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Snowded's blanket reversion

Snowded you have reverted a host of changes you say you agree with because of reservations (unspecified in any way) and without discussion here. Unless you make some attempt at discussion here. I think your changes should be undone. Brews ohare (talk) 14:57, 16 April 2015 (UTC)

You were hasty with your revision, and we now have duplicate text about the dilemma. You also seem to think the mind-body problem and subject-object problem are unrelated to the issue of causal closure, which is unfortunate. And last, you still have not addressed the ambiguities of 'natural law'. Brews ohare (talk) 01:59, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

Remove the duplicate material by all means. Otherwise I have explained my reasoning and I'm not going into it again. ----Snowded ^TALK 04:16, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, nowhere have you "explained" anything. You have stated your personal preference for 'natural law', unsupported by any vestige of argument. You have not addressed at all your removal of links to subject-object problem and mind-body problem and their connection to causal closure. Before you do that you might read this discussion in the Stanford Encyclopedia. Brews ohare (talk) 05:28, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

Please don't assume that Brews does not agree with this is the same as This has not been explained ----Snowded ^TALK 10:58, 17 April 2015 (UTC).

No basis laid for such a trivialization. Links supplied showing three philosophy- related meanings for 'natural law' of which two including the one discussed in Natural law are irrelevant, suggesting clarity is improved by use of "law of nature". You also have not responded to the request for explanation of your causal closure censureship.

I understand that is your opinion Brews and I'm sorry you thought it was mocking. It wasn't; it was just a very direct way of saying that I am not prepared to explain a point again and again and again simply because you disagree or won't compromise. The fact you are now returning to other articles to try and impose changes that were rejected last time round just illustrates the uncompromising and intransigent nature of your interactions with other editors.----Snowded ^TALK 14:59, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: My remarks merely repeat and link to published sources and are the opinions of those cited authors. As you know, these sources matter whether you agree with them or not, and whether I agree with them or not. So get off your fanny and provide sources of your own for comparison and proper summary. And stop with the mud slinging and nonresponses, Brews ohare (talk) 19:48, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

Hard incompatibilism

life is still killing me and i don't have time to even engage in responses to this, but I just noticed that the definition given for hard incompatibilism currently in the lede is incorrect, and i'm not sure when that started.

it currently says that hard incompatibilism is the position that determinism is false and still we don't have free will.

the correct definition is that it's the position that whether or not determinism is true or false, either way we wouldn't have free will.

though there's a sourced quote saying the former position has no adherents, i'm fairly positive the latter position has at least some, since that's what the whole dilemma of determinism is all about (whatever the story is on determinism, either way undermines free will). also those who put forth the Mind Argument (so called by Van Inwagen) are claiming exactly that if determinism were false (which it is) then we could not have free will.

Pfhorrest (talk) 04:33, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

The position you find lacking is sourced and so is its repudiation as lacking advocates. Do you have sources for your modified view of hard incompatibilism and its reception? Brews ohare (talk) 05:33, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

The 'no adherents' was mine and it is well sourced, happy to change if there are some. ----Snowded ^TALK 10:59, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

The cited source says the position we have called "hard incompatibilism" has no adherents and no name. He suggest calling it libertinism. Vesal (talk) 02:49, 18 April 2015 (UTC)

I basically just removed the claim that this is called "hard incompatibilism", which is a position that has notable proponents, such as Derk Pereboom. It seems that the "no free will" position is nowadays more commonly called free will pessimism, skepticism, impossibilism, etc. Vesal (talk) 17:12, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

You may be correct in taking a wider stance on this issue, but I think that actions like this should be supported by inks to specific comments in published sources, not just on what might be called "name dropping" of a reference to Pereboom. Brews ohare (talk) 23:58, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

Laws of science

Brews would you please stop equating the Laws of Science with types of physical constraint. We are dealing with a subject that has a long history in which that term means something different, and even in the current day the question of what is included has some ambiguity. For example is ritual covered by the laws of science? Some at the biological end of Anthropology would argue they do, others that they don't. Also given that change has already been opposed bringing it back in anywhere in the article without agreement is edit warring. ----Snowded ^TALK 15:23, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: the definitions of physical determinism and nomological determinism were taken from hose articles and are not opinions of mine. If you prefer, I will source these definitions. In any event, it is clear that physical and nomological determinism differ. The use of "physical determinism (nomological determinism)" could be construed as saying they are different names for the same thing. That would be incorrect, so it is better to separate them. Brews ohare (talk) 15:32, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

The fact that one source discussing a problem uses a particular verbal construct does not justify making it an absolute statement. That is why we go to third party reviews of the field as a whole when we are doing that. You are far too particular in your choice of sources and use of them to make definitive statements. I've made this point a hundred times (as have several other editors both directly and in RfCs) and until I consent on the talk page I'm not accepting that type of change. ----Snowded ^TALK 15:59, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, I'm lost. Your reversion is concerned with nomological cf. physical determinism. The Oxford Dictionary suggests nomological is the broader term, including physical as an example. Your comment seems to be about some other point not the subject of your reversion. What is the issue? Brews ohare (talk) 16:13, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

And I've suggested a way out of the woods for you too many times to repeat myself. Read the aspect I criticised in my first comment. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:22, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded - if you cannot identify the topic here, how can we proceed? Is it about these two definitions or something else? If something else, what has your reversion of these definitions got to do with what you wish to assert? Please clarify the subject here. Brews ohare (talk) 16:26, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

See multiple previous comments----Snowded ^TALK 16:37, 19 April 2015 (UTC)

A useful reply consists of a "yes" or a "no", just one word to answer if the issue here is to settle the difference between nomological and physical determinism. If this is the issue, The Oxford Dictionary settles the matter: nomological determinism is the broader term and includes physical determinism. If this is not the issue, I propose to reinstate this difference as explained in the text you removed simply because this distinction is the entire meaning and purpose of the removed text. Brews ohare (talk)

It does appear from your initial words to me to stop conflating 'laws of science' with 'physical constraints' has nothing to do with your reversion, leading me to think you made this reversion without reading what you reverted. Brews ohare (talk) 01:14, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

If you restore it with the conflation I will revert Brews. You are not the arbitration of truth here. Neither am I obliged to keep repeating myself ----Snowded ^TALK 03:03, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

The only conflation occurring here is the conflation of nomological with physical determinism that I am trying to avoid by providing the Oxford Dictionary definition that shows 'nomological' to be a broader term than 'physical' determination. You have not opposed this view, and you have identified no other "conflation" so you seem to have nothing at all to say here. Brews ohare (talk) 05:04, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

See OPENING STATEMENT in this thread "Brews would you please stop equating the Laws of Science with types of physical constraint" ----Snowded ^TALK 07:28, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

Already responded to just above-your reversion is unrelated to "equating laws of science and physical constraints". It deals instead with the Oxford Dictionary definition of 'nomological' as a broader term than 'physical' . You appear to confuse these separate matters. Brews ohare (talk) 14:01, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm open to you separating issues with different edits over a longer period But with your policy on putting together controversial and non-controversial edits together with a reference form which makes it difficult to change, there is little alternative but to revert. I made the reasons for my reversion clear. ----Snowded ^TALK 03:27, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

You are speaking in generalities, but what we face here is a narrow specific edit explaining 'nomological' cf 'physical' determinism. No grand themes of multiple edits and standard forms of citation you dislike. Brews ohare (talk) 05:19, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

I don't dislike the citation form Brews, I think its excellent for stable text. But it is a real pain for other editors who have less time that you when the article is being actively edited. What it means in practice is that you are more likely to face a mass revert than a revision. ----Snowded ^TALK 10:37, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

Which is related how to the topic of "nomological" versus "physical" determinism? I'll rewrite this discussion to provide more detail and more sources. You could contribute as well, you know. Your role as arm-chair film director is not all that you could do, Brews ohare (talk) 16:20, 22 April 2015 (UTC)

Nomological, physical determinism, causal closure, laws of nature

Snowded: these topics are not treated the same way by all authors. Some treat nomological and physical determinism as synonyms, some distinguish between them. Some take causal closure as indisputable, others as extrapolation at best. The ideas are clear, but he terminology is not. Perhaps we should tackle these topics on the basis of the conceptions involved, and we can then agree on some mutually acceptable labeling? Brews ohare (talk) 15:35, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

Here is a possible starting point. Brews ohare (talk) 16:04, 20 April 2015 (UTC)

You can't synthesis different sources, you need a source that does the synthesis ----Snowded ^TALK 03:26, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: I now see that your idea of "synthesis" does not refer to WP:OR, that is, you do not refer to a WP editor making an unsupported claim. Rather, you refer to presenting sourced opinion from multiple secondary sources. So, if source A says a and source B says ~a, you would reject a WP sentence that says "There is a difference of opinion on this subject, for example, A says a and B says ~a. "

I am guessing that you object on the grounds that there may be other sources, other views, not discussed by A or B and worthy of mention. In other words, such a sentence might suffer from a lack of breadth or from WP:UNDUE. That could be the case. However, WP attempts to correct such situations by having various WP contributors contribute additional sourced opinions over time, eventually converging upon a balanced presentation that compensates for the ignorance or impetuous choices of a few.

I think you do not subscribe to this evolutionary process. That is why you want to reject all such contributions, unless they express the views of a select few sources you have annointed.

WP is designed around a cooperative process that involves many over a long time. You need more faith in such collaboration and in the constructive comparison of sources. Try it out, please. Brews ohare (talk) 05:07, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

Wikipedia does not allow synthesis Brews. If you want to have an evolutionary approach then discuss on the talk page and reach agreement as to what should be included before directly editing the article based on your particular perspective. Several editors have point out over the last two years that you have a particular take on the subject so you need to be more aware of that ----Snowded ^TALK 10:35, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, you have reintroduced the term "synthesis", which in terms of WP policy is defined by WP:OR and refers to including a WP editor's personal opinion unsupported by citations to reliable sources instead of following WP:SECONDARY. Your notion of "synthesis" as you outline it here has nothing to do with following WP:SECONDARY. Your idea of "synthesis" is any contribution that has not reached talk page agreement with you, whether it fits WP:SECONDARY or not. Obviously talk page agreement is desirable. But it is reached by editors making comparisons of sources, not by diatribe, but by all participants using WP:SECONDARY.

You exhibit a huge reluctance to engage this way in talk page discussion. Most of your commentary makes no attempt at improving proposed text using sources, but instead complains using abstractions and generalities unrelated to specifics, and without introducing links to a single source to widen or to deepen discussion. Thus avoiding "synthesis" as you understand it becomes, not agreement about what the literature has to say, but merely agreement with Snowded.

I hoped my invitation in this thread might be an opportunity to collaborate. Brews ohare (talk) 13:05, 21 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm not interested in having discussions about your particular perspective on the subject Brews. if you want that go and study the subject at a University or find a study group. Out business here is to create a encyclopaedia. You are also getting pretty tedious on the accusations. Can I remind you that on multiple RfCs in the past you were not supported by other members of the community and I'm not the one with a major topic ban from ArbCom ----Snowded ^TALK 02:55, 22 April 2015 (UTC)

I am surprised that you would indicate such indifference to WP procedures, and dress that up as a well justified pique over my "general behavior". I think we could work together on this article in the fashion I outlined based upon presenting sourced and cited opinion. However, it is your view that any sources I present are inadequate, simply by virtue of being found by me, and there is no point in your presenting any sources of your own because I'd never understand them anyway. Well, that attitude can lead nowhere. Brews ohare (talk) 07:36, 22 April 2015 (UTC)

Brews, you have consistently refused requests to agree things on the talk page first. You also have this bad habit either mistaking or misunderstanding views that contradict your own. Synthesis is well defined in Wikipedia and the issue is your use of sources. ----Snowded ^TALK 10:12, 22 April 2015 (UTC)

An odd response, completely avoiding my reply about process, and returning to your theme of saying that I won't accept views other than my own and misuse sources. I guess I have to repeat that I present only sourced opinion, whether I agree with it or not, while you rarely use sources at all, and present your visceral reactions unsupported, mostly without specifics about improvements in presentation. Of course, if I cherry picked sources, then you could counter with sources known to you. Instead, you prefer this kind of personality assassination that has nothing to do with explaining with what sources say. A practical method is to follow WP:SECONDARY, with both of us identifying and summarizing published sources. There is no room there for personal opinion or cherry picking. Nor, I add, is there room in such a source-based process for arbitrary reversion of sourced material supported by glib one-line Edit Summaries that provide no clue as to how statements could be amended to be a more accurate portrayal of sourced opinion, but assert a self-annointed authority to adjudicate. Brews ohare (talk)

You present your selection of sourced opinion and you do not respond to suggestions which would make it easier to work with you. There is no requirement if you have 5 cherry picked sources for me to find another 5 and pepper the article with them. Our objective is not to synthesis a selection of material but to use third party sources. Either way, the Oxford Handbook on Free Will and also the one on Causation have just arrived at home so I am going to take a look at the material in those and see if we can salvage something here. For the moment jet lag is catching up with me ----Snowded ^TALK 19:39, 23 April 2015 (UTC)

Your jet lag will not improve your analytical talents, so it is good to wait for recovery. Your claim that sources are "cherry-picked' is just your personal bias until you provide alternative sources that have different views. If you do that, the proper course is to add these alternate views to the WP text so as to satisfy WP:NPOV, not to argue over who cherry-picked what. Presenting the opinion of a variety of sources, despite your own personal definition, does not constitute "synthesis" as it is defined by WP:SYN. It is the correct process according to WP:SECONDARY. And as for your choice of "third-party" sources, the Oxford Handbook on Free Will and on Causation, they are not WP third-party sources (A third-party source is one that is entirely independent of the subject being covered) as all the articles are written by single authors actively involved in the philosophical issues they report upon. They are secondary sources as described by WP:SECONDARY. Brews ohare (talk) 16:27, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

What a mess

What a rambling mess this article is. Compare it with the comparatively tidy SEP article. It's also unnecessarily complicated, if we take the view that Wikipedia is for a general audience, perhaps people from the age of 15 upwards, to your own grandparents. 'Nomological determinism' is mentioned throughout without any attempt to explain it (I know the theory is that you can click on the article it is linked to, but that makes it read very badly). Many of the sections are just lists of opinions held by philosophers.

Also interesting that logical determinism has no article about it, although there is the Problem of future contingents (whose introduction I wrote years ago).

The talk page above gives me a headache. Can anything be salvaged? Peter Damian (talk) 18:49, 23 April 2015 (UTC)

Nothing would please me more than if someone ignored the talk page (which is making no progress) and took a fresh look at it ----Snowded ^TALK 19:27, 23 April 2015 (UTC)

The term 'nomological determinism:' has a variety of meanings ranging from a general definition indistinguishable from determinism:

Given the state of the world at one time and various "laws of nature" (which may include laws beyond physical laws), there is only one possible way the world could be at other times

to physical determinism:

All physical events have physical causes, and are determined by antecedent physical events. Of course, a "physical event" is pretty vague, and might be limited to oscilloscope traces generated by a hadron collider.. :-)

So the upshot for free will is that you cannot discuss verbal morass surrounding 'freedom' until you set up the "determinism" from which the will is free. It seems likely that an approach based upon this summary could be more understandable and shorter than the present hodgepodge, which is a result largely of the variety of usages of terms leading to constant confusion about who is talking about what. A Tower of Babel. Here is one forlorn attempt to untangle it, and here is another. Brews ohare (talk) 15:50, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

'Physical event' is completely vague. What if scientists discover a different kind of matter or substance or force that turns out to be the basis of free will? What is the point of the different types of determinism? Start with a single definition that covers them all. Peter Damian (talk) 19:46, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

Featured article

I found the article in its featured article state, December 2004. It is better than the current version. Peter Damian (talk) 07:22, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Thats an interesting proposition, I'm open to it ----Snowded ^TALK 07:31, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Well I didn't actually make a proposition, only an observation. Peter Damian (talk) 07:32, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

It's could be a good idea. Create a sandpit and invite those editors with some knowledge of the subject to help put, use that as a start and then create something that can be put to a RfA here ----Snowded ^TALK 08:11, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

OK I will think about it. The problem as always is time. I have about four nearly finished papers to polish and send off, and Wikipedia is a form of displacement activity. Free will is an interesting problem. Peter Damian (talk) 08:14, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

I'd agree that 2004 edition has a lot to recommend it, at least as far as clearly stating the main issues. As with many WP articles, it has been a downhill run since that time. Brews ohare (talk) 15:54, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Recent reversal by Snowded

In this edit with the one-line edit summary:

"I don;t by 'appears' and 'inescapable' as other than an opinion and stringing together references is no way to edit an article (per previous exchanges with multiple editors)"

that invokes non-existent exchanges with other editors over this new material, Snowded reverted the following text, a modification of a paragraph previously existing:

It appears difficult to reconcile the intuition that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical laws.¹ An inescapable contradiction between the intuition of free will and the scientific view arises with nomological determinism,^{2, 3} the doctrine that all events are determined by antecedent causes.^{3, 4} The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law is less clear when causal closure and physical determinism both are asserted. Causal closure is usually limited to the physical domain, and states that if a physical event has a cause, that is a physical cause.⁵ The assertion of physical determinism is that every physical event has a physical cause, and therefore asserts that there are no uncaused physical events.⁵ Belief in these two tenets does not logically exclude the possibility that there may be events and entities that lie outside the physical domain.⁶

As an example of phenomena that possibly could lie outside the physical domain, ...

Sources

¹ Max Velmans (2002). "How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 9 (11): 2–29.

² Steven W Horst (2011). "§7.5 Nomological determinism". Laws, Mind, and Free Will. MIT Press. pp. 97 ff. ISBN 9780262015257.

³ Stathis Paillos (2007). "Past and contemporary perspectives on explanation". In Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard, John Woods, Theo A.F. Kuipers, eds (ed.). General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. Elsevier. p. 156. ISBN 9780080548548. According to determinism, every event that occurs has a fully determinate and sufficient set of antecedence causes. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)

⁴ There is a lack of consensus on terminology regarding 'nomological determinism'. Some authors equate 'physical determinism' with 'nomological determinism', and some equate 'nomological determinism' to determinism itself. Where the term 'nomological determinism' is distinguished from 'physical determinism', 'nomological determinism' is taken to be the broader claim. See Brian Doyle (2011). Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy. I-Phi Press. p. 149. ISBN 9780983580263. and "'nomological'". Oxford Dictionary. Retrieved April 23, 2015.

⁵ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. pp. 15–16. ISBN 9781400840847. The causal closure of the physical domain. If a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t

⁶ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. pp. 15–16. ISBN 9781400840847. It is plain that physical casual closure...does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is

Comment

• Of course, the selected works might be improperly presented, but Snowded has not suggested that is the case or in what way that might be true. It also could be that there are other views that should be presented, but Snowded has not provided any sources that should be added to make the presentation more representative of published opinion. I invite him to provide some actual reasoning behind his action, preferably based upon sources. Brews ohare (talk) 00:03, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

• You (i) changed the language to your own perspective on the problem and (ii) created a long list of references to further add commentary rather than to support the text. If you check back a year when you last attempted to do this over 4/5 Philosophy articles, that approach was rejected in several RFAs ----Snowded ^TALK 05:13, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, not a single specific piece of text you object to nor a single source you claim is misrepresented or irrelevant to the presentation. Just primping and window dressing, Snowded, nothing of substance in your comments. Brews ohare (talk) 05:19, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

• Response to Snowded's vague assertions of fault:

The current text preferred by Snowded states:

"It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical law.¹ The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect)."

Snowded's charges are that the proposal

(i) changed the language to your own perspective on the problem. The perspective has indeed changed, although it is not my own perspective but those of the additional sources cited. The current text fails to distinguish between nomological determinism and physical determinism. As the proposal points out, some authors do not distinguish between the two, but many do distinguish, and where a distinction is made (see Kim), 'nomological' is seen as a broader claim including all events, while 'physical' is confined to physical events.

(ii) created a long list of references to further add commentary rather than to support the text. Additional references have indeed been added in the proposal. However these are not 'commentary' unrelated to supporting the text. The only 'commentary' is footnote 4 that points out differences in usage for the term 'nomological' and cites Doyle and the Oxford Dictionary to the effect that there is a difference according to some authors.

Reference [1] is in the current text and is retained.

Reference [2] is to the discussion of nomological determinism by Horst. Among other matters he quotes Vihvelin to the effect that one cannot have all encompassing laws and yet allow free actions by human beings. This discussion of Horst supports the view that nomological determinism in the broad sense of including all events is incompatible with free will, as asserted in the sentence to which this citation is attached.

Reference [3] is to a definition of determinism which is as quoted.

Reference [4] as discussed already points out some differences in usage for 'nomological determinism'

Reference [5] is to Kim, a very influential writer in this area, and serves to support the stated meanings for 'causal closure' and 'physical determinism' as limiting their claims to physical events, leaving open the possibility of other kinds of events. This is a key point, not made in the current paragraph. According to Kim (p. 16) "It is plain that physical casual closure...does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is"

As these reference by reference explanations show, Snowded's claims about "my own perspective" and "references added to allow commentary" are groundless.

If Snowded finds these explanations deficient in some way I suggest that he provide more detailed objections to these sources and the 'nomological' vs 'physical' determinism distinction. Brews ohare (talk) 14:46, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

By the way, the WP articles nomological determinism and physical determinism do make a distinction. Brews ohare (talk) 15:04, 24 April 2015 (UTC)

The issue is not that you have found references by google searches Brews but the questions raised (here and elsewhere over various articles and repeatedly as you do't address them) are (i) is your selection partial and (ii) is your interpretation or use of what you have found valid. Otherwise references are there to justify the next not to provide additional reading or commentary ----Snowded ^TALK 07:30, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm still not up to speed with the issue here. When I looked at additions by Brews, they were all strictly correct, although sometimes poorly worded, but they tended to introduce material that was not relevant to the true focus of the article. I think every article should have a subject, addressed at the right level of scope and granularity, but this article has at least 10 subjects, addressed in all kinds of different ways. Is that the issue? I have also engaged with Brews on this page (see below) and he sometimes seems to miss the point. Peter Damian (talk) 07:35, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

The "issue" here is to use sources to construct a presentation of published opinion. Instead, the discussion loses all focus upon presentation of sourced opinion on this topic. Instead of pitching in with the process envisioned by WP:SECONDARY and WP:NPOV, useful construction of a presentation satisfying WP:SECONDARY and WP:NPOV is replaced by off-the cuff pronouncements and reversions, which diversions do avoid doing any reading or exploring for additional sources, and do allow entertainment to triumph over progress. Brews ohare (talk) 14:15, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

I have rewritten the proposal and put it back into the main article. I think the revision will avoid the objections raised, vague though they are. Brews ohare (talk) 16:53, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Bob Doyle (inventor)

Brews links above to Bob Doyle (2011). Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy. Bob Doyle is Bob Doyle (inventor), most of which article was written by an account called Cmsreview, who has written an entire walled garden around this stuff. See e.g. Two-stage model of free will, which surprisingly Doyle himself has written about on his own website. I would of course be blocked in two seconds if I suggested that Bob Doyle is behind that account (unless Doyle is also Grant Shapps of course), but this is the problem with Wikipedia. Peter Damian (talk) 08:15, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Also Brews has a tendency to use sources from Physics on Philosophy articles. We had that with him trying to use Hawkins at one point. The problem is understanding the nature and origin of the source and its relevance. I agree with your suggestion (elsewhere) that some form of peer review is going to have to be the next stage of evolution here. ----Snowded ^TALK 08:19, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

The notion of "peer review" (at least in the scholarly sense) is alien to WP, which denies appeal to personal expertise and forces all authority upon published sources. Self-appointed "experts" are just pontificators in this scenario. The process envisioned in the policies of WP are summarized in WP:SECONDARY coupled with WP:NPOV. It consists of WP editors contributing presentations of what secondary sources say with links to them, and balance being maintained by a continuing process of constructive addition of sources or more careful presentation of sources already presented. Brews ohare (talk) 15:27, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

That was the interpretation you tried to have accepted Brews, it was not. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:39, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Correction: It was deemed so obvious to all that no change in policy to further emphasize it was thought necessary. Brews ohare (talk) 18:47, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Tendentious editing

At issue (at least as I understand it) is Brews' insistence on using a melange of citations from primary sources, to advance a novel presentation without citations or references to other, secondary sources supporting this presentation. This runs afoul of Wikipedia policies of No Original Research and avoidance of Synthesis. Despite this being pointed out to him repeatedly (mostly but by no means exclusively by User:Snowded) the process has become completely mired in edits, reversions, accusations, accusations of bad faith and general battleground mentality (see the talk page discussions of any of the articles listed for ample examples). This also leads to forum shopping and canvassing with seemingly endless RFCs and petitions on policy pages (Wikipedia_talk:NOR#Explaining_rejections.3F), project pages (Wikipedia_talk:WikiProject_Philosophy) and various users' talk pages to bring others to Brews' d way of thinking, almost always to no avail. Then the whole cycle starts again on another article. ANI April 2014

That agrees with my very brief assessment of the situation. I haven't encountered Brews before (to my knowledge), though I have heard of him (the Speed of Light arbitration case). I was asked by user Snowded to look at this article, I have read as much of the talk page as I can bear, and I have looked at some of Brews contributions. My view is precisely as characterised above, namely the use of citations to advance a novel presentation etc. Peter Damian (talk) 09:14, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

It is a difficult situation, however. I haven't found yet any cases where Brews adds something that is unequivocally incorrect. But here is a good example. Snowded reverts with the comment that the original was much clearer (I agree) and that the "Quintessence paragraph adds nothing just confuses". I broadly agree, and this is also the problem with the article here – the additions are not incorrect, but they tend to complicate the article. Again, our first duty is to the readers, not the editors. Peter Damian (talk) 09:38, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

It is annoying that you opine Snowded's reversion of this material removed a contribution that is "unequivocally incorrect" without explaining how it misrepresents the sources cited in its support. (That was not Snowded's claim BTW.) A tendency toward unsupported assertion is hard to quell, but try we must. Your phrase describing my efforts as "namely the use of citations to advance a novel presentation" is an oxymoron, as WP:SYN and WP:OR refer to a WP editor's introduction of personal opinion, not an editor's attempt to present what sources say. Although I am sure error is possible in my efforts to do this, the way forward is not to accuse me of some agenda, but to improve the presentation to make portrayal of the source more accurate or, if necessary, to introduce additional sources that make the presentation closer to a neutral point of view. Brews ohare (talk) 14:41, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

As for ANI's claim that I use primary sources "to advance a novel presentation without citations or references to other, secondary sources supporting this presentation", this is pure nonsense as secondary sources are used aplenty and there is no "novel agenda". These statements float in the aether, without any substance. They also are a misdirection from the objective of this Talk page of assessing content of this article Free will. Brews ohare (talk)

It was not incorrect. I said I hadn't found any instances of incorrectness. I then gave an example of the actual problem. "the additions are not incorrect, but they tend to complicate the article". Sorry for the misunderstanding.Peter Damian (talk) 16:51, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

Much as I am intrigued by the article, I think I shall bow out and leave Snowded to it. I have four papers to finish, as I said, and life is too short. Peter Damian (talk) 17:48, 25 April 2015 (UTC)

The basic problem is that Brews is enthusiastically writing essays based on reading the results of google searches on the subject. That is not what writing an encyclopaedia is about. If I look at the Oxford handbook on Free Will - which I now have at home - the selections made by Brews come from articles advocating or explaining a particular perspective on the problem but are used to support a statement about the field as a whole. In the edits I had to revert this morning a list of different perspectives on free will is used by Brews to draw the conclusion that there is no agreement on definitions, something that the source does not support. That is Brews conclusion which may or may not be valid. But its not the way Wikipedia is written. Unless and until Brew's gets his head around WP:OR and WP:SYNTH we are going to have these problems. The trouble is, from his attempts on policy pages, that he doesn't really agree with those policies as commonly understood. Again that is legitimate point of view, but he needs to change the policies before he edits articles against those policies ----Snowded ^TALK 05:20, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

I see your jet lag has passed, but there is no increased interest in supporting your peculiar stance with sources. That there is a wide difference among authors on the usage of 'nomological determinism' is perfectly obvious, and is not limited to the sources cited. Even the minimal effort needed to read Doyle's separate definitions of 'nomological' and 'physical' determinism seems to be beyond your interest or capacity at the moment. As for finding authors that equate the two, just make a simple Google book search. Brews ohare (talk) 05:32, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Nothing is obvious unless it is referenced Brews. Find a third party source which says there is a wider spread disagreement and fine. Making "simple Good book seaches" is part of the problem here, not the solution. ----Snowded ^TALK 05:40, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

The text you support lumps physical determinism and nomological determinism together, despite the distinctions drawn (and sourced) in the WP articles on these separate topics. Here are two links that also confound the two: "Physical determinism is generally used synonymously with nomological determinism". "The thesis of physical (or causal or nomological) determinism fits very closely with the kinds of physicalism that we studied.." Other authors equate nomological determinism to determinism itself (for instance, Viv\hvelin in the SEP). Doyle and many other authors carefully distinguish the two. You have nothing to complain about here, you are mistaken, and additionally have made no substantial criticisms or contributions toward clarification. Brews ohare (talk) 05:59, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Happy to talk about that aspect here Brews, but its one aspect of a series of changes you made. Starting with 'Nomological" rather than the current more accessible text is also a mistake. Drafting something that just makes that distinction and agreeing it here would be the best way forward. For example the idea that nomological determinism encompasses physical determinism but is not encompassed by it is an interest proposition implied by Doyle, but the very title of Doyle's book indicates controversy. At the same time "nomological" does not appear in the index of the Oxford handbook on Free will or The Oxford Companion to Philosophy both make use of Nomic but do not make the distinction you are making in your edit. So we need to be careful there to avoid synthesis of current debates ----Snowded ^TALK 06:21, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

I'm still having a little trouble in understanding the exact disagreement. Brews says there is a distinction between nomological and physical determinism. Fine, I don't think there will be any disagreement in that. The question for me is whether that distinction is a very fine-grained one, too fine to belong in a general 'flagship' article on the subject. The problem then is that there are no Wikipedia guidelines, AFAIK, about what a flagship article looks like. My instinct is that subtle or fine distinctions do not belong in general introductions to a subject, particularly if they don't really contribute towards understanding the subject. My view on the nomological/physical distinction is that it doesn't contribute. Therefore it hinders understanding. Therefore leave it out (but perhaps mention it in a footnote). Peter Damian (talk) 07:39, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

On Snow's point about looking at other general introductions (such as the Oxford Companion, which I referred to), that is a good rule. Few of the introductory texts I have looked at mention the distinction at all. Peter Damian (talk) 07:41, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Yep, that was my point. Without some reference in something like the Oxford Companion it is difficult to avoid synthesis and difficult to prove relevance. Per your other comments I also agree that the problem is not that Brews does not reference his material, but that he chooses to advance a particular thesis by his choice of primary sources. Now it can, in some circumstances be legitimate to provide some summary of that, but if contested the nature of the summary and sources used should be agreed on the talk page before the page is edited. And in all cases contested edits should not be inserted again simply because their author is unhappy with the response they have received on the talk page. ----Snowded ^TALK 08:10, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Opposition to the proposed paragraph appears to be that nomological determinism is not mentioned in the index of The Oxford Handbook on Free Will or The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, and therefore is inconsequential or a "subtle point" and irrelevant to this article on Free will. I am unimpressed with the due diligence exhibited here regarding usage of this term, which is taken by Vihvelin to be the exemplar of the word "determinism" in his Arguments for Compatibilism. He says (lead sentence of §1) "In the literature, “determinism” is sometimes used as an umbrella term for a variety of different claims which have traditionally been regarded as threats to free will. Given this usage, the thesis that I am calling “determinism” (nomological determinism) is just one of several different kinds of determinism, and the free will/determinism problem we will be discussing is one of a family of related problems." [Bold font is mine]. According to Schreuder, p.50 "Nomological determinism is the most common form of causal determinism." Horst, pp. 97-100 devotes an entire subsection to nomological determinism. Griffith, p. 19 says: "Others...talk about determinism in terms of laws of nature (nomological determinism — ‘nomological’ refers to the natural laws — or just determinism." Doyle, p. 149, whom Snowded and Damian pooh-pooh, has a section: The Determinisms containing a lexicon of varieties, in which nomological determinism is defined as "a broad term to cover determinism by laws, of nature, of human nature, etc." According to Snowded, Doyle, and by implication this definition, is controversial, but it fits the definition of 'nomological' provided by the Oxford Dictionary and the references just linked.

My conclusion? The term nomological determinism is used in many discussions about free will. Sometimes it is taken to be sufficiently broad as to represent determinism in general, and both nomological determinism and determinism in general have a subdivision called physical determinism.

This belaboring of a point would be unnecessary if the real objective of critics here was to depict the literature, rather than indulge in a purely rhetorical exercise.

These critics suggest that whatever else might be said, 'nomological determinism' is not very important to the subject of free will. To be pertinent here, this statement has to be viewed as a commentary upon the literature of free will. Historically, nomological determinism has been the huge focus of free will arguments through Hobbes, Hume, Laplace and so on. One may ask if it is so important in today's arguments, and I'd suggest that it is not, that physical determinism and the arguments over causal closure are the main thrust today. Assuming the critics might entertain this possibility, the importance of nomological determinism to this free will article is to help the reader understand that emphasis has shifted.

One consequence of this shift is Kim's point, p. 16 (referenced and quoted in detail in the reverted paragraph) that there is a logical out for free will with this formulation, namely that it limits itself to "physical events" (whatever they might be), and free will logically could lie outside this purview. See also Hutto, p. 89. In fact a great many modern thinkers including Wittgenstein, Nagel and Evans, adopt this viewpoint, which is a major aspect of any discussion of free will. See, as just one example, Smart on The mind/brain identity theory that processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain, basically a closure argument, and Freeman's extended discussion. Hence the importance of this distinction.

I would appreciate some attempt on the part of Snowded and Damian to help construct an accurate article and desist from polemics unrelated to any positive change. Brews ohare (talk) 14:31, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

If you can't keep a civil tongue in your mouth don't expect engagement ----Snowded ^TALK 17:49, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

So far, I have seen no engagement beyond rhetoric, put-downs, and polemics. No presentation of a source, not an idea for improved presentation, not a thing. Brews ohare (talk) 18:53, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

And just how many editors have you had this problem with today Brews? Should tell you something. Either way the comment stands. You have the clear view of several editors that your overall approach breaks WP:SYNTH so you either change policy or change your approach ----Snowded ^TALK 18:59, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Care to point out what aspect of WP:SYN is involved here? It deals with presenting unsupported WP editor's opinion. which is not at stake here at all, where secondary sources are summarized. Period. Brews ohare (talk) 19:27, 26 April 2015 (UTC).

I have many times, Damian just has, Pforest has in the past, other editors have in your previous failed RfAs. Sorry Brews there are a limited number of times anyone can reasonably be expected to repeat themselves ----Snowded ^TALK 19:31, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

These are imaginary events, Snowded. Will you ever get around to discussing the point here, the role of nomological determinism and its relation to physical determinism? So far you are in support of no distinction, which at best is a minority view, inconsistent with the views of at least half a dozed linked sources. Brews ohare (talk) 19:32, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Well a lot of us have had to spend a lot of time dealing with your imaginary events. Otherwise see above comments, this one is closed unless you have NEW arguments or other editors engage ----Snowded ^TALK 19:35, 26 April 2015 (UTC)

Adherents to nondeterministic and no free will

The entry cites one article for an assertion that there are no adherents to the position that there is no free will and that the universe is nondeterministic, but Kevin Timpe seems to suggest there are. Hackwrench (talk) 16:38, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

What this article says about this is:

"It is possible that one is an incompatibilist, thinks that the actual world is not deterministic, and yet still thinks that agents in the actual world do not have free will. While it is less clear what to call such a position (perhaps "free will deniers"), it illustrates that hard determinism and libertarianism do not exhaust the ways to be an incompatibilist."

This statement is not an assertion that there are adherents of this position, only that it is a possible position, which is not a contradiction of what the text says at the moment. Brews ohare (talk) 17:20, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

Revisiting the role of moral responsibility

In a recent edit, Snowded removed the following simple statement about the importance of 'moral responsibility' to the subject of 'free will':

"Some philosophers consider the main reason for interest in free will to be the moral aspects, which impact everyday attitudes and the law, as well as philosophy:^1,2,3

¹ Timothy O'Connor (October 29, 2010). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Free Will". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2002 Edition). Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. Acting with free will, on such views, is just to satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one's action. {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)

² McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin (February 25, 2015). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Compatibilism: §1.1 Free will". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition). For the most part, what philosophers working on this issue have been hunting for is a feature of agency that is necessary for persons to be morally responsible for their conduct. {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

³ David K. Chan (2008). "Note 7". Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 221. ISBN 9781402068720. The primary motivation of most scholars...is the the perceived threat to moral responsibility and agency.

Snowded's justification for removing this sentence is the one line Edit Summary: "I'm sure they do, and some don't. The moral aspect is already well covered."

The superficial comment "some do, some don't" simply ignores the history of the subject of "free will" from the historic article by William James to the modern treatment of McKenna & Coates, both of which make moral responsibility the basis for their entire discussion.

Let's examine what Snowded thinks constitutes "well covered".

The current version of Free will addresses 'moral responsibility' in a short paragraph under Free will#In Western philosophy:

"The puzzle of reconciling 'free will' with a deterministic universe is known as the problem of free will or sometimes referred to as the dilemma of determinism.[21] This dilemma leads to a moral dilemma as well: How are we to assign responsibility for our actions if they are caused entirely by past events?[22][23]"

The remainder of the "coverage" consists of a sentence or so buried as asides in later paragraphs on other topics. The relegation of 'moral responsibility' to a few footnotes and asides is hardly adequate coverage of moral responsibility, considered by many philosophers to be the main reason for the widespread interest in the topic of free will, and probably a primary reason for any readership of this article. Brews ohare (talk) 13:35, 29 April 2015 (UTC)

Apparently, no comment is to be expected about the lack of emphasis upon moral responsibility that forms such a strong thread through the history of 'free will'. I therefore propose reinsertion of the deleted sentence indicating this emphasis. Brews ohare (talk) 14:31, 1 May 2015 (UTC)

I have inserted the above reference to the view that moral responsibility is an important aspect of free will, but shortened by stripping out the quotations that make clear the sources do address this point directly. I don't think this insertion is debatable. Brews ohare (talk) 16:54, 1 May 2015 (UTC)

The added sentence is:

"Some philosophers consider the main interest in free will to stem from the moral aspects, which impact everyday attitudes and the law, as well as philosophy."¹

Note

¹ Timothy O'Connor (October 29, 2010). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). "Free Will". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2002 Edition).; McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin (February 25, 2015). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). "Compatibilism: §1.1 Free will". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition).{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link); David K. Chan (2008). "Note 7". Moral Psychology Today: Essays on Values, Rational Choice, and the Will. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 221. ISBN 9781402068720.

Despite the innocuous nature of this addition, Snowded has removed it several times. It may be noted that the connection between free will and moral responsibility extends over two millennia beginning before Chrysippus and Plutarch. Brews ohare (talk) 15:08, 2 May 2015 (UTC)

RfC: Distinguishing 'nomological' from 'physical' determinism

Comments are invited upon changing the third paragraph in Free will#In Western philosophy to more correctly separate the different roles played by the metaphysical doctrines of nomological determinism and physical determinism. Most importantly, the paragraph is expanded to incorporate Kim's view: "It is plain that physical casual closure...does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is." A possible replacement is proposed for comment. Brews ohare (talk) 00:58, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

Current paragraph

The paragraph that currently appears in the article Free will is as follows:

It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical law.¹ The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism (nomological determinism) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect).

Sources

¹ Max Velmans (2002). "How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 9 (11): 2–29.

Comment on current paragraph

There are several difficulties with the current paragraph that should be fixed.

One is the use of the parenthetic construction physical determinism(nomological determinism). The parenthetic addition of ('nomological determinism') is likely to be interpreted to mean that physical and nomological determinism are two names for the same thing. Although a few authors do not trouble to distinguish the two and take the definition of physical determinism as also being the definition of nomological determinism, that lack of distinction is not the general view of the literature on these subjects. A separation also is the reason for two WP articles instead of one: nomological determinism and physical determinism. The general view is that nomological determinism is a broader claim (including many sorts of 'events' and many sorts of possible 'laws').

It might be thought that this confusion of terms is not important to the topic of free will, but that is not the case, and leads to another important problem with the current paragraph. That is the confusion introduced by stating that a conflict arises between intuitively felt freedom and natural law when either physical determinism or causal closure are adopted. Although such conflict is obvious if nomological determinism is invoked because it encompasses everything, with physical determinism that statement is an exaggeration. The two concepts of 'physical determinism' and 'causal closure' apply only to physical events and an intuition of free will quite possibly (according to some authors anyway) is not such an event. And the two concepts have to be applied jointly, not individually.

Still another problem with this paragraph is the claim that with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). That is not the claim of the metaphysical doctrine of physical determinism, which limits its claims to only physical events, not all events, and secondly does not claim the past dictates the future, but only that physical events past or present are connected by physical laws. These laws may or may not be deterministic, depending upon which laws we are thinking about and what is known about physical laws in the epoch we live in.

However, the most significant difficulty with the current paragraph is that it omits note of the self-imposed limitation of the metaphysical doctrine of physical determinism to the physical domain, which opens way to the many modern discussions of what might lie outside this domain, in particular the ambiguities of the subject-object problem and their effect upon the metaphysics of free will.

Recommendation

The suggestion of the RfC is that this paragraph be rewritten to avoid its present failings. As a trial balloon the following paragraph is proposed:

Nomological determinism often is taken to be the "notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws",¹ or the doctrine that all events are determined by antecedent causes.² Other definitions are used,³ but if these particular formulations are used, then a contradiction is present between concepts describing our intuition of free will and nomological determinism.^{4, 5} Although it may appear difficult to reconcile the intuition that conscious decisions are causally effective with the scientific view that the physical world can be explained to operate perfectly by physical laws,⁶ a conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law is less clear when, instead of nomological determinism, causal closure and physical determinism both are asserted. Causal closure is usually limited to the physical domain, and states that if a physical event has a cause, that is a physical cause.⁷ The assertion of physical determinism is that every physical event does have a physical cause, and therefore asserts that there are no uncaused physical events.⁸ Belief in these two tenets does not logically exclude the possibility that there may be events and entities that lie outside the physical domain.⁹

As an example of phenomena that possibly could lie outside the physical domain, the laws of physics (deterministic or not) have yet to resolve the hard problem of consciousness:¹⁰

Sources

¹ Duco A. Schreuder (2014). Vision and Visual Perception. Archway Publishing. p. 505. ISBN 9781480812949.

² Stathis Paillos (2007). Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard, John Woods, Theo A.F. Kuipers, eds (ed.). General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. Elsevier. p. 156. ISBN 9780080548548. According to determinism, every event that occurs has a fully determinate and sufficient set of antecedence causes. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)

³ There is a lack of consensus on terminology regarding 'nomological determinism'. Some authors equate 'physical determinism' with 'nomological determinism', and some equate 'nomological determinism' to determinism itself. Where the term 'nomological determinism' is distinguished from 'physical determinism', 'nomological determinism' is taken to be the broader claim. See Brian DOyle (2011). Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy. I-Phi Press. p. 149. ISBN 9780983580263. and "'nomological'". Oxford Dictionary. Retrieved April 23, 2015.

⁴ Jack Martin, Jeff H. Sugarman, Sarah Hickinbottom (2009). Persons: Understanding Psychological Selfhood and Agency. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 20. ISBN 9781441910653. Traditionally, at least at the extremes, philosophical arguments concerning agency are predicated on a strict contradiction between free choice and complete causal determinism.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

⁵ Steven W Horst (2011). "§7.5 Nomological determinism". Laws, Mind, and Free Will. MIT Press. pp. 97 ff. ISBN 9780262015257.

⁶Max Velmans (2002). "How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 9 (11): 2–29.

⁷ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. p. 15. ISBN 9781400840847. The causal closure of the physical domain. If a physical event has a cause at t, then it has a physical cause at t

⁸ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness - Note 8". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. p. 16. ISBN 9781400840847. The thesis of physical determinism to the effect that every physical event has a physical cause

⁹ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. pp. 15–16. ISBN 9781400840847. It is plain that physical casual closure...does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is

¹⁰ See Josh Weisberg. "The hard problem of consciousness". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. or Robert Van Gulick (Jan 14, 2014). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). "Consciousness: §9.9 Non-physical theories". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition).

Brews ohare (talk) 00:58, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

The last sentence above is not part of the trial balloon. It's just a segue to the next paragraph already present in the current article that briefly describes the hard problem of consciousness as an example of one discussion of what lies outside physical determinism.

NOTE THE TEXT OF THIS RFC WAS AMENDED BY THE CALLING EDITOR FOLLOWING INITIAL COMMENTS

Comments

• This paragraph is just a starting point, but it does correct the problems of the current paragraph. It also provides a reader with some sources for further reading. Changes or alternatives are invited. Brews ohare (talk) 00:58, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded, can you address the problems with the current paragraph beyond adding to these problems your view that "nomological determinism" has no place in the discussion of free will? Your suggestion that the sources of the proposed paragraph are not WP:SECONDARY sources appears to me to apply (or not apply) equally to your preferred single-author expositions invited to appear in compilations by single editors, all parties with established philosophical positions. Brews ohare (talk) 12:38, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

• • You;ve called an RfC on that specific addition Brews, against the advice of two/three editors involved. I'm more than happy to have a discussion about what should be included in the lede and have offered that before. But rather than make such an agreement then draft you seem determined to draft and then challenge others to produce an alternative. My previous offer remains open, its up to you if you take it up or not. ----Snowded ^TALK 15:36, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: I have not grasped what seems to me to be distinctions without a difference. Here I have proposed a replacement paragraph for discussion. That discussion is open to you. You can propose different sources, different wording, or different content. I'd appreciate that proposed changes in content be source based, and not simply your own opinion (however well-based that may be upon your personal expertise). But why not go ahead and participate, help this paragraph evolve toward a cogent presentation? This is not an escalation of earlier battles, but a challenge to progress. Brews ohare (talk) 15:45, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

• • • • You have called an RfC because your disagree with the view of other editors on the nomological issue. Those opposed to you say that its lack of mention in the main third party sources means that it is not relevant here. An RfC is to resolve an issue, if you want other editors to engage more generally then ask at the notice boards. I've offered a way forward on rewriting the lede but you rejected it. Your call, no one can compel you. But calling an RfC requires the RfC to resolve that issue. ----Snowded ^TALK 07:15, 28 April 2015 (UTC)
• See my comments (as well as those of another editor) in the section Tendentious Editing above. In particular "At the same time "nomological" does not appear in the index of the Oxford Handbook on Free will or The Oxford Companion to Philosophy both make use of Gnomic but do not make the distinction you are making in your edit." Brews is choosing material he finds interesting from primary sources rather than reflecting secondary ones ----Snowded ^TALK 04:45, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

The RfC is not about disagreement at all - it is about obtaining participation. You opted out, as I understood the situation. Also the RfC is not about the lede at all, it is about the third paragraph in the subsection Free will#In Western philosophy. Your objection to distinguishing between two types of determinism is to say 'nomological' determinism is irrelevant to free will. Yet, the paragraph you reinstated includes 'nomological' determinism in a mistaken manner. In addition, you have arrived at this belief by ignoring cited discussions that do use this term, such as The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Horst, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Doyle and others. But the biggest issue, that of the role of 'physical' determinism as explained by Kim remains outside your attention.

I don't understand why you cannot address these matters more carefully. Brews ohare (talk) 13:19, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

You consume too much time to too little purpose Brews. The RfC is about getting other editors to help resolve an issue, that issue is stated in the text and editors comment. Its not the way to obtain general participation in the wider aspects of the article. Nothing in my comment here references the lede, it does make it clear the objection to your proposed text and that is all that is needed. I haven't opted out of the article, I have opted out of constantly repeating the same points to an editor who either chooses not to listen, or simply finds disagreement impossible to handle. I suspect both ----Snowded ^TALK 15:23, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

Snowded: Your remarks are a reflex reaction patently wide of the mark. You have as yet never addressed even one of the issues raised with the current paragraph, never mind the proposed solution to them. As for never discussing the lede, you seem to have forgotten your immediately preceding remark that I've offered a way forward on rewriting the lede but you rejected it. Snowded, you are simply absentmindedly obstructionist. Please put your thoughts in gear and make some specific recommendations instead of vague maunderings. Brews ohare (talk) 15:38, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

To help structure a specific response the issues are as follows:

1. The parenthetic construction ‘physical determinism (nomological determinism)’ that seems to imply they are synonyms.

2. The confused treatment of what is only potential controversy between free will and the combination of physical determinism and causal closure

3. The confused idea of what physical determinism and causal closure mean.

4. The failure to draw attention to discussions of what could lie outside the physical domain, which leads naturally to the following paragraph on the hard problem of consciousness, presently just dangling in space.

Brews ohare (talk) 16:03, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

• Brews ohare, once again, I appreciate your high level contributions to Wikipedia.

I agree that the paragraph needs rewriting to bring its level down to the readership and to clarify its content.

Most forms of determinism are rooted in either unwarranted generalizations of Newtonian and other limited, deterministic physical theories, or in theistic rationalization of an ideal world. Neither of these varieties have more than a possible or probable logical connection to actual events.

Based on these biases, I opine that all references to either psychological or to subjective first person (Protagorean) views be excluded. You have plenty of other references to support either God given lawful (yeah, I know), or physical law based determinism. BlueMist (talk) 15:03, 27 April 2015 (UTC)

BlueMist: My thinking is that psychological and first-person views are the ones most important. For example, William James opined that any "theory" that doesn't support moral responsibility is incorrect right from the gate: "determinism... violates my sense of morality through and through." Unfortunately discussion of moral responsibility has largely been lost from the article. Kim, Evans, Nagel all point out that the ambiguities of the subject-object problem are behind the problems in grappling with free will. Here is a statement of the connection. Brews ohare (talk) 13:43, 28 April 2015 (UTC)

• As has been the case in the past, there is no interest from the Philosophy Project participants in maintenance of philosophy articles, even those articles like 'free will' that rank among the most famous and published-upon topics of philosophy. That apathy is demonstrated on most academic subjects found on WP and is an indicator of the gradual demise of activity here beyond celebrity tabloid coverage. Brews ohare (talk) 14:37, 1 May 2015 (UTC)
• Anticipating no further developments, I have inserted the following abbreviated amplification of the nomological-physical differences:

"It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with the view that the world can be explained to operate perfectly by natural laws.¹ A conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural laws arises when nomological determinism is asserted.² Such a contradiction is more open to debate if causal closure and physical determinism are asserted, because these doctrines self-limit themselves to the domain of the physical. With causal closure, every cause of a physical event is a physical cause, and physical determinism states that there are no uncaused physical events. That leaves open the possibility of events and causes that lie outside the physical domain, in particular, certain subjective events.³

Sources

¹ Max Velmans (2002). "How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?". Journal of Consciousness Studies. 9 (11): 2–29.

² Nomological determinism often is taken to be the "notion that the past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws":Duco A. Schreuder (2014). Vision and Visual Perception. Archway Publishing. p. 505. ISBN 9781480812949. Others adopt the definition that "every event that occurs has a fully determinate and sufficient set of antecedent causes": Stathis Paillos (2007). "§16: Statistical explanation". In Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard, John Woods, Theo A.F. Kuipers, eds (ed.). General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. Elsevier. p. 156. ISBN 9780080548548. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link) Still other definitions sometimes are used.

³ Jaegwon Kim (2007). "Chapter 1: Mental causation and consciousness". Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. pp. 15–16. ISBN 9781400840847. It is plain that physical casual closure...does not say that physical events and entities are all that there are in this world, or that physical causation is all the causation that there is

Brews ohare (talk)

Despite the noncontroversial nature of this paragraph, and despite its advantages in correcting misinformation in the paragraph it replaces, Snowded remains implacable in insisting upon its removal, although he has yet to provide any specific opposition, such as claiming some specific sentence is inaccurate, biased, misleading, or whatever. Brews ohare (talk) 15:29, 2 May 2015 (UTC)