Talk:Battle of Cannae/Archive 1

Archive 1

Archive 2

Casualties

Polybius' claim, 70,000 were killed, is almost certainly exaggerated. Around 52,000 is Livyus guess. Right, some people don't have a very good understanding of some terms. So I'll make it 100% clear okay. A casualty DOES NOT MEAN SOMEONE WHO HAS DIED!!!!!! A casualty is a person who is dead, wounded or missing. Somme's first day might have had more casualties that Cannae, Somme about 60k casualties, cannae about 52k depending who you talk to. BUT!!!!!! almost every casualty at the battle of cannae was also a fatality!!! Only around 20k of the 60k casualties at the first day of the somme were fatalities So, recap. 20,000ish Died at the first day of the somme, 50,000ish at Cannae. NEXT!!!! Borodino Borodino had 66,500-125,000 casualties according the wiki article on here. BUT ONLY 25%-33% were fatalities. So thats 20,000ish to 45,000ish. The highest possible fatalities at that battle, 45,000 is lower than the lowest possible number at Cannae 50,000 So, recap again. 20,000-45,000 died at Borodino, and at least 50,000 at Cannae, probably more!! So before you edit this article again. Please make sure you have a full grasp of the differences between a casualty and a fatality ---OOPSIE- 17:38, 9 January 2006 (UTC)

The key point here is that its unknown how many Roman's fought, how many died, and how many were captured. The estimate's very widely on how many were actually killed.--Cannae 20:19, 10 January 2006 (UTC)

Your numbers need work. You mention the Roman army fielded 80,000 men at Cannae - which is generally seen as correct. How, then, did the Romans suffer between 70,000 and 80,000 casualties *and* have 16,000 survive to escape? 96,000 is a higher number than 80,000 in most numerical systems.

I have heard that the battle of Cannae had the greatest number killed in a battle in one day in all of history, more even than the first day of the Somme. Is this true? If so, this should be given a mention. Gingekerr 21:43, 14 Mar 2004 (UTC)

Highly unlikely. In the ancient world perhaps, but my sources don't even make that claim. Stan 14:02, 15 Mar 2004 (UTC)

User:-OOPSIE just added that to the page. However, Hiroshima may have seen 80,000 deaths when it was bombed, which probably exceeds this. The Battle of the Somme (1916) had 57,000 British casualties, but only about 19,000 deaths. I note that above and below, the casualty numbers are debated. So, perhaps that sentence should be reverted.... This is not my area of knowledge, so I defer. --Habap 6 July 2005 16:56 (UTC)

I'm pretty new to wikipedia, so sorry if I mess up. Cannae had 50,000 to 60,000 deaths, the first day of the somme had only 19,000. And Hiroshima wasn't really a battle to the way I see the meaning of battle, since it was more of a moment of slaughter, than two armies battling against each other.-OOPSIE- 6 July 2005 17:20 (UTC)

As noted on User Talk:-OOPSIE-, I get it now. --Habap 6 July 2005 19:06 (UTC)

The Battle of Plataeai (Plataea according to wikipedia, yikes) was most likely deadlier, even by conservative accounts. I will not edit, but if anyone is interested in looking into it, it would be nice. Further, the Battle of Mycale may have taken place on the same day, hence this might be the deadliest day in history by far. cangelis 02 (12:47 GMT+02:00) Aug 2005

If I'm not mistaken, at Platea Mardonius had more soldies (2.5k) than Hannibal and Rome had at Cannae combined. Cannae might be the single bloodiest day percentage wise for the percent killed of those deployed (60-70% Roman/10-30% Hannibal).--Cannae 22:30, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

I would like to note that this page is inconsistent as to the number of casualties with the page Second Punic War. In particular, that page claims that less than a hundred Romans survived. Pmetzger 19:16, 3 Aug 2004 (UTC)T

No one here has mentioned The Battle of Salamis, which may have had as many as 100,000 casualties, nearly all of which were fatal drownings.

I do believe drownings are always fatal. ;-)

Roman Forces

I think the number about Roman Forces should be revised. As far as I know, there are two versions on that:

1 - Romans had 2 "standard" Consular armies, each consisting of 2 legions, for a total of 4 legions.

2 - Romans had 2 "augmented" consular armies, each consisting of 4 legions, for a total of 8 legions.

This should set the Roman forces at 6000x4=24000 or 6000x8=48000 legionary infantry, plus the cavalry and auxiliary troops.

Moreover, during the early republic there were no legions formed entirely by Italic allies. Instead, every single legion was formed by approximately the same number of Roman and Allied men, organized in manipuli.

"The term 'legion' was apt to mean one Roman and one allied legion, nearly ten thousand men. Thus the usual consular armies was really two Roman and two allied legions, eighteen to twenty thousand men, of which eighteen hundred were horsemen."-Dodge pg. 57. Furthermore almost every Roman legion was augmented in some way or another, either with more foot or horse. In the standard 'blueprint' legion, there was supposed to be of both 1,200 velites, principes and hastati (1200 x 3 = 3600). Their were supposed to be 600 triarii and 300 horse (600 in allied legions). This all adds up to about (3600 + 300 + 600 = 4500) to about 4,500 soldiers in a standard Roman Legion and 4,800 in a standard Allied Legion. As I said before, almost every legion was augmented in some way, varying in size from the standard 4.5 k to upwards of 6,000. Aemillius Paullus had 6,00 per legion while in Macedon. Scipio had 5,200 per legion at Zama. At this stage in the Republic it was well established custom that Rome and its Allies fought as seperate legions, but alternated positions in battle line, i.e. Horse | Roman | Allied | Roman | Allied | Horse.--Cannae 23:19, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

Roman Tactics

Like many people, I've always wondered how this battle came to be such a disaster. How do you surround a larger force with a smaller one? If Hannibal had his weakest troops in the centre, why weren't the Roman legionaries able to break through them like they did at Trebia and Trasimene?

This isn't so hard to understand if you think about the geometry. Assuming roughly constant spacing between men, the number of troops in each unit should be roughly proportional to its area. The area of the surrounded unit rises as a square law with its size, while the surrounding unit is only circumference x thickness of cordon, which can be linear. Thus the larger and larger the two forces are, the less effectively the surrounded unit can apply its combat power, and the less relevant is its numerical advantage. Here are some concrete figures for illustration: let us assume 1m² per man, and that the Romans, at their most desperate plight, were forced into a circle. Then the 70,000 actually on the field would be in a circle 300 m in diameter, with just 938 on the circumference in a position to fight. They could, in principle, be surrounded by as few as 944 men; the Carthaginians actual 50,000 could have formed a cordon up to 46 men deep. In such a configuration they would have fought roughly one on one, with the Carthaginian's superior training and experience counting for more, and the Roman's 7:5 advantage totally negated. None of this discussion is meant to be an analysis of the actual tactics, just to point out that it is actually perfectly feasible for a smaller force to surround a larger one, and advantageous too. -- Securiger 07:39, 2 August 2005 (UTC)

I agree with that from a mathematical perspective (I double-checked the figures and they look right to me) but I wasn't really talking from a mathematical perspective. There are two problems as I see it - how do you get your enemy into this nice, neat circle, and how do you kill them once they are there. To answer the first one, you've got to explain what was different about this battle rather than the ones that came before it. One of the sources (from memory I think it was Polybius) suggests that in the year before Cannae strenuous efforts were made to improve the training of the legionaries, which was viewed as a failing at the previous battles. So I don't think simple "the Carthaginians were better soldiers and Hanibal was a genius" statements explain the difference. Equally, once troops start to retreat, it is very, very difficult for them to stop. So what caused the Carthaginian centre to hold, contrary to all experience? I've suggested one (admittedly far fetched) possibility - another is that the river was behind the Carthaginian centre and that caused it to hold. But to me the idea that the barbarian troops in the centre executed a careful retreat until just the right point is the most far-fetched of all.

OK, so assume that by whatever method, you have your Romans arranged in a nice neat circle. How do you get rid of them? I'm not very convinced by the idea of a long series of one to one combats where the superior weapons handling skill of the Carthaginian allowed them to butcher the Romans for negligible casualties. The normal method for causing large casualties in an ancient battle was to get your opponents to run, and then mow them down with your cavalry (see Xenophon). In contrast, forcing them into a position where they have nowhere to retreat is likely to nullify the better training and morale of you own troops rather than taking advantage of it (see Sun Tzu). People who have no choice tend to fight pretty well...

Modern experience tells us that a large crowd of panic stricken people in a constrained area will lead to people being crushed to death (see football tragedies, the Hajj). In fact, Livy provides a lot of evidence for this being the case here - those people who dug themselves into the ground were definitely panicking, and the behaviour sounds like someone trying to escape a fatal crush.

Interesting discussion, though! Mike Moreton 15:10, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

Here's the only theory I can come up with.

Trasimene and Trebia were both heavy defeats for the Romans. It's just possible that in the recriminations that must have followed, someone blamed the legionaries who cut their way out for not staying to help their colleagues.

So maybe, when the Carthaginian centre began to collapse, it was actually someone in the van of the Roman army who gave the order to halt. With that huge depth of legionaries behind, some of whom were beginning to be pressed from the sides and behind, utter confusion would have been caused. The retreating Carthaginian centre would have seen their foes halted and in confusion, and would have counter-attacked.

At this point the entire Roman army would have been in panic, and it's possible that the majority of them were killed by crushing, not by Carthaginian weapons.

Just a theory...

Why can't some people just accept that on the day of battle the Carthaginians were better soldiers lead by Hannibal an ackowledged millitary genius of all times? The carthaginian Army was as much a mercenary army and more professional at that point than the Roman army which in the early early repblic was not a professional force. That made part of the difference. Now by the end of the second punic war those men who survived cannae, transimene etc were hardy veterans looking for revenge led by Scipio Africanus who was at least as good of a general as Hannibal. Hannibals army of carthaginans that he raised to conter Scipio (in the last battle of the Second punic war fought just outside Carthage) was mostly inexperenced.

Dont believe me here is a source. http://www.barca.fsnet.co.uk/army-carthage.htm

--68.164.231.3 20:04, 2 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Not all of Hannibal's army was as good as the Romans. His well trained Africans and Spaniards who were armed with Roman plunder were most likely far better than the standard Roman legionary, but the Gauls and Italics were most likely far worse vis a vis equiptment, tactics and training. His Cavalry, it goes without saying, was vastly superior. Rome's tactics depended upon the mass of the legionaries, as well as their discipline, to simply step forward and shatter the weaker elements of Hannibal's line. The only reason that this did not happen was 1.) Hannibal's convex line, 2.) Hannibal's retention of his African's on the flanks, and 3.) Hannibal's enormous cavalry victory and subsequent deployment of the cavalry and his flank 'reserve'. The discipline and skill of Rome's army was shown by the savage battle that still raged in the center after they lost both consuls (one to flight) and were penned in. While they were somewhat ill-trained, they were still soldiers from one of the most martial societies ever.--Cannae 22:41, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

When Hannibal's centre moved backwards, the Romans fighting them moved as well. Hannibal's flanks however, remained stationary, as did the Romans fighting them. When any crowds of people are together, they will naturally "flow" into space (like sand in a funnel)- in this case the only availible space was in the centre, where the Romans were advancing and therefore freeing up space in their ranks. Consequently there would have been more men in the Roman centre and less men on their flanks. This enabled Hannibal's flanks to envelop the Romans- despite higher numbers, they had naturally squashed themselves into a relatively small area.

As for why so many were killed, there are myriad factors. Loss of formation and discipline (with so many men all fighting at the same time, the noise must have drowned out any commands coming from officers). The Romans would have been crushed together as well- fighting against a crowd is hard enough in the best of circumstances. With everyone around wearing some armour and being armed with wepaons and shields, it must have been very chaotic, and probably exhausted the Romans. Panic also works both ways- for every man who resolves to go out fighting, there is a man who drops his weapon and develops a sudden bout of incontinence. Canislupisbarca 13:15, 5 October 2007 (UTC)

Wrong info about the battle's execution

To the above poster - this battle was the most people killed in one day UNDER THE COMMAND of one field general. so, patton for example, never kllled that many people in one day. ya know?

to the other above poster - The weak Gallic center did not break 1) because the Gauls were fierce warriors who wanted revenge for their own war with Rome and 2) because the Romans could not even swing their swords because they were being crushed together by the elite african phalanxes. Roman spearmen were usually in the rear of the army to deal with cavalry or for emergency situations... the romans in the front were short sword carriers and the roans couldn't break out of the sides because the punic infantry used phalanx discipline and romans were short swords probably couldnt even TOUCH them. Also keep in mind that Hannibal himself was behind the Gauls and his presence must have inspired the center to hold fast.

The dusty wind also blew in the Roman front line's direction with a strong gust - thus "Pushing" the gauls into the Romans and giving them an advantage on the field.

Now, the major inaccuracu in the article is that Hannibals cavalry only fought and won on Hannibal's left flank. the numidian light cavalry and the roman light cabalry were waiting around not doing much of anything. the spanish/gallic heavy cavalry won against the outnumbered romans, then charged across the back of the roman lines in a show of great discipline and rode towards the roman light cavalry. the roman light cavalry werer young pretty boy nobles, and when they saw the spears of the heavy cavalry instead of the lighter weapons of the numidian cavalry, they ran. in fact, the carthaginians pointed their spears upwards towards the roman youths' faces to scare them from potential scars.

You're mixing up stories, Caesar at Pharsalus commanded his soldiers to slash Pompey's noble cavalry in the face or near it, so they'd shie back. According to most historians, including Dodge, the Roman left was allied cavalry while the right was Roman. Rome is notorious for its bad cavalry so there is some reason to think the allied contingent was the stronger, but neither would be termed 'light' cavalry. I have read a few books on the subject of Hannibal, but never have I seen it credited that the wind "pushed" the Gauls into the Romans. I have read that is blinded and disheartened them, a morale rather than physical force. And to invoke Gallic hatred of Rome as a valid argument for the Carthaginian center is rather silly. The center could have broken, the key word is key, we do not know. If it did break, the break obviously would have been small and hard to exploit 1) because of Rome's enormous front and 2) because Hannibal backed his army on the river. Most sources agree that the line held, but it was a rather tenuous position at best. Hannibal's subsequent deployment of his Africans halted the Roman advance. A further point which seems to be missing from this talk page is the fact that Varro effectively merged his first and second lines, destroying one of Rome's best weapons, its versatility/mobility. By pushing the Principes' maniples into the gaps between the Hastati's maniples, Varro eliminated about 2/3rds of his reserve capabilities which would have been used to deal with the threat of the Africans.--Cannae 23:03, 5 January 2006 (UTC)

Strategy & Tactics

Aren't tactics used on a single battlefield and strategy in a campaign? Why would someone have changed it to be wrong? --Habap 17:26, 20 October 2005 (UTC)

Someone have a reference/source to this information: "The Libyan troops in fact carried spears "shorter than the Roman Triarii""?????

I always tought the libyans fought on some kind of phalanx (probably with shorter spears than the sarisa), due to the greek technics in training that Carthage have imported before the war.

Delete it. It is simply nonsense. They did have longer spears and according to Polybius they had to hide them before the engagement with the Romans. Wandalstouring 09:04, 17 August 2007 (UTC)

mathematical analysis

"This isn't so hard to understand if you think about the geometry. Assuming roughly constant spacing between men, the number of troops in each unit should be roughly proportional to its area. The area of the surrounded unit rises as a square law with its size, while the surrounding unit is only circumference x thickness of cordon, which can be linear. Thus the larger and larger the two forces are, the less effectively the surrounded unit can apply its combat power, and the less relevant is its numerical advantage. Here are some concrete figures for illustration: let us assume 1m2 per man, and that the Romans, at their most desperate plight, were forced into a circle. Then the 70,000 actually on the field would be in a circle 300 m in diameter, with just 938 on the circumference in a position to fight. They could, in principle, be surrounded by as few as 944 men; the Carthaginians actual 50,000 could have formed a cordon up to 46 men deep. In such a configuration they would have fought roughly one on one, with the Carthaginian's superior training and experience counting for more, and the Roman's 7:5 advantage totally negated. None of this discussion is meant to be an analysis of the actual tactics, just to point out that it is actually perfectly feasible for a smaller force to surround a larger one, and advantageous too" the geographic and mathematic analysis of the battle above is extremely intresting perhaps it could be incorporated into the article.--Gary123 15:48, 19 December 2005 (UTC)

HOOK!

OF GAUUUUUUUUL! --Tykell 23:09, 29 January 2006 (UTC)

Why would you deliberately publish false information?--User:Soul Catcher 06:44, 30 January 2006 (UTC)

OF GAUUUUUL!!!!!!!!!!! --Tykell 20:37, 30 January 2006 (UTC)

Images

I miss images in this article, especially since the descriptions of formations are easier to understand if there is some form of drawings. I`m not too familiar with which pictures wikipedia can use, but I understand that american government material doesn`t have copyright. (Am I right?) What about United States Military Academy[1]? Can we use images like this[2]?Shauni 14:22, 16 February 2006 (UTC)

I just realised one thing about the image I put a link too: Why does it say 215 BC? Shauni 18:16, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

I agree. This article is in desperate need of images and diagrams. I'll put up a request. If I knew how to upload images, I would do it myself :-( --chub 03:05, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

Images for the article

there are some very good (I think) images that could help this article at http://www.roman-empire.net/army/cannae.html , I just don't know if adding them to the article would violate any copyright restrictions...

Putting them in would normally violate copyright - but, why not write the author (they have an e-mail contact link on the page) and ask for permission? Then it is no longer a copyright violation - and the owner gets to specifically control the use in Wikipedia. - Vedexent 15:58, 26 March 2006 (UTC)

Peer review?

You can probably take that banner off - there really wasn't a peer review - and the top of the page is getting crowded :) - Vedexent 15:59, 26 March 2006 (UTC)

Directions?

"In addition, the Carthaginian forces had maneuvered so that the Romans would face south, while they would face north. Not only would the morning sunlight face towards the Romans..." Ummm...didn't the sun rise in the east in Hannibal's time? The map shows the armies lined up east-west, so I'm going to reword it. Clarityfiend 23:30, 11 June 2006 (UTC)

Fatal casualties, Cannae vs Passchendaele

I know this has been referenced to Bradford, 1981 but I believe the claim "More men were killed at Cannae than in all the four months of the Battle of Passchendaele" is misleading. Estimates of casualties at Passchendaele are up to 700,000 or more, with approximately one-third killed. It is thus safe to say over 200,000 men were killed during Passchendaele, far more than the total at Cannae. Not all these bodies were recovered so many were listed as missing. In some sources the total reported toll of Passchendaele dead was about 75,000, with an equal number listed as missing. But the vast majority of those listed as missing would have been killed.

So basically the death toll at Cannae exceeds the death toll in the four months of Passchendaele ONLY if the HIGHEST estimate is used for Cannae and the LOWEST estimate used for Passchendaele. I believe this reference should be removed because it is far from conclusive. Regards, --203.213.7.130 00:38, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

If the statement is referenced, then it should remain. No matter if you perceieve it as inconclusive, it is validated by a source. If you feel the need to mention that the deaths at Passchendaele may be higher than what the article suggests, then by all means do so, but you would have to cite your soure as well. Chubdub 09:32, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

Passchendaele, a battle fought in an era which reliable records were kept that can be checked. Cannae fought in an era where such book keeping was not remotely so reliable. Add to that the two figures we have for Cannae differ so wildly. The crucial point is that the Roman field army was destroyed as fighting force but how many actally lay dead on the field and how many just ran back to their farms is impossible to determine today - not withstanding the guesses of Livy and Polybus.Dejvid 13:24, 2 August 2006 (UTC)

Fraustadt

I think the Battle of Fraustadt should be mention in the Historical significance section. The battles were very similar and to my knowledge the closest anyone has come to repeating Hannibal’s success. --Carl Logan 15:18, 24 July 2006 (UTC)

Unclear sentence

"He placed his lowest quality infantry (Iberians, Gauls and Celtiberians) in the middle, alternating the two across the front line to strengthen it." What two? And how did it strengthen the line? Clarityfiend 05:51, 13 November 2006 (UTC)

This is a bit silly

If true, this makes the Battle of Cannae one of the single bloodiest battles in all of recorded human history, in terms of the number of lives lost within a day. The total number of lives lost surpasses the number of servicemen killed in the Royal Air Force throughout World War I and World War II.[3] More men were killed at Cannae than in all the four months of the Passchendaele, which is considered one of the bloodiest battles of World War I.[9] So devastating were these losses, that the total number of casualties represents just under one third of the total number of American soldiers, sailors, and airmen killed in four years of fighting during World War II.[3] In fact, the losses suffered within a single day on the battlefield of Cannae (no larger than a few square miles), would not be rivaled until the first day of fighting on the Somme in 1916 — which took place on a 25-mile (40 km) front over 2,000 years later.[12]

How many comparisons are going to be made here? Simply saying it is one of the most costly battles and then linking to the most costly battles list should be sufficient, rather than comparisons that don't really make much sense - who knows how many servicemen died in the RAF in WWI and WWII? If you don't know, it is not a meaningful comparison, if you do know, then you already knew the difference. This just comes off as a bad documentary. Only the last sentence is worth keeping. Sad mouse 05:07, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

Probably give the number it ranks on the list (about thirtieth, and not even the highest ancient battle), because that is a sensible comparison and better than simply saying "it is on the list of the most costly". Sad mouse 05:10, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

I agree with sad mouse. These comparisons are in poor taste and also fairly meaningless. Dr Spam (MD) 07:19, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

I think this is a more appropriate way to compare the casuality toll

The total casualty figure of the battle, therefore, exceeds 80,000 men. At the time when Cannae was fought, it was probably the third most costly battle in history, behind only the Battle of Salsu and the Battle of Plataea. Until the Mongol invasions, ~1500 years later, it was ranked in the ten most costly battles in human history, and even in modern times the death toll remains in the fifty most lethal battles in world history. Sad mouse 16:00, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

Provide a source for more than 80,000 casualties. It sounds like a misquote to me. Wandalstouring 10:29, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

It is a bit silly actually, comparing Cannae to half the battles of the 20th century. (82.28.237.200 (talk) 13:23, 30 August 2008 (UTC))

Missing Historian

Peter Connolly is mentioned in the text, without citation, and without appearing in the article's bibliography.... Anyone care to remedy this? Paul James Cowie 05:48, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

It's most likely from Peter Connolly's Greece and Rome at War, but I don't have the publication data on that book (I've read it, but don't own it). IMO, one of the better resources on the ancient armies, but (sadly) out-of-print. The Dark 14:19, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

Name

I was seeing the picture of the route of Invasion of Hannibal and I wonder if there was "Spain" in 216 BC? Or just "Iberia"?RMVAC 10:31, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

Spain is used as a geographic location, Iberian peninsula works too, but Iberia was anything on the fringes of the world in classical geography (for example the Caucasus was called Iberia, etc.) Wandalstouring

Date

Would it be prudent to add a reference beside the uses of the month "August" to denote that the month was called "Sextilis" at the time when this battle was fought? Oberiko 14:33, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

No, just do it. Wandalstouring 10:25, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

Map title

I enjoyed the article, but I'd point out that there's a typo on the first map's title: "Thrird". qp10qp 17:44, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

Fixed Kmusser 14:01, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

It's not showing up for me yet.

There's something odd about the title box for "The Second Punic War", too. "Hannibal dominates Rome about the Third B.C." isn't quite right. Even if "century" were added, that phrasing still wouldn't really work, in my opinion. I hate to be picky because these maps are useful, and I love maps. qp10qp 15:55, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

You're right, these came out of a government publication, errors and all. The first one was an obvious typo, but I'm not sure what the second one would be changed to.Kmusser 17:38, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

As for the map showing up you probably just need to clear out your cache. Kmusser 17:39, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

I see it now. Seamless! Cheers. qp10qp 15:27, 25 January 2007 (UTC)

STOP THE VANDALIZATION

PLEASE STOP VANDALIZING!!!!

71.241.145.126 23:14, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

Someone wrote..."god was in this battle" in the beginning of the article. Regardless of whether you believe in god or not (and I do) I think that this is the equivalent of graffiti. Wikipedia provides a public service to many people who can't afford an Encyclopedia so please stop vandalizing...

Small change

Furthermore, the strict laws of the Roman state required that high command alternate between the two consuls — thus restricting strategic flexibility.

I don't think that "flexibility" is the proper word here--if anything, multiple leaders would lead to TOO MUCH flexibility. Thus, I have changed the word to "consistency." --Lode Runner 04:05, 21 February 2007 (UTC)

Atlernative View Section

Someone with IP 142.179.57.130 recently added this large section (which I have moved to the end of the article). At present I don't think it satisfies http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:NPOV. It doesn't cite its sources. I don't know enough about Cannae to say whether there is any academic controversy around the generally accepted version or not so I have left it in for now. I think that this section needs some serious work if it is stay in. Tomgreeny 22:51, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

Battle of Cannae - An alternate view

An unfortunate fact of the historical analysis surrounding the Battle of Cannae is that insufficient weight has been given to an entirely different, yet plausible, reconstruction of the battle, which greatly reduces the size of the Roman army present, and the number of casualties suffered on the Roman side. Too many observers have taken all of Polybius's possibly exaggerated statements at face value, ignoring a contradictory account found in Livy, for example. One of his sources said that only four legions, reinforced by 10,000 men, fought at Cannae. As for Polybius's statement that eight legions were present at the battle, this number is less believable than it might be, because earlier in his history, Polybius reports that four legions were conscripted after the Battle of Lake Trasimene, while Livy tells us that the dictator Fabius had only two legions at this time. One historian (in the first edition of the Cambridge Ancient History) suggested that Polybius was mistranslating the Latin terminology, and accidentally doubling the number of legions.

Livy's account of four heavily reinforced legions present at Cannae is also more likely for several other reasons. First, this would still have been by far the largest army ever put into the field by the Roman Republic. The Romans always moved in incremental steps, so it seems more likely that they reinforced a double consular army with 10,000 extra legionaries, as Livy reports may have been the case, rather than fielding the gigantic force reported by Polybius - something they had no prior experience of doing. Another reason for doubting Polybius's account has to do with the number of allies present on the battlefield. Rome had to be extremely careful calling up the allies for military duty. In normal circumstances, the allies (including the Latins) made up (give or take) approximately half a double consular army, roughly 20,000 out of 40,000 men total. The doubtful Polybian figure of 87,000 men present at Cannae may have been arrived at by assuming that the allies made up their usual proportion of 50%, matching the supposed eight Roman legions present at the battle. However, it is not at all clear that so many allies could be called up on such short notice, especially after the heavy allied losses already suffered in the war, also taking into consideration the political difficulties of placing such a heavy burden on peoples of perhaps wavering or doubtful loyalty. Maybe that accounts for Livy's mention of Roman legionary reinforcements prior to Cannae, but no specific mention of an increase in allied field strength, except the allied cavalry, which were doubled in strength. According to Livy, allied infantry strength remained the same, which makes it difficult to accept Polybius's battlefield accounting.

This set of doubts has prompted numerous historians to suggest that the Roman force at Cannae did not exceed 50,000 men, with the casualties suffered reduced accordingly. Another reason for reducing the casualty count is that we can be certain that upwards of 8,000 Roman infantry, (not allies) along with some of their military tribunes, occupying the centre of the line at Cannae, escaped from the battlefield to fight another day. This directly contradicts the usual assertion that Hannibal succeeded in trapping the entire Roman force. Perhaps these men pierced the Carthaginian line in one group, just as they did at the Trebia, or maybe scattered units managed to break out in the confusion and dust of battle. Either way, the Carthaginian trap could not have been as airtight as reported, which means that part of the traditional account of the battle is certainly wrong. The 8,000 or so escapees were sent to Sicily as punishment, and not permitted to return to Italy until Hannibal was no longer on Italian soil. We have not been told if there was a specific reason for this severe penalty inflicted on Roman citizen soldiers, but it is possible that orders were disobeyed, or that units panicked without sufficient cause, spooked by the professionalism, brilliance, and growing repute of the Carthaginian forces. Maybe the Senate simply felt that an example had to be set, and that running away from Hannibal was no longer an option. Later in the war, other disgraced units were sent to join this force in Sicily. (These highly experienced veterans later formed the nucleus of Scipio Africanus's army sent to Africa.)

If some or all of the above is true, it's possible that Cannae was not anywhere near as disastrous to Rome as the exaggerators would have it. Maybe the casualties were in the range of 30,000 men, still bad enough, but nothing like the highly doubtful Polybian figure of 70,000. This reconstruction of the battle also allows for around 8,000 captured -- on the battlefield, and in the two abandoned Roman camps. However, Livy also reports that in the aftermath Varro assembled 10,000 survivors at Canusium, which would reduce the casualty count even further. This view of the battle relegates Cannae to a disaster slightly more serious than the Battle of Trebia two years earlier, but not the catastrophe which too many historians have fallen in love with, and embellished into the perfect battle of encirclement and annihilation. Historians, military theorists, and commanders, from Schlieffen to Schwartzkopf, would like to have such a battle to hold up as an example of perfection, but Cannae may not actually have been what they would like it to be.

Other doubts about the reporting of Cannae are political in nature. If Varro was such a bad commander, why was he offically thanked by the Senate for "not despairing of the Republic?" Why was he given high command on other occasions later in the war? Why was he not prosecuted, as other failures or incompetents were taken to court? It must be that the Romans were coming to the belated and painful realization that their systems of command, training, and tactics were simply not up the Carthaginian standard. The decision to fight a pitched battle at Cannae with an improperly trained army had been shown to be a monumental blunder, and the mistake was not repeated. Varro was not the problem. The problem was expecting too many raw recruits in a conscript army to succeed against the far more experienced and professional Carthaginian forces. It would take many years to remedy this deficiency.

I moved the section out of the FA and on the discussion page. The anonymous user has some valid points and modern historiography does consider them. The article's information does not reflect state of science. The problem is that these are currently unsourced claims inserted into an FA article. To improve them we should discuss things point by point and integrate all sourceable views into the article. Wandalstouring 23:26, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

The source could be a design/historical note, supposedly by Richard Berg, for the Cannae scenario of his SPQR wargame. But I haven't made a thorough comparison, just skimmed over the above addition and checked the info was indeed in SPQR and not some other game. Whether a two page note in a wargame is an acceptable source is anotehr question.--Caranorn 23:51, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

Author of "Cannae, an alternate view."

I am the author of the section "Cannae, an alternate view." I am new to Wikipedia, user name "esf456." Interested parties can reach me at eric.fernatgmail.com. I wrote the piece because the main article, unfortunately, is not written from an expert perspective, and repeats uncritically too many doubtful assertions about the battle. It ought to be completely re-written. In writing the short insertion, I could have included many more points that throw doubt on this article. For example, the original author is obviously not aware that Livy states categorically the Romans did not employ as heavy infantry any forces except Roman citizens, and members of the Latin confederacy. The term "allies" is thrown around carelessly and needs to be far more specific. As for source citation, I can cite sources for every assertion I made in the piece, both modern historians, and Livy, of course.

I stand by my main point that Cannae has attracted all sorts of historical hyperbole from people who want to be able to cite an example of "the perfect battle." Even the renowned John Keegan gets into the act. In his "History of Warfare" he says there were sixteen legions present at Cannae. I have no idea where he got this crazy number.

It is very interesting to read some of the comments above. Several perplexed observers say they cannot understand how such a large Roman force was surrounded by a much smaller Carthaginian force. Answer. The Romans only slightly outnumbered Hannibal, and they weren't completely surrounded.

That is a point of view not all sources agree to. We write an encyclopedia here and have to tell at least all opinions that are reflected by recognized scholars on the subject. There are often issues one is unlikely to agree with many sources, but WP:NPOV demands to acknowledge them without judgement. Wandalstouring 10:23, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

When I have time, I will re-write "Cannae, An Alternate View." with full source citation. Esf456 10:55, 27 February 2007 (UTC)esf456

yes

i have got a question........if the strength of the romans were 84,400-87,000 including allied legions how could 70,000 killed with another 50,000 and 11,000 killed or captured which all is about 130,100 when the strength was 84,400-87,000 there cant be more casualties than strength can somebody tell me if this makes any sense

That's numbers according to two roman historians. Polybius (actually he's Greek iirc) says 70,000, Livy (latin: Livius) 50,000. So the two are not to be added together. I'm not quite sure who is used for the number of captured. Maybe instead of the current form this should be given as:

70,000<:ref>Polybius (with an exact modern translation)</ref> or 50,000<:ref>Livy (with an exact modern translation)</ref>
11,000 captured <:ref>the correct source</ref>

or something similar.--Caranorn 12:37, 13 March 2007 (UTC)

thats true

That is write because when i saw it i thought wait a minute this isnt correct.It should be changed the way you have just introduced it to me in your last post.

wait a second

it should have that estimation sign with numbers at 50,000-70,000.not 50,000 and 70,000 together

While I find many of the arguments in the "alternate view" plausible (though unsourced) IMO it is not correct. The reason beening that something like 1/3 of Italy, including major cities such as Capua and Tarentum (sorry spelling) deflected to Hannibal almost immediately after the defeat. This means the Roman had to have suffered a defeat so great that the provinces of southern Italy all felt Rome could no longer defend them and Carthage would emmerge from the war victorious. IMO a "disaster slightly more serious than the Battle of Trebia" would not cause such a reaction. I also believe that in a lot of instances modern historians underestimate the ancient governments' abilities to field armies. Also there is absolutely no problem that an army of 54000 can surround an army of 814000, since the Romans crowded in the middle. It has been done by other armies in history - can't think of an example off the top of my head, but I'm 100% sure there is. Though I have to say someone should put Liby's account of troop layout (ie how many legion, how many allies, and how many cavalry) on the article. This seems to be a very valid argument. ParallelPain 05:54, 31 March 2007 (UTC)

BTW, I fail to see why you can't see there's 16 legions. He obviously took from Polybious's (sorry spelling) account of 8 Roman letions and added the 8 allied legions that supposedly accompanied them. There's 16 for you.ParallelPain 10:55, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Hello ParallelPain; This is eric.fern@gmail.com, the author of "Cannae, An alternate view." I have not had time to write up my piece with full source citations, but should be able to some time in the near future. I have FIVE modern-day classical historians who all say that the Roman force at Cannae did not much exceed 50,000 men, who all agree that Polybius was mis-translating his Roman sources, and that four heavily re-inforced legions fought at Cannae, not eight or sixteen. As for the statement, "disaster slightly more serious than the Battle of Trebia," you are forgetting that Roman prestige had already been badly shaken by the lost battles at the Ticinus, Trebia, and Lake Trasimene. The Battle of Cannae was the tipping point after a series of disasters. It did not have to be as disastrous as people think, in order for serious consequences to follow. Including Cannae, Roman casualties now certainly exceeded 100,000, a large proportion of their trained military strength, and experienced officers. No coherent Roman army remained in the field to enforce allied loyalty. The allies who defected were not keen on Rome anyway, and harboured long-standing historical resentments. Many of these same "allies" had also deserted the Roman alliance 64 years earlier when Pyrrhus of Epirus had marched up the Peninsula to within a few miles of Rome. None of the defectors were Latin-speaking. Don't forget that all 30 Latin colonies remained loyal. The Latin colonies provided about half of the heavy infantry in a Roman army, while the other allies provided none. The loss of the allies was not a great loss, in terms of military recruitment, and Hannibal probably only got them to defect by promising not to conscript their citizenry, a fateful promise that was one of the reasons why his military power in southern Italy slowly faded away. Another reason was that he could not be reinforced direct from Carthage due to Roman naval supremacy.

Other factors enter into consideration. Remember that Rome, in a far-sighted strategic decision in 218BC, at the start of the war, had sent two of its best generals (the Scipio brothers) and the cream of its best infantry into Spain, to prevent Carthaginian reinforcements reaching Italy from that quarter. If these had all been available in Italy prior to Cannae, things might have been greatly different, especially if the Romans had maneuvered separate armies against Hannibal. These were the tactics by which the Romans had trapped and defeated the Gauls at Telamon only nine years earlier, in 225BC. The use of separate consular armies had also played a role in the final defeat of Pyrrhus at Malventum in 275BC.

As for Keegan's spurious mention of sixteen legions, and your suggestion about "8 allied legions," his and your terminology is wrong. Neither Livy or Polybius ever mention "allied legions." The correct terminology is "ala sinistra" for the left wing, and "ala dextra," for the right wing. Livy states categorically that all the heavy infantry in the "alae" or wings, were Latins, i.e. non-post-Cannae defectors.

The source of the error found in Polybius relates to the use of the term "στρατόπεδον" to refer to a "double unit of a Roman legion of citizens and allies." CAH 1st edition, chart facing Page 104.

Esf456 04:52, 7 May 2007 (UTC)esf456

Ic, ic. Actually I don't really since I don't know Latin or Greek. But I'll take you're word for it. Now all you have to do is rewrite your article with proper sitations and we can post it up. Though I still say it is possible for an army of less than 50000 to surround an army of over 80000 even if those were not the numbers. It all depends on cohorts/ranks deep, troop types, and how they're used. ParallelPain 05:12, 15 May 2007 (UTC)

I checked Gregory Daly, Cannae The experience of battle in the Second Punic War, page 79ff where he supports Polybius figure of 86k Romans in total. According to him(page 25ff), at least 10k Romans were in camp and of the rest 15k(page 175) were skirmishers and 6k cavalry, leaving 55k troops of the line. Hannibal(page 29ff) had 10k cavalry, at least 8k(page 175) skirmishers, 8k in camp and 32k troops of the line(estimated 16k Celts, 6k Iberians and 10k Africans). Does this information help you? Wandalstouring 10:23, 17 May 2007 (UTC)

test Esf456 06:52, 18 May 2007 (UTC)esf456

question

how is this considered one of the the most costliest battles in all of recorded history?just look at one of the battles in the 3rd punic war http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Punic_War

in the battle of cannae it has one historian saying 50,000 and one saying 70,000...when there both in the same box like that without an explanation its assumingly both added up to the to 130,000 when its not. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 209.167.194.136 (talk) 23:05, 16 March 2007 (UTC).

No, it is 70k or 50k and not and. The Third Punic War was one war and quite a lot of civilians were killed in some stages of the siege of Carthage, yes, but the battle of Cannae is argueably so devestating because soldiers were killed in great numbers in one battle. Compare battles with battles, wars with wars and apple pie with apple pie. Wandalstouring 12:49, 17 March 2007 (UTC)

the third punic war said 64,000 casualties and this article says maybe 50,000 or 70,000...now which is more???

Compare battles with battles, wars with wars and apple pie with apple pie. Wandalstouring 11:39, 18 March 2007 (UTC)

this person who makes no sense come back when you no what your talking about!

Possible Mistake

I was reading the article for the Xth time when I found out a possible mistake. In the first section "Strategic Background" or something, it says the Fabian strategy is unpopular and so when his term is up power is transfered back to Gaius Flaminius and another counsel. But Gaius Flaminius died at Lake Trasimene according to the Lake Trasimene and Gaius Flaminius articles. And I know that battle comes before the Fabian strategy. Hell it is Lake Trasimene that caused the Fabian strategy. So the other articles are mistaken and the commander at Lake Trasimene wasn't Gaius Flaminius, or this article is mistaken. ParallelPain 05:23, 31 March 2007 (UTC)

Well reliable sources will help us fix the mistake, or if you have some regarding your question. Lakers 05:17, 4 April 2007 (UTC)

FAR

I think about nominating this article for FAR. In my opinion, several parts contain problematic statements which need at least some sources. Wandalstouring 17:24, 8 April 2007 (UTC)

BC vs BCE

This article seem to be using BC, and I noticed someone just swapped some BCE back to BC. Which one should we use? Isn't BCE the standard now since not everyone is Christian? ParallelPain 05:12, 15 May 2007 (UTC)

Guidelines say an artilce should use one style only and it should stay at BCE if it was started as BCE and BC if it was started BC. In articles about Islam for example, we add BH and AH. Wandalstouring 09:43, 17 May 2007 (UTC)

Map may be incorrect

I believe the map is incorrect; try the following instead: http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/AncientWarfare/HI370GIF/07CannaeBattle.gif - Frunobulax (talk) 19:06, 3 August 2010 (UTC)

measures

the article mentions "three and a half measures" of gold / gold rings...? how much is this ? can this number be related to talents or another measure of currency?

GREAT Comprehensive ARTICLE!!!!!

I believe that sometimes we disregard the dual purpose of knowledge: to both inform and share. Despite its faults, this article is clear, comprehensive, and interesting. It is not consumed by academic jargon or ‘dumbed’ down to ignore critical facts. Moreover, I applaud the author’s continuous efforts to improve upon his work!!

I AGREE! It's VERY COMPREHENSIVE! Large ALTERNATING capital LETTERS! Fantastic!

The Iraqi Army

I recently removed a section of the article on the Iraqi Army that seems unnecessary and, worse, biased and expressing a clear POV. My revision was subsequently undone by Gala.Martin. I wanted to discuss the section. For starters, someone added it after a previous edit that included a reference and left the reference in despite the fact that the referred book doesn't at all mention the opinions expressed in the new section. Furthermore, there is no reason to go on at length about the reasons why the Iraqi army was in bad shape in the Persian Gulf War in an article about the Battle of Cannae. The edit I gave, which merely describes them as "less impressive" [than the Roman legions at Cannae] seems more than sufficient. Finally, stating that the Iraqi Army's deplorable condition made Schwartzkopf's tactics "redundant" is clear POV and, again, not mentioned in the reference.

I think my edit should have stood. But I'd love to hear back if I'm wrong! Thanks. Ginsengbomb 15:52, 10 August 2007 (UTC)

I have already told you that you were right. I do not see why pulling this here. gala.martin (what?) 09:01, 12 August 2007 (UTC)

I "pulled this here" well before you told me you agreed :). Honestly, no harm or offense intended -- I'm glad we agree on the edit. I'm not trying to attack you or anything like that. Your edits and page reveal you to be an intelligent, honest person and a contributor to Wikipedia on an order that I can't even begin to resemble. I'm just happy (and sincerely so) that someone of your stature would agree with me -- not that this agreement represents a "victory" on my part, or any such silliness, but that it means that I'm not, you know, a total honking idiot ;). Anyway, glad to see we're on the same page and I look forward to working together in the future on more ancient history articles :). Ginsengbomb 01:28, 13 August 2007 (UTC)

Regulus not Flaminius

As another reader of this article has noticed, there is a mistake in the part "Strategic Background" where it is written that Gaius Flaminius received the command from Fabius after the end of the latter's dictatorship. In fact, however, by then (the autumn of 217 BC) it was six months since Flaminius had rested in peace at the Lake Trasimene. He was replaced by Marcus Atilius Regulus (check Livy, XXII.25,31-32 and Polybius, III.114). I'm putting it in the article. Dobrin 17:23, 28 September 2007 (UTC)

Another view of Cannae

I found this after reading Adrian Goldsworthy's Cannae (for those of you who don't know who he is, he's a very good historian on Roman stuff especially warfare). According to Adrian Goldsworthy, the celtic troops did break in the centre. They were at first in the arc's tip, first to contact the Romans. They bent flat and then back a little bit, then broke. This actually makes more sense than the formation bending to as much as a semi-circle (as this is not natural bending of a rigid military force, pointed out by many people who doubt the account of the battle). The celts in the centre broke, and the Romans were in pursue. The troops on the two flanks of the original arc did not break as they were both better troops and had been in contact for a less amount of time. The pursuing Romans both flooded and were sucked into the hole by their own forward momentum and their wish of victory. At this point the African mercenaries, who were placed behind the two flanks of the original arc, turned into the pursuing Roman and attacking them on two sides. The pursuit is stopped as individual maniples have to turn and face the new threat (and from 2 directions). This gave Mago and Hannibal, who had been with the celts from the start, time to rally the broken forces and throw them back into the fight, attacking the Romans from three sides (ok only the ones who had been sucked in from 3 sides, but that's a lot). It is also pointed out that at the start of battle Paulus was with the allied cavalry that faced Hasdrubal's Spanish and African heavy cavalry, while Varro was with the Roman cavalry that faced the numidians. When the allied cavalry was defeated Paulus decided to take his guard and join the infantry in the centre. But when the Roman cavalry were defeated, Varro fled with them. This explains how Varro survived when Paulus didn't. This basically explains everything. The Roman infantry did not perform poorly at Cannae, they performed just as well but Hannibal checked their ability to win the battle. I read Polybius' account in the library and it matches what Adrian Goldsworthy describes. Oh and Livy gave the Roman strength at 83700 if I remember right, but he definately gave over 80 000. So... what can I say two Roman historians both gave that figure (though Livy probably used Polybius' with some revision). ParallelPain 20:27, 2 October 2007 (UTC)

Oh and neither Polybius nor Goldsworthy said the encirclement was perfect. How could it be with only so many cavalry to cover the entire length of infantry line.ParallelPain 20:31, 2 October 2007 (UTC)

And there was an account somewhere that quite many of the Colonies of Rome (Roman settlements in Italy?) sent word to the Roman Senate a year or something after the battle that they had been deprived of man-power and resources and can no longer help the Roman war effort. All the Senate's shouts and threats can not change the mind of these Colonies. So many, many men were lost, throughout the war. Maybe this battle had a lot of contribution to that. BTW, can I put this account into the main article (with proper siting from both Polybius and Adrian Goldsworthy of course).ParallelPain 20:39, 2 October 2007 (UTC)

Hello ParallelPain. This is Eric Fern (wikipedia user esf456) my real name, to comment on Mr. Goldsworthy. Yes, Goldsworthy is a good historian. Nevertheless, I think his reconstruction of Cannae is much too detailed to be accepted at face value. He went far beyond the information available in the sources, resorting to free invention and groundless speculation. Investigators are always tempted to resort to this kind of padding to fill out their narrative, but it is a bad idea to take it too far. That's how history gets distorted in the first place.

As for the number "83,700" which you claim you found in Livy, you do not "remember right." The number I think you are referring to is 87,200, but Livy is not talking about the strength at Cannae, he is referring to the total Roman strength at that time, which included the army in Spain, garrisons in Sicily, Tarentum, Rome itself, and the field armies which fought at Cannae. In the Pengun edition of Livy "The War with Hannibal," page 134, we find the exact quote as follows. "Some have put it on record that at the time of the battle of Cannae, Rome had 87,200 men in service." Note that he says "some," meaning more than one source, and "in service," which does not refer specifically to the battle of Cannae itself. In the Latin, this is even clearer than in English.

Your second error comes up when you refer to the Latin colonies that stopped sending men and material to Rome. This happened in 209BC, seven years after Cannae, when 12 out of 30 Latin colonies broke their obligations under the "formula togatorum," pleading "non possumus." This unsatisfactory state of affairs went on until 204BC when the Senate cracked the whip, punishing the offenders with;

1) Double or triple contributions of men, over and above their treaty commitments. 2) A new tax levied at the rate of one "as" per thousand. 3) Threats to detain the leading men of the colonies if Roman orders were disobeyed. 4) The requirement that the colonies submit to the same census forms and procedures required of full Roman citizens.

We hear of no further such trouble from the Latin colonies.

Esf456 23:32, 14 October 2007 (UTC)esf456

From Wiki's very own Livy: "Thus, according to these writers, there were 87,200 men in the Roman camp when the battle of Cannae was fought." So I think you better go find many translations and double and triple check that. You seem to know Latin so you better go see if the word also meant "camp" at the time or was it just a mistranslation. Of course you can't change it, because Wiki's Livy is taken from a published translation so unless you want to type your copy of the translation in its entirety...

Also Goldsworthy did site his sources. He did not just use Livy and Polybius but took into account the way battles were fought at the time, something not many historians took into account. He clearly explained why Polybius pointed out that cavalry melee many jumped off their horses and fought like infantry: because there was no room for charge and countercharge that cavalry fights usually fought in (supported by Secret History of the Mongols, not Goldsworthy's source but I was reading it and that's how a cavalry fight was described.) He also clearly explained why the Triarii did not just turn around and present a war of spears to the Spanish cavalry: in the confusion of the battle and the suction pulling the Romans forward through the whole in the Carthaginian line, the battle order of 3 lines was destroyed. There was no more distinct 3rd line of Triarii, so while individual maniples might have been able to do that, their would be huge gaps in the line of spears that the cavalry can charge through. This is a much better explaination than the romans leaving their BEST troops in their camp for a roundabout attack on Hannibal's (as some have put forward to explain the lack of a spear wall).

POLYBIUS also specifically said that after contacting the Romans first, the Gauls "retreated." The Romans "pursued", and the Africans stationed on the flanks, without needing Hannibal's command because the situation "showed them what needs to be done" turned in and attacked the Romans. He said NOTHING, at least not in the translation available to me at my university, about the Africans ADVANCING AND THEN turn in, just that they turned in. This is all from Polybius himself and not Goldsworthy. The positioning of the commanders were also written by Polybius and Livy, as well as what happened to the major commanders. But of course since you know Latin if you can find a copy in Latin and translate it for me you can prove the translation I was reading from wrong.

And as this article itself points out, bending so much to form almost a semicircle is very unnatural. Goldsworthy's account, as well as Polybius's gives an explaination of trapping the Romans in a semicircle with the infantry without the unnatural bending. I don't understand why so many historians who read Polybius didn't come up with this idea and it took Goldsworthy to do it.

And Goldsworthy's Cannae is definately not a narrative. Livy's is a narrative. Goldsworthy's is a detailed explaination

ParallelPain 03:20, 15 October 2007 (UTC)

One more thing. This shows that the 12 Latin colonies suffered so much from the war they told Rome in effect that "from now on we'll be neutral." And Rome suffered so much as well and was loosing, or at best a draw that it can't crack down on these colonies for fear of their defection to Hannibal until 204BC when they were clearly winning. Just because it's 7 years after Cannae doesn't take away Cannae's contribution in that.ParallelPain 03:24, 15 October 2007 (UTC)

I'm not a fan of Goldsworthy, but he is a usable source, however some of his opinions are rather controversial and should be presented appropriately since he is definetly not the only one writing about Cannae. Wandalstouring 08:42, 15 October 2007 (UTC)

Hello ParallelPain. I don't know on what basis you make the statement that the colonies "told Rome in effect" "from now on we'll be neutral." When the Latin colonies declined to provide additional troops in 209BC, this did not mean that surviving colony members already in service were automatically withdrawn from the fight. They would continue to serve up to age 46, just like everybody else. The complaints by the colonies that there were few men left to recruit must have been literally true, or they would not have been tolerated by Rome in the first place. Five years later, when no doubt a fair number of youngsters had grown up to military age, the fault could be remedied. As for your suggestion that the Roman authorities feared the colonies would defect to Hannibal, this is not credible. In the entire Hannibalic War, all the Latin speaking peoples (and many other non Latin speakers) remained steadfastly loyal. There was never a hint of defection, or any threats to do so.

As for Goldsworthy's reconstruction of Cannae itself, we have to remember that no modern historian has ever witnessed a real battle fought with swords, spears, lances, shields, etc., by tens of thousands of combatatants. It's all second-hand and third-hand speculation. Even Livy and Polybius contain no eyewitness reports as such. Both were writing long after the event, and were totally reliant on previous writers, many of well-known dubious reliability, especially the old Roman annalists. This contrasts with other writers that do give us eyewitness reports, such as Thucydides and Caesar, and a remarkable letter from Sulpicius Galba to Cicero describing the battle of Forum Gallorum, where battle reconstructions can be far more credible and reliable, far more than in the case of Cannae, whose genuine reconstruction, unfortunately, probably remains unrecoverable. Esf456 18:09, 15 October 2007 (UTC)esf456

Ah true true. That part is my bad. Though the 12 colonies if I remember right also refused to pay any more taxes, but I might have remembered wrong again. However, an investigation was held after the defeat of Hasdrubal of which towns in the area of the battle (forgot name) considered going over to Carthage as soon as the Carthaginian arrived. This meant there were towns planning this, or at the very list the Romans suspected towns were planning this. So I wouldn't say all the people that didn't defect to Hannibal already by this point were all steadfastly loyal. At least the Romans didn't think they were.

And it is true that Goldsworthy's reconstruction needs to be doubted. But this does not mean that we should not take it into consideration just because it differs from other historians. And yes Livy and Polybius are not first-hand accounts, but they are the closest accounts we have and all other historians besides Goldsworthy also rely on Livy and Polybius. And they had access to documents we don't have, so we have no choice but to rely on them. Not to mention Polybius served alongside the Roman army for a time and wrote about the tactics used by the Romans. They did live at the time, and while they might not be as objective as modern historians, they did have chances (especially Polybius) to see and hear about how battles were actually fought, and Livy also rely on Polybius somewhat. Please remember what I'm trying to change here. I'm not saying we put all the cavalry and spear fight in. I'm saying that the centre of the Celtic line did break, and the Romans pursuing through this gap was attacked by the Africans that were stationed to the rear of the sides of the Celtic line, which held because they were in contact for a less amount of time. The Romans, attacked from both flanks by the Africans, were then attacked from the front by the Celtic centre which Hannibal and Mago was able to rally.

To support this I have borrowed 3 books from the library: 1) Polybius, translated by W.R. Paton. 2) Livy, translated by J. C. Yardley (Wiki's Livy is translated by C Roberts), and 3) Goldsworthy's Cannae. Now I won't use Goldsworthy for now as you guys don't seem to like him, I'll use Polybius and Livy.

From Polybius Book 3: "For a time the Spaniards and Celts kept their ranks and struggled bravely with the Romans, but soon, borne down by the weight of the legions, they gave way and fell back, breaking up the crescent. The Roman maniples, pursuing them furiously, easily penetrated the enemy's front, since the Celts were deployed in a thin line while they themselves had crowded up from the wings to the centre where the fighting was going on. For the centres and wings did not come into action simultaneously, but the centres first, as the Celts were drawn up in a crescent and a long way in advance of their wings, the convex face of the crescent being turned towards the enemy. The Romans, however, followed up the Celts and pressing on to the centre and that part of the enemy's line which was giving way, progressed so far that they now had the heavy-armed Africans on both of their flanks. Hereupon the Africans on the right wing facing to the left and then beginning from the right charged upon the enemy's flank, while those on the left faced to the right and dressing by the left, did the same, the situation itself indicating to them how to act. The consequence was that, as Hannibal had designed, the Romans, straoying too far in pursuit of the Celts, were caught between the two divisions of the enemy, and they now no longer kept their compact formation but turned singly or in companies to deal with the enemy who was falling on their flanks."

As you can see Polybius mentions nothing about the Africans moving forward, but that the Romans pursued the routing Celts so far, they pasted by the Africans, giving them the natural opportunity to flank the Romans. There's also another version of translation that specifically said the Celts retreated.

From Livy Book 22: "Thus, after persistent and frequent efforts, the Romans eventually pushed their adversary back. Then, the enemy repelled and retreating in confusion, the Romans charged ahead and, in one surge, drove through the terror-stricken column of fleeing men, and into the Carthaginian centre. Meeting no resistance, they finally reached the African reserves, who had taken up a position on the two wings. The wings had been drawn back from the main body of both sides, while the centre, formed of Gauls and Spaniards, had protruded some way ahead of them. This convex formation had now been driven back, first of all straightening out the Carthaginian front, and then, as the Carthaginian retreat continued, even forming a depression in the centre. The Africans had now completed the crescent-formation at both ends and, as the Romans charged recklessly into the centre, they outflanked them, and soon extended the cresent to enclose them to their rear as well. (end of paragraph). At this point the Romans found the one battle they had now finished was to no purpose, and leaving the Gauls and Spaniards, whom they had been cutting down as they retreated, they entered into a fresh combat with the Africans..."

Even Livy says that the Celts routed, and that the Romans broke off their pursue to fight the Africans. This means the Romans were not immediately attacked from three sides by the infantry. In fact they would only be attacked from three sides if Hannibal and Mago were able to rally the Celts and send them back into the fray, which is a good assumption.

So the two closest sources we have says that the Celtic centre broke. This is in no way represented in the article, which does not even mention the possibility of the line breaking. I think the problem might be that people think that when the centre of the army breaks, the battle is lost. But we have to remember that at both Marathon and Trebia the victor's centre broke, and they still won. So I believe we should at the very least state the possibility of the Celtic centre breaking, as that is what two of our most reliable ancient sources tell us.

Now the rest is Goldsworthy's speculation. He speculated instead of the Africans making up the ends of the first and only line, they were held in reserve behind the ends of the first line. While this is not represented in Livy or Polybius, and I am not saying this is the correct way, I have to say I understand why Goldsworthy would think so and say it's possible. For the Romans had to be incredibly stupid to leave the ends of the enemy line unengaged, no matter how desperite for glory they were and how heavily they focused on the centre. However if the Africans were stationed in reserve instead, they would have been more or less out of sight against the incoming Romans. So if the Romans were smart enough to engage the entire Carthaginian front line, which they should be, the Africans could still flank the Romans breaking through the centre. Not only that, the Africans would have reinforced the ends of the Celtic line, insuring the ends don't break.

Now for numbers. We already know Polybius's so that's ok. But even Yardley translates that Livy wrote "They were, they claim, 87,200 men under arms in the Roman camp when the battle was fought at Cannae." I would say that has a high possibility of being the number Livy said was the army that tagged Hannibal during the days leading up to the battle (not the battle itself) instead of the entire Roman armed forces.

There is one more thing I'd like to address. Polybius wrote "Since the Roman army, as I said, faced south and the Carthaginians north, they were neither of them inconvenienced by the rising sun." This is repeated by Livy who states "Whether they owed their position to calculation or pure chance, both sides were fortunate enough to have the sun at an angle, the Romans facing south and the Carthaginians north." Now given the account of the battle and the map (given by Goldsworthy, sorry that's the only book I have with a map of the River Aufidius), the River Audifius in the vicinity of Cannae runs from Southwest to Northeast. As both sides anchored one flank next to the river, neither side would have the Sun straight in their face.

Now the question is risen, which side of the river is the battle fought on? North or south? This is important as this is also, amoungst various other things such as the approach to Cannae taken by the armies, which side has the sun PARTLY in his face? If the battle is fought on the north side, then the Romans, facing north east would have the sun slightly in their face. But if the battle is fought on the south side, then the Carthaginians would have the sun partly in their face. As it's only partly it's no great deal, and really the approach to the battle would be more important. This point is argued by historians and the argument should be presented, which it is not.

I personally think the battle was fought on the south side of the river, as both Polybius and Livy states the Carthaginians faced north and the Romans south. While this is not possible exactly, it is possible approximately when the battle is fought on the south side of the river, in which case the Carthaginians faced northeast and Romans southwest. But I think the best way to solve this is whether the Volturnus, the wind that blew in the face of the Romans (stated by Livy) blew towards the northeast or southwest. Goldsworthy states that the wind blew from the southwest towards the northeast, which gives support that the battle is fought on the south side of the river. However Goldsworthy does not site the source which he got for this wind, and I don't have one, so I don't know.

But I would say all these things need to be stated in the article.ParallelPain 01:50, 16 October 2007 (UTC)

Reread your sources and do not OR. Wandalstouring 10:11, 16 October 2007 (UTC)

Hey hey hey. Goldworthy said all this. I'm just supporting it with Livy and Polybius. I won't call it ORParallelPain 15:28, 16 October 2007 (UTC)

Right bank, left bank

Hello again ParallelPain. I would like to advise you that when referring to rivers, the customary terminology is "right bank," and "left bank," not 'north' or 'south.' The right bank is the bank on the right hand side when the observer faces the sea, the left bank is naturally the opposite. In the case of the battle of Cannae, by far the majority of investigators have stated that the battle was fought on the right bank, the evidence for which seems very persuasive. Esf456 17:31, 16 October 2007 (UTC)esf456

The only problem with that is that I don't know which way the onlooker is facing and neither do we know the exact area of the battle. Is one looking from Cannae? The Roman side? The Carthaginian side? Upstream? Downstream? So you'll have to explain to me what right bank and left bank is. Is rightbank the north bank or the south?ParallelPain 18:10, 16 October 2007 (UTC)

I am at the library and just did some digging. Here's the result: It seems, just as you said, most of the historians nowdays says the battle is fought on the south-eastern bank of the river, or right bank. The one I found that said so are: Hannibal by G. P. Baker, Hannibal's War by John Peddie, Rome Against Carthage, by T. A. Dorey and D. R. Dudley, Punic War by Brian Caven, The Punic War by Nigel Bagnall, and Cannae by Gregory Daly. None of the books I found supported the left, or north-west bank theory. However, Daly points out the debate that had taken place and gave a map with a number of battlefield location that had been put forward before on it. The ones on the left bank are: Sturenburg, De Sanctis, and Dodge. The ones on the right bank of the modern river are Kromayer and Arnold Hesselbart. The one on the right bank of a proposed ancient course of the river are Connolly and Goldsworthy. There's also one Peusch who's place of the battle looks almost as if the Roman rear faced the ancient course of the river -.-".

Anyway if we take the more modern right-bank theory to be correct, then there's two things wrong with this article. 1)The map is wrong. The battle, taking place on the right bank, would have taken place on the same side as the town of Cannae. The river should be flowing from southwest to northeast anyway. But more importantly 2) With the concrete fact that the Romans anchored their right flank beside the river and Carthage their left, it means the Carthaginians faced in the general direction of Northeast and the Romans Southwest. This means if the angle of the sun's path is east to west (it's southeast to southwest but I don't know how much south) then the sun would have shawn at an angle into the eyes of the Carthaginians and not the Romans as stated in the article. So I am saying the sunlight in the eyes of the Romans is Dodge's own theory and is not backed by evidence. ParallelPain 19:34, 16 October 2007 (UTC)

Make a collection of all different theories and then present them. Wandalstouring 18:24, 17 October 2007 (UTC)

So what do I do with the map? Draw a new set?ParallelPain 18:15, 18 October 2007 (UTC)

The map is correct according to one view of the event. We could draw a map for each different view, however, there are at least ten different suggestions for locations and battle deployments at Cannae and none can be judged truer than another by us. Simply try to find out what the scientific community currently accepts and point out some of the controversies in science. Goldsworthy, you are using, is one of the more controversial writers. Wandalstouring 12:24, 19 October 2007 (UTC)

I don't have to use Goldsworthy's. In fact Kromayer's looks a tiny little bit more convincing because it's more North-South than Goldsworthy's. As for the riverbank argument, I don't have access to the books of the people (such as Dodge) arguing for left bank, I only have for right-bank. So...can't really present both sides of the arguement. ParallelPain 20:04, 19 October 2007 (UTC)

Try to get your hands on Gregory Daly he presents the different views in his book "Cannae. The experience of battle in the Second Punic War".Wandalstouring —Preceding comment was added at 07:43, 20 October 2007 (UTC)

I found it, page 33 Dodge, Stürenburg De Sanctis propose the left bank. Goldsworthy, Reusch and Connolly across the stream and Kromayer and Arnold Hesselbarth on the right bank. Wandalstouring 07:48, 20 October 2007 (UTC)

I know that. I wrote that up there ^ remember? But Daly doesn't give detailed arguements of both sides, instead only going into deatil for Connolly, who proposed an ancient course of the river and says the battle took place on the right bank of that ancient river course, and Kromayer, who says the battle took place on the rightbank a bit more downstream than what the other right-bank guys said. That's all good but there's no arguement for leftbank here. I remember in a book someone, possibly Goldsworthy or Daly, said that the older historians chose left bank simply because there's a flat plain there...well what you want me to just quote that? BTW, why is Daly's annalysis not controversial and Goldsworthy's is? Daly's is much more detailed than Goldsworthys, even Daly himself said he try to reconstruct the battle in way Goldsworthy and someone else said you can't due to lack of information.ParallelPain 01:11, 21 October 2007 (UTC)

Daly tries to use what all his sources say and is at great pain to present the other opinions, Goldsworthy presents his view, that's the little difference. Wandalstouring 09:15, 21 October 2007 (UTC)

OK, so how do I represent the left-bank people? Again Daly never goes into detail for any of them. I'm sorry but I'm beginning to think you never bother reading my posts in their entirety and just read the last few lines. Because if you had read it you wouldn't bave bothered explaining to me about Daly's view when I had already listed it. And now I give you Daly's view in even more detail but you only answer my question about Goldsworthy. And no where do I see that Daly taking a greater amount of pain than Goldsworthy to present his view. He gave a simple map of about 6~8 views and would only explain two, both of which are right-bank, while Goldsworthy went on to explain the left-bank arguement too, though I admit he didn't do a very good job of it with only 2~3 sentences, but at least he did it. Daly just said "it doesn't fit with the evidence" and left it at that. What do you want me to do just quote Daly and say all left-bank guys are wrong? Cause I actually want to do that very much instead of being all this professional and present all views, since I also see the left-bank as not fitting with the evidence.

To me as a reader Daly and Goldsworthy took the same amount of pain. The only thing Daly did better was keep quoting ancient sources and modern views which Goldsworthy only paraphrased and then put it in his notes section. Daly also relied a lot on Goldsworthy, I need to remind you. I also need to remind you that both Daly (who uses Kromayer) and Goldsworthy support the right-bank theory, just one uses the right-bank of a proposed ancient course of the river while Kromayer, who Daly uses, puts it a little more downstream of the modern course of the river. I also feel like I've typed this before.ParallelPain 17:59, 21 October 2007 (UTC)

Sure, you repeat yourself. Is it clear that you need to present an overview about all theories? Wandalstouring 09:28, 22 October 2007 (UTC)

Ok so AGAIN, how do I represent the left-bank people? As I said, now the 3rd time, Daly does not present an argument for the left-bank people. All he gave was a map and "it doesn't fit with the evidence" and I have no book here in this library arguing for the left-bank.ParallelPain 17:57, 22 October 2007 (UTC)

Just add who supports left right an in between, later we can add a detailed overview of arguments, I'm a bit under time constraints otherwise I'd research it already. In a few month probably I can add some of the arguments. However, we shouldn't overempahsize one side as long as it is not clearly the only accepted view. Wandalstouring 09:52, 23 October 2007 (UTC)

Long time no post. School will be starting soon then I can go run down the copy of Daly. Meanwhile there's another arguement that popped up. I scanned over a book on Hannibal by none other than Theodore Dodge. And what do you know not only does he have the battle on the left bank, he has Hannibal positioning his troops with their back to the riverParallelPain (talk) 21:41, 2 January 2008 (UTC)

Dodge is very disputed. I have his book, but didn't read it yet. Wandalstouring (talk) 10:28, 3 January 2008 (UTC)

I just finished reading a chapter in Dodge(the one on Hannibal's character.) I think he is OK, but for some details we have to check other authors since he isn't always the most critically minded(the family background had its flaws). Wandalstouring (talk) 11:40, 3 January 2008 (UTC)