't do most of them, because they were not priorities in the face of enemy opposition. de Guingand specifically stated that no firm promises were made to capture Caen on D-Day, or on any specific date thereafter. You keep failing to mention these obvious caveats to Allied planning after they have been repeatedly shown to you via lengthy extract from cited sources, and the fact that planners had to look at and plan for all possibilities. You refuse to acknowledge that not meeting the wildest possibilities of D-Day plans for Caen doesn't constitute a defeat nor a deception at Caen, anymore than it did for the similar plans at the other beachheads. Bradley states that it was Monty's plan for the Breakout to occur via the US Army and he supported this and Monty's version of events surrounding the Goodwood press conference. Again the "controversy" had no effect on the fighting, and did not result in Monty being refused any requested support, therefore it has no place in the article except via a link to another article and/or to Monty's and the other commander's biographical articles. The Battle for Caen directly led to one of the greatest defeats in the history of the German army; it was an overwhelming Allied victory and the "controversy" seems to be just a way to deflect the article away from that, and give it the appearance of an Allied defeat. A book length treatment of the battle can discuss it in depth and place it in context without unduly weighting the book, but we cannot do that in a short encyclopedic article.Damwiki1 (talk) 17:30, 9 July 2017 (UTC)

"The Allies planned to do a lot of things on D-Day and didn't do most of them...." Neither did the Germans, apparently that was Monty's fault too. ;o)Keith-264 (talk) 17:57, 9 July 2017 (UTC)

Let me try again, since you clearly are not hearing all the sources that don’t agree with your POV. Generals in battles don't make "promises", they make plans – and those plans either succeed or they fail. The excuse that Monty shrugged off Caen and the airfields "because they were not priorities" is a bit pathetic, considering how other sources – including Eisenhower – said they were vital objectives.

In his work Bradley: A Biography. Alan Axelrod states at pg 126: "Tasked with taking Caen, Monty had airily promised that he would do so very rapidly; then would hold the town as the centre of a great eastward wheeling movement by the rest of the invasion force. Pivoting on Caen, the First Canadian Army was to turn sharply east-northeast to the Seine, near Rouen. At the same time, the Second British Army would sweep south-southwest of this, through the German strongpoints of Falaise and Argentan, also driving towards the Seine. First US Army was to provide the major momentum for the breakout, wheeling south past Avranches, …."

This gels neatly with what Eisenhower wrote in Crusade in Europe, pg 266: "In his more detailed presentation of April 7, Montgomery stated that the second great phase of the operation, estimated to begin shortly after D plus 20, would require the British Army to pivot on its left at Falaise, to "swing with its right towards Argentan-Alencon". This meant that Falaise would be in our possession before the great wheel began. The line that we actually held when the breakout began on D plus 50 was approximately that planned for D plus 5."

It is thus ABUNDANTLY clear that there was a firm plan, which Montgomery failed to accomplish. That firm plan included the British Army capturing Caen and the Caen-Falaise Plain by D+5. It also seemingly involved the Canadian component thereafter driving eastward toward Rouen on the Seine. This exactly contradicts Monty's memoirs where he said that at no time was the plan to break out from the British end of the lodgement.

This also gels with what Eisenhower wrote soon after the invasion began, as quoted by Carafano (pg 22) "and that when this plan failed, Eisenhower wrote that Monty had "evolved" the original plan to one which required greater American initiative in unhinging the German defenses."

Everything hangs together, so it's no surprise that a lot of writers were a bit surprised when Monty started saying something completely different. These were not "the wildest possibilities of D-Day plans", this was the core plan, on which all else was premised. If it was wildly optimistic then it was a poor plan, but it was the plan nonetheless. Ultimately Caen was indeed captured – many weeks behind schedule – so obviously this was not an Allied defeat, and I have never suggested that it was. However it was clearly a serious failure to stick to the plan, and thus for Monty to say otherwise does indeed constitute a deception – as many reliable sources have pointed out.

Axelrod also writes at pg 127: "Bradley inwardly fumed at Montgomery, believing that if he had moved more quickly and aggressively, he might have beaten at least some of Rommel's forces to his objective. Now, deprived of Caen, the centre of the planned great wheel through France, Bradley concentrated on overrunning the village of Carentan …" That doesn't sound like Bradley was agreeing that everything was going according to plan, does it?

Bradley's much-quoted passage about the breakout taking place in the American sector agrees exactly with the material from Axelrod, and it also gels with the statements by Eisenhower, and other reliable sources.

Re Bradley supposedly supporting Monty's version of events surrounding the Goodwood press conference – Bradley was not part of Goodwood, and I have explained the ambiguity of the much-quoted passage. However Eisenhower, as Montgomery's direct commanding officer, was WELL AWARE of what was supposed to be happening with Goodwood, and the reliable sources tell us that Ike was furious with the failure and seriously considered sacking Montgomery. Baxter (pg 75) cites Stacey: "Colonel Stacey observed that the misunderstandings regarding Montgomery's plans were understandable given his communications to Eisenhower before the battle, which indicated that Goodwood was a breakthrough operation."

The "controversy" was part of the battle, and has been noted by various reliable sources. It has bearing on what was intended, and on how it was finally achieved. Per WP:NPOV, it therefore should be included.

The "controversy" is in no way an attempt to deflect the article away from the eventual Allied victory, or to create the appearance of an Allied defeat. I have never attempted to do that, and the very suggestion is an attempt at distraction and a mendacious one at that. The final comment about undue weight is once again a nonsense – a few paragraphs to cite reliable sources will in no way unbalance the article.

Wdford (talk) 20:55, 9 July 2017 (UTC)

I really think we have lost sight of what controversy we are even talking about. In regards to the British plans, even Ellis (British official historian) states the same thing you have gone in length to prove:

"The Overlord plan called for the Second Army (Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey) to secure the city and then form a front line from Caumont-l'Éventé to the south-east of Caen, acquiring airfields and protecting the left flank of the US First Army while it moved on Cherbourg.[5] Possession of Caen and its surroundings would give the Second Army a suitable staging area for a push south to capture Falaise, which could be used as the pivot for a swing left of the Allied front to advance on Argentan and then towards the Touques River.[6]"

To note, the above paragraph is on numerous Normandy articles. As far as I am aware, this is a non-issue. The "Master Plan" argument revolves around (and I note that you seem to avoid Bradley and Belchem) if everything went according to plan; the capture of territory? No, clearly. However, as Monty and co along with their supports have gone in length to discuss is that the whole point was to attract attention and pin down German forces. To be hyperbolic, the British army could have been sitting in Paris doing this along as it allowed the Americans to break out and circle around. We seem to have strayed away from that onto an over-focused attempt to prove that Second Army was suppose to capture Argentan etc. and thus Monty's plan failed.

"That doesn't sound like Bradley was agreeing that everything was going according to plan, does it?"

Not really for us to say is it. We can only report what the sources say. His own published opinion has already been posted here, in which he agrees the campaign went according to plan.

To reiterate, I believe we can achieve a comprise everyone is happy with and include something in this article; but the over the top attempt to prove one side wins over the other is not for here.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:55, 9 July 2017 (UTC)

In Bradley's own words:

"...In later years, some confusion would arise in the minds of military historians over the exact role Monty assigned his own forces in Overlord. There was never any confusion about his role at the time. Monty's self assigned mission was to seize Caen and the area south and east toward Falaise for the construction of Allied airfields and to give his ground forces a lodgement of sufficient size for resupply and maneuver. He did not ever envision a major "breakout" from his lodgement; the major breakout was to be conducted by my forces, wheeling as described; Monty would absorb the main shock of the enemy counterattack, pin down and kill as many of the enemy as possible (keeping them off my forces), providing the solid hub on which we would turn our wheel..." [ A General's life, p.234. My italics]. The exact timing of all of this was not entirely up to Bradley or Monty, since it depended on the German response: "...A key assumption in the Overlord plan was that after we had achieved overwhelming strength in Normandy the German armies facing us would make a gradual withdrawal to the Seine River, a natural defensive barrier. We also assumed that by that time the Germans would have awakened to the fact that Fortitude had been a deception, and the German Fifteenth Army would be shifted from Pas de Calais to the Seine for an all-out defense, the showdown battle for Germany. These were the prescribed textbook solutions to the German military battle in Normandy. But the Germans were not following the textbook. Hitler, still in pain and agony from the wounds he received in the assassination attempt, and distrustful of von Kluge's loyalty, had taken control of strategy on the Western Front. Against all military advice, he forbade withdrawal to the Seine. Not a foot of ground was to be yielded to the Allies. Not only that, he was hatching plans for a new and visionary counterattack that would shatter the Allies and drive us back into the sea. In preparation for this offensive, he released divisions from the Fifteenth Army at Pas de Calais to move to Normandy. Other units in southern France received similar orders. In all, Hitler committed some seven new divisions. Hitler had made the decision to fight the showdown battle for Germany not at the Seine, as we had anticipated, but in Normandy. It was the worst possible military strategy, one of the great mistakes of World War II..."[ A General's life, p.289 ]. This is not to suggest that Bradley and Monty didn't have some serious disagreements about the way the battle was fought and, for example, Bradley places the blame on Monty for not foreseeing the US Army's difficulties with the Bocage (as though Bradley was not an active participant in the planning, and as though there was any alternatives to placing the US Army where it was). And we can see that Bradley was also feeling the heat for the US Army's poor showing in July (First bolded segment below). Regarding GOODWOOD Bradley stated: "...Some historians have seized on these pronouncements, and others, to suggest that at this point there was a radical change in Allied strategy. That owing to lack of faith in the GI and the difficulty of the terrain facing my forces—the hedgerows and marshes—Monty had decided that he, not I, would mount the real breakout in good tank country and that Ike approved this change in strategy. This is not true. Monty's order to Dempsey's Second Army, dated July 15, clearly defines a limited offensive in which "a victory on the eastern flank will help us gain what we want on the Western Front." The aide he sent to the War Office also said, "All the activities on the eastern flank are designed to help the [American forces] in the west while ensuring that a firm bastion is kept in the east." What happened, I think, is that Monty promoted Goodwood to such a degree that Ike allowed himself to believe that it could develop into something larger than designed. At this point, Ike desperately wanted Monty to get moving. Goodwood was the first solid indication that Monty might really get moving. In his eagerness to buttress Monty's apparent resolve, Ike got a little carried away himself. Nor had Monty misled Ike into believing that he, Monty, had made a fundamental change in strategy—as some historians also suggest. Ike knew full well that the original Overlord strategy was still the guiding policy, that Goodwood was designed to support Cobra, the main breakout effort, and not the other way around. This is clearly shown, I believe, in an undated letter Ike wrote me on the eve of Cobra..."[ A General's life, p.274-275. My italics] and "...We viewed Goodwood as a limited thrust in support of Cobra and expected no more..."[A General's life, p.278. My italics]

I am pleased that there is finally confirmation of the objectives of the Overlord Plan - this non-issue has been the subject of much contention. I trust I am now allowed to tweak the planning paragraphs to make this plan fully clear? (If you would please provide the reference from Ellis, we could include an actual quote?)

The issue of the controversy has been much muddied here. The controversy extends across the entire length of the battle, and it relates to the "misunderstandings" about Montgomery's plans and intentions. It covers the D-Day objectives, as above, it includes the "evolving" of the plan after the failure to capture Caen as planned, and it covers Goodwood at the end, where Monty seemingly gave one set of orders to those below him, but a different set of objectives to those above him – including the air commanders and his direct superior, Eisenhower.

Per Baxter pg 80 – "Hamilton agreed with Monty's own chief of Intelligence, Brigadier Sir Edgar T. "Bill" Williams, that to say that everything went according to plan – as Monty insisted – was absolute nonsense. Things did not go according to plan: Caen was not taken on the first day, and the deep armored thrusts – "staking out claims" – did not occur."

Per Baxter pg 81 – "D'Este argues convincingly that between Monty's actual plans and later boasting, "a great gulf lay". … Only after the failure to take Caen, in D'Este's view, did Monty emphasise 2nd Army's defensive role in acting as a magnet for German armour. Failure to take Caen soon after D-Day, in D'Este's view, was not just a "local setback", but a major failure. … D'Este is a strong advocate of the view that Monty changed his plans to meet the new circumstances."

Re Bradley, who was below Monty in the chain at that time, the mission was indeed to seize Caen and the area south and east toward Falaise for the construction of Allied airfields and to give his ground forces a lodgement of sufficient size for resupply and maneuver. Bradley states that Monty did not ever envision a "major" breakout in the east, but since Falaise was 40km past Caen, and Argentan etc a great deal further inland than that, presumably he envisaged a "minor" breakout at least.

Bradley notes that "a key assumption" was the German armies would withdraw to the Seine River, but then Hitler acted differently. So that key part of the plan didn’t work out either.

Regarding Goodwood, Bradley was defending the performance of his own troops. When he states that "Monty's order to Dempsey's Second Army, dated July 15, clearly defines a limited offensive in which "a victory on the eastern flank will help us gain what we want on the Western Front," that is clearly in contradiction with what Blumenson reports was communicated to Ike and to SHAEF. Therein lies the controversy.

Baxter (pg 75) cites Stacey: "Colonel Stacey observed that the misunderstandings regarding Montgomery's plans were understandable given his communications to Eisenhower before the battle, which indicated that Goodwood was a breakthrough operation."

This "misunderstanding" is also mentioned in Blumenson, who has a whole section headed "In Search of a Breakthrough: GOODWOOD". To cite some excerpts, from page 188 onward: "The Second Army launched a strong attack (GOODWOOD) that promised the Allies an excellent chance of achieving a breakthrough. Had it succeeded, COBRA would probably have been unnecessary." … "He alerted Dempsey to hold a corps of three armored divisions in reserve for a "massive stroke" east of the Orne River from Caen to Falaise." … "Whether the primary intention of GOODWOOD was to aid COBRA by forcing the Germans to engage their mobile reserves and the secondary intention to achieve a breakthrough, or whether the reverse was true - though perhaps unimportant in the final analysis and perhaps even unknown to General Montgomery at the time – later became a matter of doubt and controversy." … "Promising General Eisenhower that his "whole eastern flank" would "burst into flames," General Montgomery requested the "whole weight of air power" to bring about a "decisive" victory." … And page 194: "To those in the Allied camp who had expected a decisive breakthrough and exploitation, expressions of satisfaction seemed hollow."

Belchem is an interesting case. He was also a member of Montgomery's inner circle, and he did indeed support Monty's version. Powers has criticized Belchem's accuracy. Powers (in Hixon 154-155) notes that Belchem failed to include in his memoir the objective of breaking out into the open country south of Caen on D-Day. Per Powers, Belchem contended that Monty only included the airfields etc in the plan to "buy-off" the air chiefs – this is also supported by D'Este. Powers also states (Hixon pg 161) that Monty "glibly promised" the airfields, which contradicts de Guingand somewhat. Powers also criticized Belchem's "stout" defense of Monty re Goodwood (Hixon pg 154), which assertion Powers says was "unrealistic".

Buckley in Monty's Men (pg 97) states that Belchem claimed that Monty deliberately withheld from Ike the fact that he had reduced the Goodwood plan, so as to maintain the support of SHEAF and the bombers etc. And, of course, Belchem's views are not entirely in line with those of the more senior people.

So, re the way forward – it would help a lot if the Ellis quote could be added to the planning sections. It is also clear that the controversy was reported in various reliable sources, including D'Este and Blumenson and Stacey, also Carafano etc, so per WP:NPOV we should include it in the article as well. It only needs two or three paragraphs, which is surely not "undue weight" as has been contended by certain editors? Wdford (talk) 16:45, 10 July 2017 (UTC)

Do stop trolling the talk page, there's a good chap.Keith-264 (talk) 17:33, 10 July 2017 (UTC)

Some of the critics seem to think that Montgomery was under some obligation to tell all and sundry his true plans for Normandy. Well, he wasn't. He wasn't stupid enough to do this and then risk seeing the details published in the newspapers, thus alerting the Germans. He told his subordinates what they needed to know. As long as they did their tasks as-ordered then the overall plan of the battle for Normandy was none of their business. The Normandy battle included an element of deception that might have caused the whole invasion attempt to fail if the Germans had caught on to it. Luckily, helped by various of the 'faint-hearted' in the Allied camp, who broadcast Monty's 'failures' in the Press, they didn't. In fact, they (the critics) helped convince the Germans they were doing the right thing in increasing pressure on the British around Caen, when in fact they should have paid more attention to Bradley in the west.

BTW, look at a map. The German panzer reserves were all kept roughly mid-way between the Pas de Calais and Normandy because before the invasion Hitler couldn't decide in which of these two areas the invasion was going to land. Montgomery knew this, as he had Ultra. When the invasion occurred these reserves were then faced with travelling to the invasion areas, and this meant transiting the main road and rail hub that was Caen. To reach Bradley's Americans these reserves were forced to go through Caen first. THAT's why Montgomery didn't mind Caen not being taken on schedule. The heavier the fighting around Caen the less likely the German panzer reserves were ever likely to get to Bradley. The more the 'faint-hearted' publicly criticised Montgomery for 'failing' to take Caen the better it suited his plan. They (the critics) actually helped it succeed, as their criticism was being published in the newspapers and the Germans were reading them.

Oh, I nearly forgot. Hitler couldn't decide where the invasion was to land, and ordered the panzer reserves stationed mid-way between the two possible landing sites, because of the deception operations that took place before and during the invasion, specifically Operation Fortitude. Guess who was one of the the driving forces behind that. Well, Montgomery was. Even before the invasion was launched on June 6th he knew these panzer reserves would have to pass through Caen to get to the west, where Bradley's Americans were to operate. So Montgomery didn't 'make-it-all-up afterwards'.

Oh, and another thing. The British achieved all their planned D+90 objectives several days early. They could not have done this if Caen and the other 'failures' in the fighting in Normandy had delayed them.

... and finally. Normally it is reckoned to require a 300% numerical superiority in forces in order to successfully carry out a land invasion. Montgomery did a successful amphibious one with a superiority of only 25%. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.11.144 (talk) 18:12, 12 July 2017 (UTC)