Talk:British Army during the American Revolutionary War

Some of the errors and misrepresentations in this article that would benefit from revision

Thousands of volunteer militia battalions were raised for home defense in Ireland and England, and some of the most competent of these were embodied to the regular army. The British Government took a further step by releasing criminals and debtors from prison on the condition they joined the army. Three entire regiments were raised from this early release program.

Three entire regiments raise from released prisoners? Which were they?

25,000 foreigners (the “Hessians”)

The foreign contract troops were from several German states. This should be made clear.

The elite of the infantry were formed in the Foot Guard and the Highland regiments, who were usually the tallest and fittest men. On taking command in America General William Howe gave orders that every regiment form a company of light infantry who were then placed in composite light infantry battalions.[10][11] These men were again hand picked from the tallest and fittest of the rank and file.

This series of generalisations is so full of error as to be meaningless. Men were not selected from the infantry to join the Guards, or the Highland regiments for that matter. Infantry battalons were ordered to form light companies in 1770-71. Height was not a stipulation for light infantry. If anything, the opposite was preferred.

a tactic that was known as "loose files and American scramble"

This phrase could not have been used in America since it is a quotation from correspondence between Harcourt and Dundas in 1785.

The most common order of battle positioned the light infantry and Grenadiers on the flanks of the main line of infantry, while Highlanders or Guards were usually held back as a reserve.

The LI and Grenadier battalions were placed where they were required, frequently forming the core of a battle line. Light infantry also formed outposts, and operated as advance or flank guards on the march. Historical references to the Guards and Highlanders being in the Reserve, eg under Cornwallis, are not a reference to their deployment in battle but an C18th term that describes a large brigade formed of the C-in-C's best troops. At both Long Island and Brandywine, the Reserve provided the manoeuvre portion of Howe's attack against Washington.

The most proficient line regiments were deployed on the right, while inexperienced regiments or militias were placed on the left of the battle line.

This statement is a misrepresentation of the custom that the senior regiment, by number, took the right of the line. The next senior would take the left, and so alternately until all battalions in a brigade were deployed .

Soldiers of the new light infantry not only adopted new tactics, but adapted their uniforms.[26] Coats were cut short, so that they rested at the men's waists, all lace was removed and the cumbersome tricorn hats were cut down to brims to resemble derby hats (Bowler hats), while some were issued with short leather caps.

The term 'tricorne' is unhistorical. By 1775 the military cocked hat had been evolving away from the three-cornered form for some time. The cocked hat cut-down for campaign use was seen in varying styles; those with a narrow brim but one of them. The reference to a Derby or Bowler hat is misleading. The leather caps were pre-war issue to some infantry Light companies and probably little worn in the field. They were not a wartime adaptation.

The lighter armament consisted of a shorter musket, while the heavy and cumbersome cartridge-box was replaced by a small one, instead worn across the stomach, containing nine cartridges lined up in a row for easy access.[26] Light companies were also issued with powder horns and naval boarding axes (which became known as Tomahawks in North America).

Although in evidence, the belly box and powder horn were not general issue to Light companies.

Much of the early training was found to be inadequate,[27] with officers unsure how to use light companies.[27] Many of the brightest young officers sought commissions elsewhere because being a "light-bob" officer lacked social prestige.

As a generalisation, this does not make sense. As the light company was but one of eight companies in a peacetime battalion, a junior officer need not seek a commission elsewhere, although in individual circumstances a disagreement with the Lieutenant Colonel might have prompted that.

Hair was usually cut short or fixed in plaits at the top of the head.

There is evidence of hair cut short for the 1777 campaign with orders being given to let it grow again. Whether it was usaul is by no means certain. The plaited queue, turned up and fixed with a comb was a peaceime grenadier distinction, also worn by fusiliers.

Light foot were issued with short coats, with their ammunition box worn across the front of their stomach rather than at the side as by line infantry. Grenadiers usually carried cavalry sabers as a side arm, while light infantry carried small axes.

The belly box was not a general feature of light troops. A standard cartouche box slung from the left shoulder was worn. The infantry hanger was not a cavalry weapon. It was not worn by grenadiers in America.

Soldiers were also issued with greatcoats to be worn in adverse conditions, and were often used as tents or blankets.

In the British army, great coats were not issued until 1802. Are you thinking of 'watch coats', effectively cloaks, which were held in limited numbers for sentries and piquets?

After inconclusive skirmishing with Washington's army at the Battle of the Clouds, a battalion of British light infantry were accused of committing a massacre in a surprise assault on a rebel camp at the Battle of Paoli. All remaining resistance to Howe was eliminated in this attack, and the rest of Howe's army marched on the rebel capital unopposed.

This is not the case. The attack on Wayne's force near Paoli Tavern was a sideshow. Washington continued his attempts to manoeuvre Howe away from Philadelphia while protecting his logistical base for another week. He then delivered a counterattack at Germantown that almost succeeded.

Command was given to Clinton who, after the French declaration of war, carried out orders to evacuate the British army from Philadelphia to New York. He did this with an overland march, fighting a large action at the Monmouth on the way.

This doesn't make much sense.

In January 1781 Tarleton's cavalry force was destroyed at the Battle of Cowpens.

At Cowpens, Tarleton had a mixed force of line infantry and loyalists, including the cavalry of his Legion.

In 1788 the British army was reformed by General David Dundas, an officer who had not served in America.

In 1788, Dundas merely published a treatise on infantry drill. It formed the basis of regulations authorised in 1793. Certain organisational reforms took place in the British army, primarily under the orders of the Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief from 1795 onwards. The representation of Dundas position re. Prussian practice and Light Infantry, is greatly oversimplified.

The failure to formally absorb the tactical lessons of the American War of Independence contributed to the early difficulties experienced by the British army during the French Revolutionary Wars.

The problems the British army faced in the Low Countries were not tactical. British troops regularly defeated French troops in the field and held their own against overwhelming numbers. The problems were systemic: lack of formal staff organisation, breakdown of supply and medical care, a corrupt system of recruiting soldiers and providing officers and the general effects of an army run down in peacetime.

JF42 (talk) 09:02, 1 March 2016 (UTC)

I have substantially copyedited the "Infantry" section, mainly to remove repetition and over-wordiness. I have removed some of the disputed sections referred to but left others in, as there I found no contradictory references. Perhaps JF42 (talk) might continue the copyediting. HLGallon (talk) 23:54, 30 April 2016 (UTC)

Moves from ARW

I've moved some material and images from American Revolutionary War that is very specifically related to the "British Army during the American Revolutionary War", rather than a general account of the ARW as a military conflict, the premise of the earlier article site for this research.

I've tried to make the transition as seamless as possible. The material is almost entirely footnoted in a HarvRef citation style, with referenced items added to the Bibliography.

Three footnotes I have not yet sorted are those to "Statutes at Large, Ruffhead’s Edition", "War Office Papers, volume 1", and the "9th Report on Public Accounts". Otherwise, I've completed the citations and footnote coding for seven other non-standard elements that were once on the ARW page, before bringing them over here. Respectfully - TheVirginiaHistorian (talk) 23:11, 21 September 2020 (UTC)

British logistics

Below is a copy-paste of narrative with its HarvRef footnotes and references for your use here. It is removed completely from American Revolutionary War as too detailed for the survey account of military campaigns there. The effort is part of a trimming project in coordination with the Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/Assessment/Requests, to promote the ARW article to B-class status.

40th Regt. of Foot Grenadier
and Brown Bess musket, 1767

Logistical organization of eighteenth century armies was chaotic at best, and the British Army was no exception. No logistical corps existed in the modern sense; while on campaign in foreign territories such as America, horses, wagons, and drivers were frequently requisitioned from the locals, often by impressment or by hire. No centrally organized medical corps existed. It was common for surgeons to have no formal medical education, and no diploma or entry examination was required. Nurses sometimes were apprentices to surgeons, but many were drafted from the women who followed the army. Army surgeons and doctors were poorly paid and were regarded as social inferiors to other officers.

The heavy personal equipment and wool uniform of the regular infantrymen were wholly unsuitable for combat in America, and the outfit was especially ill-suited to comfort and agile movement. During the Battle of Monmouth in late June 1778, the temperature exceeded 100 °F (38 °C), and heat stroke claimed more lives than actual combat. The standard-issue firearm of the British Army was the Land Pattern Musket. Some officers preferred their troops to fire careful, measured shots (around two per minute), rather than rapid firing. A bayonet made firing difficult, as its cumbersome shape hampered ramming down the charge into the barrel. British troops had a tendency to fire impetuously, resulting in inaccurate fire, a trait for which John Burgoyne criticized them during the Saratoga campaign. Burgoyne instead encouraged bayonet charges to break up enemy formations, which was a preferred tactic in most European armies at the time.

Soldiers of the Black Watch
and Brown Bess muskets, 1790

Every battalion in America had organized its own rifle company by the end of the war, although rifles were not formally issued to the army until the Baker Rifle in 1801. Flintlocks were heavily dependent on the weather; high winds could blow the gunpowder from the flash pan, while heavy rain could soak the paper cartridge, ruining the powder and rendering the musket unable to fire. Furthermore, flints used in British muskets were of notoriously poor quality; they could only be fired around six times before requiring resharpening, while American flints could fire sixty. This led to a common expression among the British: "Yankee flint was as good as a glass of grog".

Provisioning troops and sailors proved to be an immense challenge, as the majority of food stores had to be shipped overseas from Britain. The need to maintain Loyalist support prevented the Army from living off the land. Other factors also impeded this option; the countryside was too sparsely populated and the inhabitants were largely hostile or indifferent, the network of roads and bridges was poorly developed, and the area which the British controlled was so limited that foraging parties were frequently in danger of being ambushed. After France entered the war, the threat of the French navy increased the difficulty of transporting supplies to America. Food supplies were frequently in bad condition. The climate was also against the British in the southern colonies and the Caribbean, where the intense summer heat caused food supplies to sour and spoil. Life at sea was little better. Sailors and passengers were issued a daily food ration, largely consisting of stale hardtack and beer. Meat supplies often spoiled on long voyages. The lack of fresh fruit and vegetables gave rise to scurvy, one of the biggest killers at sea.

Citations

Bibliography

• Black, Jeremy (2001) [1991]. War for America: The Fight for Independence, 1775–1783. Sutton Publishing. ISBN 978-0750928083.
• British Army (1916) [7 August 1781]. Proceedings of a Board of general officers of the British army at New York, 1781. New York Historical Society. The board of inquiry was convened by Sir Henry Clinton into Army accounts and expenditures
• Burgoyne, John (1780). A state of the expedition from Canada : as laid before the House of commons. London : Printed for J. Almon.
• Donne, W. Bodham, ed. (1867). The correspondence of King George the Third with Lord North from 1768 to 1783. Vol. 2. online at Hathi Trust
• Duncan, Francis (1879). History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery. London: John Murray.
• Fortescue, John (1902). A history of the British army. Vol. 3.
• Hagist, Don N. (Winter 2011). "Unpublished Writings of Roger Lamb, Soldier of the American War of Independence". Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research. 89 (360). Society for Army Historical Research: 280–290. JSTOR 44232931.
• Lloyd, Earnest Marsh (1908). A review of the history of infantry. New York: Longmans, Green, and co.
• National Institute of Health "Scurvy". National Institute of Health. 14 November 2016. Retrieved 1 October 2020. Genetic and Rare Diseases Information Center
• "Battle of Monmouth Courthouse". Robinson Library. Self-published. Retrieved June 20, 2017.
• Royal Navy Museum "Ships Biscuits – Royal Navy hardtack". Royal Navy Museum. Archived from the original on October 31, 2009. Retrieved January 14, 2010.
• Sawyer, C.W. (1910). Firearms in American History. Boston: C.W. Sawyer. online at Hathi Trust
• Smith, Merril D. (2015). The World of the American Revolution: A Daily Life Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 374. ISBN 978-1-4408-3028-0.
• Trevelyan, George Otto (1912). George the Third and Charles Fox: the concluding part of The American revolution. Longmans, Green, and Company. Archived online at HathiTrust.org

Sincerely - TheVirginiaHistorian (talk) 20:24, 12 October 2020 (UTC)

British Army command

This material is removed from American Revolutionary War for your use here.

Ultimately, Gage was relieved of command for underestimating the strength of republican sympathy and Patriot support. In 1777, Howe might have committed his army to support Burgoyne attacking south from Quebec into New York, but he saw Washington positioned before Philadelphia as a greater threat. At the Battle of White Marsh, Howe failed to exploit the vulnerable American rear, and then he inexplicably ordered a retreat to Philadelphia after only minor skirmishes. His withdrawal astonished both sides.

Citations

Bibliography

• Cadwalader, Richard McCall (1901). Observance of the One Hundred and Twenty-third Anniversary of the Evacuation of Philadelphia by the British Army: Fort Washington and the Encampment of White Marsh, November 2, 1777. Press of the New Era Printing Company. pp. 20–28. Retrieved January 7, 2016.
• McGuire, Thomas J. (2011). Stop the Revolution: America in the Summer of Independence and the Conference for Peace. Stackpole Books. ISBN 978-0-8117-4508-6.

Respectfully submitted - TheVirginiaHistorian (talk) 09:52, 14 October 2020 (UTC)