Talk:Battle of Camperdown/Archives/2023/December

Dutch point of view

When one reads this article, its references, and the bibliography at the end, soon the question arises: what did Dutch historians think and what (primary) Dutch material is available that is not mentioned in the article? To start with the latter question, when I did a quick Google search I found a report entitled: Volledig verslag van de zee-battaille van den 11 October laatstleden, tusschen de Bataafsche en Engelsche Vlooten by Olivier, G. van; Besier, A.G.; Polders, J.M.; Winter, De; Committé tot de zaken van de Marine (Complete report on the sea battle of last 11 October between the Batavian and English fleets), commissioned by the Nationale Vergadering of the Batavian Republic and published (among others) in its Dagverhaal der handelingen van de Nationale vergadering representeerende het volk van Nederland, Volume 7 (The Hague 1797), pp. 797 ff. [1]. It is indeed a very extensive and comprehensive narrative (published as an appendix to the debate in the Dagverhaal) that probably would have been an important source for Dutch historians (and British historians if they would take the trouble of reading it, or having it translated). But of the first there appears to be little, and of the latter apparently none at all:-) I did find one Dutch historical work online that mentions the report and uses its material: Gerrit Dirk Bom (Hgz.), "D'Vrijheid" 1781-1797: geschiedenis van een vlaggeschip (Bom 1897), p.225 [2], which is a bit disappointing. Of course, this work is also in Dutch and therefore "inaccessible" (one is reminded of the poor Persians who only come to us through the eyes of the Classical Greek historians, their mortal enemies, because "who reads Old Persian?").

I did find an anecdote in an English-language source that seems to have slipped the attention of most historians. It relates that admiral De Winter, while being conveyed by his captors from his damaged flagship to Duncan's flagship, inadvertently stepped on a piece of driftwood that was not sufficiently secured, and went into the drink. He was rescued with some difficulty so that he could the enact the celebrated surrender ceremony (after his captors had handed his sword back to him) on the deck of HMS Venerable. Cf. Joseph Allen, Admiral De Winter's Surrender, in: The Living Age, Volume 2 (Littel & Cy, 1844), pp. 362 ff.[3]

On reflection, it may not be a good idea to insert this "anecdote" as there is serious doubt as to its veracity. The anecdote was published originally in an article in the United Service Magazine of 1844 (the link I gave above is a reprint). The "premier" Dutch naval historian of the 19th century read the article also and in 1848 commented extensively on its veracity in his article on the Battle of Camperdown: J.C. de Jonge, Onderneming tegen Ierland en zeeslag van Kamperduin, 11 october 1797, in : Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche zeewezen: Van de omwenteling des jaars 1795 tot de inlijving in Frankrijk, 1810, Zesde deel, tweede stuk (Van Cleef 1848), pp. 217-219 [4]. On the one hand he tells us that already in October, 1797 rumors were published about the affair in Dutch newspapers, based on English stories, and the notorious intrigant J.C. Hespe put a request before the Nationale Vergadering on Nov. 6, 1797 "to give the two English seamen who had rescued Admiral De Winter with fear for their own life a reward." But he immediately adds that he has spoken with a close personal friend of the Admiral, Mr. P.W. Provo Kluyt (president of the provincial Court of Appeal of North Holland), who told him he had asked his friend about the rumors, and was told that the admiral had just stumbled and only got one foot wet, but needed no rescue, because he was never in danger of drowning. He then goes into rumors about De Winter having tried to commit suicide, which need not detain us here. In conclusion, I would suggest that this anecdote should not be included in the article, unless in a "trivia" section at the end about the way rumors about the battle were still bandied about more than 40 years after the battle.--Ereunetes (talk) 20:39, 23 December 2017 (UTC)

In any case, might it be an idea to add these references in the appropriate place in the article?--Ereunetes (talk) 20:55, 20 December 2017 (UTC)

Thank you for these notes - I will revisit the article again in the near future and make amendments based on the sources you have supplied.--Jackyd101 (talk) 02:39, 23 December 2017 (UTC)

Please wait! I have found a lot more "goodies" in the article of J.C. de Jonge I cite above in another context. He has a lot on the importance of the difficulties De Winter had in organising his line of battle, and the possible consequences this had for the result. This played an important role in the scandal that erupted after De Winter returned and vindictively went after his "incompetent' and "cowardly" underlings, resulting in a string of courts martial (referred to already later in the article). In the course of these trials a lot of additional relevant information became available, that one won't find in the English literature. And De Jonge bases his extensive analysis of the events mostly on these witness statements. I still have to read the story about those trials, but one not inconsequential omission I discovered, is that you overlooked an entire rear-admiral (also in the Order of Battle article). This was Frederik Alexander Meurer who shared command of the Jupiter with vice-admiral (not rear-admiral) Reijntjes. It turns out that Reijntjes had had a stroke just before the fleet sailed and therefore was not fully fit for command, so the naval board assigned Meurer to "assist" him. It became more than just "assisting" when Reijntjes received his mortal wound during the battle, so much that you ascribe to Reijntjes was actually Meurer's doing (it is strange that English sources miss Meurer, as he was made a prisoner of war together with Reijntjes, so his presence was known). As Reijntjes died in captivity, Meurer got to bear the brunt of De Winter's ire and he was indeed one of the officers who were convicted of dereliction of duty. Because of this he wrote a pamphlet to defend his good name, that also should count as an important Dutch primary source on at least the part the Jupiter had in the battle (entitled, in translation, "On what grounds could the surrender of the Jupiter be condemned?"). together with his trial record and a memoir he wrote in 1808, apparently in a polemic with De Winter. Another important point is that in the description of the engagement of the frigate HMS Endymion with Brutus in the Return Journeys section you have rear-admiral Bloys van Treslong still firmly in command, while that person at the time was so ill from the recent amputation of his arm, that he was later not even able to file his own after-battle report. This had to be done by his flag captain, commander (not commodore, as the article on the order of battle erroneously has it) Polders, who also led the ship in its engagement with HMS Endymion. In short, there are still a lot of facts to check. I hope to get back to you in the next few days.--Ereunetes (talk) 21:45, 23 December 2017 (UTC)

Problem with anecdote about Wassenaer striking twice

As an example of the dangers of only relying on British sources I would like to point at the example of the anecdote of the Wassenaer striking twice, first to Triumph, but then rehoisting her colors after an unnamed Dutch brig allegedly fired at her, and the second time to Russell. The article gives as reference (currently 55) for the story about the Dutch brig: Clowes p.329. But if one looks up this reference it turns out this is an unsourced footnote. However, the source may be another unsourced footnote, this time in the work by James, referenced in the article, either on p. 70 (in the version the reference links to online), or p. 31 in an edition I found in Google books[5]. This footnote also appears to be the source for the assertion that Wassenaer struck the second time to Russell (which the article justifies with reference 60 to Lloyd, p.150, though that reference also turns out to be unsourced. In sum, we only seem to have James as the original source for this anecdote, and he does not tell us where he got his information. The problem with all this is that in Dutch sources there is no mention of this. According to J.C. de Jonge, chapter Onderneming tegen Ierland en zeeslag van Kamperduin, 11 october 1797 in: Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewezen, vol. 5 (1862) pp. 284-423, the most authoritative Dutch secondary source on the battle of Camperdown, based on many Dutch archival sources and the trial records of the courts martial of the Dutch officers, Wassenaer surrendered only once, to three unidentified British ships, after she had suffered debilitating damage in a duel with (probably) Triumph, which ship, however, broke off the fight and sailed further down the line, without the Wassenaer having struck to her. So the Dutch version confirms the duel with Triumph(but denies striking her colours at this time), and then striking to an overwhelmingly superior force later on (p. 336). The source here is the after-battle report of the commander of the Wassenaer, cdr. Holland. There is no mention of a Dutch brig opening fire on her and this no doubt would have been an event that would not have eluded cdr. Holland, or failed to draw the interest of the court, if it had happened. The Dutch would have known which brig it concerned, and there would have been a witness statement of its master to justify his action. Lacking all of this documentation I submit that the anecdote is highly suspicious and should be eliminated from the article as being unsubstantiated.--Ereunetes (talk) 02:17, 23 December 2017 (UTC)

Thanks for this comment. I'm not saying that you are wrong on the facts (I expect you are correct), but the anecdote is not "unsubstantiated" - as you note, it appears in three respected English-language histories of the battle. That they do not give their sources is immaterial in an encyclopedia such as this which relies on published reliable sources rather than editor assumptions and original research. When I take a look at this article again in the near future, following the interesting information you've left here and on my talk page, I will rephrase to reflect the lack of mention in Dutch sources, but given how widely sourced it is we cannot just remove it because we think its an English exaggeration. Best--Jackyd101 (talk) 02:36, 23 December 2017 (UTC)

Well, as I explained above, at least the part about the "Dutch brig shooting at the Wassenaer because she had struck her colors is apparently just a spurious remark by one naval historian, however respected (but who made other serious errors, like announcing the death of De Winter in captivity), and the fact that others have repeated it without checking it, is hardly a recommendation as to its veracity. I also object, because the story puts an undeserved black mark on the reputation of the captain and crew of the Wassenaer who are now implicitly accused of "cowardice" (why would the brig otherwise have fired on its own comrades?). If one wants a story about cowardice during the battle there are better examples. Whether or not the Wassenaer indeed struck twice remains a matter of debate; I think the Triumph, noting the state of disarray of its opponent, just assumed that the Wassenaer would strike, before breaking off the fight, and that later the Russell found the wreck drifting around and accepted its surrender--Ereunetes (talk) 20:57, 23 December 2017 (UTC)

Suggestions for improvements

As promised I have cursorily studied the relevant Dutch naval-historical literature about the subject of the battle of Kamperduin and have come to the conclusion that the best secondary source to use would be the 1862 version of Johannes Cornelis de Jonge, Onderneming tegen Ierland en zeeslag van Kamperduin, 11 October 1797 (Enterprise against Ireland and sea battle of Camperdown, 11 October 1797), in: Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche zeewezen, Deel V (Haarlem 1862), pp. 284-422[6]. Caution, there are multiple editions online. This is the one edited by de Jonge's son, from 1862, where the chapter is part of Deel V. The original version was published in 1848, in "Deel 6, tweede stuk" and has pagination 117-314. For consistency one should select one of these editions as otherwise the page references would clash. De Jonge was since 1831 the Rijksarchivaris (chief archivist of the Netherlands), and as such the keeper of the Dutch National Archives. In other words, he had the relevant Dutch primary sources at his fingertips. He published a series of books about Dutch naval history, of which this was the final one. One may consider him "the Dutch James" as Dutch naval historians tend to follow his account of the Battle as "authoritative", just like many British historians follow James (errors and all). He used primary sources like the Dagverhaal of the Dutch Nationale Vergadering (which one might consider the "Congressional Record" of that parliament of the Batavian Republic), which contained many of the relevant reports, and also the proceedings of the Hoge Zeekrijgsraad (High Naval Court) that was charged with the trials of the Dutch officers after the scandal about the battle broke when de Winter returned in 1798. The witness statements in those proceedings shed a detailed light on the events as perceived from the Dutch side and the motivations of the Dutch officers (particularly de Winter). Of course, like the British literature, the Dutch literature and sources are partial and biased, but if we use them wisely, by comparing the two sides and use our common sense, they may correct the regrettably often factually defective narrative, as given in the article. The chapter written by de Jonge is eminently useful for this purpose, because it follows the structure of the article: French/Batavian designs on Ireland, British mutinies, de Winter's cruise, the several stages of the battle (and what went wrong on the respective sides), and aftermath, but from the Dutch perspective. So the comparison is made easier.

Background This section is written from a somewhat biased perspective vis a vis the Batavian Republic as a "puppet state" of the French Republic. But one can't have it both ways: if the Batavians were French puppets, the French should be held accountable for everything that went wrong also. In reality, the situation was more nuanced, as one may infer from the account given in Simon Schama Patriots and Liberators. Revolution in the Netherlands 1780–1813 (1977). Interestingly, the account given of the history of the Batavian/French "Project of Ireland" by both Schama and de Jonge is mostly the same (they used the same sources) so I would prefer Schama as the main reference in this case. Both show that the Project was a grandiose, two-pronged invasion of Ireland, to attack Great-Britain in the back, and secondarily to support an Irish insurrection. Initially, a French-Spanish fleet would land in the South of Ireland, while the Batavian fleet, with 25,000 French soldiers in transport ships, would sail around Scotland, and land in the North of Ireland (it was never intended that this fleet would combine with the Franco-Spanish fleet). The Battle of Cape St Vincent (1797) put paid to the Franco-Spanish part of the project, because the Spanish navy was no longer capable of providing the promised support and with this the French also lost their appetite. However, general Hoche and the Batavian Commission on Foreign Policy (a secretive policy-making body within the Nationale Vergadering to which the Naval Affairs Committee and the "Alliance"/Army Affairs Committee were subordinated) were still raring to go. The plan was amended in the Spring of 1797, after it became clear that France was no longer going to do the Southern invasion, or provide troops, in the sense that the invasion would be limited to the northern prong, and the troops to be used would be 15,000 Batavian troops under the command of the revolutionary hero lt. gen. Herman Willem Daendels, to be transported in Batavian ships and escorted by the Batavian fleet. The route was to be around Scotland (at one point even a landing in Scotland, followed by a march through Scotland, and a re-embarkation on the Scottish west coast was considered) and the expedition should leave as soon as possible from the Texel. So the 15,000 Batavian troops were embarked in transport ships, lying in the Texel roadstead, where they spent the whole Summer of 1797 waiting for the adverse prevailing Westerly winds to abate (which are seasonal in that part of the world). This situation became untenable at the end of the Summer, as the troops suffered great privations aboard the transports, so the Commission on Foreign Affairs decided to abort the expedition (except for a secondary project to send part of the fleet to the Dutch West Indies with troops to strengthen the garrisons there. The troops selected for that secondary expedition mutinied aboard their transports, when their colleagues were allowed to disembark, while they had to stay aboard. Admiral de Winter suppressed that insurrection and had the ringleaders put in irons in his ships, where they still were when the battle started). But despite the cancellation of the expedition the Commission still felt that the Batavian fleet should make a demonstration against the British fleet, and this for internal political reasons. This was because the Patriot faction during the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War two decades earlier, had strongly attacked the Orangist government of the Dutch Republic about the reluctance of the Dutch fleet to engage the British, characterising it as "pure cowardice". To avoid similar taunts from the Orangist opposition, and the wrath of the Patiot-faction "base", the Commission now felt constrained to demonstrate that a similar "cowardly" attitude did not exist among the new Batavian navy. So Admiral de Winter, against his better judgment, was ordered to make a sortie from his lair at the Texel roadstead (not port), as soon as the winds would become favorable (i.e. from an easterly direction) and he was explicitly ordered to offer battle to a British fleet, unless the odds were overwhelmingly against him. The winds changed favorably on October 5, 1797, and after further prodding from the Commission (who would rue this after the battle, because it opened them up to political attacks), the Batavian fleet set out to sea on October 7. But not to embark on a "sweep down the English Channel", as the article would have it, because the Dutch had no intention of being locked up in Brest. See for all of this De Jonge, pp. 284 - 309, and Schama, pp. 278-283. The mutinies at Spithead and Nore are treated en passant in these accounts, but give no reason to change anything in the article, except to answer the question "Why didn't the French/Batavians take advantage?" with the reply of both de Jonge and Schama: "because neither was ready at the time to launch the expedition to Ireland".

The narrative in the article further down, and de Jonge's narrative run parallel in broad strokes. However, in the important details there are big discrepancies. I will attempt to point a number of those out, with my arguments why I think the version of de Jonge is better founded. I will therefore enter my comments in the form of suggested edits in the relevant parts of the sections of the article.

De Winter's cruise

"By the middle of August 1797, after six weeks of constant easterly winds that kept his ships trapped in their harbour". This of course should be "westerly winds". Also the ships were lying in a roadstead, not a harbour, as the port of Den Helder did not yet exist.

In my opinion the first paragraph contains a number of speculations by British historians, that are not supported by the facts. For instance, as I showed above, the decision to abort the expedition to Ireland at the end of August was not de Winter's to make. It was taken by the Commission of Foreign Affairs. Also, it was never the Dutch intent "to join the French at Brest", but to sail around Scotland on the way to Ireland. So he did not "abandon the plan" to do that. So it is not necessary to come up with all the reasons why he might have "abandoned" it. Some of the reasons mentioned may indeed be reasons why he was reluctant to follow the order to make a sortie. But that is a different context. Those reasons had not deterred the Commission when it came up with the harebrained idea of the expedition to Ireland. Needless to say, de Jonge does not discuss these speculations, because he was not aware of them. The sentence "Although De Winter was an avowed republican ... support for the House of Orange remained strong among the Dutch population and with the fleet's sailors.[" lacks in logic: the one fact had nothing to do with the other, so if anything it could be better formulated.

"Preparing the ships for sea took some time, and the Dutch did not manage to leave the Texel until 10:00 on 8 October" According to de Jonge this was at 9.30 AM local time (which is one hour later than English time; I shall henceforth convert all Dutch times to "English" times) but one day earlier: October 7 (de Jonge, p.308, note 1 and p. 309; this comes in the middle of a discussion of the row-by-express-letter the Commission and de Winter had about his reluctance to obey their order to put to sea, which in turn played an important part later on when both parties were blaming each other for the disastrous consequences of that order).

"De Winter turning southwest in the hope of linking with another Dutch ship of the line at the mouth of the River Maas." This at least is correct: the ship was the Kortenaer (capt. Van Grootenray) that together with the frigate Scipio was blocked up in Hellevoetsluis by a blockading flotilla of five British ships, which, together with the well-known "adverse winds" prevented Van Grootenray from coming out to sea. (de Jonge, p. 309)

" Having failed to make the rendezvous off the Maas, De Winter then turned to the northwest, cruising off Lowestoft in Suffolk..." De Winter turned indeed northwest, but did not get this close to England (according to de Jonge he never got further from the Dutch coast than about 11 to 12 miles; de Jonge, p. 310). Instead, in the night of 10 on 11 October he went on a NE course (with NNW wind) to either offer battle if he encountered a British fleet, or return to the Texel (de Jonge, p. 312).

"The weather was poor, with heavy seas and strong wind from the southeast ..." The wind had been NW for most of the time, so how it suddenly got to the SE for the British is somewhat mysterious. The rest of this weather bulletin is confirmed by de Jonge (p. 313).

Duncan's attack

I have no problems with the first few paragraphs, describing the difficulties Duncan had organising his line of battle. However, the next paragraph "De Winter had originally intended to close his line up into a solid defensive platform and retreat to shallower waters while Duncan formed his own line of battle, but the sudden, disorganised British attack had thrown his plans into confusion. As a result, gaps had opened up between his van, centre and rear, leaving the last four ships greatly outnumbered and unsupported.[46] De Winter gave urgent orders for the van and centre to drop back and assist the rear, but there was little time, and his situation looked desperate ..." is pure fantasy. De Jonge gives a very deailed account of what happened really, and this is supported by a great deal of documentary material, as admiral de Winter later blamed his defeat for a great part on the mistakes that were made executing his orders, and caused a number of his officers to be tried for dereliction of duty. The witness statements during the trials provide the detailed information. According to the narrative of de Jonge the following is what happened. The Batavian fleet was sailing in three columns (van, center, and rear, from windward to leeward) sailing on an easterly course, when the British fleet was observed around the same time Duncan saw the Batavian fleet (8.30 AM English time). At 9 AM de Winter ordered the three divsions to go into line of battle with the signal " op de bij den wind linie van bataille, over stuurboord met bakboordshalzen toe, achter den anderen" (signal No. 655 of the General Signalbook; de Jonge, p. 314). This deserves some explanation, before I attempt a translation into English. In the first place the English expression "on the port tack" would be translated in nautical Dutch as "over stuurboord", so the exact opposite. This is because the Dutch refer to the position of the sails (toward starboard with a wind coming from port), while the English refer to the side of the ship the wind is coming in. So in this case the correct translation needs to be that the ships were ordered "on the port tack". "Met bakboords halzen toe" literally means "with port sheets drawn tight" (indeed, what else would one do on the port tack?, so this seems a bit superfluous), but I think this would be in idiomatic nautical English "on the larboard". As far as I understand, in English parlance this superfluous specification would normally be omitted, as it is a repetition in other words of "on the port tack". The entire sentence would then become: "in line of battle, close hauled on the port tack, behind your predecessor". This appears easy enough, but what is "your predecessor"? Evidently, this could not be determined on the spot. De Winter had issued a directive about the sailing order in the line of battle on July 6, but had issued a different sailing order on July 17. He later maintained that the directive of July 17 was intended only for the specific case the fleet had to form the line of battle while exiting the Texel, but that the order in all other cases was still the one of July 6. This had been misunderstood by rear-admiral Bloys van Treslong, the commander of the windward van division, who was supposed to swing into position at the point of the line. Three ships of the van took up their assigned position, but Bloys in Brutus and his "wingman" Tjerk Hiddes remained lying to windward, with their topsails held back , evidently to let the other ships pass (de Jonge, p. 314). De Winter repeated the signal, but Bloys later asserted he had not seen this and eventually he went into the line at the end of the center division (what he considered the best position for his ship). This may have improved strength of the center of the line of battle, but it weakenend the van appreciably. Also there were now no flag officers present in the van. A few minutes later de Winter signalled the Tjerk Hiddes to make sail (speed up) and go to her assigned position in the van, but he did not give a similar signal to Brutus, leaving her at the end of the center division (de Jonge, p. 315). In the rear division the correct sequence of the ships was accidentally also not observed. The Delft had previously been detached to investigate a number of merchant ships to leeward, and had therefore difficulty getting back to the fleet in time to take up its assigned position between Jupiter (vice-admiral Reijntjes and rear-admiral Meurer) and the Cerberus. When the Delft finally arrived the Cerberus did not leave enough room for the Delft, and Reijntjes, observing this, sent the frigate Monnikendam to convey his order to the Delft to take up position at the very end of the line, behind Alkmaar. The captain of the Delft obeyed the order, despite the fact that he judged that the placement of two "50-ers", the most-lightly armed ships in the fleet (Alkmaar and Delft), at the end of the line weakened the battle line appreciably (as turned out to be correct during the battle). (de Jonge, p. 316). In the center division the intended sequence was also changed by improvisation, as the Wassenaar ("a notoriously badly trimmed ship") did not succeed in taking its assigned place behind the Vrijheid of admiral de Winter. So de Winter ordered Staten Generaal (rear-admiral Story) verbally to take up position behind Vrijheid, and Wassenaar behind that ship. The result was that the center had two flag ships behind each other, not ideal either (de Jonge, p. 316). The line of battle thus having been improvised, another accident befell the commander-in-chief. The main top-sail yard of the Vrijheid suddenly broke (without apparent cause), causing the ship to immediately lose speed. This forced the Staten generaal behind her to steer out of the line to avoid a collision, so the ships ended up with the stern of the Vrijheid to windward of the bow of the Staten Generaal, which overlap had not yet been remedied by the time the British reached this part of the Batavian line of battle (this may also explain why Duncan with Venerable could not break through the line between Vrijheid and Staten Generaal, but had to pass behind Staten Generaal later on) (de Jonge, p. 317). At this time de Winter also noticed a number of gaps in the Dutch line (behind the first-most ship, Gelijkheid, that was racing too fast ahead and had to be admonished to lessen sail; between Staten Generaal and Wassenaar, because of this mishap; and between Jupiter and Haarlem in the rear division), but time was lacking (except in the case of the van) to remedy these gaps, so they were in place when the British ships reached the Dutch line, and these were the two gaps that Onslow and Duncan eventually utilized to breach the Dutch line (de Jonge, p. 317-318). In sum, the account de Jonge gives contradicts the statement in the article (which I already quoted above): "De Winter gave urgent orders for the van and centre to drop back and assist the rear, but there was little time, and his situation looked desperate: although the Dutch and British lines each mustered 16 ships, the British vessels were almost all larger and more strongly built than their Dutch counterparts, and their crews were experienced seamen in the heavy weather conditions, while the Dutch crews, confined to port for the previous year, had little understanding of the skills required in combat at sea." As shown above Winter did not "give urgent orders for the van and centre to drop back and assist the rear..." also because that would have been quite difficult to do given the "closely hauled" course the Dutch line of battle was maintaining. The Dutch van and centre would have had to come about to reach the rear, which only would have made the situation far worse (they were using square-rigged sailing ships, after all, not motor boats). Also, though the Dutch seamen may have been inexperienced in naval combat (de Jonge, p. 321 notes complaints by Dutch officers about this), they were all professional sailors (unlike many "press-ganged landlubbers" in the British ranks) and in this phase of the battle there was no fighting going on, so the relatively simple maneuver of forming the line of battle was not beyond their skill. And nobody on the Dutch side asserted this as an excuse: everybody knew that all Dutch crew members were hired as seasoned professional sailors (though many were of German or Scandinavian origin, but that has nothing to do with their skill set); the Dutch did not use impressment, and conscription was not introduced before 1810, so they were dependent on voluntary enlistees, but could limit their hiring to able seamen on the other hand. So de Winter did not blame the crews for the errors made during the formation of the line of battle (though he had reason to blame his own "staff work"). De Jonge explicitly blamed that staff work, and the onbezeildheid("notoriously bad trim") of two of the ships: Wassenaar and Haarlem (de Jonge, p. 325), but exactly because this defect had long been known, this was something de Winter should have allowed for himself. In any case, the commanders of the two ships were not blamed for the results of their ship's defects at the later trial before the Hoge Zeekrijgsraad. In his concluding comments de Jonge in addition throws cold water on de Winter's claim that the defects of the line of battle in itself "cost him the battle", though the breach of the line of battle in two places was a deciding factor (but the weakness of the line was only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for that breach). Other factors were more important.(de Jonge, pp. 419-422)

Finally, as my personal comment (I do not get this directly from de Jonge) I would like to add that forming the line of battle was a routine matter that even the most junior lieutenant could plan, at least in theory. Naval tactics theory was something a naval officer was examined on, before getting his commission. There were manuals on naval tactics on both sides that in exhaustive detail prescribed the optimal courses in all kinds of situations, with the attendant maneuvers one had to perform. And the maneuvers were translated into standard signals that one had to learn by heart (just like the tactics were probably learned by rote). I found several contemporary Dutch manuals online, like G. Hulst van Keulen, Grondbeginselen der zee-tacticq ("Principles of naval tactics" in old Dutch), published in 1782, so just in time for the Fourth Anglo-Dutch war. In the English language I found Constantine Richard MOORSOM, The Principles of Naval Tactics Exemplified (William Clowes 1843), who already in the introduction discusses the problems of forming the line of battle from three divisions, and the pros and cons of breaching the line (pp. 4 ff.) All heady stuff, in other words that would provide valuable background information for an article like this, because it lets us landlubbers understand what came naturally to a naval officer of the day. Also, the effects of certain tactical decisions, like going on a close-hauled course, should be understood, if one wants to understand what happened and why. Sailing such a course, if there is sufficient wind, causes the ships to heel to the side opposite that from which the wind comes in. So, sailing close-hauled on the port tack implies that the ship will heel to starboard. If the ship heels sufficiently, the lower gun ports may be submerged, depriving the ship of the services of its lower starboard battery (usually the heaviest guns). So, going on the port tack in the line of battle usually has the advantage that the enemy, even if he attacks before the wind from windward (as in this case) will start heeling to starboard when he luffs up to the parallel course to windward of the line. So the battery on the side of the attacking ship that is aimed at the ship in the line, may not be fully usable, while the attacked ship has full use of its port battery. Conversely, once ships had breached the enemy line, and assumed a parallel course to lee of the line, it would be the attacked ships that were deprived of the use of their starboard battery, while the attacking ships now had the full use of their port batteries. Of course, the amount of heeling varies with the force of the wind, and the amount of sail a ship has deployed. De Winter had ordered his fleet to carry klein zeil ("short sail"; de Jonge, p. 318), i.e. to use only the top sails, not the full complement of sails. He sacrificed speed this way, but the ships became easier to handle, and would have heeled less than with full sails, so diminishing the problem with the starboard batteries. Still, Wassenaar in her battle with two British ships (on either side), could not fully utilize her starboard battery, because of the heeling problem (de Jonge, p. 336). And I am sure there were other, similar cases.

Collapse of the Dutch rearguard

"The Dutch ships had waited until the British were well within effective range in order to maximise the effect of their shot,..." De Jonge cites Dutch critics, who deplore that Reijntjes waited "too long". In any case, the Dutch do not appear to have been waiting till they saw the whites of the British eyes. (de Jonge, p. 390, note 1)

" In response, Onslow opened fire on the smaller vessels, destroying the frigate's wheel and damaging the rigging, so that the ship fell back ..." De Jonge, describing the same event, does not mention any damage to steering wheel or rudder, but mentions that Monnikendam (one "k" in modern Dutch in "Monnikendam"') let herself fall back into the lee of Alkmaar, and assisted that ship in her defense. However, when the steering wheel of the Alkmaar was then damaged, that ship was forced to veer to leeward out of the line of battle, and collided with Monnikendam shattering her poop. Apparently two separate events have been conflated here. Still cdr. Lancester did not give up, but he eventually had to strike against Beaulieu. Unfortunately, de Jong does not mention which brig accompanied Monnikendam, if any Dutch brig did. (de Jonge, pp. 327-328)

"...HMS Monmouth, which passed between Alkmaar and Delft..." De Jonge denies that Monmouth passed between Alkmaar and Delft. In his version Montagu, not Monmouth, made an attempt to break through in front of Alkmaar but he says that ship passed behind Delft (the last ship in the Dutch line), together with another 74-er, which he probably mistakenly, identifies as Powerfull (maybe it was one of the "late arrivals" mentioned in the article?). Unfortunately, de Jonge does not identify other British ships, but says only that the two mentioned above went behind Delft to the leeward of the Dutch rear (in addition of course to Monarch), while three other ships (among whom Russell) stayed on the windward side. The point is important, because there does not appear to have been a gap between Alkmaar and Delft, so it appears to be unlikely that Monmouth (or Montagu) would have tried to do the more difficult thing of going in front of Delft (de Jonge, p. 328). Besides, any other interpretation would defy the laws of physics. Everybody seems to agree that Monmouth "somehow" got to the leeward of the Dutch line and engaged Alkmaar and Delft from their leeward, on a course parallel with the course of the Dutch line. This would have been impossible, at least as far as Delft is concerned, if Monmouth had crossed in front of Delft (except for a broadside into Delft's bow during the passage through the line). Because then Monmouth would have had to go "the wrong way", on the starboard tack, and nobody asserts this. Alternatively, Monmouth, after luffing up to get on the parallel course, could have "braked" (by holding back her topsails) to allow Delft to come up from behind (like Monnikendam must have done earlier, to get alongside Alkmaar), and then engage her with the port battery. But again, nobody reports such a maneuver. This is also unlikely, because such a maneuver would have made Monmouth vulnerable to a broadside from Delft's starboard battery into the port-rear of Monmouth, while Delft was coming up from behind (while Monmouth would still not have been able to bring her own port battery to bear fully). So de Jonge's account seems to be the more plausible.

For the remainder of this part of the battle in the Dutch rear, de Jonge goes in much detail about the ordeal of Alkmaar and Delft without giving information that contradicts the account in this paragraph of the article. He does not identify the British ships involved with these two Dutch ships, so making it difficult to check the accounts for discrepancies. He does, however, mention Cerberus (cdr. Jacobsson), whose position was just in front of Jupiter. This ship is not mentioned in the account in the article, probably because after only a few broadsides it absconded to leeward, passing the embattled Vrijheid, without coming to the assistance of his embattled commander-in-chief, and took no more part in the battle. He eventually joined the ships that were collected by rear-admiral Story and returned to the Texel. Initially, Jacobsson got a very favorable review in the report of the Committee for Naval Affairs, but he was eventually charged with cowardice and convicted by the Hoge Zeekrijgsraad (de Jonge, pp. 331-333). The disappearance of Cerberus in turn made the defense of Jupiter (vice-admiral Reijntjes and rear-admiral Meurer) much more difficult, because it freed up a British ship for an attack on Jupiter. When also Haarlem (behind Jupiter in the line) was less than stellar in its defense (though here there was not such a blatant dereliction of duty) and surrendered prematurely, Jupiter became surrounded by British ships. Because Monarch was lying slightly behind Jupiter to her lee, pouring broadsides into her port-rear, Reijntjes was forced to bear away slightly to leeward, to bring his own starboard battery to bear (de Jonge, p.330). Vice-admiral Reijntjes during this phase of the battle received a belly wound that would kill him after the battle, while in British captivity (this was probably the reason why James got confused and later reported that vice-admiral de Winter had died in captivity; there were two vice-admirals in the Dutch fleet). Rear-admiral Meurer continued the yard-arm to yard-arm duel with Monarch for a while, but seeing that it was hopeless, he surrendered after only one hour of battle. Though the fight had been with at least three British ships, and Jupiter had been pummeled mercilessly, the Hoge Zeekrijgsraad considered this to be "too soon" and Meurer was later convicted of dereliction of duty. The same judgment would have been given about Reijntjes, but he was already dead at that time (de Jonge, pp. 331-332) It is, of course unusual that a ship has both a vice-admiral and a rear-admiral, sharing a command. This may explain why Meurer is not mentioned in British accounts (as far as I could determine) though he was a prisoner of war, together with Reijntjes. The explanation is that Reijntjes had suffered a stroke, just before the fleet sailed. Meurer was assigned to "assist" him, as he evidently was not fit for command, and it seems likely that Meurer took most of the decisions, though Reijntjes formally was responsible (de Jonge, p. 331)

"At the same time, HMS Montagu attacked Alkmaar, the next in line, from the west,..." I suppose what is intended is "from windward", as the compass direction "West" would have been behind Alkmaar, which ship, like the rest of the line, was on an broadly easterly compass course (as earlier in the article established). Better to use wind-orientation-related designations, like windward, or leeward. Better still, why not include a diagram, giving both the compass courses and the wind-orientations? Such a diagram could show the Dutch line of battle as a horizontal SouthWest-NorthEast line. The direction of the wind (WNW to NNW according to de Jonge, p. 318) could then be shown as two oblique lines that make a 70 degree angle with the horizontal line (those two lines also give the courses of the two bunches of British ships, who were sailing "before the wind"). The two oblique lines would become perpendicular to the horizontal line as the British ships luffed up to break through the Dutch column, and then bend to the right, as they came to the parallel course with the Dutch, below the other horizontal line. Other British course-lines would bend to the right, before the Dutch horizontal line was crossed, showing that the Dutch were attacked from both the windward (above the horizontal line) and leeward. The 70 degree angle follows from the fact that the Dutch (and the British after luffing up) were close-hauled on the port tack, and square-rigged ships generally could not get "higher" than a 70 degree angle with the wind (though fore-and-aft-rigged ships can achieve a much sharper angle). Cf. the article Square rig which also has a few useful external links to videos showing the maneuvers of square-rigged ships, like "coming about" and "jibe", as applied to this type of rig.

"The Dutch centre ... pulled away from the engagement behind them ..." How is that possible? The wind was the same for everyone, so they ought to have remained in the same relative positions, unless the centre increased sail to speed up, which nobody reports. But it is, of course, true that the centre was unable to come to the assistance of the ships behind them, without turning around. And this would have involved breaking up the line by coming about (or, alternatively, performing a "chicken jibe" in modern terms), and leaving the van in the lurch, when that division was about to be engaged. The centre itself was about to be attacked by Duncan's division, also not the best time to perform a complicated maneuver, like coming about. Maybe, instead of writing these slightly nonsensical sentences, this would be the place to rhapsodize about Duncan's superior tactical insight in attacking the van and rear separately, while leaving the centre alone for the time being, to be dealt with later at his leisure, when the two other divisions had been destroyed? Because this is what happened eventually.

Battle of the vanguards and Onslow's reinforcement

I understand the reasoning for devoting separate sections to the battles for the Dutch vanguard and the Dutch centre division. However, there seems to be insufficient material for the section about the van, so that this section is cluttered up by a paragraph which actually belongs in the section about the centre division. This in its turn causes problems for the accuracy and continuity of both sections. I propose that the paragraph about the duel between Vrijheid and Ardent/Venerable be moved to the section about the centre division (which might itself be split up, because it would get longer). The "hole" in the section about the vanguard might then be filled up with a fuller treatment of the Hercules, whose ordeal had a decisive influence on the outcome of the battle. The Hercules (cdr. Rysoort) was placed between Beschermer and Tjerk Hiddes in the Dutch vanguard. De Jonge starts his story by saying that this ship was briefly attacked by a British ship from windward (the van had not been breached), which he does not identify (maybe it was Bedford?), but which soon moved on to the next Dutch ship Beschermer. Next she was attacked by Triumph, which had come up all the way from the rear, attacking Wassenaar, Vrijheid, and Tjerk Hiddes (or simply bypassing them), which incidentally makes it unlikely that she had had time to accept the surrender of Wassenaar. On the way to Hercules, Triumph (capt. Essington) passed Tjerk Hiddes which gave it a broadside that among others severely damaged its spanker, causing the ship to turn its stern to Hercules. This enabled cdr. Rysoort to put two broadsides of shrapnel into Triumph, causing 50 casuaties and disabling the lower battery. According to the testimony on oath of lieutenant A. Musquetier (who later took over from Rysoort, after the latter was mortally wounded) before the Hoge Zeekrijgsraad capt. Essington later told him (when he had become his prisoner) that at that time he considered striking.(de Jonge, pp. 339-340, note on p. 340). But Essington succeeded in losing a salvo from his carronades (which were on his quarterdeck), mortally wounding Rysoort, and setting the gunwale of the Hercules on fire. (de Jonge, p. 340). Rysoort then gave over command to lieutenant Arend Musquetier (a namesake of J.D. Musquetier, the officer commanding the Leyden; possibly a younger relative), who therefore was responsible for the heroic attempt to put out the fire that soon engulfed the ship. Rysoort had twice attempted to obtain a fire-engine with piston pump from the stores in Den Helder, before the ship left the Texel, but was rebuffed by the quartermaster both times. The fire therefore had to be fought the old-fashioned way, with pails of water (de Jonge, p. 341, note 1). The fire spread quickly and Musquetier was forced to bear away from the line and summon up his gun crews from below decks, cut loose the downed mizzen mast (as the downed spanker was on fire), and open the sea cocks. When the powder room was threatened he was forced to have the gun powder thrown overboard to avoid the ship being blown up.(de Jonge, p. 341). While the ship was drifting around other ships did their best to avoid being set on fire themselves by its embers, a few times causing brief "cease fires" in duels of ships of both nations (an example was the duel between Vrijheid and Venerable who came up on the flaming wreck, and had to make evasive maneuvers, breaking up the Dutch line of battle, and allowing British ships to get to leeward of the vanguard).(de Jonge, p. 342). After a while, the fire became less intense, and Musquetier decided to evacuate his most-severely wounded, among whom cdr. Rysoort. He launched one of the ship's longboats, but this was stormed by such a number of desperate men that the boat overturned, causing nine of them to drown. The next longboat was taken over by a bunch of renegades, who rowed away in it to Triumph (according to de Jonge, but he may have mistaken the ship for Russell, as he also says that the renegades had informed the captain of the British ship to which they absconded, of the fact that Hercules was without ammunition). So Musquetier (and not Rysoort, as the article says) was forced to strike (presumably to Russell) after the fire had been extinguished (de Jonge, p. 342).

I'll now continue with the most important individual suggested edits. I'll skip a number of less important criticisms; one has to draw the line somewhere. Also, de Jonge spends a lot of space on the controversy about the behavior of rear-admiral Bloys van Treslong and his three ships, in the center, behind Batavier: Brutus, Leyden, and Mars , but he notes that so contradictory were the testimonies on oath in the respective trials (ending in the cashiering of rear-admiral Bloys; a miscarriage of justice, if only because he was clearly denied due process) that "after fifty years (he wrote this in 1848) it is impossible for the historian to decide what really happened". And this applies even more after more than 200 years.

"...but Story ensured that there was no gap between his vessel and the flagship to break through ..." This gives too much honor to Story, who unintentionally had to let Staten Generaal overlap with Vrijheid, due to the accident with Vrijheid's broken yardarm, as explained above. Maybe this is a good place to refer to that accident.

"... raking Story's ship twice and causing it to drift off in confusion as Duncan engaged Vrijheid from the east". This lets off Story too lightly. But first, another important effect of the physical impossibility to breach the line between Vrijheid and Staten Generaal should be noted: five of the ships of Duncan's division were forced to luff up to windward of the Dutch line, and therefore attacked the Dutch van from windward. Only Duncan's Venerable broke through, but between Staten Generaal and Wassenaar (where the gap was). (de Jonge, p. 325). And at this place in his narrative, in a footnote, de Jonge notes a curious utterance of admiral de Winter, namely that he was glad that Venerable had broken through his line (!). De Winter says this both in his letter to the Committee of Naval Affairs, that he was allowed to send from captivity, and in his testimony to the Hoge Zeekrijgsraad. His reasoning was that he hoped that Wassenaar would as yet close up the gap in the line and so isolate Duncan on the leeward side, the easier to be dealt with. De Jonge then continues by throwing cold water on this notion by remarking that this would probably have required a degree of expertise on the part of the Dutch commanders that they clearly were lacking (de Jonge, p. 325, note 1, continued on p. 326; maybe this could be put in a Note as a curiosity?)

De Jonge notes that Venerable, after taking up position somewhat behind Staten Generaal to her lee (just like Onslow in Monarch earlier had done to Jupiter) opened up. Like Reijntjes earlier, this forced Story to bear away to lee to be able to bring his starboard battery to bear on Venerable, or be chewed up by her broadsides. According to de Jonge, on this new course Story was able to inflict appreciable damage on Venerable, but the new course carried him away from Vrijheid. And because he was "close-hauled" to the wind, it was difficult for him to correct this, because steering to windward would have put the bow "in the wind", slowing the Staten Generaal down and making her unmaneuverable ; any further windward, and the ship would have to come about on the starboard tack. This explanation later saved Story's hide before the Hoge Zeekrijgsraad because these experts knew that doing any fancy tacking would not have been practicable in the state the ship was in. He remained lying to leeward of the battle, without being able to intervene to assist Vrijheid, but collected other stragglers from the battle, who also drifted away to leeward, around him, including most of the brigs and frigates that had been on a course parallel to that of the line of battle, to the leeward. This way he saved an appreciable part of the Dutch fleet, by conducting them safely to the Texel after the battle. (de Jonge, p. 334).

This brings us to the stage in the battle in which Venerable (still to leeward of the Dutch line) came up from behind to Vrijheid, which at the same time was engaged by Ardent on windward. The article at this point unfortunately shifts to using terms like "East" and "South", instead of "windward" and "leeward" which are easier to understand the relative positions and orientations. Could this be remedied? In any case, the narratives seem to run parallel, in the sense that de Jonge tells a similar story about the duel between Vrijheid on the one hand and Ardent and Venerable to either side. De Jonge confirms that Vrijheid did great execution to both ships and that Duncan was forced to signal for assistance from British ships further back (de Jonge, p. 334). But he then says that Powerfull was the first to respond, probably again misidentifying that ship. In any case, de Jonge confirms that Wassenaar was taken on first by ships coming from behind, without identifying Triumph. He does, however, mention that Wassenaar got into this trouble, because Batavier, following behind her between Wassenaar and Brutus, cowardly fled to leeward, leaving a new gap behind her (de Jonge, p. 335) (The master of the Batavier, cdr. Souter, was later convicted by the Hoge Zeekrijgsraad and sentenced to mock execution (the executioner swung an executioner's sword over his head), and ten years hard labor. He was briefly liberated during the Anglo-Russian invasion of North-Holland in 1799, when the city of Hoorn, where he was incarcerated, was captured by the British, but recaptured the next day, when the Batavian army retook the city, so he presumably served the full sentence; de Jonge, p.379, note 3). However this may be, the narratives diverge from this point, as de Jonge remains with Wassenaar and the article jumps ahead first, and later, in the next section, comes back to the Powerfull and her engagement with Vrijheid. So this is all a bit confusing.

Though the narrative in the article about the duel between Vrijheid and both Ardent and Venerable is at least not contradicted by de Jonge's account, the following is not supported: "...both Venerable and Ardent were surrounded, as at least one of the frigates from the second line joined the attack on the two isolated British vessels." I am sure de Jonge would have been happy to brag about a Dutch frigate joining the fray (like earlier Monnikendam), but there appears to have been no mention of any of this in the Dutch after-battle reports, nor in the witness statements during the trials before the Hoge Zeekrijgsraad (where this no doubt would have come out, if it had happened). So I think the intervention of this frigate was another figment of Padfield's imagination (as he seems to be the source for a number of questionable statements in the article). It would certainly strengthen the case for Padfield, if at least the name of the frigate could be given.

At this point in the narrative the fire on the Hercules is suddenly introduced, in a confusing manner: "...Captain Inglis passing through the gap between Beschermer and Hercules." Originally there was no "gap" in the van, as is suggested here. After the Hercules was set on fire, however (as related further down in the article), the ship became a danger to both sides in the battle and everybody did his best to give the ship "a wide berth", to coin a phrase. I suppose this also enabled Inglis to get to the leeward of the Dutch van, but this could only have happened after the fire on Hercules broke out, which was later in the battle. I suggest that the problems with the Hercules should be discussed only in one place in the article (see above).

Let's take up the story of the Wassenaar as there is a major discrepancy beween the narratives there. According to the article Wassenaar was first attacked by Triumph to which she surrenderd after an arduous fight. Then we are supposed to believe that Triumph did not put a prize crew on Wassenaar, but sailed away, allowing Wassenaar to rehoist its colors, possibly prodded by an unidentified Dutch brig, who opened fire on her. Needless to say, de Jonge recounts the duel with "a British ship", but does mention nothing about about Wassenaar striking her colors, or being fired upon by a Dutch brig, probably because it didn't happen. What makes the story implausible is that by omitting to put a prize crew aboard Wassenaar, Triumph gave up its rights on the prize money, later divided among the crew of Russell, to which ship Wassenaar eventually surrendered, without having resumed the fight, however, because de Jong says that after Triumph broke off the fight, Wassenaar drifted around aimlessly, too damaged to do any fighting, until she was approached by three ships and surrendered to Russell, who did put a prize crew aboard her. (de Jonge, pp. 335-336)

"...the battered Wassenaar surrendered to Triumph, with Captain Holland dead on his quarterdeck". This must have been news to cdr. Holland, the master of the Wassenaar, who according to de Jonge was very much alive when he struck to Russell. He was made a prisoner of war and later paroled, together with the other captured Dutch officers. After his return to the Batavian Republic he was also tried by the Hoge Zeekrijgsraad and acquitted ("with the compliments of the court") (de Jonge, p. 379, note 2). This "blooper" appears to be due to James, who makes Clowes complicit in his error (Clowes should not have copied James uncritically, as in the matter of the mythical Dutch brig). Anyway, if only one error in the article should be rectified, it should be this one, I think.

"The Dutch central division joined the battle at the head of the line shortly after the engagement of Triumph and Bedford, causing considerable damage to all of the British vessels, particularly Venerable.[54] The British flagship was soon isolated in the midst of the Dutch van, engaging Vrijheid, Staaten General, Admiral Tjerk Hiddes De Vries and Wassenaar simultaneously." Where shall I start, there are so many errors here? First of all, the Dutch central division (the ships Vrijheid through Mars, to avoid misunderstandings) was never able to come to the aid of the van. Only Vrijheid really engaged Venerable. I just wrote about the fate of Wassenaar, which had her own troubles and was not able to go forward after Venerable. Staten Generaal had fought briefly with Venerable, but had been forced out of the line by her, and was so damaged in that engagement (and through other, later, encounters with British ships) that she no longer was in the fight with Venerable, let alone part of a Dutch "encirclement" of Venerable. Tjerk Hiddes, which preceded Vrijheid in the line, was for that reason unable to join the duel behind her between Vrijheid and the two already mentioned British ships, and a third one, whose name de Jonge does not know (de Jonge, p.350); she would have had to turn back otherwise. If anything, it was Vrijheid that was encircled by British ships. During this duel, cdr. Van Rossem, de Winter's flag captain was mortally wounded, so his command was taken over by the first officer, cdr. H.H. Hora Siccama (de Jonge, p. 350). Around this time de Winter made an attempt to signal the ships behind him in the line to come to his aid (the ones in front were at that time clearly not capable for different reasons to turn around). But this proved impossible, because the signal flags were repeatedly shot away (de Jonge, p. 351). Then the wind changed from NW to N, and the flaming wreck of the Hercules was encountered, and de Winter saw a chance to temporarily break off the fight with the three British ships by bearing away to lee, jibing, and coming before the wind. He now tried (sailing back along the line to its leeward) to join the line behind Mars, the rasee that was the third ship behind Brutus and Leyden, that had originally followed Batavier, until that ship absconded, and Wassenaar(by that time a floating wreck). But these three ships were unable to come to his aid (for reasons which are in dispute among the Dutch, and which form the core of the feud between de Winter and rear-admiral Bloys van Treslong, that was fought out before the Hoge Zeekrijgsraad; I'll leave those for the moment). (de Jonge, pp. 351-352). Vrijheid was therefore all alone when she encountered the upcoming Director (capt. Bligh), who had been fighting the three Dutch ships under the command of Bloys, and who now passed Vrijheid on windward and dealt her a devastating broadside, also with her carronades, dismasting Vrijheid's main and foremast, and causing great carnage. The Director then jibed behind Vrijheid, came up to her leeward, and dealt her another devastating broadside, this time shooting down the mizzen mast. The wreck of the Vrijheid was then surrounded by other British ships, among them Venerable, who pummeled her from all sides, but de Winter continued the uneven duel for another half hour, before the fight petered out. (de Jonge is aware that all of this is in the British literature usually ascribed to Venerable, but he insists that it was really Director who dealt the death blow; de Jonge, p. 352, note 1). In a footnote de Jonge notes that among the wounded was the twelve-year old midshipman P. de Babgian, a nephew of de Winter, whose leg had been shot off, but who displayed great courage, trying to motivate the crew with cheers of "Long live the republic". The boy later died of his wounds (de Jonge, p. 352, note 2).

De Jonge also discusses the lore about the surrender of Vrijheid and de Winter's personal surrender to Duncan on the quarterdeck of Venerable, but with some twists. First of all he gives a different version of the verbal exchange between the two ships about Vrijheid's striking her flag. He first remarks that de Winter did no longer have a flag to strike, as all flags had been shot away. Then he says that "an enemy ship-of-the-line" (he does not identify Venerable) came alongside and someone, speaking Dutch, inquired whether Vrijheid was finally about to strike her colors. The acting flag captain Hora Siccama, angered by such a question of who he took to be a Dutch renegade (who else aboard a British ship would speak Dutch?), answered sarcastically "Wat dunkt u zelf?" ("What do you think yourself?"). This is the stuff of which legends are fabricated! (de Jonge, p. 354). In a footnote on the same page de Jonge debunks the story of Circe's first lieutenant Richardson, finding de Winter with a shipwright building a raft, or repairing a longboat(versions differ), and tells us that there are no Dutch witness statements confirming this (de Jonge, p. 354, note 1). He also extensively debunks the anecdote (also told by Richardson int the United Services Magazine) "that de Winter almost drowned" while being transferred to Venerable (de Jonge, p. 354, note 2).

Aftermath and Return journeys

"... five ships of the Dutch van had been captured as well as the frigate Ambuscade that had attacked from the second line", in combination with "The other captured frigate, Ambuscade, was also driven ashore in a sinking state and the prize crew made prisoner, but in that case the ship was salvaged and later returned to Dutch service.", in the next section. De Jonge drily remarks in a footnote on page 356 that "many English writers report that Embuscade was also taken, but this was incorrect, as this ship returned together with rear-admiral Story to the Texel". Story returned early in the morning of October 12 to the Texel, together with Staten Generaal, Leyden, Beschermer, and Batavier (all ships of the line), and the frigates Embuscade, Heldin, Waakzaamheid, and Minerva, and the brigs Ajax and Daphne (de Jonge, p. 358, note 1). Earlier the same morning Cerberus and Mars, who had fled independently, had already reached the roadstead. (de Jonge, p. 358). Brutus (now under the command of cdr. Polders; rear-admiral Bloys was too ill; so Polders deserves the credit) and the brigs Athalanta and Haasje had reached the Hinder sandbank, where he had the encounter with HMS Endymion, more or less as described in the article (de Jong, pp. 358-359). But these ships also eventually reached the fleet at the Texel.

"Among the losses were Captain Hinxt of Beschermer and Captain Holland of Wassenaar, both of whom were killed early in the battle." As already noted above cdr. Holland survived the battle and was later paroled. Cdr. Hinxt was mortally wounded during the battle, but died later in captivity.(de Jonge, p. 339).

"In total, Dutch losses were later reported as 540 men killed and 620 wounded..." De Jonge says that the total number of casualties on the Batavian fleet was about 1200 (of which 400 killed on the captured ships alone, and more than 600 injured) (de Jonge, p. 356). "...with Vrijheid the worst hit with the loss of almost half of its total complement". De Jonge: 58 killed and 98 wounded on Vrijheid (de Jonge, p. 352, note 2).

"Monnikkendam had been supplied with a prize crew ... Local boats came out to the stranded vessel and all aboard were saved, the 35 British prisoners taken to a prison hulk at Flushing." No doubt the prize crew were made prisoners of war, but the Dutch did not have a prison hulk in Flushing (only the British used prison hulks, and the roadstead of Flushing would be unfit to have a prison hulk lying there). So one may presume that the British prisoners were housed on land. Cf. de Jonge, p. 361.)

Effects and Legacy

"De Winter was released from captivity in 1798 after news reached Britain that his wife had suffered a stroke, and he subsequently became the Batavian ambassador to France, before resuming command of the Dutch fleet at the start of the Napoleonic Wars." Not only de Winter was released, but all other Dutch officers who gave their parole, which meant that they could not fight against Great Britain for the duration of the war (which ended with the Peace of Amiens in 1802). This deprived the Batavian navy of their services. To make things worse, de Winter returned to the Netherlands promising vengeance on those who, in his view, had "betrayed" him. As he was successful in getting rear-admiral Bloys van Treslong, and a number of other officers, convicted (among whom also rear-admiral Meurer), the Batavian fleet was deprived from even more capable officers. One might therefore qualify the release of de Winter an act of strategic genius, that did almost as much damage, as defeating him (and this includes the freedom he was given to correspond freely with the Netherlands during his captivity, so he could start his destructive work early). Rear-admiral Story escaped this fate (miraculously, as he might have been dismissed with more reason than rear-admiral Meurer, or even rear-admiral Bloys). So it was Story who led the Batavian fleet (or what remained of it) at the Vlieter incident, where his wavering conduct contributed to the loss of the Batavian fleet to again admiral Duncan, without a shot being fired. De Jonge certainly blames de Winter himself for most of his troubles during the battle. De Jonge first of all blames the Commission on Foreign Affairs for the disaster for forcing de Winter to go on a frivolous sortie (after the need to accompany the expedition to Ireland no longer existed), i.e. to taunt the British by "showing the flag" and offer battle to the British fleet (if not with superior numbers) in the hope of scoring an easy victory. (This might have worked, if de Winter had been able to surprise Trollope's squadron in the night before the battle, as he attempted; de Jonge, pp. 311-312. 372). Given that the fleet had sailed, one may say that de Winter accepting battle as he did, was the second best option, as he could have sailed away to Hellevoetsluis (the other major base of the Batavian fleet) and there safely awaited the departure of Duncan. But he accepted battle, and his decision to form the line of battle cannot be faulted in itself. But through his own fault, the originally planned order of battle was not implemented correctly, with several ships in the wrong place (though he blamed rear-admiral Bloys van Treslong and vice-admiral Reijntjes for this), and with two gaps in the line, caused by two ships that were notorious "bad handlers" (so he could have forestalled this). However, even if these mistakes had not been made, it is doubtful if defeat could have been averted. Like the Maginot Line on land, the line-of-battle could be simply "rolled up" from behind, even when the line would not have been breached, as eventually happened. The breach of the line helped, because it allowed the British to place ships on both windward (as would normally have happened) and leeward of their victims, so making it possible to create "local superiority of forces" and picking off the Dutch ships one by one. Because of the course de Winter had selected, and the fact that Duncan had the "weather gauge" (which de Winter had negligently let him have; de Jonge, p. 384), Duncan could choose where he would attack the Dutch line-of-battle. Just aiming for the end of the line would have been easiest (as eventually happened with the ships that went around the stern of Delft, British ships could then be placed both on windward and leeward of the Dutch ships, without any need to breach the line), but he opted for "brilliance" by attempting a breach in two places. In any case, because after this maneuver, both fleets were close-hauled on the port tack, going forward along the Dutch line was easily done by increasing sail and so speeding up. The Dutch ships were slower in any case, and de Jonge tells us (pp. 313-314, 385) that de Winter had ordered klein zeil (i.e. the ships did not use their topgallants and royals), so they were progressing relatively slowly. This explains why the British ships easily could overtake the Dutch ships on their way from the end of the line to the point of the vanguard. One of the judges at the trial of de Winter, vice-admiral Jan Sels, reproached him for this passive, slow-sailing approach, and said he should instead have moved the fleet before the wind to the Deurloo sandbank before the Meuse, and there awaited Duncan, in a much more favorable position, or even retreated to Zeeland (p. 385-386). That way the fleet would have been saved. But of course, the Commission on Foreign Affairs and the political opposition would have crucified him for "cravenness" if he had done this.

If I may, I'd like to interject an idea here that I have come up with myself, while reading about the "testosterone spewing" language of the Commission on Foreign Affairs about "the arrogant Brit needing a lesson from the manly Batavian" (or words to that effect; de Jonge quotes a number of examples). If one is in this state of mind, one lets emotion govern one's actions, rather than cool strategic thinking. It is understandable that people were fuming about the inactivity of the Dutch navy in both the recent Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, and again in this conflict, but paradoxically a fleet-not-used may have its strategic advantages, if it poses a credible threat. This is the concept of the Fleet in being, as espoused by admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, who used the strategy of the Dutch admiral Michiel de Ruyter during the Third Anglo-Dutch War to illustrate the concept. As another illustration I could mention the fact that it took five British ships to blockade the one Kortenaer in Hellevoetsluis, before de Winter briefly chased them away. In other words, even without the Dutch doing anything, the British navy still had to mobilize a large number of ships to blockade that fleet, as long as the threat of its coming out to sea was credible. In other words, the hotheads who decried the "inactivity" of the Batavian fleet, had not thought it through. Admiral Sels was right that it would have been preferable to "cowardly" run away, and preserve the fleet-in-being (and not just because this might have saved a lot of lives).

--Ereunetes (talk) 01:42, 30 December 2017 (UTC)