Talk:Cosmological argument/Archive 1

Archive 1

Archive 2

Untitled

Would it make sense to say that God is just another name for the property of existence?

That's correct. --Eequor 19:37, 20 Jun 2004 (UTC)

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This page really needs work, it talks down to those who "stubbornly" advocate the principle of causality, etc. This is simply not apropriate for something in an encyclopedia article. (Esp. not a NPOV encyclopedia!!!)

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Not sure why there is a specific section for Islamic view on the arguement. Can some oen fill me in on this?

I tend to agree, I think it should be moved to Origin belief unless someone can give a reason why it is here. Bothar 07:07, 21 November 2006 (UTC)

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It could also be pointed out that if

A = The uncaused cause that got the universe going.
B = Some entity that separated "wrong" actions from "right".
C = Some entity that continuously monitors the behaviour of humans.
D = Some entity that organizes an afterlife for humans, possibly based on their previous behaviour.

then the existence of A does not necessarily imply the existence of B, C or D.

And also: B, C, and D need not all refer to a single, common entity. --Eequor 19:37, 20 Jun 2004 (UTC)

No sources

It concerns me that so much work is being done on this article, but no one bothers to refer to sources. If I knew anything about the topic I would have helped. Please, if you attributed to the article, come back and put in your references that you used to make additions. Bothar 07:07, 21 November 2006 (UTC)

Closing paragraphs

I'm disappointed by the sudden departure from rigor in the prior closing three paragraphs. It's like saying, "There are strong arguments against the cosmological argument, which are [...] -- but I believe in God." The text seems to immediately forget that it argued the possibility of a universe which exists necessarily without need for a creator. It pointlessly invokes the Law of Conservation of Energy, a property which applies only within the universe. Then it makes a completely unsupported claim that the creator was omnipotent. --Eequor 19:51, 20 Jun 2004 (UTC)

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Obvious (at least to myself?) ommision/question: If the empirically determinable (ie we can scientifically guess it) start to the chain of causality requires something to bring it into effect, why does not a god too? That is to say, how is saying "God made the big bang happen (or created the earth 20000(00..) years ago complete...*sigh*)" any better than "The big bang caused the rest of the universe to happen". Some simply still, if God caused the first phyiscal event, what caused God" seems like a valid question, whereas Spiritual/Physical event dichotomy doesn't seem valid to anyone who doesn't already subscribe to some superphysical belief. (Aside: some mention of singularity would probably be useful too)
Views/Comments?

I think it's better to dispense with notions of gods altogether. It doesn't really matter whether the creator is called God or The Big Bang; their purposes were identical. We know that something created everything (else we wouldn't be here to observe it), but it's basically unknowable what the creating event was, because any creating event must have had, in turn, its own creating event (see phenomenon and noumenon).

It isn't quite enough to say that the universe is its own creating event (see Ourobouros); unfortunately that still leaves us with the question of how the universe came to exist so that it could create itself. A snake emerging from its own mouth is still a snake. It's unclear why nothingness would have chosen to give itself the form of a snake rather than content itself with remaining nothing. And even could we understand that, we are forced to ask where the nothing came from. --Eequor 00:36, 1 Aug 2004 (UTC)

The reply to this, I think, would be that God is something that exists outside of Time. So, since cause and effect is motivated by the concept of time, God would need no cause and no effect. He would be, by his very nature, his own cause and his own effect. I use the word God here as any sort of catylyst for the universe, or the big bang.

So you conveniently excuse yourself for having to present any rational explanation for your argument. To quote Richard Dawkins, "if that kind of logic convinces you, you are welcome to it."--Primal Chaos 13:49, 5 January 2007 (UTC)

Merge

I have merged in First Cause. -- FirstPrinciples 08:49, Feb 13, 2005 (UTC)

Copy-editing?

This article may need some work, but it doesn't seem to need major copy-editing per se. I've removed the notice. If you object, let me know. Thanks, Zensufi 16:16, 23 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Cosmological is not first cause.

I was under the impression that the first cause argument is a type of cosmological argument [1]. We can certainly have First cause redirect to Cosmological argument, but we must explain that the two are not equivalent. If no one objects to this comment for a while, I'll rewrite the beginning myself. Zensufi 16:20, 23 Apr 2005 (UTC)

If there is a distinction, you might consider making two different articles, even if first cause is only a stub. Joshuaschroeder 02:28, 25 Apr 2005 (UTC)

I do not think first cause should be in a separate article. It is certainly a form of cosmological argument, hence it belongs in this article. (I also suggest there should also be references to the prime mover which is also a cosmological argument as stated by Aquinas.) -- FP ?? 02:53, Apr 25, 2005 (UTC)

I agree with FP. Cosmological argument should be one article, divided into a general discussion of the cosmological argument followed by specific examples, such as first cause and others such as the classical ones of Aquinas and more modern ones. Ones that already have their own article (such as the Kalam cosmological argument) should only be summarized. If, however, the first cause or any other section becomes so long as to become unwieldy, we'll give it its own article. Zensufi 03:42, 25 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Needs work

One of the most glaring omissions is the lip service it gives to the infinite regress objection--mentioning it once outside the criticisms section and barely even alluding to it in the criticisms section. We know a lot more about math than we did in Aquinas's day and infinite series are well known. The idea that a casual chain can't stretch back infinitely far isn't considered logical by modern understanding.

I noticed that there is no mention of one of the most common arguments against infinite regress that I've heard: "If the universe is infinitely old, why hasn't everything happened yet?" Rozencrantz 23:42, 3 November 2006 (UTC)

The article also fails to give the objection that deciding that God is exempt from the rule that everything has a cause amounts to special pleading, though the Leibniz reply is close. Ken Arromdee 21:08, 10 August 2005 (UTC)

Merge from teleological argument

Everything from "Premise 2" onwards in the section "Other counter-arguments" on the teleological argument page is the same as this one. I think it should be merged here (or simply edited out of teleological argument as it is beyond the scope of that argument). --Ben 02:03, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

Yeah, go ahead, but write a summary in its place or put a link there. Infinity0 11:47, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

Merge complete. --Ben 22:41, 20 November 2005 (UTC)

"Mistakenly" and "nothingness"

The claim that it is a "mistake" to assume that quantum physics allows for the creation of something out of nothing is incorrect. Indeed when a quantum particle tunnels out of the vacuum, it is indeed a case of something coming from nothing -- quite literally.

The claim that "nothingness" isn't really "nothing" when it involves vacuum energy fluctuations is also a limited POV. In general, nothing means absense of all forms of waveparticle energy (naked spacetime). There is no way to get rid of the metric and so the philosophical claim that the vacuum energy density is not really "nothing" is without empirical test and therefore a metaphysical POV.

--Joshuaschroeder 22:54, 20 November 2005 (UTC)

Remember that the quantum vacuum is not literal nothingness but a sea of fluctuating energy. To say "it is indeed a case of something coming from nothing -- quite literally" cannot be correct because the particles come about via fluctuations in vacuum energy. Vacuum energy is not literal nothingness; if anything it is the opposite. If one says that the particles come from "nothing" and neglects to mention the energy fluctuations that are responsible for their creation, such a claim can be rather misleading to say the least. --Wade A. Tisthammer 18:04, 13 January 2006 (UTC)

By your definition there is no such thing in existence in the universe as a literal nothing. If such a thing doesn't exist, then the statement is meaningless from an empirical standpoint. --ScienceApologist 21:51, 14 January 2006 (UTC)

String theory argument

The paragraph

Some proponents of String Theory state that there are more dimensions than the ones we experience. In this argument, two universes existed outside of time, our fourth dimension. They collided with each other and dropped down into the lower four dimensions, x, y, z, and time. The universes in the other dimensions both existed forever and never existed, as they are not fettered by time and thus require no "first cause".

appears questionable as physics. For one thing, it claims that the two universes existed "out of time", but then says that they "collided" i.e. an event happened in time. It was also added by an anon 24.14.237.188 with a very short edit record, who added nonsense to the Pi page (that the irrationality of Pi is an open question). When I removed it pending verification, User:Infinity0 added it back, saying "I can't be bothered finding a source right now, but I've heard of this and it's not fictional vandalism." I don't think "hearing of" something outlandish is sufficient sourcing to put something in Wikipedia. --Macrakis 18:50, 27 November 2005 (UTC)

Comment it out from the page, but don't remove it. I'll go cook a source up later. Infinity0 18:56, 27 November 2005 (UTC)

/ They could be two different people you know, 15 days between the edits you mentioned, and IPs are variable. Infinity0 21:55, 27 November 2005 (UTC)

True. In which case the string theory comment was put in by someone with no editing record at all, which suggests that he/she might not be familiar with Wikipedia standards, or just someone who forgot to log in. In any case, a solid reference would clarify the matter. --Macrakis 23:31, 27 November 2005 (UTC)

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this is not meant to be an atheist outlet for point-counterpoint. Simply state the cosmological argument. The criticism section is just too huge and is clearly sprung by the inner, passionate desire atheists have to counter every theistic argument on wiki. Counter arguments are valid, but belong on their OWN PAGE. use this page to reference counter arguments, but keep them as references. Atheists need to resist their strong emotional urge to engage in a debate. To keep the NPOV, simply describe and state the merits and meaning of the cosmological argument. providing a counterpoint to everything in the argument makes this an atheist op-ed piece. Atheists have numerous pages on wiki to define and enunciate their arguments. but the debate style urges that atheists keep brining to the theist argument pages is getting a bit over the top. Marshill 17:28, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

An article about an argument should have both sides included. Or do you suggest making a "Objections to the teleological argument" article, and for every article about an argument? If you think the criticism section is too long, go over it and make it more concise. That will help readers, as long as you don't delete the key points. Infinity0 ^talk 17:43, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

"North of the North Pole"

I've added in the point about "before", "after", "caused" becoming meaningless idea in a timeless pre-Universe, and indirectly quoted Stephen Hawking - I can't remember his exact wording, nor can I find it. Please modify that bit if I've got something wrong! Tyrhinis 22:41, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

It's a very impressive point to make! So simple, yet so forceful. Even if it wasn't Stephen Hawking who said it, it should still be in there! :D Infinity0 ^talk 22:48, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

<<slaps self>> I really ought to look in obvious places before I say something; from the Stephen Hawking article (yeah, the one I linked above):

[...] His witty way with words has both entertained the non-specialist public and helped them to understand complex questions. Asked recently (October 2005) to explain his assertion on the British daytime chat show Richard and Judy that the question, "What came before the big bang?" was meaningless, he compared it to asking, "What lies north of the north pole?"

Not sure how to add this encyclopaedically, so putting it here for someone more experienced than me to add. Thanks. Tyrhinis 23:02, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

Addition

Recent addition [2] moved to talk:

But the assertion that quantum theory disproves the causal principle can be highly misleading. As Kanitsheider put it," The violent microstructure of the vacuum has been used in attempts to explain the origin of the universe as a long-lived vacuum fluctuation. But some authors have attached to this legitimate speculations[sic.] far reaching metaphysical claims, or at most they couched their mathematics in highly misledaing language when they maintained the 'creation of the universe out of nothing.' From the philosophical point of view it is essential to note that the foregoing is far from a spontaneous generation of everything from naught, but the origin of that embryonic bubble is really a causal process leading from a primordial substratum to a materialized substratum of the vacuum. Admittedly this process is not deterministic. It includes that weak sort of causal dependence peculiar to every quantum mechanical process." John Gribbin notes that,"Tryon talked about a'vacuum fluctuation', implying that some form of spacetime metric existed before the Universe came into being,..."(Gribbin 1998;303). There do exist more radical models of the universe such as the Vilenkin model which posits the origin of the universe from 'literally nothing',but Guth notes that " From general relativity, Vilenkin took the idea that the geometry of space is not fixed, but instead that space is plastic and capable of distortion. There are many possible geometries, including the closed universe, the open universe, and many less symmetric contortions of space and time. Among all possible geometries is the totally empty geometry, a space that contains no points whatever."(Guth 1997;274) This seems to support John Post's assertion that,"In fact the nothing out of which the universe tunnels in this scenario is a space, even though it is not a space time with all the structure that that implies."

Infinity0 ^talk 19:09, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

Significant edits in March 2006

The article now includes a history of the argument going back to the Socratic era, upon which Aquinas' versions of the argument were built. Also added was a significant clarification of the arguments in esse, in fieri, and the argument from contingency.

On the issue of the presented semantic-logic example of the argument: I changed it back to a five point argument. It appears the objections and counterargument section had already referred to these by number (then someone expanded it). Seems to me it should remain a five-point argument for consistency's sake thoughout the article.

On the form of the argument itself: The reason 1, 2, 3, and 4 are all in question when you get to the "first cause" (#5) is: Whatever exactly the rules are when one gets into the infinite or the "super-natural," we already know from leading edge physics that even such seemingly basic propositions as the statement "a causal chain cannont be of infinite length" probably do not apply. For one thing, there is no such thing as "length" beyond time-space, as far as we know. I don't have time to look it up for sourcing right now, but suffice it to say the "heavyweights" typically agree virtually everything is up for grabs once you get beyond time-space. Even in the realm of quarks and gluons and the like (and we haven't even gotten to the bottom of things yet), the "normal" rules of linearity simply don't apply. Kenosis 16:44, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

"Length" as a dimension may or may not exist outside space time. But "length" in this case means numbers, which do exist independent of space time. "A causal chain cannot be infinite" is a separate point, and is not contradicted by 5 (in fact the argument is that 5 leads from 4). 3 leads from 1 and 2, so it's redundant putting that in. -- infinity0 18:34, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

Infinity0, I cannot address it in full right at the moment. But the primary point is that the "normal" rules of cause-and-effect and related deduction that we take for granted within time-space plainly are not to b e taken as granted beyond time-space. These kinds of issues are why so many intensely thoughful persons (e.g. a number of leading-edge physicists and some top-flight philosophers and theologians) have become interested in the cosmological argument (along with the "fine-tuned universe" speculations) after a century and a half of "ho-hum" about it ("oh yeah, Aquinas' arguments"). Having said that, I do think it should be documented in talk; something as confusing as this obviously won't stay put for long unless it is thoroughly hashed through on this talk page. Take care for now...Kenosis 19:23, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

Yes, I understand that. But point 4 is "infinite causal chain". It's only a number, independent of spacetime. Since 4 logically leads onto 5, I don't see how 5 might "exclude 4". -- infinity0 19:41, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

I'm sure I can properly source this given some time. Though I should add to what you said: 4 leads to 5, but the qualification in parentheses is a separate deduction. The attempted application of propositions 1-4 to a "first cause" is in turn negated if 1 is not true ("first cause" is not-caused), if 2 is not true ("first cause" is "self-caused"), if 3 is for any reason not properly deduced with respect to a "first cause," or if 4 is not true (first cause's internal causal chain is "infinite," which is what is commonly taken to be a characteristic of God.) Even with today's understanding of the big bang and the hypothesized singularity from which it came, no one can show what the rules were "before" the big bang, although there is no before the big bang, because (as far as our cosmos is concerned) there is no time before the big bang... etc., etc. Similarly, from a theological slant, "If god is infinite (i.e. existing beyond time-space) any causal chain within God is also infinite; and might also be simultaneous (another characteristic we don't ordinarily associate with cause-and-effect); and might also be simultaneous mutual feedback mode, which makes it yet more difficult to conceive, to name just a few quirks we encounter when dealing with the very concept of infinite outside of time-space. Some people even end up in psychiatric facilities from this stuff :)

Possibly the qualification (to which one or more of the above propositions cannot apply) is one way to short-cut this for the present. Might also be a way to avoid continued wrangling about it by many others in the future while keeping it straightrorward...Kenosis 20:32, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

On the other hand, maybe this should be dealt with in the paragraph immediately below the 5-premise version of the argument...I'm fairly optimistic there is a way that it can be a stable enough edit for it to be able to handle the out-of-the-blue challenges at least. Plus the article's already committed to the five point form, on account of the criticism section being built on it.Kenosis 20:43, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

To say that 4 is wrong is a counter-argument. But the actual argument tries to prove the existence of a being to which 1 and 2 doesn't apply (the being doesn't have a cause, and the being causes itself). Obviously, you can pick faults with all the premises, but the argument itself only admits that the being transcends premises 1 and 2. For the argument, premise 4 is true. That it isn't true is not part of the argument. -- infinity0 20:56, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

The argument is for a first cause (historically an argument for existence of God). These are not counterarguments, only typical observations of where the premises themselves lead (which is to a sentient being to "whom" the normal rules do not apply, or some "thing" to which the normal rules do not apply). That's where the argument always has gone. Let me go look through the objections again and I'll get back to you on that one.Kenosis 21:02, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

I think I see now what you were referring to.

When I said above: "The attempted application of propositions 1-4 to a "first cause" is in turn negated if..." I was referring to the application of those rules to the "first cause", not to the cosmological argument premises themselves. The immediate point, the one that has always been made by the major proponents at least since Averroes and Aquinas, is that the rules which lead us to deduce that there was a first cause obviously do not apply to the first cause (and I am reinforcing the view that at least one of the four, or possibly all of the four, must not be true of the first cause.)Kenosis 21:10, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

But how does premise 4 apply to the first cause? Premise 4 is only the premise that "the rule which leads us to deduce that there was a first cause obviously do not apply to the first cause". -- infinity0 21:55, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

I appreciate your thoughtful challenge on this. I am now thinking a bit more strongly that perhaps this parenthetical qualification should be removed from the #5 of argument per se, and discussed separately in a subsequent paragraph.Kenosis 22:10, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

I think it is correct in saying that "premises 1, 2" do not apply to the first cause, though, since that is the logical outcome of the argument. -- infinity0 22:27, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

To me, premise 3 doesn't apply to the first cause unless premise 4 is false. And if premise 4 is false, then 5 is false as it relies on 4 in order to be true. Sorry I'm getting into this a bit late, but I just got home recently.

Also, 4 is itself contradicted by the more modern views of cosmology including multiverses and parallel universes. Admittedly, these are very new theories, and are a long way from being proven or disproven, but they are supported by M- and string-theory, and are not contradicted by either relativity or quantum theory. On the other hand, I doubt we want all of that in the article. Jim62sch 23:08, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

True what you say. Seems to me after having tackled it a bit that I messed up the argument proper by attaching this parenthetical directly to it. Too many questions directly emanate from it--there's enough content here to fill a whole section legitimately.Kenosis 22:39, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

So how about adding 1 and 2 back in? Or would that be too clumsy? -- infinity0 22:56, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

I think it potentially opens up a can of worms, so to speak. I am hoping to hear from at least Jim62sch on this too, as it's an interest of his; but my offhand sense is that the real debate here is whether the cosmological argument article should include discussion of this type at all (again, my mistake for trying to slip it into the argument). it could be extremely interesting to the previously unexposed reader (and perhaps to some who are already familiar too), but could lead us pretty far afield too if it is not very carefully done. The reason is that it gets more into the attributes of the first cause-- on the other hand, the in esse argument already opens this door to a degree, as does the inevitable curiosity about what exactly is a singularity, and so forth....Kenosis 23:09, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

Arguing against inclusion at this stage, I also hear there is some correlation between interest in the implications of the cosmological argument and likelihood of seeking psychiatric care within a six month period, but it's just hearsay. :) Kenosis 23:18, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

I finally show up (see above) and you've given up? :) Actually, I think that this argument can be in the article, in fact needs to be in it, but I agree we need to be careful. Jim62sch 23:27, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

Separate paragraph after the argument perhaps?Kenosis 23:44, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

Which argument are you talking about? The outside-spacetime/cause counter-argument, or the parenthesized (premise 1 and 2 does not apply)? -- infinity0 23:53, 16 March 2006 (UTC)

yes, I was referring to the parenthesized observation attached to premise 5. i now believe it should be discussed in a separate paragraph in the same section.Kenosis 00:21, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

That should work...give it a shot. Jim62sch 00:37, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Nice men in clean white coats are on their way here right now. I'll try it over the weekend. :} Kenosis 00:57, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

I know the feeling.  :) Jim62sch 01:01, 17 March 2006 (UTC)

Big Bang, Big Crunch

Re "Recently, newer, speculative theories have been offered by a number of theorists, but there is no scientific consensus as of yet on whether the universe necessarily began to exist or whether it is eternal (for example, "big bang," expansion of cosmos, then contraction, then "big crunch," then a "big bang" again, once every 30 or 40 billion years ad infinitum)."

Support for a big crunch has significantly declined with the discovery of dark energy, and the increasing expansion of the universe. (Dark energy works essentially in the opposite way as gravity -- while gravity decreases with the square of distance, dark energy increases with the square of distance).

As a placeholder, the sentence added is good and represents a real issue, but it needs to be copy edited. Jim62sch 11:08, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

"Formal Proof"

The assumptions found in the article, namely

a) Everything has a cause(s). b) Nothing can cause itself. c) A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.

do not at all imply an uncaused cause (a explicitely forbids that), they do rather imply circular causation: Because there are not infinitely many linked causes (c) and there is no start of the chain (b), every cause in a finite set of linked causes must be caused by another element of the set. Icek 07:25, 6 May 2006 (UTC) Added: Or does one have to be capable of doublethink for this argument ? ;) Icek 07:26, 6 May 2006 (UTC)

Yes, for those of us who notice the doublethink, it's essentially just that. But a lot of people really do see value in this argument, and it definitely has reason to have an entry, and it must have a NPOV. I'd suggest not making any attempt to edit the article to argue this, as this is clearly not what Wikipedia is intended for. Save it for the debates. :) - Anonymous, 02:36, 23 May 2006

Fluctuations in vacuum

Quoted from the last section of the text

Modern quantum physics is sometimes interpreted to deny the validity of the first premise of this argument (that everything has a cause), showing that subatomic particles such as electrons, positrons, and photons, can come into existence, and perish, by virtue of spontaneous energy fluctuations in a vacuum. Though such occurrences do not violate the Law of Conservation of Mass and Energy, Bell's theorem shows that these are impossible to predict. Because the "nothingness" from which the subatomic particles arise from a sea of fluctuating vacuum energy, it may be that such processes contradict the assertion that all effects have causes.

The last clause in this passage is illogically assumed. It argues that there is no cause at all, but doesn't this seem to argue for a first cause in esse? Who wrote that? D. F. Schmidt 01:36, 31 May 2006 (UTC)

Regarding the recent edit of the Scientific Positions section, I am removing the sentence and placing it here on the talk page for further analysis and justification. Originally this section somehow got mistakenly placed under "Criticisms", perhaps tending to unnecessarily attract arguments against the cosmological argument. I have moved "Scientific Positions" up one level in heirarchy so as not to imply that such positions are either necessarily supportive or critical at the outset.

But at the moment we have seen two contradictory assertions by different editors. So I am removing the sentence under controversy with the expectation of providing the readers of the article with some reasoning for a conclusion based on quantum fluctuations, rather than just a conclusory statement. The two competing versions are:

• Earlier version: "Because the "nothingness" from which the subatomic particles arise from a sea of fluctuating vacuum energy, it may be that such processes contradict the assertion that all effects have causes." ... 05:35, 31 May 2006 (UTC)
• Edited version: "Because the "nothingness" from which the subatomic particles arise from a sea of fluctuating vacuum energy, it may be that such processes argue in esse. ... 05:35, 31 May 2006 (UTC)

That sounds fair. D. F. Schmidt 14:18, 31 May 2006 (UTC)

I imagine the justification for the in esse conclusion is that random variations occur within the relevant parameters of the randomness being described. Seems simple enough, but how do you explain that to the reader of the article given the widespread misconceptions of randomness as some kind of amorphous soup? ... Kenosis 14:54, 31 May 2006 (UTC)

Uh.... I'm not certain what you are asking, nor who. I assume it's posed to me since I was the only one who expressed the in esse conclusion. Correct me if I'm wrong. Right now, it may be just my lack of sleep – although I doubt it – but I really don't understand your question. Maybe this helps or maybe it doesn't. My conclusion came from figuring that the variations occur as a "fuel" (for lack of better term which would probably be energy) or perhaps as a result of such a fuel, where there is some relationship between the fluctuations and energy. (I must give myself away and say here that I don't have any other knowledge about the fluctuations in vacuum, but the conclusion that first appeared made no sense to me given what was stated.)

As for referring to amorphous soup, I am at a loss. I don't see how that has any relevance here, although once again, maybe it's just lack of sleep and perhaps you can clarify that for me. D. F. Schmidt 04:24, 5 June 2006 (UTC)

Infinite & First Cause Theory

Has there been a counter-argument to this argument regarding physics OUTSIDE of our known universe? Because the law that there cannot be an infinite; or that there must be a first cause, may only apply to our universe. So outside of our universe; physics could be different; therefore, ther emay be infinite; and there doesn't necessarilly need to be a beginning to the universe; it can go on forever. I've brung this up before, but the only response I remember getting was "this isn't a notable argument (not popular), so we can't include it in the article". I wanted responses/debate/counter-arguments/etc. 24.23.51.27 21:15, 28 June 2006 (UTC)

Well... I don't think it's a very good counter-argument because you basically assume that there is physics outside our universe, which is just as bad as assuming there is a god. Also, yeah, I haven't heard of it before. If you could provide a link to a notable page where it's seriously considered, then it could probably be inserted. -- infinity0 15:27, 29 June 2006 (UTC)

If there are no physics outside of this universe; then there is no law that states there cannot be a infinite ammount of causes; therefore, there can be an infinite outside of the universe. 165.196.149.50 19:11, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

Maybe we're actually in a theme park serving as an exhibition for some relatively large onlookers. This question of what is "beyond" the physical cosmos is a classic conceptual problem. Indeed one of the senses of supernatural is that it is not confined by the parameters of time-space. And the infinite regress argument has been considered by a number of theorists -- it was bounced around quite a bit in the mid-eighties when these debates were coming to the fore among those familiar with astrophysics, and it does continue to come up. The speculation of a possible infinite regress definitely gives rise to one method of criticism of the cosmological argument. Since supernatural is by definition outside the bounds of time-space, why not an infinite regress. But as Hawking put it, the question of what came before the Big Bang is like asking what's north of the North Pole. ... Kenosis 20:12, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

As you say : It's nonsense to search a what occured before the big bang. So it's nonsense to say "maybe the universe is going on forever". The universe is not going on at all, it "IS", end of story. In order to have a beginnig, an end, a schedule of events, you must be confined into a spacetime. Events are occuring within the universe because the universe is a spacetime, but nothing may append for the universe as a whole, because of the lack of temporal reference. In other words, an event can occur to our universe as a whole only if our universe is confined into a spacetime of superior level.--Rudzaw 13:22, 22 July 2006 (UTC)

Laws of the Universe

I think that god exists because all the matter and energy in the univers follow the same laws. If god dose not exist and mater and energy in the univers follow the same laws then why is the univers not semetrical. Why didnt the antimatter in the univers counter out all the regular matter in the univers. The proprty of size can only be determind by comparing something to something else so why is the univers not infinitly filled with semetricle spheers of matter and energy evenly spaced apart. In string theory matter and energy are made out of tiny one dimentional stings but what are the stings made of. Why would difrent stings interact difrently with other stings. What force would cause them to act the way they do. Why are there only 3 dimentions and not 4 or 5. By definition existing defies the law of consevation of mass and energy becouse the universe came into existance without existing before. 02:16, 10 July 2006 (UTC)Gjeremy

Reverted counter-counterarguments

I have reverted changes made [[3] here] and [[4] here] These are attempting to counter the counterarguments and arrive at an independent personal conclusion regarding the counterarguments. Perhaps there is some way to integrate these without interspersing the counterarguments with objections and further commentary as they're being presented? ... Kenosis 03:35, 21 July 2006 (UTC)

Professional contribution would be nice

This article has had merits and de-merits. Merits would be a very nice history of the argument. De-merits would be much of the section on "Criticisms and objections". The latter section in many respects could be re-titled "puissant little coffee-house reasons why I don't believe in God - gotchya! nany nany nany." The objections don't appear to be serious philosophical objections but appear to be people's personal responses to an argument that they assume is trying to prove the existence of God, but which they don't in fact understand.

I took the liberty of putting a variety of clarifying comments in the Criticism/objections with a mind to helping people sort out legitimate philosophical objections to either (1) the cosmological argument itself or (2) the argument as it is applied/modified as a proof-case for theism, versus (3) objections that don't belong on this page because they are [reasons-why-I-personally-don't-believe-in-God], not legitimate objections or criticisms to the actual historical/philosophical formulation or assertions of the cosmological argument.

If you have an unsupressible urge to express your personal reasons for not believing in God, go ahead, please express yourself, but do so in an appropriate place, not here on this article - keep "objections" to the argument limited to those that object to this argument and remember: this argument is not ONLY about God, in fact it spent most of its history not being about God, so in objecting, you aren't necessarily objecting to the existence of God.

The so called "Criticisms" and "objections" in this article are so far off-base it's like this:

Argument: I believe people should stop their cars at stop-signs.

Objection 1: No, definitely not, if you can't climb mountains you'll never have a good view. Objection 2: Right, you have to be able to climb mountains so you can escape floods. Objection 3: Yes, and remember fires, fires too! You have to be able to climb mountains to escape fires. Objection 4: Sometimes too its good to climb mountains because we find natural resources there.

Before long, people become convinced they know what we're arguing about, but the actual effect is that we massacred the original meaning of the argument so badly no one is even talking about the same thing anymore.

And the whole thing above about "North of the North Pole"? Come on. Now, I suspect that Hawking knew what he was talking about when he said that. It's basically saying: "Apples/oranges guys. Once you get to the north pole, the notion of going further north doesn't mean anything anymore."

Which, when applied to the Big Bang, by the way: IS NOT AN OBJECTION TO THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. It actually MAKES the cosmological argument (in its Kalam form) by stating that whatever instigated or brought about the Big Bang is of an entirely different nature (essence, substance, etc thank you Aristotle!) from the substance that came about as the result of the Big Bang.

That all said, I'm not an expert, just well enough versed to be able to tell when people are shooting from the seat of their pants rather than contributing genuine expertise. It would be nice to see the whole article cleaned up by a dis-passionate expert. --Dcwood 21:37, 25 July 2006 (UTC)

Appreciate the merit on the history. ... Kenosis 22:33, 25 July 2006 (UTC)

welcome ... --Dcwood 19:10, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

Removed material

I have removed the following commentary and am placing it here where it belongs. ... Kenosis 22:33, 25 July 2006 (UTC)

• There appear to be individuals who have posted "objections/criticisms" here to the cosmological argument but which do no seem germane to the real merits or de-merits of the argument or else which otherwise betray a lack of understanding of the argument. The objections do not appear to be sourced in serious philosophical analysis but appear personal in nature. ... 22:33, 25 July 2006 (UTC)

I just removed this from the first paragraph of responses to objections section. This does not accurately convey the variations of cosmological argument displayed by Aristotle, Aquinas, Maimonides and Averroes. Don't have cites right now, but can provide if it's a real issue. ... Kenosis 00:30, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

• - the uncaused cause of the cosmological argument is, in every instant, presumed to be actively causing the caused, natural universe (the notable exception to this being the Kalam cosmological argument which actually is concerned with tracing the clock back to a specific moment of creation - addressing this as a philosophical issue explicitly on account of the fact that it is not addressed by the standard formulation of the cosmological argument) ... 00:30, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

You will have a hard time providing those sources as Aristotle did not believe time or the natural universe had a begining, he believed the universe was infinite, without beginning or end. His uncaused cause, therefore, was not a cause that occured at a particular moment in time's past, though that is a popular misunderstanding (reflected all over this article) since that's how we culturally tend to think about the universe, but to do so is to impute ourselves on Aristotle, it is not to listen to what he said. Looking at the cause as a incident in time is the particular innovation of the Kalam cosmological argument which is why the Kalam argument gets all in a hiss over trying to figure out if an actual infinite series is even possible or not. Aritotle's uncaused cause is always operative. --143.182.124.4 18:17, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

Aristotle's "uncaused cause" is not necessarily "in esse" despite the use of esse in Latin translations of Aristotle's use of "essential cause." If you look at the edit, you will see that the sentence with the removed phrase previously asserted that all four of these thinkers were arguing in esse, which they were not. Aristotle's schema actually is manifold, so the uncaused cause or "prime mover" does not permeate all levels of current motion in the universe. In any event, this has been debated and there are different interpretations, but it is quite clear that merely because these are all pre-big-bang thinkers does not automatically mean they were arguing "in esse". Therefore the removal of those four placed as a group is wholly justified. There also is yet more fact-checking to do in those sections, but this one was quite conspicuous. ... Kenosis 18:56, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

Really curious to see how you're going to do that. Issue of "in esse" doesn't really seem germane to the point. In each case, Maimonides, Aquinas, Averroes, they were making Aristotle safe for theism. The whole point of the Kalam argument as an innovative form of the cosmological argument is that it really hinges off of the notion of finite time - a point the standard cosmological argument does not depend on. That's important particularly as it regards criticisms because so many who think they're posting valid or legitimate criticisms build their criticisms off of the relationship of the argument to time. That relation, however, is primarily semantic, cultural and assumed. It doesn't even make sense in the way Aristotle understood the argument, where there is neither beginning nor end to the universe. --Dcwood 19:14, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

RE "In each case, Maimonides, Aquinas, Averroes, they were making Aristotle safe for theism.": This brought a smile--thanks. Yes indeedie, we couldn't have theism that was also pantheism and panentheism now, could we? Nor could we imply that Aquinas' brand of Aristotlean thinking was supporting the gnostic "emanations" either. That Aquinas was a smart one indeed. And yes, Ibn Rushd certainly did pave the way for Aquinas, who certainly made Aristotle safe for theism, as did Maimonides in his own way.

Unfortunately I don't have adequate time to thoroughly parse the "in esse"/"in fieri" issues from the Prime Mover/immanent consciousness issues right now with respect to all four of those thinkers. Later. ... Kenosis 19:33, 26 July 2006 (UTC)

"Almost all physical cosmologists..."

From the article:

Almost all physical cosmologists subscribe to a theory of universal origin that is effectively dualistic in nature and basically reflective of the Aristotlean reasoning underlying the original cosmological argument - they simply do so without making the jump to assume any spiritually supernatural qualities of a universe's dual source.

Really? How do we know this? Is there some survey of physical cosmologists that backs up this claim?

It looks more like this is the author's opinion of the views of physical cosmologists -- and I doubt that physical cosmologists would in general represent their own views in this way. The author defines "dualism" in this context as a difference between present day natural conditions and past natural conditions. Everyone agrees the present is different than the past, but the obvious implication is that the pr esent is fundamentally different than the past -- i.e., the big bang was governed by fundamentally different physical laws than the laws that govern the universe today.

I'm fairly certain this misrepresents the views of modern cosmologists. It is true that physics doesn't have a fully developed theory of quantum gravity, i.e., a theory that can describe things that are simultaneously very small (quantum) and very massive (gravity). Thus, there's no theory that can describe the big bang, when all the mass of the universe was concentrated into a tiny point. However, physicists in general believe that if such a theory exists, it will apply to small and massive things in the present day universe (e.g., the singularity inside a black hole) as well as the big bang. Moreover, they believe that it will apply to things that are small but not massive (although in that range it can be approximated by a known theory -- quantum mechanics) and to things which are massive but not small (although in that range it can be approximated by another known theory, general relativity).

There's a huge difference between saying:

(1) Physical cosmologists believe different laws applied in the early universe as apply today.

(2) Physical cosmologists believe that the same laws hold for the universe today as in the past. However, our current theories are just an approximation for these laws, which only works well in certain cases. The early universe isn't one of these cases, nor are some things that exist today (like black hole singularities, and possibly other mysterious phenomena like dark matter and dark energy).

I think (2) is correct, but if the article is going to claim (1) it needs a cite to back it up. Cite one cosmologist and change the wording to "At least one physical cosmologist", or else cite a poll that indicates a majority opinion.

If the same physical laws apply to the universe today as in the past, and it's just the actual state of the universe that's different, then calling this "dualistic" seems very misleading. We could just as well say, "The universe used to have no stars, but after a while stars formed, so the universe has a dualistic nature." It's an arbitrary distinction, equally applicable to anything which has ever changed. Even if you consider "The universe isn't the same now as it once was" to be dualism, you need a citation to back up the claim that physical cosmologists share this opinion.

I consider this a pretty severe problem, because it's claiming scientific support for a certain philosophical point of view, without citing any references to back this up.

Also from the article:

On careful consideration of the big bang, for example, some sort of dualistic "cause", itself presumably not caused, or at least not caused by the "natural" forces manifest by current conditions in our universe, appears prima facie to be inescapable.

This is in the same paragraph, so the article gives the impression that this too is the opinion of physical cosmologists. Again, this claim needs to be backed up with a cite. But I don't think it's true anyway -- as I said, it's not that cosmologists think the laws have changed, it's that our current understanding is an approximation to the true laws, and that approximation is only valid under certain conditions. It's like how the special theory of relativity applies to all objects, but its effects can be ignored except for things that are moving at velocities close to the speed of light. The approximation which ignores relativity works well for things that move slow, but these things aren't fundamentally different than things that move fast.

Also, I think this sentence is problematic anyway. It's pretending to be an argument without actually making one. If I said, for example, "On careful consideration of his policies, the conclusion that George Bush is a bad president seems inescapable," no one would buy this as a legitimate argument. What policies? How is it inescapable? The claim implies that anyone who disagrees just hasn't considered carefully enough. That's not an argument -- it's meaningless rhetoric. If you have a point to make, then make it, but I suspect the point is "If you accept the cosmological argument, then it is obvious that . . . . " -- Tim314 15:05, 29 September 2006 (UTC)

By the way, I'm well aware that "quantum" doesn't literally mean "small", and so forth. I'm trying to keep the science in laymans terms except where technical details are relevant. Please keep that in mind if you're going to nitpick. -- Tim314 16:11, 29 September 2006 (UTC)

Arab philosophers?

I think that more could be said about contributions made by Arab philosophers to the cosmological argument, particularly the kalam variant. My understanding is that Muslim thinkers got the idea from the Greeks and, being theists, were eager to use the argument to prove (or at least support) the existence of God. al-Kindi and Averroes deserve more mention, I think. Jacob1207 00:10, 8 December 2006

As the world wide web expands and as the world shrinks from global media coverage, we need to expand our educational horrizens. But not only Arab thinkers and writers, but also Jewish, Indian, Japaneese, Chineese, and all peoples of the world have likewise made numerous contributions to our joint treasury of world wide wisdom. Let all cultures participate to the maximum. And when we come to better understand all cultures, we will respect each other as we should. For fear is fear of the unknown. Let all participate. Jerry Weaver ageoftheology.com Jerryweaver 22:53, 13 July 2007 (UTC)

J. Richard Gott

Should we mention J. Richard Gott and his paper on the universe creating itself in the article? It would seem to contradict the assumption that "Nothing finite and dependent (contingent) can cause itself," because his article is about a finite universe causing itself. Also, is it just me, or does this assumption also assume that there is no time travel (because if there is time travel, there is a possibility of things creating themselves). Eds01 23:26, 25 August 2007 (UTC)

"See also" section

I removed the following links from the see also section on the grounds that they are insufficiently linked to the cosmological argument:

• Day-Age Creationism
• Evolutionary Creationism
• Gap Creationism
• Young Earth Creationism
• Intelligent design
• Old Earth Creationism

Those topics, most of them pseudo-science, have little, if anything, to do with the metaphysical argument for a first cause. Anyone agree/disagree? Jacob1207 23:52, 7 December 2006 (UTC)

Yeh I agree, they're to do with creation of the earth, not with the philosophy of the cosmological argument. Seems fine to me. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.137.201.12 (talk) 18:06, 17 October 2007 (UTC)

Spelling: Anake v. Ananke

Isn't this thing supposed to be spelled "anankē" with an e? 63.249.110.32 (talk) 00:41, 21 April 2008 (UTC)

C. Stephen Evans

A citation from C. Stephen Evans' Philosophy of Religion: Thinking About Faith in the section entitled "Criticisms of counterarguments" has been added for the community to review.

Philip Monson (talk) 21:09, 29 May 2008 (UTC)

Bias in recent edits?

I'm a bit concerned about a number of edits I've recently seen in the article by one anonymous editor. My main concern is that rather than rewriting paragraphs, the author is deleting certain portions (including one described as "self-contradictory", although it seems perfectly self-consistent to me) and inserting refutations immediately after presentation of a criticism of the argument. In particular, one refutation describes the relevant criticism as "irrational", which seems to me a decidedly POV term. The tone of the edits seems to me more reminiscent of original research than of encyclopedic summarization from secondary sources. The problem is serious enough in my mind that I've added the POV tag. -- MatthewDBA (talk) 12:32, 20 August 2008 (UTC)

That's good, MatthewDBA. That's very good. One part I significantly contributed to (Existence of a First Cause) had some rather biased parts. I fully admit that. Was I trying to be biased? Of course not. Some of your other accusations are false, though. For one, I never labeled anything as "irrational." Also, I never strategically placed refutations - I kept them to the objections/counterarguments section. I am not here to fight. I am here to help, and I hope you can understand that. I am glad that *someone* answered my request to improve this article. Why don't we all work on this together? (I like what you and others have done so far, by the way. It is less biased now, but more cleanup is required.) 12.208.25.100 71.39.35.41 (talk) 23:05, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

Ah, I just realized that a number of edits were made shortly before your complaint. Those were not mine. That means that your accusations (at least most of them) weren't directed at me. However, I stand by the fact that some of my edits were biased, and I apologize for those. 12.208.25.100 71.39.35.41 (talk) 23:11, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

Wow, whoever made those edits really fscked up the article. I've just gone through the edit history. Didn't ANYONE pay attention to my requests in the previous discussion section (Cleanup)? Also, why on earth was there a refutation in the fscking introduction?? Great, this anonymous editor removed some of my CITED additions. Meh, you can see why I pretty much gave up on this article. Any thoughts? Anyone? 12.208.25.100 71.39.35.41 (talk) 23:22, 21 August 2008 (UTC)

On second thought, these edits by 98.199.232.188 reek of bias (for the argument/against objections and counterarguments), so I am reverting. 12.208.25.100 71.39.35.41 (talk) 01:42, 22 August 2008 (UTC)

Looks much better now. And yes, I wasn't thinking of your edits at all but the ones by the other anon. I'd hardly qualify myself as an expert, but I'm searching for books to use as reliable sources. I'll do my best on this one. --MatthewDBA (talk) 02:22, 22 August 2008 (UTC)

Existence is energy

energy cannot be created nor destroyed.

what's this page about, really?

-MONITOR613 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 65.185.12.90 (talk) 05:32, 25 January 2009 (UTC)

The POV edits by 98.199.232.188 have been added again. I have reverted again. 98.199.232.188 seems to be operating under the conclusion that the argument is sound. 12.208.25.100

yeeeep. if i'm wrong just tell me how i'm wrong so i can fix it. (n/m). and if i figure out if my argument is truly flawed then i'll recant.

but if you want to hear some "theories" of mine about Time Space and Existence, then i'll be glad to provide them. - MONITOR613 1:26:09 4:22am

129.138.30.188 (talk) 04:56, 24 August 2008 (UTC)

I hate this "proof". There is no evidence that the big bang is not a periodic function of the universe. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Can Not (talk • contribs) 16:36, 14 February 2009 (UTC)

Non-Sequiter

Is it just me, or is this poorly expressed:

"...(merely logical) contingency of anything it does not logically follow that there must be some time at which – the merely logically (not empirically) contingent – things, like for example matter, in fact did not exist (in order to prove that matter did need to have a cause outside itself)."

Does the author wish merely to say: "The conclusion is false because, well, why should it have to be true?" —Preceding unsigned comment added by RWZero (talk • contribs) 04:07, 7 June 2009 (UTC)

Incompleteness theorems (moved)

98.149.104.138 (talk) 06:18, 25 July 2009 (UTC)I think this article may commit the fallacy of equivocation in the part there it says "One possible answer to this quandary can be found by examining Gödel's incompleteness theorems which posit that no system can fully describe itself or comprehend itself using only examination from within the system; such a system might be able to understand the apparent operation of aspects of the system, but it cannot understand everything that composes it. Thus, it follows that since people are within the universe, and cannot see outside of it due to the operation of the Laws of Nature itself, or see beyond the instantiation of the Universe at the moment of the First Cause, then science and reason in and of themselves cannot be assumed to function outside of the known universe, as science, logic, and reason are only within scope within the known Universe, and outside of it, different laws may apply, if any. Thus, to assume that any existence outside of the known universe can be necessarily comprehended by science and reason could be considered illogical."

The Incompleteness theorems refer to formal systems for arithmetic of mathematical interest, not "systems" in the sens that the universe is called a system.98.149.104.138 (talk) 06:18, 25 July 2009 (UTC)

Unmover mover exists or unmoved mover existed?

If we have established that the unmoved mover exists, have we established if it still exists or that it just existed? Any ideas on the arguements or counterarguements for this topic or where the arguements are at right now? (Simonapro 14:55, 29 August 2006 (UTC))

This is already included in the article in the explanation of the difference between in esse and in fieri. ... Kenosis 15:07, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

How does the Kalam cosmological argument verify in esse? (Simonapro 15:54, 29 August 2006 (UTC))

Beats me. Offhand I'd say it's just another form of cosmological argument. Now that we know (or at least think we know) that there was a Big Bang (a beginning), the issue still isn't settled. It's also closely related to the difference between a theistic perspective and a deistic perspective on things. ... Kenosis 16:49, 29 August 2006 (UTC)

Do you know if in esse in terms of the Kalam cosmological argument has been varified or even tried? It seems to me if not then the Kalam cosmological argument only establishes that God may have existed, not that God exists.(Simonapro 19:41, 29 August 2006 (UTC))

"According to Kaku, these particles could move forever, without beginning or end. So, there is no need for a First Mover to explain the origins of motion. It does not provide an explanation for the reason those molecules exist in the first place, though." (someone deal with this last sentence here, it's ambiguous what the first word 'it' there even refers to, and the statement is unrelated to the preceding stuff.) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 60.240.162.169 (talk) 08:11, 27 June 2008 (UTC)

This section needs some serious cleaning; the initial author's bias is a banner on a supposedly-neutral slate. Providing examples of counterarguments is productive; presenting the examples from one source as representative and held by a significant proportion is not. Kaku is the only cited source for this section; using any plural term is not justified. Also, Kaku's cited claim seems to go exactly AGAINST the first law of thermodynamics--molecules in a jar could only "bounce around" indefinitely if they were indefinitely supplied with external energy. Also, those molecules initially received their energy from some source (i.e. a "cause"). It doesn't even sound like Kaku has a fallacious argument (that may be a big step up!), but rather a series of statements that strain credulity. If Kaku's argument bears more coherence than this, then it needs to be explained in a coherent fashion. MasVeritas (talk) 03:10, 19 September 2009 (UTC)

Evangelizing through this article

This article seems regularly trolled by people who want the cosmological argument to be proof to the validity of their own religious beliefs, thus try to rewrite or add to the page so that it evangelizes the 'validity' of believing in a God, while overemphasizing and sometimes just miscontruing 'errors' in refutations. In fact, entire sections seem dedicated to this, such as the redundant 'Criticisms of Counter-arguments' section, which I would be in favor of doing away with.

We need to rewrite large sections and present this philosophical concept cleanly and neutrally rather than let this article be reduced to religious cheerleading, criticizing all criticisms, undermining all alternatives while upholding the argument itself as dogma only a fool would question.--Primal Chaos 04:59, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

I think it just needs moar nonsense. 67.149.107.82 02:28, 2 November 2007 (UTC)

I agree with your feeling of "criticisms of counter-arguments" and was actually thinking of "objections to criticisms of counter-arguments", viz. none of the counter-arguments listed before it have said anything about time being non-natural, and don't argue against a non-natural First Cause - the counter-arguments are: (non-)existence of a first cause (the past might be infinite, or, the Universe is the first cause), (non-)necessity of first cause (the universe may not be causal on all levels), (non-)identity of first cause (First Cause is not necessarily God/Yahweh/Allah, I can call It "Satan" or "Lord Amaterasu" or "Chuck Norris"). The section about "Aristotle and Dualism" is not clear and doesn't seem to be a counterargument either. 124.107.146.20 (talk) 04:10, 27 March 2008 (UTC)

This whole article is hopelessly muddled, attempting as it does to present a modern argument from mathematical physics as somehow a development of earlier arguments based upon rational or philosophical physics. It is not. It represents a complete break with Aristotelian thought. Thus, the counterarguments don't exlusively address the argument actually presented as The Cosmological Argument, but attempt to include the Aristotelian arguments as well, while these two forms of argument are, as I said, based upon completely different principles. The result? An incoherent mess and a "Criticisms of Counterarguments" section the first two objections of which turn out to be, in reality, objections to the main argument, not the counterarguments.

If I may say so, this article gives the impression of having been written and organized by first-year philosophy students. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.87.134.39 (talk) 22:39, 3 May 2008 (UTC)

Heh, no doubt in my mind about that either. The arguments FOR are misrepresented and the arguments AGIANST aren't doing the article any favor either (Kaku, for instance, argued against a part of the first cause argument, not belief in God or the existence of any deities, which this article seems to suggest). Maybe this article needs a complete reworking for both "sides." Well, we aren't sopposed to take sides, but you know what I mean. I think. 98.198.83.12 (talk) 23:36, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

Massive edits and what to do with them.

I'm unsure what should be done about this, but there is an edit that was massive done by an anonymous person from 173.55.80.176. Some of the edits are useful and probably should stay in, but I'm unsure what the protocol is for adding critiques to objections for one. If we allow all such changes, this would become a debate and not a resource. I will leave it up to someone more experienced with how best to deal with this issue. It seems overbroad to totally undo all their edits, but extremely tedious to pick through all the edits to find which ones are appropriate. PoDuck (talk) 14:13, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

The series of edits were partially reverted by myself, but given that 173.55.80.176 was edit warring to keep inserting blatantly fringe views which were rather incoherent on other articles, I've reverted these edits to the last good version as edited by 97.118.186.114 at 03:28, 9 December 2009. Please review the changes on a paragraph by paragraph basis, and redo those that are useful. That way we start with a clean slate, and only introduce changes that we're confident are suitable. Thanks for bringing this up, apologies to the IP's who tried to clean up the muddle a little, don't think we've lost any improvements from these edits. . . dave souza, talk 16:16, 13 January 2010 (UTC)

Ex Nihilo

"For Plato, the demiurge lacked the supernatural ability to create ex nihilo (out of nothing). It was only able to organize the ananke (necessity), the only other co-existent element or presence in Plato's cosmogony."

This statement contradicts Plato's cosmological argument which requires ex nihilo. If creatio ex materia is what Plato is illustrating in the Timaeus, the cosmological argument would require that the previoussly existing material was also made by his Demiurge, reverting to creatio ex nihilo. I've deleted the statement. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 62.25.109.197 (talk) 10:59, 11 March 2010 (UTC)

"For Aristotle too, as for Plato, the underlying essence of the Universe always was in existence and always would be"

This seems to be a logical contradition? As I understand it the first cause argument is used also to prove 'creatio ex nihilo'. If matter or the material universe have always existed, in what sense is the first cause really the first cause. Both Plato & Aristotle spoke in somewhat metaphorical terms, the prexisting substance the Demiurge uses to create the world is actually non-being i.e nothing.

If there are no objections I intend to delete the contradictions and insert a text about creatio ex nihilo with a link to the Wikipedia artice. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 62.25.106.209 (talk) 07:58, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

The First Cause would be definition then be external to the universe. If time has existed only as long as the universe, then the universe has always existed--for all of time. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.18.190.199 (talk) 16:39, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

Trinitarian causation

About a week ago, I added a caveat to the "Objections and counterarguments" section, observing that not all philosophers acknowledge (what that section asserted as a fact) that causality is dependent on time, and adducing the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as an example of a philosophical conception that implies the contrary. This appears to have been deleted without comment. I have now added it again; if the same person wishes to delete it again, I would be grateful if he or she would explain why, in a response to this comment, before doing so. -Agur bar Jacé (talk) 14:45, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

Scientific positions on philosophy

The article's Scientific positions § has always had problems (see above). I've removed a statement identified as OR in 2007. There's also plenty of comments suggesting Kaku's statement doesn't convey scientific understanding very well, so it needs to be explicitly attributed everywhere its inserted. Apparently whoever rewrote this lately thinks Aristotle's "cosmological argument" is based on motions being caused as per his "Physics", (I changed the first sentence awhile back to refer to Metaphysics because it read something like "the cosmological argument is based on a scientific foundation of Aristotelian Physics"). Well, that's not what its based on. Aristotle had no problem with eternal unchanging (circular) motion. The OR and SYN goes on: "the concepts of cause and effect so necessary to the cosmological argument no longer apply"… To Aristotle, time was infinite but space was not. He made it clear its senseless to speak about what lies beyond the sphere of fixed stars. Which is to say, you didn't just blown his mind dude.—Machine Elf 1735 (talk) 20:35, 1 April 2010 (UTC)

Regarding Kaku, it seems as if his arguments fall apart on their own. I'm not certain that his arguments are valid. When he says that "Gas molecules may bounce against the walls of a container without requiring anything or anyone to get them moving", that is not necessarily true, because in the example cited, the gas molecules were already moving before entering the container, or by sealing the recipient, one could/would generate kinetic energy. I'm not sure this is relevant to the section, but to me it does support the claims that he doesn't convey scientific understanding very well. Pikolas (talk) 23:47, 5 April 2010 (UTC)

The argument about gas molecules is ludicrous, and not at all consistent with accepted scientific understanding of thermodynamics. The movement of gas molecules is not magic, as Kaku appears to be presenting, but rather due to stored energy in the molecules. The reason they continue bouncing against the walls is because heat is being applied to the container from the surrounding material, which has a finite temperature. If the container were placed in a medium that was not applying heat (i.e. at 0 Kelvin) the gas molecules would slow down and eventually stop (when the also reached 0 Kelvin). The movement of the gas molecules required the application of heat to the gas at some point. Meelash (talk) 13:20, 9 April 2010 (UTC) Also, the example in the following paragraph is spurious, since North is not a dimension. North is a defined concept and its definition entails certain properties, one of which is established in this example, namely because it is defined as the direction of a certain point, when at that point, the direction will be undefined. In order to extend this property of this specifically defined concept to the concept of dimension requires a proof that the definition of dimension also implies this property (which it doesn't) therefore the example is spurious and I'm removing it. The poor example does not negate the possible validity of the argument, however, so I'm leaving that. Meelash (talk) 13:28, 9 April 2010 (UTC)

Please don't perceive this as a criticism of the core of your religion, but I don't think you understand the scientific arguments that you're dismissing. (Perhaps take refuge in science having nothing to say as to the "purpose" of the universe..) It might help if you better understood infinite sequences beforehand (see Zeno)..

Kaku's molecules are *not* moving because of a cause (heat) from outside the container, they are moving now because they were already moving just a moment before. If their box stays perfectly isolated forever into the future then the molecules will never, ever, stop moving. Likewise (since laws of Newtonian mechanics are time-reversible), if the box had stayed perfectly isolated for all time in the past, the molecules must have *always* been moving. Thus it is a very simple example of a mathematically valid solution of the equations of physics, for motion which had no beginning.

The relativists objection is that Einstein's General Relativity theory ascribes the universe with four dimensions (space and time) in *exactly* the same way that the surface of the globe is ascribed two dimensions (north and east), using the mathematics of differential geometry. People often ask, what is at/past the edge of the universe? But many solutions to GR have no edge: you could rocket in a straight line forever, and never ever get outside of the universe (and, still without changing direction, could possibly even end up back where you started). So mathematically, it makes no sense to ask "what is below the universe" or "what is to the right of the universe" (such directions have definitions only within the universe). Likewise (at least for many solutions of GR), asking "what happened before/after the universe" is the same because of (the particular mathematical sense in which) the fundamental principle of relativity theory treats time and space on equal footing. Cesiumfrog (talk) 23:34, 26 April 2010 (UTC)

What does the new last line mean? "Neither the physical laws, nor dimensions or logics existed at the beginning of the world, but appeared successively " Myrvin (talk) 09:37, 29 April 2010 (UTC)

Turns out that the book referenced may be pubished by Lulu. Myrvin (talk) 09:43, 29 April 2010 (UTC)

infinite chain of events

Someone cited this:

^ Matilal, Bimal K.. "A note on Śamkara's theodicy". Journal of Indian Philosophy. "There does not seem to be any real logical objection to infinite causal chains, accidental or not. The Indian version of the acceptable and provable infinite causal chain of seeds and sprouts seems to be harking back to a similar argument."

This makes no sense whatsoever. There's a million real logical objections, in fact, such an idea itself is illogical and doesn't make sense. If there is an infinite chain of events behind us, we wouldn't be here, because the infinite chain of events can not end. They're infinite! The fact that we do exist shows that there were a finite series of events prior to us. It's as simple as that. Nobody from the body of accepted scientists or mainstream science can back such a claim that seems clearly based on ancient Indian religious philosophy and not on our modern standards of logic. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.45.199.23 (talk) 00:10, 7 June 2010 (UTC)

Clarification needed throughout this article

In the initial introduction of the forms of arguments necessitating a "first" cause, the author originally wrote in esse (existence), but aren't essence and existence ESSENTIALLY and EXISTENTIALLY different? This renders the explanation of cosmological origination (in esse and in fiere) incoherent. To say that light is essentially not light without a candle fails to grasp the essence of light on a functional level. Whether or not candles ever exist does not affect the essential characteristics of light, same goes with the glass of water. The pressure of the sides of the glass do not alter or provide water with its essential characteristics. AS container, the walls of the glass DO accentuate a particular dimension of water's essential nature, but to remove the walls expresses another dimension of water's essence. This explication of the the two arguments fundamentally obfuscates their coherence.

Aletheus (talk) 20:02, 25 January 2011 (UTC)aletheus

Problems

If everyone would realize the big picture here for a moment, the only reason any of this is being said is because we haven't explored the Universe yet.

Maybe. Think of it this way: the Cosmological Argument relies on the assumption that nothing can have absolute infinity. What about God? If God exists, surely he has a cause? And surely that cause has a cause, ad infinitem? Or maybe not:

• Perhaps God did not begin to exist, but if he didn't, then why can't the Universe be an exception too?
• Perhaps God can't be expressed in the same way as anything else can, and so he is exempt from causality. Again, perhaps the Universe is different too? It's not as if we know of anything else like the Universe.

The Cosmological Argument is trying to fill a gap. It's really a very reasonable and intelligent argument, but then again, perhaps God shouldn't really be considered an exception to it. (BTW, please do not take offense at my argument, or at the fact I seem to keep on referring to God as a 'he'. I've never met God, so I wouldn't know, but maybe there isn't a God to meet. Or maybe there is. I love being agnostic.) I Enjoy Commenting 18:37, 30 October 2007 (UTC)

From what I have been able to deduce by reading articles on the beginning of time, the Universe never "began" to exist because a beginning implies a time before its existence. Time did not exist at a point when the Universe did not exist, so it would be nonsensical to speak of a cause per say. Likewise, a theoretical "god" could either have existed for all time, like the Universe, in which it would have been impossible for this being to have created the universe because it had no power at the (lack of) time at which the universe did not exist. I think it should be pointed out that the entire cosmological argument should have a section on the disproval that the argument speaks of "before" the universe when most scientific evidence points to the conclusion that there is no "before" the universe. 129.67.39.207 (talk) 14:25, 7 July 2009 (UTC)

The claim is that that arguments that end in infinite regress refer to events or situations that are physically (and metaphysically) impossible. Far be it from me to argue with Aristotle on this one. But I personally have no problem detaching causation and consequence from unidirectional notions of time. There could still be a cause without the universe having a beginning, it just may be impossible to reconcile physics and metaphysics on this one. The perennial argument over the "chicken or the egg".

Aletheus (talk) 20:41, 25 January 2011 (UTC)aletheus

in esse

User Aletheus has changed the English for 'in esse' to 'in essence' or 'essentiality' instead of 'in existence'. There seems no justification for this. The OED clearly has: "In med.L. phrase in esse, in actual existence; opposed to in posse, in potentiality.

1592 Nobody & Some-b. 1299 Like a king in Esse..this night, Lets make a hostile uprore in the Court. 1597 HOWSON Serm. 31 Our spirituall preferments in esse and in posse. 1767 BLACKSTONE Comm. II. 169 Some one, that may by common possibility..be in esse at or before the particular estate determines. 1818 CRUISE Digest VI. 19 All natural persons who are in esse at the time when a will is made."

I think it should be changed back. Myrvin (talk) 20:06, 25 January 2011 (UTC)

You're pointing out a functional state rather than an ontological one. I edited based on the lack of ontological clarity. Maybe it's my lack of familiarity with latin. But the cosmological arguments for origination in esse seem to incline towards essentia, not existentia. There is no causal necessity between the two, and there's no metaphysical ground for essence to be considered interchangeable with existence.

In other words, in esse is not a kinetic state, and does, in fact exist as actual, as a part of one's nature, like genetic switches, things are present in essentia AND in existentia. The essence of a thing does not potentiate its function in the direction of its essence, rather its essence provides the ground for actuation in a particular existential direction. A being's essence prescribes its existence.

Aletheus (talk) 20:15, 25 January 2011 (UTC)aletheus

I am talking about the phrase 'in esse'. It always seems to mean 'existence'. The distinction seems to be between becoming and actually existing. Do you have citations where this is not so? Also, I cannot see where 'in causa' means 'causality'. Myrvin (talk) 20:35, 25 January 2011 (UTC)

I direct you to the hyperlinks (which were the purpose of my edit) in the explication of the in esse/in fieri arguments for cosmological origination. I am not here to cause problems, and have no issues with the edit being reversed. I was just reading through the article, seeing the lack of clarity and attempting to cast light on the explication.

I wonder if the problem is with 'in esse' versus 'esse'. OED has for 'esse': "Essence, essential nature.

1642 SIR E. DERING Sp. on Relig. 14 Dec. v. 16 The very esse of every Synod doth subsist in a double foundation. 1736 BAILEY, Esse [in the school philosophy] is used in the same sense with essence; principally for that which is actual, or actually existing. 1920 Life of Faith 23 June 619/2 The great missionary meeting on the Saturday morning..is not the esse of the movement. 1929 I. M. CLARK Hist. Ch. Discip. in Scot. 208 Some form of law will be necessary to regulate her [sc. the Church's] life and protect that distinctive character which is her esse." That sounds like your meaning.

Now what did Aristotle and Aquinas use and mean? I am looking. Myrvin (talk) 21:21, 25 January 2011 (UTC)

Maybe not. This book on Aquinas [5] has esse as existence all over the place.Myrvin (talk) 21:32, 25 January 2011 (UTC)

Also, this [6] seems definitive and maybe where the article text came from. Myrvin (talk) 21:41, 25 January 2011 (UTC)

I see your point. And in accordance with this being a collection of human knowledge, and NOT a forum for the actual "Truth" of the situation, have no problems correcting my edit. That being said, this explication still does not get at the core of the formal grounds for either argument: the explication needs work per my critique of the problem above.

Aletheus (talk) 03:06, 26 January 2011 (UTC)aletheus

David Hume

I've removed a sentence which asserted that David Hume promoted the cosmological arguument. He was, to the contrary, quite skeptical about the cosmological argument, especially in the ways that it was commonly put forward in his day. He did, though, admit the following in a letter to a colleague. "But allow me to tell you that I never asserted so absurd a Proposition as that anything might arise without a cause" (David Hume to John Stewart, Feb. 1754, in The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), 1: 187. Similarly, Mackie: "I myself find it hard to accept the notion of self–creation from nothing, even given unrestricted chance. And how can this be given, if there really is nothing?" (J. L. Mackie, Times Literary Supplement [5 February, 1982], p. 126).

... Kenosis 16:21, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

Do you mean skeptical of ANY arguments for cosmological origination? Being a hard-line empiricist would incline one to not speculate about anything, which would include cosmological origination arguments. There's more than one argument though, in face there are dozens of TYPES of arguments, and THOUSANDS of actual arguments, each adhering to or borrowing from one or several types, each etching out its own nuance. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Aletheus (talk • contribs) 03:23, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Machine Elf 1735 edits

These latest edits have turned the article's view of Aristotle on its head. There seems to be no discussion here, and, in the edits, I can see no references or quotations to support the argument that A was against the C argument. So, at the moment, this looks like Elf's own research or opinion. Perhaps there is more to come. I shall try to find out more about what others think of A's view. Myrvin (talk) 09:49, 22 February 2011 (UTC)

Oh, I hoping to turn it on it's ear, so it maybe needs some more work. I did get distracted...

You know, I personally wouldn't have said that Aristotle was against "the" Cosmo Arg, but from the depiction here, with its focus on efficient cause... that really wasn't the gist of his argument but it was something he argued against... against infinite chains of efficient cause. Why would he argue for that in an eternal cosmos? What he wants in the Physics and Metaphysics, really is more like the in esse view than the in fieri view (not this: #The argument). But it doesn't seem right to compare Aristotle directly with St.TA because their purposes are so different, (plus, TA had more sophisticated logic at his disposal). Leibniz seems more contemporary...

Many authors just seem to skip right over Aristotle and start with TA (not unreasonably). I think editors sometimes use TA's discussions of Aristotle or something... And so many translations say God, Him, Soul, etc. very anachronistic. Anyway, I'll add some more refs and feel free to help... I was concerned it was getting too long.—Machine Elf 1735 (talk) 20:36, 22 February 2011 (UTC)

Your argument seems to be that the Prime Mover is not the First Cause. And A argued for the first and against the second. And later thinkers confused the two things and said that it was god. Even though A did say that it was god (or Zeus). Am I getting this right? And Zeus (plus maybe others) is incapable of interfering with the world. (Isn't this Deism?) I think this piece is getting very confused. We need citations and quotations from commentators on Aristotle to bolster and clarify the idea. Myrvin (talk) 14:55, 22 February 2011 (UTC)

First (prime) in the sense of logically prior, and first (prime) in the sense of the outer most sphere. But not the first temporally, (and certainly not by an act of creation, even volition, or with any kind of intent). And, ironically, also the final cause... at least, hierarchically (although some authors get a bit neoplatonic and talk about emanating). Some authors ascribe a "first" efficient cause (of everything) via that final cause... but that's going overboard... at most, the Sun as efficient cause of sub-lunar natural motion, and excluding chance...

I said he argued against first efficient cause (simpliciter). In both the Physics and Metaphysics he discusses the prime mover. I did say he intended the prime mover to be understood as divine, although he doesn't say that in the Physics. I didn't say medieval theologians mistook the prime mover for divinity... but realistically, it's nothing like Zeus either, is it? Except in being chief amongst peers... But Aristotle would prefer just the one (for parsimony). Calling it Deism is anachronistic. It's Aristotle theology, he obviously wasn't Catholic.

Well, I've picked up some welcome pointers from your comments and attempt to make improvements shortly, and I do have few secondary refs to go with the two primary refs I added. I think it reads clearly, so I'm not sure what's "confusing"? Machine Elf 1735 (talk) 20:36, 22 February 2011 (UTC)

Since Aristotle is thought to have influenced TA, then A is worth mentioning. It is you who say:

first cause, often confused with the idea of a "prime mover" or "unmoved mover"

So you need to say why and by whom. Perhaps it would be better to start with saying that A did argue for a prime mover, rather than simply saying he argued against FC. I have seen no writers who say what you say about A and the First Cause. Russell says the FC argument "is derived from A's argument of the unmoved mover." Guthrie et al [7] p. 252 say that "The chief arguments for an unmoved mover being the First Cause were in the Physics; the chief account of its nature is in Metaphysics Λ." I would find it difficult to help with citations because most people I have read DO mention A, as at least, a precurser of the CA, and nobody says he argued against it. Bechler [8] p79 is worth reading for your point on infinity. He seems to think that A did argue in both directions. It is not as simple as saying A "argued against the idea of a First Cause."

Also see Brentano et al [9] p.61. Possibly in your favour is [10] p 82.

P.S. I was of course referring to the concept of Deism, not the historical movement. A was certainly not a catholic, but then neither were the deists. Myrvin (talk) 10:14, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

Cleanup

Primal Chaos said, "We need to rewrite large sections and present this philosophical concept cleanly and neutrally rather than let this article be reduced to religious cheerleading, criticizing all criticisms, undermining all alternatives while upholding the argument itself as dogma only a fool would question." I, for one, agree with him. I like this article, and I would love to see it flourish. Anyone want to lend a hand? 12.208.25.100 (talk) 05:49, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

Here's what I've done so far:

1. Spelling, grammar, flow, and concision.
2. Internal links and citations.
3. Revised the "Objections and counterarguments" section.
4. Removed bias, proselytization, redundancy, and unverified content (in the most unbiased manner possible).
5. Fixed inaccurate content.

Any ideas about how else to improve this article? 12.208.25.100 (talk) 22:30, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

Aight, I've finished my second run through the article. It'll be my last for now... until someone speaks up about wanting to revise the article. Thanks! 12.208.25.100 (talk) 11:44, 22 June 2008 (UTC), 12.208.72.158, 12.208.72.171, 66.168.53.106, 216.165.149.8

I am sad that no one wants to work on this article. :( 12.208.25.100 (talk) 03:28, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

Yes, this article is not consise, not clear, it is chaotic, —Preceding unsigned comment added by 174.24.46.3 (talk) 05:02, 1 November 2010 (UTC)

From Pachomius

You say:

Here's what I've done so far:

1. Spelling, grammar, flow, and concision.
2. Internal links and citations.
3. [...]

Please just find the work of Leibniz where he says or asks: " "Why is there something rather than nothing?" [See the article.]

This quote has been time and again reported as coming from Leibniz but without any link to any work from Leibniz, however see this link which I tend not to be so sure about:

[quote]http://www.umcs.maine.edu/~chaitin/kirchberg.html

At the Kirchberg Wittgenstein conference where this paper was presented, Adolf Grünbaum discussed what he called the "primordial existential question," as formulated by Leibniz in 1714. Leibniz, Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason (1714), Section 7: "Why is there something rather than nothing? For nothing is simpler and easier than something. Furthermore, assuming that things must exist, we must be able to give a reason why they must exist in this way, and not otherwise." (Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, Hackett, 1989, p. 210.)

[/quote]

112.198.79.4 (talk) 15:05, 12 September 2011 (UTC)Pachomius

Motivation for change.

Change always has a cause. That cause is motivation which can manifest itself in many forms. The basic and the first manifestation is the Universal Motivation originating from the ‘perfect centre’. Motivation. Universal Motivation is the reason why the whole of our reality is dynamic even though Universal Motivation itself is static and it does not change. ‘First cause’ Talk Cosmological argument. Human reality, which consists of three space times, those of matter, material world and the immaterial space time, is motivated from the perfect centre but at the same time that which was created by motivation remains in permanent imbalance. This manifests itself as the static difference which is not change. To observe difference the observer must compare the state of a static unit in two moments ‘now’, one ‘before’ and the other ‘after’ change. The change itself is not observed. The sum of static units of time ‘now’ adds up and it is manifested as flowing time resulting from differences. Change, contained in the gap between two ‘now’, has variable velocity and the variation is organized into converging spiral. At the largest ring of the spiral velocity of changes is slowest due to weak motivation from the perfect centre. Examples are long lives of galaxies or atoms. At the opposite end, in the centre of the spiral, velocity of changes is fastest and it applies to electromagnetism and units of gravity which exist for very short periods of time. Electromagnetism and gravity motivate in addition to the motivation from the perfect centre. Changes are in agreement with the laws of nature represented by the properties of the existing units which are beings motivated. Example of motivation by electromagnetism, where changes are directed by the laws of nature, is human body. KK (78.146.56.15 (talk) 10:19, 7 October 2011 (UTC))