Talk:Europe first

The Forgotten Army

As always its the Forgotten Army! Where is the mention of the limitation on the resources allocated to the Burma campaign (even lower down the pecking order than the Pacific theatres, in particular the cancellation of amphibious operations? -- PBS (talk) 13:56, 1 December 2011 (UTC)

Opinion in opening paragraphs

I would like to propose removing the opinion based view that the US didn't use the Europe first strategy until 1944. Not only is it completely ignorant of the facts ranging from North Africa campaigns, to Sicily, to Italy, and all while maintaining a very hard fought strategic bombing campaign which was significant in reducing the Luftwaffe to a very inexperienced and ineffective force (little known fact is the Luftwaffe had plenty of aircraft throughout the war but not nearly enough of good pilots after the war dragged on and killed their experienced veterans). It also doesn't take into account the battle of the Atlantic which was a huge struggle, nor does it appreciate the buildup of forces in the UK and training that would be necessary to make a European invasion successful. I could continue but I think between the points I made and the fact that input like this makes the credibility of Wikipedia more questionable, I believe its justified to clean up the article of opinions and statements that can't be reasonably concluded from hard facts. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.226.196.247 (talk) 18:05, 24 August 2013 (UTC)

Nobody said that American resources weren't allocated against Europe -- but rather, contrary to Europe First, that the balance of resources was in favor of Japan during the first 2 years of the war. Later in this article, referenced from the official US Army history of WW II, are the following statements supporing that statement.

"American resources allocated to the defeat of Japan initially exceeded those allocated to Europe. In the first six months the U.S. was in the war, the U.S. army deployed more than 300,000 soldiers overseas to the Pacific while less than 100,000 were sent to Europe.[11]

"The inability of the two allies to mount an invasion of German-controlled northern Europe in 1943 permitted the U.S. to maintain more military forces arrayed against Japan than Germany. As late as December 1943, the balance was nearly even. Against Japan, the U.S. had deployed 1,873,023 men, 7,857 aircraft, and 713 warships. Against Germany the totals were 1,810,367 men, 8,807 airplanes, and 515 warships.[12] The military buildup of American forces for the invasion of France in 1944 shifted the balance of American resources toward the European theater and made Europe First a reality."

"The uncritical view that "Europe First" dictated the allocation of resources has caused many scholars to underestimate the American commitment to the war in the Pacific and the resources required to defeat Japan. For example, historian H. P. Willmott stated that the United States "allocated little more than one-quarter of her total war effort to the struggle against Japan."[13] That is an underestimate. According to official U.S. statistics, 70 percent of the U.S. Navy and all the Marine Corps were deployed in the Pacific. Of 7.3 million U.S. army and air force personnel deployed abroad, 2.7 million or 37 percent were deployed to the Pacific.[14]"

If you disagree with the "ignorant" information presented above in official US Army official histories, please justify your opinion by citing references of equal quality. Smallchief (talk 02:16, 25 August 2013 (UTC)

Roosevelt's decision

@Smallchief: Can you expand on the nuances? There are plenty of sources which say Roosevelt overruled Marshall on this point. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]. Whizz40 (talk) 14:27, 27 March 2016 (UTC)

• The statement I deleted said the following: "Rather than delegating his decision, President Roosevelt made many of the major decisions in the early stages of the war including choosing the "Europe first" strategy over the objections of his generals."

• I disagree mildly with the first clause of the above as it implies to me that Roosevelt should have "delegated his decision." I don't agree: It is always -- or should always be -- the President who makes the decision in matters of war and peace and grand strategy. Thus, I don't think it's necessary or desirable to mention "delegating the decision."

• I disagree with the rest of the sentence because Roosevelt didn't make the "Europe First" strategy over the objections of his generals. In fact, after debate and study, a majority of U.S. generals and admirals, including the leaders of the army and navy, Marshall and Stark, endorsed a Europe First policy from among a list of options -- and their adherence to that policy continued even after Pearl Harbor, despite the wishes of the American people who saw Japan as the more immediate (and hated) enemy. Roosevelt accepted the recommendation of the U.S. military for "Europe First"; he didn't force it on them (although "Europe First' was certainly Roosevelt's preferred grand strategy).

• The several occasions in which Roosevelt may have overruled Marshall and the generals should not be confused with the grand strategy of "Europe First" -- which was never seriously called into question by Roosevelt, Marshall, or most other military leaders. The most important policy conflict between Roosevelt and the generals concerned the proposed invasion of North Africa (Torch) in November 1942. Marshall and the US generals opposed the invasion of North Africa because they wanted to invade northern Europe in 1943 and believed correctly that a diversion of resources to North Africa would make a 1943 invasion impossible. Churchill persuaded Roosevelt that a 1943 landing in northern Europe was not feasible and that the US/Britain should attack a peripheral area -- North Africa -- first. So, Roosevelt overruled the his generals and decreed a landing in North Africa. (Incidentally, Roosevelt and Churchill were right. We can discuss that further if you wish.)

• Here's a good summary of the decision making process that led to "Europe First." Note that it was the U.S. military which recommended to Roosevelt a Europe First policy.
• http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2014/04/EDStoler.pdf Smallchief (talk 22:13, 27 March 2016 (UTC)

Thank you for the clarification. The article talks around this without addressing these aspects while the published sources above all discuss Roosevelt and his note to Marshall and the military. Would you agree this is relevant for this article and there is scope for addressing this in an appropriate way within the article? Whizz40 (talk) 07:33, 28 March 2016 (UTC)

More specifically, from the cite you provided and as you described:

by the spring of 1941, both the armed forces and President Franklin D. Roosevelt had agreed to adopt in RAINBOW 5 the fourth option, a “Germany-first” strategy in conjunction with European allies with a strategic defensive against Japan in the Pacific.

From the Roosevelt biography, cite number 5 above:

a defeat on the French coast, Churchill warned, was "the only way in which we could possibly lose this war." Instead, he favored attacking German and Italian forces in North Africa to keep Egypt and the oil fields of the Middle East from falling into enemy hands. American commanders thought invading Africa would be a dangerous, wasteful diversion. Rather than accept the British plan, General Marshall proposed that the United States abandon the Germany-first strategy and go on the offensive in the Pacific. Roosevelt overruled him. A premature attack in the Pacific was exactly what Germany wanted, he wrote; it would only mean the recapture of a "lot of islands," and would do nothing to help the Russians. The proposal was therefore "disapproved." He signed his response "Roosevelt, C. in C."

this is part which I see as missing from the article. Whizz40 (talk) 21:26, 30 March 2016 (UTC)

I have no problem if you want to put in a sentence of two about Marshall, opposed to a military operation in North Africa, suggesting instead that the US take the offensive in the Pacific. However, I don't think the policy disagreement between Marshall and Roosevelt should be in the summary paragraphs as that would give undue weight to an isolated issue.

Let's not cloud the big picture. Marshall and other US military leaders proposed to Roosevelt the Europe First strategy -- and it was affirmed many times by the army, the navy, and Roosevelt and in strategy sessions with the British . Marshall wished to adhere to the Europe First strategy by invading northern Europe in 1943. When Roosevelt turned that proposal down, he proposed instead going on the offensive in the Pacific -- rather than invading North Africa. But Marshall never wavered in his conviction that Germany was the more dangerous enemy and he was frustrated because Roosevelt was delaying a direct confrontation with Germany -- and looking for a way to avoid an invasion of North Africa. (And, by the way, Roosevelt was right.)

It is a canny letter Roosevelt wrote to Marshall, reminding him who was boss and that Germany was the most dangerous enemy -- as Marshall and the other generals had been arguing for years. Smallchief (talk 22:12, 30 March 2016 (UTC)

This make sense to me. Furthermore, if you agree, from the source [7] already in the article, I would suggest adding some words on the following to the lead:

at the famous Christmas 1941 meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in Washington, the decision was formally taken for the "Europe First" strategy, while maintaining a holding action in the Pacific. The Europe First strategy, (embodied in RAINBOW 5) had initially been proposed by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark in 1940 and concurred in by General Marshall.

From the same source, a brief summary on the following could add to the Analysis section (emphasized in bold in the source):

One U.S. Army division was ordered to Australia in February 1942, and in March two additional divisions were sent, one to Australia and one to New Zealand on the request of Prime Minister Churchill so that divisions from those countries could remain in the Middle East. This large deployment to the Pacific actually had the effect of aiding the "Europe First" strategy. The U.S. was taking on the responsibility for defending Australia and New Zealand so that the experienced troops from those countries could remain deployed against German forces.

Finally, unless there is a cite which says this, this sentence from the second section of the article

Thus, the U.S. adherence to the Europe First was, in the early part of the war, more of reassurance to the British ally than it was a policy put into practice.

could better reflect the sense in this source, for example

The Europe First strategy remained in effect throughout the war, however the terms "holding action" and "limited offensive" in the Pacific were subject to various interpretations and modifications of plans by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and at allied leaders conferences. This resulted in considerable competition for resources, particularly in the latter stages of the war as operations were greatly accelerated in both theaters. ... It was however, the strategic situation in the Pacific and the logistics situation which governed our early actions and placed initial primary emphasis on the Pacific.

Whizz40 (talk) 18:49, 31 March 2016 (UTC)

Looks nicely done. You put some work into it. Smallchief (talk 21:35, 4 April 2016 (UTC)

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