Talk:Decent interval

This was rejected by the administrator but it seems both true and worth mentioning:

- There is also no requirement that Nixon and Kissinger were able to accurately foretell the future. They may well have hoped in the best case that South Vietnam would be able to stand, while in the worst case of it falling there would at least be a decent interval. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.199.42.28 (talk) 21:56, 1 September 2020 (UTC)

Did you know nomination

The following is an archived discussion of the DYK nomination of the article below. Please do not modify this page. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page (such as this nomination's talk page, the article's talk page or Wikipedia talk:Did you know), unless there is consensus to re-open the discussion at this page. No further edits should be made to this page.

The result was: promoted by Yoninah (talk) 19:41, 20 September 2020 (UTC)

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• ... that a historical theory argues that after 1971, the Nixon administration abandoned South Vietnam and planned a decent interval before its defeat? Source: from the summer of 1971 to the conclusion of the Paris Agreements in January 1973 Kissinger tried to "sell" a peace agreement to his Soviet and Chinese interlocutors by stressing the American willingness to accept a "decent interval" solution: that is, the United States would not reenter the war provided that the collapse of the South Vietnamese government did not occur immediately after the last US ground troops returned home https://doi.org/10.1080%2F09592290412331308771
  • ALT1:... that a historical theory argues that Nixon sought a decent interval between American withdrawal and South Vietnamese collapse to avoid becoming the first president to lose a war? Source: As for the diplomatic side, Nixon said publicly that the aim of negotiations was to reach anagreement with the North guaranteeing the South’s right to choose its government by freeelections. Secretly, however, he did not require the North to abandon its goal of military conquest ofthe South. Instead, he settled for a “decent interval”—a period of a year or two—between his finalwithdrawal of American troops and the Communists’ final takeover of South Vietnam. For Nixon tocompletely evade the blame for defeat, he had to do more than prop up the Saigon governmentthrough 1972. If it fell shortly after he brought the troops home, Americans would see that theirsoldiers had died in vain, and Nixon would go down in history as the first president to lose a war. (Hughes, p. 9)
  • ALT2:... that Henry Kissinger's statement "our terms will eventually destroy" South Vietnam is cited as evidence that the Nixon administration planned a decent interval before defeat? Source: By 2006, when Asselin’s review appeared, there was more than enough tapedevidence available to show that Kissinger really was negotiating a “decent interval” exit for Nixon,including the August 3, 1972, conversation in which Kissinger said that “we’ve got to find someformula that holds the thing together a year or two,” and the October 6, 1972, conversation in whichKissinger said, “I also think that Thieu is right, that our terms will eventually destroy him.” (Hughes, p. 124)

• Reviewed: Template:Did you know nominations/Division slice

Created by Buidhe (talk). Self-nominated at 01:37, 2 September 2020 (UTC).

• This article is new enough and long enough. The hook facts are cited inline and any of the hooks could be used, the article is neutral and I detected no copyright issues. I have added the IP to the credits. A QPQ has been done. Cwmhiraeth (talk) 06:16, 10 September 2020 (UTC)