Talk:Enaction (philosophy)/Archive 1

Archive 1Archive 2Archive 3

Disclaimer

This article is a stub, and needs considerable expansion. Brews ohare (talk) 15:55, 30 March 2014 (UTC)

Scope and content

A useful article to create, but we need to make sure it does not digress into a coat rack for material that is in other articles - I have removed material that falls into that category. Also at the moment the sources used are a little restrictive and need expanding - I would have done something there this morning but I am away from home and my text books. We also need secondary sources to establish some of the claims in the lede.

Brews - can we please try and avoid a repetition of your normal strategy of immediately reverting changes, you know it will just be reverted in turn. Also there is an opportunity here to build a good article but that will not work if you are not prepared to compromise and insist on your material in its original form. ----Snowded TALK 09:23, 2 April 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: Your visit here is such a surprise! An invitation to collaborate is great, and improvement in this article is desirable. How can that be accomplished? I'd suggest that it be attempted by a discussion of contributions based upon sources. In that spirit, you have not provided me with much to go on. But in the section below I'll attempt a beginning. Brews ohare (talk) 15:02, 2 April 2014 (UTC)

Social constructivism

The following subsection was deleted by Snowded, and I'd like to discuss it:

Social constructivism

Enaction applies to groups as well as individuals. Social constructivism is the study of an individual's learning that takes place because of their interactions in a group, and the group's experience with its environment. According to Gergen, the social constructionist orientation suggests:[1]

  1. What we take to be knowledge of the world is not a product [simply] of induction, or of the building and testing of hypotheses...How can theoretical categories be induced or derived from observation,...if the process of identifying observational attributes itself relies on one's possessing categories? ... Constructionism asks one to suspend belief that commonly accepted categories or understandings receive their warrant through observation.
  2. The terms in which the world is understood are social artifacts, products of historically situated interchanges among people. From the constructionist position the process of understanding is not automatically driven by the forces of nature, but is the result of an active, cooperative enterprise of persons in relationship....[We are invited] to consider the social origins of taken-for-granted assumptions about the mind – such as the bifurcation between reason and emotion, the existence of motives and memories, and the symbol system believed to underlie language.
  3. The degree to which a given form of understanding prevails or is sustained across time is not fundamentally dependent on the empirical validity of the perspective in question, but on the vicissitudes of social processes (e.g., communication, negotiation, conflict, rhetoric)
  4. Descriptions and explanations of the world themselves constitute forms of social action. As such they are intertwined with the full range of other human activities.

An example is the idea of a paradigm as described by Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.[2][3] For the scientist a paradigm refers to the sense of the way reality is structured and the means by which the scientist uncovers this reality and is able to manipulate it and predict effects and events. The dissatisfaction of scientists with an existing theory leads to a paradigm shift, and this dissatisfaction is a matter of criteria demanded of an acceptable theory. These criteria are not themselves scientifically established, but describe an 'ideal' theory as seen by the scientific community, criteria such as 'elegance', 'completeness', 'seminality', 'simplicity'.[4][5]

Thus, as the idea of enaction suggests within the context of social constructivism, the development of a paradigm involves the interaction of scientists with their environment and each other, the theoretical treatment of experimental results, and re-engagement in probing the environment on the basis of that theory, sometimes with very sophisticated apparatus. Examples of complex probing of the environment as part of the cognitive process, what enaction is about, are the Hadron collider or the Hubble telescope. These activities are accompanied by the evolution and application of theories subject to an aesthetic stemming from social interactions between scientists.[4]

References

  1. ^ Kenneth J Gergen (March 1985). "The social constructionist movement in modern psychology" (PDF). American Psychologist. 40 (3): 266 ff.
  2. ^ Stefano Guzzini (2000). "A reconstruction of constructionism in international relations" (PDF). European Journal of International Relations. 6 (2): 158. One of the main defenders of epistemological constructivism who is also well known in IR [international relations], Thomas Kuhn.
  3. ^ Bruno Latour, Steve Woolgar (1986). Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. Princeton University Press. p. 275. ISBN 978-0691028323. Kuhn had already provided...the general basis for a conception of the social character of science.
  4. ^ a b Thomas Kuhn formally stated the need for the "norms for rational theory choice". One of his discussions is reprinted in Thomas S Kuhn. "Chapter 9: Rationality and Theory Choice". In James Conant, John Haugeland, eds (ed.). The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press. pp. 208 ff. ISBN 0226457990. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
  5. ^ Mark Colyvan (2001). The Indispensability of Mathematics. Oxford University Press. pp. 78–79. ISBN 0195166612.


Snowded removed this section with the in-line editorial comment "essays on social constructivism are not appropriate to this article, especially OR".

Now, the reasons why Snowded thinks the topic of social constructivism is "not appropriate" and just what in this subsection constitutes a violation of WP:OR has not been identified. Perhaps some further guidance as to what exactly Snowded has in mind could be offered as a beginning point for discussion? Brews ohare (talk) 15:11, 2 April 2014 (UTC)

Non-reductive naturalism

Snowded has removed the subsection below on non-reductive naturalism without any guidance as to his reasoning:

Non-reductive naturalism

Reductionism in science is the argument that all events (ultimately) are connected to (possibly yet-to-be-established) primal events by the 'laws of nature' and, in particular, mental events are reducible to neuroscience and brain circuitry.[R 1] In contrast, non-reductive naturalism claims that "mental phenomena cannot be reduced to any particular material object or local process, as for instance neural processing."[R 2] One form of this thesis arises in cultural psychology where mind is viewed as a cultural phenomenon.[R 3]

The enactive approach is constructivist, not reductionist, that is, it is about "the active construction of knowledge through our interaction with the environment"..."Our brains do not indiscriminately and passively crunch up any structure that can be detected in a never ending stream of sensations...Cognition is a lot about discarding irrelevant information and going out to get relevant information...Open-loop approaches restricted to input-output mappings are unable to capture this circular causality and the emergent phenomena it can bring about."[R 2][R 4]

References

  1. ^ Eric R. Kandel (2007). In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind. WW Norton. p. 9. ISBN 0393329372. ...consciousness is a biological process that will eventually be explained in terms of molecular signaling pathways used by interacting populations of nerve cells...
  2. ^ a b Marieke Rohde (2010). "Introduction". Enaction, embodiment, evolutionary robotics: Simulation models for a post-cognitivist science of mind. Atlantis Press. p. 2. ISBN 978-9078677239. Available on line here
  3. ^ Carl Ratner (2011). Macro Cultural Psychology: A Political Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. p. 96. ISBN 0199706298. Culture produces the mind; brain circuitry does not. The mind–body problem of how the physical body/brain produces mental, subjective qualia, is the wrong way to frame the origin of consciousness.
  4. ^ SM Potter (2007). "What do we know about natural intelligence (NI) that can inform artificial intelligence (AI)?". 50 Years of Artificial Intelligence: Essays Dedicated to the 50th Anniversary of Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 176 ff. ISBN 3540772952. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |editors= ignored (|editor= suggested) (help)


I hope Snowded will provide some guidance as to his reasoning in removing this subsection. Brews ohare (talk) 15:20, 2 April 2014 (UTC)

I did Brews, but as before if you don't like something you just ignore it. Its not relevant to this entry and aspects of it are OR. Otherwise see TonyClarke comments below. Assume the same response on the other section ----Snowded TALK 06:09, 3 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: The matter is simple: here we have a proposed subsection and an invitation for source-based critique. We don't have to look over your previous protestations that you have already presented suitable discussion. The discussion about this subsection is about this subsection and it is located right here. We aren't looking for abstract commentary about my editing style. We are looking for specific remarks about the material of this subsection. There is nothing here from you whatsoever. Brews ohare (talk) 14:07, 4 April 2014 (UTC)

Secondary sources

Snowded has suggested by additon of {{citation needed}} that secondary sources are needed to establish two points. The leading paragraph identifies these points as follows:

Enaction in the study of philosophy is related to the study of embodied cognition,[citation needed] the notion that mind is not coterminous with the brain or perhaps even an entire organism,1 but goes farther[citation needed] in its emphasis upon the interactions between a living organism and its surroundings.
1Francisco J. Varela, Eleanor Rosch, Evan Thompson (1992). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press. ISBN 0262261235.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

The first issue is whether there is any relation between 'enaction' and 'embodied cognition'.

My reaction is that the suggestion that the focus of embodied cognition does not necessarily stress the idea of interaction with the environment as a key aspect is obvious from the definition of that field.

The second issue is whether 'enaction' places an emphasis upon interaction.

My reaction is that the second point is the very meaning of the term 'enaction'.

In both cases the cited general introduction of the book by Varela, Thompson & Rosch is about as good a secondary source as one is likely to find, being the introduction by three authors to their essays on various topics from a decidedly non-partisan stance that discusses these aspects at length. Accordingly, these templates appear gratuitous here. Brews ohare (talk) 16:40, 2 April 2014 (UTC)

Chapter 8 of this source is titled "Enaction: Embodied cognition". It defines enaction at great length on pp. 173-174. The organism itself chooses the stimuli in the physical world to which it will be sensitive. Perception is not simply embedded within and constrained by the surrounding world. The organism both initiates and is shaped by the environment.

Perhaps, Snowded, you have some other sources in mind that would present a more 'objective' view of the subject?? Brews ohare (talk) 17:02, 2 April 2014 (UTC)

There are many issues here Brews, Embodiment is one thing, enaction and other and yes authors connect them. But in an article on enact ion we summarise those links but we don't create an extended essay on a related subject. You reference is a collection of essays that take a particular perspective it is not a general summary of the field. They use embodiment differently from other authors, some would link it more with scaffolding etc. We have the normal problem here of you finding some material and over relying on that material rather than looking at the field as a whole. If I get time between arriving home on Sunday and shipping out to the States I will check the Cambridge Companion's definition and one other secondary source on the "E"s that I think would be useful. ----Snowded TALK 06:19, 3 April 2014 (UTC)
It will be great to see some source-related commentary from you that goes beyond your claims that the presented sources have a parochial view of the matter, in your opinion. Brews ohare (talk) 14:33, 4 April 2014 (UTC)

Form of citations

Providing the rationale "in text citations makes article creation a lot easier to handle" Snowded has changed some footnotes to an 'in-text' version <ref>{{cite book |title= |author= |isbn= |url= |publisher= |page= |year=}}</ref>, replacing the less distracting use of the 'in-text' designation <ref name =author/> formatting of the original. I'd say this is an imposition of his personal distaste for the cleaner approach, and as he has not originated this article, I do not think it his prerogative to force his aesthetic upon it. Brews ohare (talk) 15:29, 2 April 2014 (UTC)

Accordingly, I have put the references into the original format. Brews ohare (talk) 16:12, 2 April 2014 (UTC)

In text citations make it easier for other editors as they don't have to do through multiple changes to prevent error messages. Your format is excellent for an article with stable text not undergoing major change. If you want participation and to reduce the temptation to simply do a mass revert you might want to think about changing ----Snowded TALK 05:56, 3 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: There are several pros for the list-defined reference format used in this article. One is that the text in the edit window is clear and uninterrupted by extraneous footnote material that is distracting and can make the text hard to follow. Another advantage to having all the reference material in its own sub-section is that it is easy to find and change references details and to edit footnote commentary by editing only the reference sub-section, and one does not have to search the body text to find where the inserted <ref>...</ref> material is to be found. The only con of this approach is that in adding a reference one has either to open the entire article to gain simultaneous access to the reference subsection and the body text being edited, or to open sequentially the reference subsection to add the source material and the text where the footnote arises.
It is a personal preference, but in my experience it is the list-defined reference approach that works best, and resistance to its use is due primarily to unfamiliarity. Brews ohare (talk) 14:53, 4 April 2014 (UTC)

Contribution to Citizendium

Finding no useful commentary here, and instead unsupported and peremptory reversion, I've decided to present this material on Citizendium where it can be found as Extended cognition. Brews ohare (talk) 15:53, 4 April 2014 (UTC)

Agree with Snowded

Brews, you asked me to be involved with this page. I am sorry to have to say that it is now looking like a rerun of many conflicts that have a arisen between you and Snowded, and conflicts without resolution or improvement resulting.

I agree with Snowded on removing the two sections. The last paragraphs in each section are not properly supported with clear citations, and your citations are put in as evidence for your views. But in fact they give only individual comments on the subject, and there are many other views and approaches which should merit a mention. I also agree that both were not strictly relevant to the subject, and I can't understand some of your responses, e.g. ' My reaction is that the suggestion that the focus of embodied cognition does not necessarily stress the idea of interaction with the environment as a key aspect is obvious from the definition of that field.' What does that mean? It does not address the point being made. Perhaps, taking up the -citation needed- suggestion constructively : ), you should look at some general introductory works on the 'four e's', some of which spell out relationships between embodied cognition, enactive cognitions, extended etc…

Well done for initiating this page, and I wish you well with it. It could be a very useful contribution to this subject. I am happy to contribute to it if there are sensible productive discussions going on, but not at the present.

TonyClarke (talk) 01:55, 3 April 2014 (UTC)

I'd appreciate your help. You could begin by framing what you see as a 'sensible productive discussion'. You have suggested the citations provided support the views presented. You suggest other views merit mention, and I encourage you to do that and source them appropriately. Brews ohare (talk) 02:17, 3 April 2014 (UTC)
Brews, for the record the 'many conflicts' are as problematic for me as for you. But you just don't listen. On every article, without exception when other editors have got involved they have not agreed with you, but you persist in arguing your original position rather than listening. As I said I think this is a useful article to create, but you need to be prepared to listen and work with other editors rather than insisting on your original text all the time. ----Snowded TALK 06:24, 3 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: I have objected to nothing said here. What I have done is object that nothing has been said. I await your reasoning about the deletions of the subsections above.
I also await Tony's introduction of the "many other views and approaches which should merit a mention". Brews ohare (talk) 12:25, 3 April 2014 (UTC)
You've been given clear reasons for the deletion by me (and in Tony's support). You just don't like them. Sorry Brews your average talk page words to content changes ration is about 5k:1 or more and I've done enough unless other editors engage ----Snowded TALK 05:46, 4 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: There has been no source-supported commentary by you or by Tony so far. In fact, so far all we have are statements of personal reservation without specifics as to offending wording or content, never mind sources. Brews ohare (talk) 15:01, 4 April 2014 (UTC)
Brews they were pretty specific. Your conclusions for example, like the run-on sentence that includes the Hubble Space Telescope etc... You could probably find cites for that kind of thing but not from a philosophy department.—Machine Elf 1735 15:26, 4 April 2014 (UTC)
MachineElf: It is you that is specific, not Snowded. As for the example of complex probing of the environment as part of the cognitive process, obviously what enaction is about, well other examples could be found, if necessary. Whether these examples are apt or not, they do not justify reversion of that subsection. However, I do appreciate your effort to introduce some specificity into the otherwise empty commentary here so far. Brews ohare (talk) 17:14, 4 April 2014 (UTC)

Removal of another pertinent and reliably sourced subsection

Snowded has removed the subsection below on internalism & externalism without any guidance as to his reasoning:

Internalism and externalism

Proponents of enaction consider its emphasis upon interaction with the external environment to be in contrast with a view of mental processes as simply the internal operation of the brain as a computer manipulating symbols encoding representations of the world, the rules and representations approach to cognition.[S 1] The issue is not just that cognition involves structures outside the brain proper, but that cognition is a process of interaction, an activity. However, the role of the subject, the individuation, of this activity might be underestimated.[S 2][S 3]

The interactivity between the organism and the environment emphasized by extended cognition impinges on the deeper philosophical questions of the subject-object problem, that is the partition of experience between subject and object.[S 2] At one extreme, our interior mental processes are dictated by interaction with the external world, and at the other extreme, they are creations of our conscious and subconscious brain activity. "Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way. Internalism (or individualism) denies this, and it affirms that having those intentional mental states depends solely on our intrinsic properties."[S 3]

Sources

  1. ^ Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embedded". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556.
  2. ^ a b Basil Smith. "Internalism and externalism in the philosophy of mind and language". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  3. ^ a b Joe Lau, Max Deutsch (Jan 22, 2014). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Externalism About Mental Content". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition). {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)


Snowded removed this material with the in-line comment: restrict to material directly related to the top (holding action there may be more if we agree scope on talk ). On this Talk page he has added the remark: "You've been given clear reasons for the deletion by me (and in Tony's support). You just don't like them. Sorry Brews your average talk page words to content changes ration is about 5k:1 or more and I've done enough unless other editors engage"

What is omitted from Snowded's words is any clarification of his reasons for removal of this subsection, or the other two that he has removed in earlier efforts. My invitations to supply reasons and sources so far has resulted only in Snowded's personal peremptory opinions and his avoidance of all source-related commentary, suggesting that he "has already done enough". Enough what? Tony has also been invited without result to provide some substance to flesh out what he feels is an incomplete presentation.

However, Snowded takes things further than Tony by removing the presentation of these subtopics entirely, and without rationale. Brews ohare (talk) 13:54, 4 April 2014 (UTC)

Why wouldn't this be a WP:SUMMARY of the Internalism and externalism article?—Machine Elf 1735 15:42, 4 April 2014 (UTC)
As the second paragraph suggests, it is the pertinence of this topic to enaction that is the purpose of this section. Feel free to improve upon it. Brews ohare (talk) 17:05, 4 April 2014 (UTC)
You are doing what you always do Brews, take one article and use it for extended essays on any subject that you find to be linked, You also confuse sourcing with relevance, they are not the same thing, ----Snowded TALK 06:56, 5 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: Evidence, please? Not about your blanket assertions of my "doing what I always do", but evidence that the topic here is not pertinent, preferably by using sources, not your unsupported notions. Brews ohare (talk) 14:01, 5 April 2014 (UTC)

Title and subject

One of the things that needs to be sorted here is the name of the article an its scope. Enaction already covers much of the material as is one aspect of the wider issue. The general anti-cartesian position emerging in Philosophy of Mind could do with a simple summary, and that would include enaction in its wider context. It is also an area where we get inconsistent use of terms by different authors, characteristic of a new field and we could do some service there as well. Personally I think this is one of the most important emerging areas on Philosophy at the moment so it deserves some serious effort. ----Snowded TALK 06:33, 3 April 2014 (UTC)

Bravo. Apparently Gregbard doesn't agree with you and has rated the importance of this article as low.
Perhaps, given your evaluation, you will actually consider contributing to this article?? One way to do that would be to explain your deletion of two subsections above, both well-sourced, both placing enaction in a broad context, and one based upon sources devoted in their entirety to 'enaction'.
The "anti-Cartesian" position is largely a misconception of the entire subject-object problem but it could be represented in the article as the opinion of some. Brews ohare (talk) 12:33, 3 April 2014 (UTC)
As it stands it is 'low' hence the suggestion below. If you bother to read any of my comments you will see suggestions, including this one as to the nature of content. If you can bother to respond to those with more open language then I might as this is a major area of interest and work for me. However if yu thing its a misconception of subject-object you really are starting in the wrong place. So please respond on the suggestion ----Snowded TALK 05:44, 4 April 2014 (UTC)
Any source-supported content suggestion here, as elsewhere, is undetectable. Brews ohare (talk) 13:57, 4 April 2014 (UTC)
Editing an encyclopaedia is not about stringing together partially understood quotations out of context however referenced Brews. hen you are prepared to engage on other than your own terms let the rest of us know ----Snowded TALK 22:03, 4 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: Your invention of "stringing together partially understood quotations out of context" lacks credibility because you have given no indication of what makes you think any of the quotations provided are 'partially understood'. And your invention that I am not "prepared to engage on other than [my] own terms" is complete fabrication. It would seem to suggest that I have refused to accept some concrete proposals for changing the original proposal. That is a fabrication, as no proposals for different wording or sourcing have been suggested at all, never mind being rejected. In fact, nothing substantive has been said to support your deletion of any of the subsections, and no attempt has been made to change or discuss their content or their sources. Your attempt at smearing the record and your refusal to participate in content review or sourcing is, well, you fill in the blanks... Brews ohare (talk) 00:15, 5 April 2014 (UTC)
OK, so despite multiple rejections by multiple editors on multiple articles you are not prepared to change, Pity (two meanings) ----Snowded TALK 06:58, 5 April 2014 (UTC)
Change what? The proposed subsections? Sure. Go ahead and suggest some specific changes in wording or some new material or some new sources. Without some concrete proposals for change, your remarks reduce to personal attacks violating WP:CIVIL. Brews ohare (talk) 14:07, 5 April 2014 (UTC)
You behaviour Brews, try and engage with discussion rather than just telling people they are wrong and insisting on your manner of editing being the only valid one. And your referencing WP:Civil somewhat takes the biscuit----Snowded TALK 22:15, 5 April 2014 (UTC)!
Snowded: I just don't know where you are coming from. I have 'insisted upon' absolutely nothing. My manner of editing may indeed be "the only valid one", just because nobody else has edited at all, except for yourself. You have simply deleted three subsections without any discussion of sources or content on the basis simply that you don't think they are satisfactory. That is not a valid manner of editing - it's just assertion of your own desires. You are living in some other universe than this talk page and this article. Brews ohare (talk) 00:40, 6 April 2014 (UTC)

Agree with removal

Brews: I agree with Snowded's removal of internalism/ externalism. People wanting to know about enactivism(philosophy) could maybe benefit form a link to internalism/externalism, to which this is related, but writing about it here would lose the focus on this important area. The article loses its strength and relevance by this divergent development.

I also think, Brews that you do use sources to back up what you say, which verges on OR. Instead we should be talking about the sources, as balanced pictures of the subject, and specify as closely as possible what they say.

You also said I haven't tried to improve the article. I think I made my point earlier about why I don't intend to get involved in editing this article. I would have to engage in drastic reversions and cuts, and Snowded is already doing this. I don't have any knowledge or allegiance to either of you, but I really think you need to listen to what is being said and try to focus your writing, after surveying the relevant literature.

I wish you well in your future writing.

TonyClarke (talk) 23:13, 5 April 2014 (UTC)

Hi Tony: I am confused why you think using sources to back up what is said constitutes OR. It sounds like the opposite to me: it is reporting what the sources say. I am not saying anything based upon my personal opinion; I'm just pointing out sources containing discussion that bears upon enaction. If you think they are a diversion from enaction, as you have mentioned here regarding internalism/externalism, then I guess the relevant policy is WP:Undue.
I think you don't want to engage here because you think the atmosphere is toxic. However, if you look closely you will see all that is going on is that I am trying to get Snowded to explain his actions, as you have tried to do for him. However, he will not do that, and he will not address sources.
I suggest that you try engaging and see whether interaction with me is as bad as Snowded would have you think. You will be surprised. Brews ohare (talk) 00:49, 6 April 2014 (UTC)

Enaction?

Is there any reliable source that uses the term "enaction" for the topic of this article? --Bob K31416 (talk) 18:58, 6 April 2014 (UTC)

Bob: Reference 2; Stewart et al. Might be what you want. Brews ohare (talk) 19:33, 6 April 2014 (UTC)
Thanks. I see the book is, Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. Looks fine. --Bob K31416 (talk) 20:36, 6 April 2014 (UTC)

Scaffolding

Scaffolding is a topic name-dropped without explanation on several occasions by Snowded. To accommodate him, this subsection was contributed. However, Snowded has removed this subsection with the in-line comment: You are just inserting material without context. Lets agree what this article is about first shall we. The subsection is below:

Scaffolding

The term scaffolding in connection with mind refers to the dependence of more complicated functionality upon simpler functionality that serves as a 'scaffold' to build and develop the more complex activity. In developmental psychology one application of scaffolding is the idea that early life experiences significantly shape the adult’s understanding.[N 1] More broadly, the term has been introduced to describe a "broad class of physical, cognitive and social augmentations -- augmentations which allow us to achieve some goal which would otherwise be beyond us".[N 2]

In the context of enaction, scaffolding refers to cognition-enhancing tools that extend mental processes into the environment and modulate or even enable interaction with that environment in the processes of cognition. A simple example is the use of a cane by a blind man, "stick-augmented perception".[N 3] From this standpoint, "what individuals inherit from their ancestors is not a mind, but the ability to develop a mind," a "matrix of resources that serve as the actual physical causes of development."[N 4] The development of mind is seen as a dynamical process involving interaction with the environment.

According to Thelan (as quoted by Griffiths and Stotz):[N 5]

"behavior and cognition, and their changes during ontogeny [development] are not represented anywhere in the system beforehand either as dedicated structures, or symbols in the brain, or as codes in the genes. Rather, thought and behavior are "softly assembled" as dynamical patterns of activity that arise as a function of the intended task at hand and an individual's "intrinsic dynamics" [by which is meant] the preferred states of the system given its current architecture and previous history of activity."

Notes

  1. ^ Lawrence E Williams, Julie Y Huang, John A Baruch (2009). "The scaffolded mind: Higher mental processes are grounded in early experience of the physical world" (PDF). European Journal of Social Psychology. 39 (7): 1257–1267.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  2. ^ Andy Clark (1998). "Chapter 8: Magic Words: How Language Augments Human Computation". In Peter Carruthers, Jill Boucher (ed.). Language and thought: Interdisciplinary themes. Cambridge University Press. pp. 162–183. ISBN 978-0521637589.
  3. ^ Andy Clark (2008). Supersizing the Mind : Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press. p. 31. ISBN 978-0199715534.
  4. ^ PE Griffiths and K Stotz (2000). "How the mind grows: a developmental perspective on the biology of cognition" (PDF). Synthese. 122 (1–2): 29–51.
  5. ^ Esther Thelen (1995)). "Chapter 3: Time-scale dynamics and the development of an embodied cognition". In Robert F Port, Timothy van Gelder, eds (ed.). Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of cognition. MIT Press. pp. 69–100. ISBN 0-262-16150-8. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help); Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link) CS1 maint: year (link)


Snowded suggests: "Let's agree what this article is about first, shall we?" Snowded indicated a while back that he was about to participate with this article, but so far no such discussion has taken place, and it remains to be seen whether Snowded has a real intention. Brews ohare (talk) 14:32, 7 April 2014 (UTC)

This deleted subsection is one of four sourced subsections (1, 2, 3 & 4) that Snowded has deleted from the article without any concrete discussion of content or sourcing. Brews ohare (talk) 14:35, 7 April 2014 (UTC)

New section

I added a summary of a 2012 article which I think covers the areas and points to the importance of enaction. It is also easier to read than many Philosophy articles. I hope it sets the scene to retain and build upon this article, which we all think is important. We need some more entries now, e.g. on 'Criticisms' of the topic (and it certainly has had some opposition!), and some other viewpoints on it. Hopefully we can make it beyond the stub status. Peace!

TonyClarke (talk) 12:58, 8 April 2014 (UTC)

If we are keeping this to Enaction I think that summary is useful with a few amendments. Thanks for that. To expand intro the wider ISS of consciousness would require something different of which that would be a part (see above). I'm neutral on which route us taken. Brews seemed to want to expand the scope so I tried to respond to that desire with a structure that reflects secondary sourcing ----Snowded TALK 14:01, 8 April 2014 (UTC)

Great, a way forward maybe. I agree that we can include contextual stuff, but perhaps when a secondary topic becomes important enough it needs its own page (or might have already), and we can branch off that way. But the article is called Enaction(Philosophy) and I think we should make that the main subject. (Not sure what you mean by the 'ISS of consciousness'?)TonyClarke (talk) 14:35, 8 April 2014 (UTC)

Tony: I reformatted two of your footnotes. The section seems to suggest that Stapleton and Ward originated the four E's, but that is not the case. For some historical background, see Rowlands' introduction Expanding the Mind. Brews ohare (talk) 15:58, 8 April 2014 (UTC)
I did some minor rewording to avoid any assertion of priority to this paper for the E's . Brews ohare (talk) 16:43, 8 April 2014 (UTC)
I did some further rewording, adopting the authors' own description of their work that includes more Es. Brews ohare (talk) 16:27, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
As Stapleton and Ward have indicated, the 'classical sandwich' is a term coined by Susan Hurley, and I've added a footnote to her work. Brews ohare (talk) 17:07, 9 April 2014 (UTC)

Title and range

OK lets try again. I will repeat my relier statement with some additions, hopefully we can get some engagement

Original comment

One of the things that needs to be sorted here is the name of the article an its scope. Enaction already covers much of the material as is one aspect of the wider issue. The general anti-cartesian position emerging in Philosophy of Mind could do with a simple summary, and that would include enaction in its wider context. It is also an area where we get inconsistent use of terms by different authors, characteristic of a new field and we could do some service there as well. Personally I think this is one of the most important emerging areas on Philosophy at the moment so it deserves some serious effort.

Additional points

I think the value of an article is to summarise the cartesian/non-cartesian split but in other language. Basically we have the view of the brain as directing activity (with lots of consequences for free will etc) and against that the ideas of extended consciousness (which might be a better title than extended cognition). That has multiple sources and we need to start with a secondary source that summarises the positions, the current one is a bit partial and over focused on the environment.

Leslie Paul Thiele is a good starting point. He characterises Cartesian approaches as seeing cognitive psychology as being responsible for working out the abstract programs that the brain (as a computational device) runs with cognitive neuroscience studying how they are implemented. He contrasts that with post-cartesian approaches which include:

  • Embodied: extra-neural
  • Embedded: scaffolding
  • Enacted: co-evolve with reality
  • Extended: into the environment

He further expands on that (from memory there are some other "E"s and he also is good on the autonomic v novelty receptive receptive parts of the brain. Pattern recognition and partial scanning then also come in. My suggestion would be that Extended Consiousness is the better name and Thiele the starting point. He references the sources used by Brews. He is also a philosopher. ----Snowded TALK 07:13, 8 April 2014 (UTC)

Glad to see some content proposals. The author Leslei Paul Thiele has written several books. You haven't mentioned just what you refer to. One of these is The Heart of Judgment, which has rather little to say about "Cartesian approaches". It seems oriented toward decision making, and doesn't mention the four points you have bulleted. A number of others are about sustainability issues, which seem wide of the subject. Could you be more specific?
In contrast with Thiele, Rowlands does discuss the issues you raise, as already cited in the original proposal for this article, so perhaps you have simply identified the wrong author? Brews ohare (talk) 15:20, 8 April 2014 (UTC)
Thiele's Heart of Judgement makes the Cartesian point and the phrases above are summary quotes from that book. It was published in 2006 and while Rowlands book is later (2010) I think Thiele provides a better overview. The origin of the "4es" is not clear from either source and Thiele (from memory I have both books with extensive notes at home and read them the year they came out in each case) references a broader range of primary sources. I think we need to resolve what this article is about as enaction may merit its own article, or be better referenced in the existing non-philosophy ones with one on the whole "4es" being a new article. You jumped the gun there creating that new article and simply slotting in the OR material on Social Constructivism etc. So for the moment that is a stub article. I suggest we resolve the issue of title and scope here before proceeding.----Snowded TALK 10:23, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: To 'resolve what this article is about' is a laudable goal, but how is it to be accomplished? When I drafted this article originally I understood enaction to stress the interactive nature of knowledge acquisition. That view was based upon Rowlands' book and the collected essays in Enaction. With that in mind, a natural issue is: "What forms of interaction are involved in knowledge acquisition?" And, one might ask, which forms of knowledge acquisition do the proponents of 'enaction' exclude from consideration, and for what reason would any of them be excluded??
The huge number of articles overlapping enaction include those in the See also list, and many overlap enaction, and might actually contain enaction, but do not put as much emphasis upon the interactive aspect. A program to determine 'what this article is about' should differentiate this article from these others, preferably using sources.
I doubt that The Heart of Judgment will help in this regard. As you are of a contrary view, some page numbers would help locate where text supporting your summary description can be found. In the meantime, a search of the text using Amazon's 'look-inside' feature reveals nothing like your summary. For example, the only reference to 'Cartesian' is one sentence on p. 22. where it occurs only in a designatory role as: "a Cartesian understanding". The words "enaction" and "scaffolding" do not occur. The word "embodied" shows up as "embodied learning", discussed at length on p. 152 and that discussion has to do with the role of the subconscious mind, and is not explicitly connected by Thiele to the four E's. Brews ohare (talk) 14:11, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
What Thiele does profess, and some others who are more clearly in the 'enaction' school agree, is a role for emergence (See section "Grappling with Multi-dimensionality"). As Thiele states it (p. 279) "Reducing a system to the laws that govern interaction of its parts does not mean those laws can be employed to reconstruct the whole... 'More is different'; the whole is not simply the aggregate of its parts." The bearing upon the 4E's is unclear, probably it is the conjecture that one cannot divide the brain from the environment it interacts with and must deal with the whole (really a question of when is a system a closed system). Using this line of thought to avoid the dilemma of determinism and permit moral responsibility is mysticism. Immersing this article in that morass is to be avoided. Brews ohare (talk) 14:42, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
You will find that Amazon searches of books is not substitute for reading them and the related literature Brews. You correctly point out that emergence is a key concept and the free will issue is fundamentally changed by the ideas of the Es and the autonomic/novelty receptive issues of decision making all of which are relevant. We can't just grab material here and its beyond the scope of this article's subject which is very precise. I am variously on the east and west coast of the US for the next two weeks. When I get home I will get both books (and a few others) and take them with me so I can respond on sourcing. What matters for the moment is to agree the range of what will be on this article, what might go onto another article and/or if this should be renamed (per your original idea to delete it). My feeling is that this article is too specific and best handled at the longer standing and non-philosophy one. We should then look at an article on distributed cognitition or post-cartesian concepts and agree the content of that. I am not up for simply collating strings of quotes.----Snowded TALK 16:01, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
Amazon searches is not a substitute for reading, but it does serve to identify whether certain words are employed, and as noted, the words you have used to describe Thiele are not his. I look forward to your providing of details when you "respond on sourcing".
I am happy to see you recognize the narrowness of the topic title "enaction (philosophy)" because philosophy is the least of all the topics involved, others being psychology, neuroscience, and all the 'See also' topics. Brews ohare (talk) 16:25, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
Which is why the value of this article is questioned, it may be better as a paragraph in the main article. Then a new article for the wider subject matter. You have not responded on that. ----Snowded TALK 17:10, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: I've agreed with you that a different article would be less of a straight jacket. I'd like your idea of an outline of topics. I don't think your list of the E′s is sufficient to build upon. Brews ohare (talk) 17:17, 9 April 2014 (UTC)

Title of section

The value of the title is that it makes no claim for the field, but reports a view. Hence I have reverted to Tony's original title as that is OK, we cannot say that this article defines the field. I have also restored neutral language. The original of the sandwich looked like OR or a key word search, that needs to reflect what is said in the article (which I do not have to hand). If they reference Hurley OK put that change back, if they do not reference Hurley for that term it should not be used----Snowded TALK 17:18, 9 April 2014 (UTC)

I have made it perfectly clear in my remarks above that Hurley is referenced by the authors. You can also read their paper and see that for yourself, as I did. There is no non-neutrality of language, and you have not bothered to support your silly accusations. If you can read this article on line, you can use the links to the sources. Do some work, don't make waves out of laziness. Brews ohare (talk) 17:42, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
The subsection title The E′s of enactive cognition is not a 'view'. It is a context for the subject of Enaction as pointed out in the Intro of this article and sourced to Rowlands. One doesn't have to subscribe to some contentious controversial view to admit to these ideas as being the subject of conversation. Brews ohare (talk) 18:05, 9 April 2014 (UTC)

The E′s of enactive cognition

Snowded has taken exception to this subsection added by TonyClarke following my addition of footnotes identifying references within this section and a change in wording to reflect Stapleton's and Ward's description of their own paper. These changes are duly noted on the Talk page in the above thread. Snowded's in-line editorial comment is A account not THE account so we can't use their title. You are also making the text definitive rather than reporting one view. TAKE IT TALK

Now this subsection clearly states that it is a presentation of the article of Stapleton and Ward, so there is no confusion about its being "definitive text". I also note that Snowded made no objection to this subsection before I made these changes, changes that are at most minor clarifications and links to sources. So I don't know what the fuss is about.

Maybe Snowded can explain??

I have taken exception to your renaming of the subsection, not to the section for the reasons stated. I left some changes, but ones that implied that the view of these authors represented the field as a whole I changed back to the original text. ----Snowded TALK 18:41, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
→ Snowded: A very inaccurate description of your activities.
1. You removed the authors' own words that describe the intended purpose of their article:
"elaborates and partially defends the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended"
in favor of the incomplete statement
"present the view that enactive cognition implies embodiment, embeddedness, and the centrality of affect in cognition"
which drops several of the E′s.
2. You removed the authors' own citation to Hurley as the philosopher who coined the term 'classical sandwich'.
3. You removed the explanation of the word 'affective' which readers will find obscure, and the reference to Dickinson.
4. You changed TonyClarke's words 'enactive cognition' to 'extended cognition' in some instances, but not in others. Part 2 of Stapleton and Ward uses enactive to refer to cognition that arises out of "adaptive interaction with the environment", Part 5 uses extended to refer to a cognitive state "extending beyond the skin and skull". In the sentence where you changed 'enactive' to 'extended' you not only overrode TonyClarke's words, but changed them to the wrong meaning.
5. You reverted the change I made to remove an incorrect identification of 'dualism' with the 'classical sandwich', even thought these two concepts are not equivalent.
I conclude quite simply that your actions, Snowded, actively impede improvement of WP, and have nothing to do with any useful activity on your part. Brews ohare (talk) 21:52, 9 April 2014 (UTC)


The E′s of enactive cognition

In a recent article Stapleton and Ward discuss enaction as central to our cognition and perception.[F 1] They elaborate and partially defend the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended, named for convenience the E′s. The term 'affective' refers to unpurposed but motivating reactions to the environment, such as physiological responses (for example, nausea) and the emotions.[F 2] Enactive cognition is possible through skillful interaction with the environment. Therefore the article intends partially to defend each of these E′s but also to point out the centrality of enactive cognition: if this is seen as a valid interpretation of our cognition, then the other aspects (the E′s, and affect) follow also.

The authors propose an 'ecumenical' enactivism combining affordances (James J. Gibson), sensorimotor expectations (Alva Noë) and mutual enactive structuring (Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1992))[F 3]. This enactivism avoids what Hurley calls the ′Classical Sandwich′,[F 4] whereby internal cognitive workings intervene between perceptual input and actions output. There is no separation between action and perception, since perception is a matter of being already attuned to the world and its features.

They agree (p9) with Varela Rosch and Thompson, that rules and regularities come about through our interaction with perceptible environment. The world and our cognition are co-constituted, the world informs us what we can see and do, and our perception demarcates that which is in our world.

The enactivist position they outline 'holds that cognition essentially depends upon the activity, both actual and potential, of the cogniser.' They trace the origins of this view to Kant's thinking, that our mind's structure and activity contribute fundamentally to the constitution of the world we inhabit. Their claim is that we embody interact with an environment we selectively create and in which we are embedded through the our bodily limitations and opportunities to enact that world. Further they emphasize the essential role of feelings, emotions and affect: since we selectively interact with the world, based on our interests, plans and goals, then evaluation of what we perceive is intrinsic to our cognitive processes. Overall their view is that our enactive cognition implies that we are embedded and embodied in an environment which we enact, and into which we are to a degree extended.

Footnotes

  1. ^ Dave Ward, Mog Stapleton (2012). "Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended". In Fabio Paglieri, ed (ed.). Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 89 ff. ISBN 978-9027213525. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help) On-line version here.
  2. ^ Anthony Dickinson (2008). "Chapter 10: Why a rat is not a beast machine". In Lawrence Weiskrantz, Martin Davies, eds (ed.). Frontiers of consciousness: The Chichele lectures. Oxford University Press. p. 275. ISBN 978-0199233151. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
  3. ^ Francisco J. Varela, Eleanor Rosch, Evan Thompson (1992). The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. MIT Press. ISBN 0262261235.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  4. ^ Susan Hurley (2001). "Perception and action: An alternative view". Synthese. 129: 3–40. Perception and action are not just separate from one another, but also separate from the higher processes of cognition. The mind is a kind of sandwich, and cognition is the filling. Hurley does not support the 'sandwich' view of cognition.


TonyClarke stated the selection of this article was based upon its clarity in stating its position, not that it was definitive. Perhaps Snowded could offer some reasons why including some footnotes has changed the character of this subsection?? Perhaps he can explain why the title: The E′s of enactive cognition, is tendentious, especially as the E′s occur in multiple references (Rowlands being one of them, and Snowded's bulleted list and reference to the E′s in talk page discussion being a recognition of the matter)?? The E′s were chosen by Stapleton and Ward simply because their audience would immediately understand what the E′s are. The subsection's wording makes its nature perfectly clear as a presentation of the views of Stapleton and Ward, IMO. Brews ohare (talk) 17:52, 9 April 2014 (UTC)

I have taken exception to your renaming of the subsection, not to the section for the reasons stated. I left some changes, but ones that implied that the view of these authors represented the field as a whole I changed back to the original text. And please don't clutter up the talk page by replicating material from the article which a diff would handle ----Snowded TALK 18:41, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
I included the text you object to along with the footnotes to make clear what the subject is. You haven't supported your activities, which amount simply to a misguided reaction to misinterpreted material. Brews ohare (talk) 19:22, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
I know Brews, anyone who disagrees with you is misguided or misinterprets you, it must be really difficult ----Snowded TALK 22:58, 9 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: Please fix this itemized list of your mess. Brews ohare (talk) 05:25, 10 April 2014 (UTC)
Your messy use of unnecessary quotes (a diff would have done) and formatting created the problem Brews. Lets see if anyone else engages before any effort is put in. Oh and remember to sign in, I assume the IP met in Reno is you----Snowded TALK 03:29, 10 April 2014 (UTC)

An enactive view of perception

This new section does not make clear what is philosophy and what is psychology. Is it the perspective here that we cannot tell? Brews ohare (talk) 15:11, 14 April 2014 (UTC)

Need to sort out subject

If this article is about enaction, then it is the third of the "E"s that the Rowlands quote identifies at the start. If that is to be the subject matter then we need to radically alter the lede to reflect the final paragraph of the first section Tony inserted. That would also imply articles for each of the other "E"s and also some summary on the post-Descartian approach. So Clark criticises eneaction, but exemplifies embedded and so on. The issue remains how much material exists to justify different approaches. At the moment a coatrack is a distinct possibility with identical material on different articles. My personal preference is to get the master article on post-Descartian approaches done and then sort out the individual ones, but I am more than open to other alternatives. The point is we need an agreed plan. ----Snowded TALK 09:03, 15 April 2014 (UTC)

Instead of adding to this WP:POVFORK, you should consider whether there's anything you want to move/add to either Enaction or Enactivism.—Machine Elf 1735 09:16, 15 April 2014 (UTC)
I think it should go there hence the deletion proposal. But I don't see that going through at the moment. So I have made changes to focus it on the subject ----Snowded TALK 09:20, 15 April 2014 (UTC)

Philosophy?

Well, it focuses on the work of a professor of philosophy; its written in an article that has philosophy in its title; how much more indication do you want that it is philosophical?? Please amend as you see fit to improve it. Not sure that I fully understand your comments Brews, or what you want to change. TonyClarke (talk) 20:09, 14 April 2014 (UTC)

Philosophy and psychology are coming together in this domain anyway so I am not sure we can split. My one concern is that we need somethng which is more of an overview, at the moment we have limited sources. But its a start ----Snowded TALK 20:23, 14 April 2014 (UTC)
Tony, there may be gray areas. However, I'd say questions that are to be settled by lab experiments designed to verify theories of perception are psychology. More abstract questions that are perhaps questions about connections between ideas and connections with the larger questions of epistemology are philosophy. Naturally a philosopher on occasion will mention the prevailing scientific view of the 'facts' as they are presently understood. Bu that is not the philosopher's purpose.
So, I'd suggest that how an animal achieves a 3-D perception of an object is a lab project, not philosophy. However, it is philosophy to suggest that the process involved in gaining a 3-D understanding is an instance of enaction, enaction being the larger epistemological view (entirely beyond all hope of empirical test) that all knowledge involves the interactive aspects seen in this simple example, and that interaction is the sine qua non of acquiring knowledge.
If, in fact, the psychological understanding of 3-D perception is hazy, then the philosopher hasn't got a bona fide example of enaction here, but only an example that, when interpreted in an unverified speculative manner, supports the view of enaction.
How do the sources see it? Brews ohare (talk) 15:07, 15 April 2014 (UTC)
A question that I cannot shake about 3-D perception is the way certain cameras can take a picture using two lenses, and then use this information to focus the image at whatever depth the photographer chooses. It would seem this process allows 3-D perception of an object, but is it an example of enaction? The passive recording of the subject by the camera is not an instance of enaction, but perhaps the photographer's use of the images is? Perhaps the camera designer's idea of multiple lenses is? Brews ohare (talk) 15:26, 15 April 2014 (UTC)

Reversions by Snowded

I don't find Snowded's drastic changes to this article have all been improvements. Much of the language is awkwardly constructed and unsourced, sometimes unintelligible. I have tried to make English out of the introduction, but find it unsatisfactory. Useful contributions (like Stapleton and Ward discussion) by Tony have been removed without Talk page discussion. Brews ohare (talk) 14:54, 15 April 2014 (UTC)

The material from Tony more or less provided the definition so I moved it to the lede with minor alterations. It did mean getting rid of discursive material. Your various derogatory comments are to be expected, but tedious nevertheless ----Snowded TALK 16:29, 15 April 2014 (UTC)