Talk:Hambantota International Port

Page name

Hello. I've moved the article back to "Hambantota Harbour" from "Port of Hambantota" for two reasons:

• The reference within the article uses "Hambantota Harbour"
• Google has 113,000 hits for "Hambantota Harbour", and 31,100 hits for "Port of Hambantota".

Please consider discussing before attempting another move. Thanks. Rehman⁽⁺⁾ 02:04, 10 March 2010 (UTC)

The official name the SLPA is using is "Port of Hambantota". That's also the name used by industry sources [1] --snowolfD4 ^{( talk / @ )} 13:43, 10 March 2010 (UTC)

You have to understand that moving it back after placing the above notice merely two hours before, does not act as a consensus to move it back as you did here. Although i do not agree with this action, i will assume good faith and leave this to you. But i do have to ask you to avoid such behaviour in the future. Hope you understand. Rehman⁽⁺⁾ 15:37, 10 March 2010 (UTC)

Name of the port

Several articles refer the name of the Hambantota port as "Magam Ruhunupura Mahinda Rajapaksa (MRMR) International Port at Hambantota" — Preceding unsigned comment added by Sajeewashaluka (talk • contribs) 14:24, 15 June 2012 (UTC)

External links modified

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hambantota port

Hambantota International Port Group (PVT) LTD. name as the hambantota port — Preceding unsigned comment added by 122.255.36.26 (talk) 11:58, 3 February 2020 (UTC)

Debt-trap

@Kautilya3:, as the article stands I sense a lack of NPOV

• Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong are extremely reputed academics even though they have been accused by some of pro-China POV. Their investigation is suitable for inclusion.
• So is a working paper for Chatham House by two faculties of the Queen Mary University of London.
• Ditto for the investigations of Deborah Bräutigam, one of the most distinguished political scientists of America. TrangaBellam (talk) 13:14, 13 July 2021 (UTC)

There is more here than meets the eye. Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong are indeed the initiators of this "myth busting" project and the other scholars are basically repeating their analysis or adding their voice to it. All of this happened during the Trump Administration's high-pitched rhetoric about China.

The basic position seems to be that the sanitised account books submitted to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange represent a higher truth than the random leaks from Sri Lankan officials that the newspapers reported on. I am not sure of that. Finance is fungible and you can make it look how you want it to look. The account books do not directly reveal anything. Michael Maray (citation 8) wrote in 2016 that the Sri Lankan government was paid $1.12 bn, which was the same amount owed by Sri Lanka to the Chinese bank. Is that true or not?

These scholars are undermining their own credibility by claiming, "everything you heard is a myth; here is the real truth". Come on! We weren't born yesterday. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:49, 13 July 2021 (UTC)

Here is a scholarly analysis that predates the Barry Sautman-Yan Hairong project, which is much more balanced.

• Carrai, Maria Adele (2019), "China's Malleable Sovereignty along the Belt and Road Initiative: The Case of the 99-Year Chinese Lease of Hambantota Port", N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics, 51 (4): 1061–1100 – via Hein Online

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:53, 13 July 2021 (UTC)

sanitised account books submitted to the HKSE represent a higher truth than the random leaks from Sri Lankan officials that the newspapers reported, No. The folks you classify as "mythbusters" weren't merely exploring (falsifiable) archives. The sources enlisted by me had interviewed multiple sources within (and around) the top echelons of Sri-Lanka government alongside statements of ministers in Parliament etc:

The central bank’s deputy governor reportedly stated, ‘from 2019 onwards, several international and domestic sovereign bonds are set to mature and this is a problem’. The deputy governor noted that ‘[t]he additional Chinese money […] will help us manage our short-term liabilities [and] help the Central Bank manage its foreign reserves’ (Imtiaz, 2017). Based on interviews with Sri Lankan policymakers, including the Central Bank governor and his predecessor, Sautman and Yan (2019b) conclude that the CMPort investment was ‘not used to repay port-related debt, but to pay off more expensive loans, generally to Western entities’.

Moreover, the loans obtained [from China] to construct [Hambantota] port were not written off and the government is still committed to loan repayments as per the original agreements. [Letter from the Finance Ministry’s External Resources Department to Sri Lanka’s parliament, plus personal confirmation from the department’s director-general.] In July 2018, Minister of Ports and Shipping Samarasinghe confirmed that the debt obligation still existed, but had been shifted from the SLPA to the Treasury, enabling the SLPA to report higher profits – as required by the IMF bailout.

Abi-Habib wishes to portray CMP bargaining for another 15,000 acres site around the port as a particularly egregious example of China's ways. But every scholar who had studied CMP notes such a business-model to have been the backbone of its operations, since long back. They have been vigorously followed both inside (generating much discontent) and outside of China. It was nothing unique for SL to be subject to such an offer. Similarly, they had taken 49/99/199 year leases even in countries like France, England and Australia. I do not intend to whitewash the ingrained neo-capitalist exploitation evident across all these deals but in today's world, it is far from sinister.

The most inexplicable part of this dispute is why would SL government pursue negotiating Chinese loans with so much zeal, when they accounted for a mere 10-20% of hanging foreign debt? Abi-Habib and others skip this factor-of-motivation. I had read Carrai (2019), who is not very impressive and mostly a series of speculations. No engagement with Bräutigam, which is very concerning. Even she agrees that unless more documents are public, it is entirely unclear whether China drove SL into a debt-trap or played the first card in ensuring an eventual loss of sovereignty. At least two of her future-fears (p.1094-95) seem have been proved wrong in the short-term.

This is a case of both kind of sources engaging in roughly similar reporting. But, we are choosing one because it suits our prejudices. I am not proposing that Mari-Habib's source be purged out or that our article state outright about the hullabaloo not making sense. Just that both of the sides find their rightful place. If you have sources that explicitly reject my three sources (and a 2021 Elgar volume supporting such an interpretation), I am all ears. TrangaBellam (talk) 17:33, 13 July 2021 (UTC)

To be honest, Wikipedia might be better served with a restriction on articles covering any geopolitical phenomenon within the past 25 years. Until enough water flows under the river and the archives open up, relevant scholarship is mostly about making the most convincing speculation while keeping true to own POV. TrangaBellam (talk) 17:54, 13 July 2021 (UTC)

China paid back the cash equivalent of the debt in return for the lease on the port. That is the significant part of the transaction. How Sri Lanka uses that money is not our concern and it doesn't affect anything. So scholars are wrong to harp on that issue as if it is some big deal. ("Debt-to-equity swap", as a non-cash transaction. makes a difference in commercial deals because it enables some account gimmicry, but it is a non-issue when sovereign countries are involved.)

Why did Sri Lanka do it? Because it was hurting for money and the port was losing money. It was an "economic dud" as Abi-Habib reported. There was no way that Sri Lanka could make it work. But for China it is a different ball game. Much of its own shipping could use that port. And China has the staying power to pump money until the port becomes profitable. So, economically it is the right thing to do. And if it was a private company doing it, nobody would have batted an eye lid.

All the concerns arise because it is a sovereign country taking control of it. China gets a base, a home away from home, which it can use for lots of things. Why exactly did China terminate all of India's trade agencies in Tibet after it took it over? If such bases are supposed to be innocuous, they should have been continued.

Did China drive Sri Lanka into a debt trap? Yes and no. Sri Lanka was already in a debt trap before the Hambantota project was started. No bank and no sane country would have loaned money for a new investment at that stage. But China did. Was it incompetence or malice? You can take your pick. It doesn't matter to me. It doesn't matter to China either. China sees these deals as "win win". It thinks that it is a superior model of financing to that of IMF. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:50, 13 July 2021 (UTC)

This is quite agreeable.

But, then why are you emphasizing that Wikipedia present debt-trap narratives as some absolute truth?

The narrative has two integral components, which you contradict by yourself. That (1) China has been intentionally pursuing such operations to wield more global power [Was it incompetence or malice? You can take your pick. It doesn't matter to me] and (2) China is responsible for throwing these countries off the rails. [Sri Lanka was already in a debt trap before the Hambantota project]

Also, Brautigam has a monograph on Chinese investments in Africa. She shows how China's policies have been largely inconsistent. They have accrued severe losses in multiple cases and finally backed up, despite having enough leverage to extract significant advantages at the cost of host nation. The case-study of Angola is part. interesting. TrangaBellam (talk) 11:19, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

That China is intentionally pursuing such operations to wield global power is obvious. Whether it intentionally made a bad loan is not known. But the fact that it was bad loan is obvious too because Sri Lanka had no ability to repay. Even to continue the port running, it had to borrow more money. In fact, it was already mired in so much debt before this loan that it couldn't even use this money to repay this loan. It had other loans which were even worse and it need to take care of those first. It is laughable to claim that it wasn't a bad loan. I see the scholars engaging in pure gimmicry that defies all logic.

Whenever anybody makes any loan, they are supposed to check your income and expenditure, all outstanding loans and loan repayments to make sure that you have the ability to repay. If any scholar has evidence that China had done its due diligence and things went sour due to circumstances outside everybody's control, let them provide it. Harping on whether it was an "intentional" bad loan or "unintentional" bad loan is entirely pointless.

No, we are not allowed to critique the scholars. Neither are we obliged to reproduce all their nonsense. As I asked, what are the facts that they are bringing to the table? Let us look at those first. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:19, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

These loans can prob. be deemed as bad - intentional or unintentional. How economically bad, depends on whether the controversial RFI was used or not and other factors of security. (Brautigam, Huang, and Acker - 2020) notes Chinese banks’ "project-by-project" analysis may have disregarded the overall debt risk in borrower countries. But, Africa (across the pol. spectrum) has been steadfast that without such loans there won't be any infrastructural development in decades to come. Even Chellaney accepts that Chinese loans have been only used to establish critical infrastructure. (Usman, 2021) note that Chinese loans to Africa has rapidly plummeted in the last few years and is lower than the US volumes from 2018 onward. (Brautigam, and Acker - 2021) notes that countries which entered into re-negotiations (which were on quite amicable terms) or had poor finances were no more offered any loan since 2019/20.

Neither are we obliged to reproduce all their nonsense. I disagree, and will incorporate their version. You can revert but we will be taking the RfC way out. TrangaBellam (talk) 14:00, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

@Kautilya3 Carrai seem to have changed stances: see this (2021). TrangaBellam (talk) 14:09, 6 February 2022 (UTC

I don't think she changed her stance. In the old article also she said it was "complex", which meant she was contesting it, though not as blatantly as here. The old article is valuable because it is a proper research article and compled various facts that are useful. The new article is a pure opinion piece. She is entitled to her opinion of course, but the three factors she mentions as to why it is not "debt-trap" are laughable. They make no difference to anything. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:46, 6 February 2022 (UTC)

The island’s tourism-dependent economy has been hammered by the pandemic and its depleted foreign exchange reserves have led to food rationing at supermarkets and shortages of essential goods.[2]

Weren't we told that the money from the sale of the port was being used to strengthen Sri Lanka's foreign exchange reserves? It looks like that game is over already. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:31, 6 February 2022 (UTC)

I think your understanding of "debt-trap" differs from how the term is used by most of the media and academic literature. To you, it boils down to China issuing loans without much diligence thereby putting host-economies at additional peril: nothing more and nothing less. This model of "reckless lending" is supported by (Brautigam, Huang, and Acker; 2020), (Carrai 2022) and most of the debt-trap "mythbusters".

I agree with this but as Usman (2021) and other show, many other countries including USA have engaged in equally dubious lending. Despite, that is no defense against Chinese policies.

However, the term has been used by Chellaney as well as popular media (esp. conservative leaning) to suggest that China is playing some kind of 3-D chess wherein they recolonize the third world by plunging them into dire straits and seize control of strategic assets. Most of the opposition to the debt-trap narrative opposes these extrapolations:

“China is moving away from this high-volume, high-risk paradigm into one where deals are struck on their own merit, at a smaller and more manageable scale than before,” a forthcoming analysis of China’s lending to Africa by Chatham House, a UK think-tank, will say.

[...]

Experts say that some of the concerns over clauses in Chinese contracts are overblown. An immunity waiver, for example, is a standard component of comparable loans made by western governments and agencies. Most experts also dismiss as a myth accusations about China’s supposed intention to entrap borrowers in order to gain control of ports or airports. “We did not find much evidence of physical infrastructure assets being put up as collateral,” says Bradley Parks, executive director of AidData, a research unit at William & Mary University and co-author of two recent studies on Chinese lending.
— Hille, Kathrin; Pilling, David (2022-01-11). "China applies brakes to Africa lending". Financial Times.

I need to read more on Sri Lanka's current situation before offering comments. TrangaBellam (talk) 11:33, 7 February 2022 (UTC)

I don't think "reckless lending" can be easily disentagled from srategic gaming. Africa and Asia cannot be equated in this regard, especially not Sri Lanka and other South Asian countries. But it looks like all the hue and cry that has been raised about Hambantota has forced China to step back. It has now allowed Sri Lanka to borrow from India. And India managed to get its own concessions too in the process.[3] -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:31, 7 February 2022 (UTC)

All Ponzi schemes must end some time:

Sri Lanka’s financial crisis stems from a critical shortfall of foreign currency, leaving traders unable to finance imports.
— Sri Lanka deploys troops as fuel shortage sparks protests, Al Jazeera, 22 March 2022.

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:59, 24 March 2022 (UTC)

This year, Sri Lanka has to repay $7bn in foreign debt even though it does not have the foreign exchange to import milk powder. Of this debt, about 10% is owed to China.
— Sri Lanka: 50 injured as protesters try to storm president’s house amid economic crisis, The Guardian, 1 April 2022

A state of emergency has been declared.[4] -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:26, 1 April 2022 (UTC)

"Deliberately"

Ajit Singh writes:

The notion of debt-trap diplomacy was coined by Indian pundit Brahma Chellaney (2017), whose argument can be summarised as follows: China uses finance to deliberately ensnare developing countries by extending unsustainable loans which recipients struggle to repay. These loans ‘are often intended not to support the local economy’, and it is ‘better for China that the projects don’t do well. After all, the heavier the debt on smaller countries, the greater China’s own leverage becomes’.

But Chellany never used the word "deliberately". The quoted phrases are correct, but the paraphrases are not.

As I said above, it doesn't matter whether it was deliberate or not. If China incompetently lends to non-creditworthy borrowers or carelessly lends, it doesn't matter. The effect on the debtor countries is just the same. They are stuck in a debt trap that they can't get out of. And I am pretty sure that Chellany understands it just the way I do.

But for these nay-sayers it matters. In fact, it is the crux of their argument. Brautigam writes:

This paper explores this meme, Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’, the claim that China deliberately seeks to entrap countries in a web of debt to secure some kind of strategic advantage or an asset of some kind.

The New York Times (2018) characterized this as ‘China got Sri Lanka to cough up a port’. Is there evidence that China planned matters in this way? Did China deliberately set a debt trap? Was this an asset seizure for non-payment?

And then she argues that there is 'no evidence' (the standard 'no evidence' strawman). In political science, matters are rarely decided based on evidence. It is well-known that evidence won't be available. Political actors are not in the business of dropping evidence for cagey analysts to pick up. They are as secretive as they can possibly be.

But by her own standards, Brautigam needs to provide evidence that there was no deliberate intent in order to brand it a "lie". Does she have it? Of course not. Her own analysis is just as much theorising as Chellany's. In fact, she rarely bothers to critique Chellany at all. He is too small a fry to worry about. He just generated a "meme", which somehow caught on. That is all he deserves credit for!

I don't really see any factual, unattributable statements that can be sourced to these papers. If you find any, please feel to bring them up. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:46, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

That is lawyerly nit-picking. A. Singh has interpreted it quite correctly. In all interviews, Chellaney has been saying that China is trying to re-colonize the world via debt trap diplomacy, their actions need to be scrutinized etc.

You say that Chellaney is simply highlighting the fact about China giving rubbish loans to already debt-ridden countries. Have you checked when was the last time IMF and others loaned to these countries? What were the amounts? CARI produces voluminous data and analysis on African economics, which is very helpful.

We, as editors, cannot critique peer-reviewed sources (by highly reputed scholars) to influence article content. If you find scholars who explicitly reject Brautigam/Singh/Sautman, I will read them. I suspect it will be a hard find. TrangaBellam (talk) 11:19, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

The lawyerly nit-picking is coming from your sources, not me. If somebody has said China made a deliberate bad loan without evidence, please feel free to cite those and point out that there is no evidence, while keeping in mind that "no evidence" doesn't necessarily mean that it is false. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:23, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

None of this should be compared to the IMF because IMF is pegged as the "lender of last resort" and, for that reason, is empowered to dish out pain in order to get the countries of their debt cycles. Ordinary countries do not have the ability to do so. All they can do is to accept or reject loans. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:51, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

On the day of the handover, China’s official news agency tweeted triumphantly, “Another milestone along path of #BeltandRoad.”[5]

So they don't see a bad loan at all. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:10, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

References

• Anyways, I will be rewriting this article in the next few days before I take a year-long break. TrangaBellam (talk) 19:49, 18 July 2021 (UTC)

Lead sentence

TrangaBellam, I am not sure why the lease information has been cut out from the lead sentence. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:45, 20 July 2021 (UTC)

"Give" or "lease" out 70 percent stake?

@Kautilya3 @Pieceofmetalwork @TrangaBellam

In spirit of WP:CONACHIEVE, I should give a fair chance to properly discuss on Talk before taking this issue further and you guys kinda seem to be the usual recent editors on this topic here. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:MobileDiff/1033377053

I disagree with the recent edit that changed the words "leased out" to "give" as that edit implies that 70 percent of the port's stake was given away forever. Which is not the case.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:MobileDiff/1033265454

I believe that the 70 percent stake of the Sri Lankan port, is being "leased" and not permanently "given" away forever. And that it was not wrong for me to write in full detail that Sri Lanka was "leasing out 70% of the stake to China Merchants Port for 99 years for $1.12 billion".

The Diplomat Article says the same in those similar words:

Instead, a 70 percent stake of the port was leased to China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited (CM Port) for 99 years for $1.12 billion.

https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-hambantota-port-deal-myths-and-realities/

So my edit was well sourced.

All stake held by China are only agreed to be valid for 99 years maximum. If it's not permanent, it's a lease. So The Diplomat wasn't wrong. And I read the summary of the agreement.

(after 99 years), those stakes will all return to Sri Lanka one way or the other. Hence it's not at all ownership but synonymous to (leasing) of those stakes. Whoever owns stock in the port business typically gets rights, stuff, share of profits and a voice on how the port will be managed,etc But Sri Lanka ultimately set a deadline for how long the Chinese can hold these stock.

After 99 years of effective date all the shares of CMPort and affiliated companies should be transferred to SLPA at a rate of USD 01

https://www.lankabusinessonline.com/parliament-adjourns-without-debating-hambantota-port-deal/

You typically own stock forever when you buy it. If you are mandated to give it back after a period of time. Despite paying money. It's literally termed a lease by any definition.

And why I believe the sentence must be Reverted back to the original edit that said the stake was leased. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:MobileDiff/1033298639

Nvtuil (talk) 13:18, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

The port has been leased out to a joint venture company for 99 years. CM Ports has 70 percent stake in that joint venture company. It is incorrect language to say that stake has been "leased out". "Stake" means a percentage ownership in a company.

What will happen at the end of 99 years is anybody's guess. Theoretically, the port reverts to the Sri Lankan government and the joint venture company might get dissolved. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:31, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

No, it says fairly clearly. A 70 percent stake (of the port) was being leased out to that chinese company.

NOT 70 percent of a chinese company which is absurd and your own weak misreading. Also old sources were grossly misleading as it was common back then to get facts wrong.

The updated diplomat article was crystal clear on this as well.

a 70 percent stake of the port was leased to China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited (CM Port) for 99 years for $1.12 billion.

https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/the-hambantota-port-deal-myths-and-realities/ Nvtuil (talk) 13:44, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

• @Kautilya3: See this report. Hambantota is a strange case where everybody disagrees with every other person. Ministers of the same govt. disagree publicly, signatories of relevant deals disagree publicly, and (quite obv.) political parties do. What a mess. TrangaBellam (talk) 14:05, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

I have multiple sources stating that the port was leased out to CM Ports by itself. Not the joint venture company and no mention of stake in the lease. These deals are complicated and authoritative sources need to be followed. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:48, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

My response was to your's What will happen at the end of 99 years. Obviously, 70% lease out is meaningless. TrangaBellam (talk) 15:03, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

The Diplomat is an authoritative source and they were very clear on this. Your edit is misleading to readers as they would think the 70 percent stake is forever. It's not and so should accurately be worded as "leased". The 70 percent stake was only for a period of time - 99 years. The stake basically means "rights" in which the joint company follows for 99 years. What did you think happens after the lease expires? That the Chinese forever owns this 70 percent stake of the port? If that was actually true, the media would say Sri Lanka sold 70 percent of rights of the port to China forever. And there will no mention of a lease of 99 years. But they didn't. 70 percent stake ultimately has an expiration date and valid for 99 years. So The Diplomat, an authoritative sources was correct about this.Nvtuil (talk) 15:22, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

No, The Diplomat is a WP:NEWSORG and this is an opinion column. By no means "authoritative". The author is said to be an economist. So it is a reasonably good source, but these deals are complicated and information is not easily available. So we can't take anything at face value. I have now cited a journal source that directly described what the agreement said. According to it, the port was leased to CMPort in full. There were no "stakes" involved. This corroborates BBC. (The stakes are involved in the operating companies. There are two of them, one of which is named in the lead paragraph.) -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:22, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

Cannot help but see the double irony that you gave me an outdated source with the author being (Maria Adele Carrai). And then claim that her journal piece is the "authoritative" source. You do realise that she is the very same author who last month strongly rejects the narrative of debt trap Diplomacy of that port and I already even gave you her article only a few hours ago, which she had explained in decent clear details, that the the rights (stakes) over the port are indeed (divided) between the two (stakeholders) of CMPort and the Sri Lankan government. She seemed pretty certain of that but you obviously didn't bother to read it or notice who the author is. 😂

https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/06/05/questioning-the-debt-trap-diplomacy-rhetoric-surrounding-hambantota-port/

So you recognized her as an expert when it suits you. But what about now in her very recent article? Is she no longer an expert lmao? And also why is BBC more reliable than the Diplomat? They are both reputed news sources with journalists. And nonetheless, that BBC article clearly stated: "In a move to ease those concerns, the Sri Lankan government announced a revised deal to cut the Chinese firm's stake to 70%.". Meaning the Chinese firm will indeed have their stake of the port cut to 70%. So not just the Diplomat is saying that. The BBC also mentions "Stakes" too. All 3 sources including your author are saying the rights are divided yet you are just clinging to excuses without giving any sources to completely back you up. But using flawed reasoning and then absurdly smearing the Diplomat as an unreliable source because you dislike what they write. 18:38, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

References

Debt-equity swap

@Kautilya3 Also forgot to point out that there is no reason given by you to revert my edits stating on what the Sri Lankan gov had used that $1.12 billion for and what not for. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:MobileDiff/1033299910 It's historically relevant in this article, to state what that money was really being used for and what it is not used for. It wasn't to pay off the Chinese debts as often alleged and even the official statements itself say that the "port owed by the Sri Lankan government to China were separate from the Concessional Agreement of the port". Given how often people claim that the payment of the lease was to directly pay off bad Chinese debts. There should be a minimal mention here that it wasn't to pay off overwhelming Chinese debts as so frequently alleged. And hence, my edit should stay given both the (relevance and factuality).

However, according to new official statements, the Agreement was not a debt/equity swap arrangement where Sri Lanka leased the territory for ninety-nine years to China as a way to pay off its debt. In 2019, Sri Lankan officials declared that the loan agreements for the port owed by the Sri Lankan government to China were separate from the Concessional Agreement of the port. It was declared that the debt owed to China for the construction of the port was simply transferred out of the books of the Sri Lanka Port Authority and taken over by the Sri Lankan Treasury.

https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/06/05/questioning-the-debt-trap-diplomacy-rhetoric-surrounding-hambantota-port/ Nvtuil (talk) 14:38, 14 July 2021 (UTC)

Belt and Road Initiative, debt trap diplomacy

I just watched a documentary stating this port was a prime example of debt trap diplomacy in the Belt and Road Initiative, but the article doesn't touch much on this. Any reason why? Was my documentary biased? Or are there some sources and text we could add to this article about that? –Novem Linguae (talk) 10:05, 1 September 2021 (UTC)