Talk:John E. Dahlquist
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editDahlquist was division commander for the 442nd Regimental Combat Team, a unit composed mostly of Japanese Americans. Many 442nd veterans felt Dahlquist was an incompetent who treated Japanese American soldiers as more expendable than white soldiers, citing in particular their famous Rescue of the Lost Battalion. In October, 1944, Dahlquist ordered the 141st Infantry Regiment (Texas National Guard) to advance beyond friendly lines, despite their warning that they would be cut off by the enemy. When German forces promptly surrounded the Texan regiment's 1st Battalion, instead of pressing other elements of the 141st to effect a rescue, Dahlquist sent in the 442nd, which was already short-handed and fatigued from 10 days of continuous fighting. After six days of desperate combat, the 442nd finally broke through to the beleaguered battalion, having suffered about 800 casualties to rescue 211 Texans. Given their devastating losses, the men of the 442nd expected to be relieved. Instead, Dahlquist ordered them to continue to secure the enemy-infested forest for another 9 days. By the time the 442nd was finally relieved, it had lost more than half its normal combat strength. Dahlquist ordered the 442nd to assemble for a recognition ceremony, which was so poorly attended that he admonished a 442nd colonel: “You disobeyed my orders. I told you to have the whole regiment.” Replied the colonel, “General, this is the regiment. The rest are either dead or in the hospital.”[1]
It is said that at a reunion of the 442nd long after the war ended, Dahlquist tried to shake the hand of a colonel who served in the regiment, asking him that 'bygones be bygones' and suggesting that what happened between him and the regiment was 'water under the bridge'. The colonel returned his salute but refused to shake his hand.[2]
The above information was removed from the article for introducing POV. If there is a controversy, it is more appropriately addressed on the article about the mission or the 442nd. The reference for the second paragraph has nothing as far as information pertaining to the paragraph it is used for. Perhaps it was discussed during the show, but the phrase, "It is said," seems to demonstrate the reliability of this source. Who said? When? --Born2flie (talk) 19:47, 24 October 2008 (UTC)
Major General John E. Dahlquist, commander of the "Texas" Division, was relatively new to combat and had nearly lost his command twice during the drive north from the Riviera for allowing his men to lag behind. The village of Bruyeres was the 442nd/100th RTC's first target. Dahlquist assured them the surrounding hills were only lightly defended. In fact, they were filled with well dug-in Germans. The 442nd cleared them off in four days despite the terrain, the steady icy downpour that filled their foxholes, and the rain of artillery shells bursting among the tree-tops. As soon as they had taken Bruyeres, General Dahlquist insisted they push further into enemy territory, to seize another heavily-defended hill overlooking Biffontaine, a tiny village with no military importance, and then to take the town itself. They did it all in just two days, but their losses were heavy in part because the inexperienced Dahlquist first gave them an unrealistic deadline for taking the hill, then ordered them off it, then forced them to retake it when the Germans returned. Meanwhile, General Dahlquist had sent a battalion of his Texans along a densely forested ridge toward the important town of St. Die. Again, veteran officers warned him the woods were full of Germans. Again, Dahlquist insisted there were none. Within an hour, the Texans were under attack. Two hundred and seventy-five of them were cut off and surrounded by the Germans who zeroed in on them from three sides. For two days, shells blasted their positions. The Texans began to run out of food and ammunition. Two attempts to break through to them failed. Finally, on October 26, Dahlquist ordered the exhausted men of the 442nd to return to the wooded slopes, rescue the Lost Battalion, as the Texans would come to be called, and restore his reputation.
For five days, fighting from tree to tree in heavy fog, they tried to get to the trapped men. On the morning of October 30 they were just 1,000 yards from the survivors -- but pinned to the steep slope by artillery and machine-gun fire. Finally, they had had enough. I Company and K Company rose to their feet and charged up the hillside, hurling grenades into German machine gun nests and firing from the waist as they climbed. I Company had started into the forest with 185 men; just eight walked out unhurt. K Company had begun with 186 men; only 17 emerged on foot. All the rest were dead or wounded or missing. On November 12, General Dahlquist announced he wanted to review the 442nd, to thank them for what they had done. When the battered unit appeared, Dahlquist grew irritated at their sparse numbers, ignorant at how much they had sacrificed.The War: FUBAR
—Preceding unsigned comment added by Garyhelm (talk • contribs) 18:11, 16 November 2008 (UTC)
So we have two big sections above, and both are supported by Ken Burns's The War, which is hardly shoddy. I think there was good faith confusion in how the original paragraph was written, but the "meat" of the paragraphs was substantiated. These need to be re-added before this article can be considered NPOV. --Bobak (talk) 06:14, 1 October 2009 (UTC)
- How they were added was POV; the language used, the lack of citing. I don't dispute the events happened, just that how the information was added into the article a) failed to discuss the subject of the article except indirectly, b) overwhelmed the remainder of the article, showing a lack of proportion. If anything, there needs to be an article about the Lost Battalion that incorporates all the details of the battle and can more thoroughly discuss the criticisms of Dahlquist. In this article, there needs to be a short treatment of the item proportionate to the detail the rest of the article receives. --Born2flie (talk) 09:10, 1 October 2009 (UTC)
- I still don't feel that the source of the criticism is documented adequately for the 442nd. Meyers only generally attributes his sources, not which information came from where. Compared to the released photos of Dahlquist interviewing Goering, Alford goes so far as to quote letters that Dahlquist received over the incident, making it apparent that the public was not happy. --Born2flie (talk) 10:34, 1 October 2009 (UTC)
- I found the incidents regarding the 442nd standing review for Dahlquist on 12 November 1944 (Veteran's Day), and the "water under the bridge" confrontation in Sterner's book. The first incident, Sterner attributes to Lieutenant Colonel Miller, the second, to Lieutenant Colonel Singles. Sterner also contradicts Meyers, in that it was the Corps headquarters' belief, not originating from Dahlquist himself, that German resistance would be light in the Vosges forest.(Sterner 2007, p. 71) --Born2flie (talk) 12:09, 1 October 2009 (UTC)
- I agree that it shouldn't overwhelm the article, and frankly a few sentences can go a long way. I've just seen a few articles that are adapted from official bios (particularly people like older Senators and generals) that inadvertently gloss over issues in their career. --Bobak (talk) 17:07, 1 October 2009 (UTC)
"Dahlquist's incompetence caused the unnecessary deaths of many brave men, and could be seen as criminal." This is extraordinarily POV and should be removed altogether or edited.