Talk:Israeli Special Forces' Operations in 2006
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Delete this article
editI think that this article should be deleted. Or be expanded to cover all IDF special forces operations in the war, including the Baalbak and Tyre operations. I am not convinced that there ever was an “Operation Beach Boys”. No serious source mentions it. If there was, it was nowhere as effective as presented in the article.
The sources for the article are less than solid. They are all uncritical Israeli right-wing newspaper interviews with anonymous officers of Maglan unit made many years after the war. Credible accounts of the war does not mention any such operation.
The Maglan force supposedly landed Aug, 3 near al-Bayyada on the Lebanese coast and operated in the area until the end of the war. But by then, regular IDF units were operating in the area, up to al-Mansouri, more than half-way to Tyre City. It is unclear why special forces were still needed.
What is worse, these accounts contradict all the evidence we have elsewhere about the effectiveness of Israeli special forces actions in the 2006 war. Most accounts agree that these operations had no or very slight effect on the war. The notion that a few dozen Maglan fighters managed to reduce Hizbullah rocket attacks by 40 percent is ridiculous. There is nothing suggesting that the whole IDF war effort did anything like that.
As Uzi Rubin, “The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War”, clearly shows, IDF failed to reduce rocket attacks. There is no evidence that IDF action reduced Hizbullah rocket fire in general OR reduced rocket fire in the western sector, where the Maglan unit was active.
Most of the short range missiles were fired from Nature Reserves, well-fortified fixed positions close to the Israeli border. Did Maglan attack them? The sources are very sketchy.
One such Nature Reserve in the Maglan area of operation was Labbouna hill, a few hundred meters from the Israeli border. In spite of being surrounded by IDF troops and being subjected to heavy artillery and air bombardment, the Hizbullah fighters managed to continue firing rockets against Israel until the cease-fire. At least two IDF officers and a soldier died trying to attack the base – and none of them were from Maglan.
New title and new content
editI have now renamed the article and expanded its scope. The main reasons are explained above. I still have some work to do with references. Please bear me out. I hope I will finish this in the next few days.
Bar Zohar/Mishal book
editThis article is "Israeli Special Forces' Operations in 2006 "- the book is not about those operations, which are not in it. An editor can't add a book not about the topic as some polemical point ("those operations are not important enough to be in the book") — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2600:1700:4FBB:D000:69AE:A802:4608:8C73 (talk) 23:44, 20 November 2023 (UTC)
Are you being serious? The book is not about Israeli Special Forces' operations!? You can't possibly have read the book, coming to that conclusion. But it is pretty obvious that you are mistaken, simply by reading the book's sub-title: "The Death-Defying Missions of the Israeli Special Forces" In fact it covers special operations on every front from 1948 to 2014. But it mentions no operation in Lebanon after 1982. The non-achievements of 2006 as well as the fiascos of PFLP-GC Headquarters Raid (1988) and Ansariya ambush (1997) are all left out. And please register before making further contributions.
Jokkmokks-Goran (talk) 00:28, 23 November 2023 (UTC)
- This book is not about the 2006 operations - but about special ops in general. If it doesn't mention the 2006 special ops, it has no place in this article. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2600:1700:4FBB:D000:5814:EC6E:4ACD:4218 (talk) 14:59, 24 November 2023 (UTC)
Repeated Anonymous sabotage
editAnonymous contributors have repeatedly questioned my reference to the article by Rubin. Here is a quote that fully covers my reference:
"The charts for the western sectors yield a similar picture. There too, the Hizbullah managed to maintain a steady barrage of long-range rockets with an average rate of about 2.8 attacks per day. There is no evidence that would indicate any shifting of the attacks from the western sectors to more easterly ones."
Jokkmokks-Goran (talk) 01:13, 30 January 2024 (UTC)
- The problem seems to be that the reference you provided has incorrect pages. That quote appears on page 25, not 23 2600:1700:4FBB:D000:88C7:78F8:8F75:5ED (talk) 15:48, 2 February 2024 (UTC)
Continuing sabotage
editI have deleted the twice introduced claim – by two "seemingly" different contributors – that the overall effect of IDF special operations was a “tactical Israeli success” since ”Israeli Special Forces manages to capture some towns but later withdraws”.
No, they didn't. Israeli Specal Forces never did capture ANY TOWN in Lebanon. Anybody reading this Wikipedia article can tell you why this claim is so wrong.
The IDF beforehand apparently believed that the Hizbullah could be defeated with only the Air Force and Special Forces. Very credible Israeli sources – including the Winograd commissions conclusions – clearly demonstrated that this was not what Israel learned from this experience. Several other Israeli experts refered to in the article agree, And very few experts would disagree. None are included in this article. Which makes this overall conclusion ridiculous.
My intuition tells me that these two contributors will not be with us very long.
An anonymous contributor has repeatedly removed a reference to a small point I've tried to make. I think it's interesting – and telling – that two Israeli writers writing a book 2015 glorifying the feats of Israeli special forces throughout the history of Israel, could not find a single operation from the Lebanon war 2006 worth including in their book. It's not an important point and I could very well cede it, if my opponent had bothered to explain his point of view and had not been anonymous.