Talk:John Searle/Archive 1

Archive 1

Archive 2

Archive 3

Content

I’ve re-worked the content, focusing on the role of intentionality in Searle’s work. I’ve removed the reference to The construction of Social Reality (linked to social construction) and to Ian Hacking because they neither added any information about Searle’s work nor linked to relevant information – apologies to the author. -Banno

Can anyone find a more scholarly critique of the Chinese room argument than the one offered by Bob Murphy? It's really poor. Rclb 23:58, 25 March 2007‎ (UTC)

NPOV removal (again)

I removed a bit that said words to the effect of "One of the few arguements for realism in modern philosophy". I would argue that there are quite a few arguements for realism. I replaced it with a statement which is neutral to the overall number of arguements for realism in modenr philosophy.

(the above was not signed separately, but I presume it was Banno?)

Not I; but I did write the text that was removed. Banno 19:27, 7 March 2007 (UTC)

Most of the following (from the end of the section on Illocutionary Acts) also failed for NPOV:

Although many think so, Searle has never proposed a clear definition of what illocutionary acts actually are. Furthermore, the conceptions he suggests in more or less detail vary substantially over the years, his fundamental assumptions are to a considerable extent implausible and lead to different technical problems such as self-contradictions (cf. Searle 1969, 1979, 1983; Doerge 2006). Searle's involvement in debates over speech-act theory includes an engagement with Jacques Derrida, one side of which is printed in the book Limited Inc.

The last sentence was OK, but the rest was (at best) completely vague and needed to be either recast or cut. I have replaced the lot with simply:

Searle's speech-act theory is rooted in the modern analytic tradition and has, unsurprisingly, been challenged by continental thinkers. A wide-ranging critique is in F C Doerge Illocutionary Acts[1]. See also Jacques Derrida 'Limited Inc'[2] and, in (brief) reply, Searle 'The Construction of Social Reality'[3] for a flavour of the motivation behind these debates.

Also, I have moved the next section (Strong AI) because the section after it (Intentionality) was written to follow on from the Illocutionary Acts section. And I have added an example to that section, to clarify Searle's use of the technical term 'Background', as well as lifting the brief explanation of intentionality from the section on Social Intentionality - it makes more sense to include it earlier in the article.

-Mark 06:23, 11 March 2007 (UTC)

Much of the article still seems unduly POV to me though much of the discussion is far over my head.68.49.36.18 (talk) 20:25, 13 January 2008 (UTC)

This seems like original research at least, if not also POV "Still, despite his announced intention (1969, 54) to present a "full dress analysis of the illocutionary act," Searle in fact does not give one." Anyone disagree? Tomcrocker (talk) 13:30, 12 May 2010 (UTC)

Biological naturalism

I agree that Biological naturalism should be mentioned. I hope someone can provide a short description of what it means.

"Biological Naturalism states that consciousness is a higher level function of the brain's physical capabilities. The neurophysiological processes in the brain cause mental phenomena, which are also a feature of the brain. However, such features as consciousness are not reducible to neurophysiological systems." (source)

Given my understanding of reducible this (above) description of Biological Naturalism makes no sense to me. I think Searle has a special definition for "reducible" that needs to be stated explicitly. JWSchmidt 18:48, 23 Mar 2004 (UTC)

Searle lists five possible senses of 'reduction' in ch.5 of Rediscovery of the Mind, but what he's claiming above is that sense data aren't reducible to brain states in the way that raindrops are reducible to water molecules. -Mark 03:31, 11 March 2007 (UTC)

Reducible doesn't just mean that one thing is identical to another it also means that true propositions about a system at one level can be adequately re-expressed in a lower level system, i.e. psychological facts can be re-stated as biological facts. It may turn out that our biological theory lacks the expressive power or that there is some further epistemological constraint that prevents the reduction.

Construction of social reality

Removed from article:

The above is not a very good example of a social construct, as a five dollar bill has the economic guarantee of a third force (The United States Government), therefore it does not rely simply upon the agreement of two parties, but rather upon the real economic integrity of a government's ability to back up its tender. Whether the second party believes a five-dollar bill to be a five-dollar bill is immaterial to the five-dollar bill's value.
Stronger examples of social construction would be the values of antiques, collectors' items, name-brand goods, or fetishized commodities, which rely upon a covenant of agreed value between two parties.

This note appears to be an opinion, and so should have been placed in talk, rather than the main article. It also shows how inadequate the section on the social construction of reality is, since it appears to contain a basic misunderstanding. The role of a nation’s government is irrelevant to the sort of social construct Searle is discussing – they are simply another party to the convention of calling certain pieces of paper money; The phrase 'real economic integrity' is telling – what the hell could 'real economic integrity' be, without a shared intentionality? As is 'Whether the second party believes a five-dollar bill to be a five-dollar bill is immaterial to the five-dollar bill's value'. No second party will use such a bill in a transaction unless they believe it has value, and furthermore, if they do not believe it has value, then ipso facto it does not have value. That the note has any value at all is a matter of shared intentionality, not economic integrity. Any economic integrity derives from that same shared intentionality.

I’ll put a re-write on my ‘’to do’’ list, but it might take a while… Banno 22:53, May 22, 2004 (UTC)

This is not an effective criticism of Searle. The value of money, in his vocabulary, is an institutional fact. It isn't valuable because one or two people agree it has value; it's valuable because society collectively agrees it has value. The guarantee of the government is merely an element of that collective intentionality. If people stopped taking the word of the government (also another socially realized fact) it would cease to be meaningful. Twinxor t 07:21, 5 October 2005 (UTC)

A better analogy might be UK banknotes. A Bank of England note is accepted pretty much anywhere in the UK, while banknotes from Northern Ireland or Scotland are generally only accepted in the relevant regions. Anyone who has ever received a blank stare from an English shopkeeper when confronted with an Ulster Bank five-pound-note will immediately understand what Searle is discussing here. ;-) -- Grey Knight 08:46, 1 June 2007 (UTC)

Unified Field Theories of Consciousness

Searle has been a strong proponent of unified field theories of consciousness (See "Consciousness" - Annu Rev Neurosci. 2000;23:557-78), and I think he's exerted some influence on the neuroscience community in this regard. Yet, I don't find anything related to unified field theories of consciousness on his page. Is there a reason, or is this something that maybe I should think about adding? Cerebral 02:31, 23 May 2004 (UTC)

---

I noticed that some sites give his date of birth as July 31, 1932. Since that's more precise that what we've got now, I'm inclined to think it might be correct, but I don't know, so I didn't change it. I'm also not quite sure if the middle name is "Rogers" or "Roger". Everyking 05:40, 2 Jun 2004 (UTC)

What an awful photograph, he looks like he just got out of bed after having been kept up all night with a cold. Does he look like that normally? If not, is there a more appropriate picture for him that could be used? -mqbs Oct 25 23:43:20 EDT 2004

That's what he looks like in person, at least when I saw him (I took the picture). In his "official photos", those which are not from the 1970s, he is done up a bit more. But I've never seen any of those that could be released under the Wikipedia license. --Fastfission 02:50, 27 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Ontological Objectivity vs. Epistemic Objectivity

I've been editing Objectivity (philosophy). That article only states Searle's distinction between [ontological] and epistemic objectivity. Since that distinction isn't in the John Searle article, I'm questioning whether that distinction warrants its own article. Perhaps it should be moved here and that page redirected to Object (philosophy). I really don't know much about Searle, so I was hoping that someone here has an opinion. Chiok 02:33, 30 October 2005 (UTC)

I've changed 'metaphysical objectivity' to 'ontological objectivity', Searle's preferred term, in the above. I have also added a section to this article about Searle's views and terminology, though I have not added a link to it from the article on Objectivity (philosophy).

-Mark 14:08, 8 March 2007 (UTC)

Better picture available?

The front picture looks an unkind shot of Searle. Frankly, it is the worst Searle pic. I've ever seen. Can't we find a better one? -- Orz 11:13, 1 January 2006 (UTC)

• It's not intentionally unkind -- it's what he looks like these days (almost all of his published photographs are from a much earlier period, apparently). But if a better one can be found -- go for it. I donated that one just because I happened to have taken it, and thus it could be released under a free license. --Fastfission 17:11, 6 January 2006 (UTC)

Better to have a picture than not; and removing the pic removed the info box. So I;ve restored it, but agree that a different picture might be better. Banno 19:05, 6 January 2006 (UTC)

I agree too; I came to this talk page to suggest this but I found it was already being discussed! EdGl 21:52, 4 March 2006 (UTC)

I'm here for the same reason! I recommend his UC Berkeley photo, though I haven't the time to properly put it on there just now... hurtstotouchfire 5:19 (UTC) - 3 September 2006

He looks nothing like the photo. Please change it. 169.229.84.149 04:19, 21 October 2006 (UTC)

The one there now looks quite good. I saw him just the other day and that photo represents a rather charitable account of how he's doing these days, although I suppose some strong AI folks might demand a less attractive photo, don't you think? :) Loganbartling 08:12, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

Regardless whether the present (10 April 2008) picture represents the truth or not, in my view this is not the kind of photo supposed to be used for an encyclopedia. As far as I remember, the predecessor was more adequate. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.189.164.49 (talk) 09:20, 10 April 2008 (UTC)

Searle's influences

I think it's fair to say that Searle has has philosophical influences besides Strawson and Austin. For instance, he's repeatedly called Wittgenstein "the most influential philosopher of the twentieth century" and his dog is named Ludwig Wittgenstein Searle. He also continuously recommends Russell's History of Western Philosophy and claims it had a "big impression" on him as a teenager. Can whoever it is who jealously deletes any new additions to this category either cease or explain himself?

So provide citations in the text, as per the guidelines: Entries in Influences, Influenced, and Notable ideas should be explained in the main text of one of the articles. Those that are not mentioned in the main text may be deleted.[1] Banno 10:55, 18 November 2006 (UTC)

Fair enough; I certainly don't want to require exceptions to the rules. I shall try to see if I can fit them in without compromising the integrity of the article; if not, then I'll drop the issue.

Thanks. Banno

Banno: Searle's *former* dog was named Ludwig Wittgenstein Searle. His current dog is named Gilbert Ryle Searle.

I once had a rooster named Bertrand Russel, after his example of the fallacy of induction. Hardly a vital fact. Find a citation. Banno 20:04, 22 November 2006 (UTC)

Banno: There are articles on Searle's website. One of them is 'What is Language?'. It is dated Sept. 7, 2006. On page 8 of the article, in the middle, you will find a reference to Gilbert. "I, on the contrary, think that it is obvious that many animals, like my dog, Gilbert,...." http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/whatislanguage.pdf

Wow. Banno

Hey guys, Grice was one of his teachers. Grice should probably be added to the influences. 169.229.84.149 11:14, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

In the section on intentionality, I have mentioned Searle's claim that Wittgenstein's On Certainty is all about what Searle calls the 'Background', and Searle has also cited Kant as a major influence. But many, many modern thinkers would cite these two, so I'd still leave them out. On the other hand, Julius Weinberg, who taught Searle at Wisconsin Uni, should definitely be in as Searle himself cites him. -Mark 05:53, 11 March 2007 (UTC)

Landlord

This section appears potentially unbalanced, particularly as Searle won his legal case in the Courts. Regardless of the desires of Berkley residents for cheaper rents the courts are the final arbiters. 06:50, 25 February 2007 (UTC)

What exactly do you think is non-neutral? Searle sued, won his case, and Berkeley residents were upset. All of these are objective facts and easy to understand; the article doesn't take the side of any of parties. AaronSw 06:26, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

The opening sentence - 'Berkely residents refer to Searle as a "notorious slumlord" for his ownership of a great deal of housing in the area' are weasel words. Which residents did this? When? What percentage? What documentation is there of this? Jaxsonjo 08:17, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

Although the paragraph does contain factual information the tone presented is one which gives a feeling of being against Searle. The quotes presented attack his character rather than his motives (which are left completely unstated). Tom P Joyce 21:10, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

I removed the whole section. We dont have a biography section but 20 sentences about Searle as an landlord ... that's really absurd. Of course, we can mention it in a biography section with one or two sentences. But its an article about philosophy - we dont need a section "Kant and the women", "David Chalmers' hair cut" or "The landlord John Searle". --Davidlud 06:17, 28 February 2007 (UTC)

Last time I checked, we did have a section on Chalmers haircut. This isn't an encyclopedia of philosophy; being a landlord is part of Searle's biography. Perhaps history won't judge it to be as important as his philosophical contributions, but it's nonetheless as important as many other biographies that appear in Wikipedia. AaronSw 15:44, 14 March 2007 (UTC)

Four speech acts, or five?

The article states:

Searle originally assumes that the illocutionary forces of a sentence consists in the subjection of this sentence to certain specifiable rules. These rules set out the circumstances under which it is admissible to utter the sentence, and what this uttering counts as. Searle assumes four general types of such rules.

Perhaps I'm at cross-purposes here, but if these 'four' are Searle's speech act types, these days he claims there are "exactly five":

assertives: "We're married."; directives: "Get married!"; commissives: "Yes, I'll marry you."; expressives: "I wish you'd marry."; declarations: "I declare you husband and wife."

The terms are his, the examples are of what I think he means by each. Were there only four in "Speech Acts"? Did he decide later that declarations are distinct from assertions, perhaps?

-Mark 13:22, 7 March 2007 (UTC)

One of the problems with Wikipedia is successive small edits by authors who do not take into account the structure of the section, and so progressively destroy it - a phenomenon called "Wikirot". In the original paragraph, the four types of rules Searle uses in speech acts were listed, in italics. but the paragraph cited above has come adrift from the rules. They are: propositional content, preparatory conditions, sincerity condition - and one other that seems to have been removed altogether, and which I cannot recall. I agree the section does not now make sense. Banno 20:28, 8 March 2007 (UTC)

Ah, of course - the intentionality of the rule - what it is intended to do. This has grown into a full sub-section. This is one of the best examples of wikirot I have seen. Banno 20:43, 8 March 2007 (UTC)

incidentally, each of the parenthetic comments in the article seem to be POV. I suggest they be removed, or at least re-written. Banno 20:43, 8 March 2007 (UTC)

I have removed most of them for lack of precision as much as POV, but the reference to the Doerge critique was good, so I've just moved to the end. (I think mixing references to comment/criticism with explanation just creates clutter). BUT: In the above comment, you say: "the intentionality of the rule - what it is intended to do". But the intention is what it is intended to do, the intentionality is what is it is about. So I've assumed you intended intention, and wrote intentionality unintentionally. (sorry...) -Mark 05:45, 11 March 2007 (UTC)

Fair enough. I don't like the way Searle uses the word intentionality. But then, his work on the topic is not treated well enough in the article. Well done. Banno 07:02, 11 March 2007 (UTC)

Joking apart, I'm somewhat bewildered about this concept (intentionality) too. But I don't think it's Searle's fault as such, because standard usage seems to more-or-less equate intentionality with 'aboutness', and my dictionary quite independently defines intentionality as "the property of mental phenomena whereby the mind can contemplate non-existent objects and states of affairs." But both non-existence and mentalness seem irrelevent to me, because (a) my true belief that Paris is in France surely has just as much intentionality as a false belief that Paris is in Germany, but only the latter is a 'non-existent state of affairs', and (b) my street map of Paris seems to me to be 'about' the real Paris in the same kind of way that my belief is, but maps are not mental phenomena. I'm just confused, I suppose. Or else my dictionary is crap. MaherCoen (talk) 04:19, 15 August 2008 (UTC)

Opposition to dualism

With reference to this dif[2], if he claims to oppose it, isn't he opposing it? Or have you evidence that is claim is disingenuous? Banno 21:23, 30 July 2007 (UTC)

Cat:Wittgensteinian philosopher

Searle was a student of Austin, who is independent of Witgenstein. Banno 10:35, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

Clarification required

"It is this gap that makes us think we have freedom of the will" It's not clear whether Searl considers this thought (thinking we have freedom of the will) is valid or not. That is whether Searl thinks free-will follows or not. Can someone please clarify? Thanks. Amit@Talk 13:29, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

Ok I read this and now things are clearer to me. Amit@Talk 16:35, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

I expanded his views on free will using that source. (Pats self on the back) Amit@Talk 14:56, 10 December 2007 (UTC)

Low importance?

Shouldn't this article be atleast mid-importance given Searle's contribution? Thanks.Amit@Talk 16:15, 21 December 2007 (UTC)

I agree. He's actually relatively important. I read him as a computer science grad student, which means it's only him and Bertrand that we read... Wkerney (talk) 21:56, 18 July 2008 (UTC)

Picture

I think the old photo was better :| ReluctantPhilosopher (talk) 11:43, 11 February 2008 (UTC)

Pronunciation

How do you pronounce "Searle"? Could we get a phonetic spelling on the top of the page? Wkerney (talk) 21:57, 18 July 2008 (UTC)

Terrible Criticism Section

I'm deleting the entire criticism section of Searle, not because I don't believe there are valid criticisms (indeed, I'm shocked that in the whole thing, the numerous critiques of his Chinese Room thought experiment isn't even mentioned in passing), but because the whole thing seems to be the writings of a displeased reader who has no interest in NPOV. Weasel words abound (e.g. "written in a clear and conversational style, supposedly with the goal..."), and unsupported opinion is the norm ("the explanatory benefit of which may be doubted", "given so much divergence, it is rather obvious, Searle is using the term 'rationality' in an unusual manner..." , "In the end it is impossible to say whether Searle's conception..."). The few typos only reinforce the notion that this is a section undeserving of the encyclopedia. I'm sure there are valid criticisms out there, and if this section could be rewritten in such a way that the opinions at least appear to be qualified, that would be appropriate. The only section that is cited and might be of interest is: "Searle owns a large amount of property in Berkeley, California. He is well-known for his 1980s lawsuit which led the California Supreme Court to overturn the city's rent control policy in what came to be known as the "Searle Decision".[11] The city government claimed this led to "significantly increased rent levels in Berkeley"."

I'm deleting this as well, mostly because it seems like a very irrelevant detail to make an entire section entitled "Criticism" over, and it does not seem to pertain to his life in general, which is an academic. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Reaper Man (talk • contribs) 21:25, 25 July 2008 (UTC)

Reaper Man (talk) 22:16, 25 July 2008 (UTC)

Well there should be a section discussing criticism. Here is an example of just how dishonest Searle can be, as he builds an accusation of a misquote based off a misquote!! (and this most certainly pertains to his academic life)

"The mental gymnastics that partisans of strong AI have performed in their attempts to refute this rather simple argument are truly extraordinary[3] but the method employed by Hofstadter and Dennett is more direct: they simply fabricate a direct quotation that was never uttered by me and then attack the quotation. They claim "it is a mistake to try to impute the understanding to the (incidentally) animate simulator; rather it belongs to the system as a whole, which includes what Searle casually characterizes as 'a few slips of paper.' This offhand comment, we feel, reveals how Searle's image has blinded him to the realities of the situation." The trouble is, no such "offhand comment" was ever made by me, casually or otherwise; it is a complete fabrication, as any reader can verify from my article, which they reprint in full." ~Searle 1982, The Myth of the Computer

Here we see Searle accuses Hofstadter of misquoting him as saying "a few slips of paper", but if we look at Hofstadter's writing we see:

"Our response to this (and, as we shall show later, Searle's response as well, in a way) is basically the "Systems Reply": -that it is a mistake to try to impute the understanding to the (incidentally) animate simulator; rather it belongs to the system as a whole, which includes what Searle casually characterizes as "bits of paper." This offhand comment, we feel, reveals how Searle's image has blinded him to the realities of the situation." ~Hofstadter 1981

And worse yet, Searle really DID say "bits of paper":

"The idea is that while a person doesn't understand Chinese, somehow the conjunction of that person and bits of paper might understand Chinese."

~Searle 1980, Minds, Brains and Programs; see "1. The Systems Reply"

--Mike Spenard (talk) 05:01, 4 November 2008 (UTC)

I don't understand the point Mr Spenard has raised here. Specifically, Searle writes (reprinted in David Rosenthal "the Nature of Mind" (1991), in the paper referred to, ie "Mind's, Brains, and Programs"):

"The idea is that while a person doesn't understand Chinese, somehow the *conjunction* of that person and bits of paper might understand Chinese."

To be precise, "conjuntion" is italicised, but "bits of paper" is not and in any case is not the same phrase as the "a few slips of paper" quote given above. So where is the argument? If someone had misquoted me, even in a relatively technical way, I'd surely make that point. And so far from being settled, nothing said here makes any kind of case one way or the other.

I kind of hope that when these guys are all dead, we'll be able to sift the truth from the bitchery. As it is, I'd advise either getting hold of a copy of Rosenthal's relatively informative '91 book, or giving up on this debate altogether. -MaherCoen (talk) 13:33, 1 February 2009 (UTC)

I think a discussion of criticism of Searle should also include his spat with Derrida in Limited Inc and "Reply to Derrida" about intentionality in language, although it gets pretty bitter pretty quickly. 76.115.84.129 (talk) 18:35, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Non-specialist language

I'd appreciate if someone with the knowledge could write a short description of Professor Searle's key contributions in non-technical language. I came to this page to get the gist of what he is known for. (His website is somewhat opaque, even to a well-educated non-specialist.) Unfortunately, I couldn't figure it out from this Wiki article either. The challenge is that each paragraph dives into philosophy jargon right away. It is apparent that the jargon is useful for describing his position in the context om modern philosophers; but that jargon is impenetrable to many outsiders.

Even two or three sentences of explanation would do a great deal. Assume I don't know any other philosphers. Assume that I have no idea what "illocutionary" means (even after reading this Wiki article). There isn't space in those 3 sentences to give the whole nuanced explanation of illocutionary and still get around to why Searle is important.

Here's a start: Below are a few statements that I got from a journalist. I can understand the concepts they describe. However, I don’t know whether they accurately reflect Searle’s position. Nor do I know whether these are the major concepts for which he is known.

Paraphrased from Harvey Blume, The Boston Globe, Feb. 7, 2007.

Searle studies how the mind creates a sense of self.

Mental processes do not work like computers, even when doing the same task. Therefore, the computer model of the mind can tell us nothing about how our brains produce mind, consciousness, and a sense of self.

Our modern knowledge of biology has made it unnecessary to call some mystical force to explain how life works.

It is impossible to reconcile a universe consisting entirely of mindless, meaningless fields of force with a concept of ourselves as conscious, mindful, free. But free will is not an illusion: we are stuck with a paradox.

Thanks so much! Phytism (talk) 12:33, 12 December 2008 (UTC)

Journalist or not, you might have to contemplate buying a few books, rather than relying on Wikipedia. A fifteen-dollar-plus philosophical dictionary is a must. Console yourself that it'll be the best fifteen dollars you ever spent, if you give it time to spread to your brain. Philosophical language is too technical for guesswork (eg: intentionality), and you just won't be bothered to keep checking on the net. Buy the book and take it to bed instead.

After that, remember that philosophy is important and inescapable. It doesn't meet deadlines. But you already know enough, and I don't want to distract the kind of hero who can throw together 2500 words on demand, so I'm gonna shut up and let you think. You'll get it down to the standard three sentences eventually, no worries.

Searle's most accessible book is perhaps "Mind, Language, and Society". His "Mystery of Consciousness" is also easy, and the kind of riot hacks enjoy most: a fresh mix of mature thought and juvenile academic bickering. Between those, this article, and that dictionary you just ordered from Amazon, you'll be fine. Even if you've missed a deadline. Oops!

Three sentences, Mr journo? Trim these three down to two, add one more, and you'll make your page:

Californian professor John R Searle is a philosophical pugilist, a true heavyweight among contemporary thinkers, whose contributions to the so-called philosophy of mind might rather be called a philosophical body-blow to orthodox scientific thought. Beginning with the observation that ordinary words don't just describe the world ("We got married"), question it ("Did you guys ever date?"), or instruct it ("You'd just better marry her, buddy!"), but that they also create it ("I declare you man and wife!"), Searle has proceeded to demolish the claims of computer science with his notorious but yet-to-be-refuted "Chinese Room" argument, that no computer can ever really know, learn, or understand, and gone on to kick the shins of such esteemed luminaries as Noam Chomsky and the late Ludwig Wittgenstein, two intellectual giants who are often called the greatest thinkers of the 20th century. Who else could prove that the flimsy piece of paper in my back pocket is money just because millions of people I've never even met believe exactly the same thing, and that Obama just made president for precisely the same reason?

It's not exactly true, but before anyone else chips in, it'll sell papers, so who will mind? Indeed, who (or what?) has got one? -M MaherCoen (talk) 10:56, 1 February 2009 (UTC)

Interesting comment! I might mention that I'm not a journalist, I just stole some words from one to provide an example of clearer language than that used in the wiki article. I appreciate your alternate version, which reminds me of a different aspect of publishing. It reads like a hyperbolic blurb from a book cover. It's effective for making me more curious about this fellow, but I'm still not sure what he did.

Since Wikipedia is an all-purpose encyclopedia, with information for the lay reader, the specialist, and the afficionado of the abstruse, different parts of an article should serve those different audiences. What I'm suggesting is that this article does not serve the first audience satisfactorily.

In general, if you wish to communicate an idea to an audience, you have to do so in language that they are going to accept and understand. My comment is addressed to those who understand Searle's importance and would like more Wikipedia readers to do so as well.

I gather from your comment that you disagree with my purpose. I infer that yo do not think that people interested in individual philosophers, or the main themes of academic philosophy, should to be permitted any understanding unless they have done the necessary background. I am hopeful that someone with a different perspective sees fit to add some good language to this article. Phytism (talk) 17:36, 3 February 2009 (UTC)

Well, I was with you for a while there, but that last paragraph was hardly warranted.

I do not think that people should not be "permitted any understanding" they want - quite the opposite! However, it is unreasonable to expect an article about a specific philosopher to cover the basics of a complex and technical subject, any more than an article about Vladimir Kramnik should have to explain the rules of chess.

My advice that anyone interested in philosophy should spend fifteen dollars on a philosophical dictionary was given in the best of faith, and I am entirely unrepentant for suggesting it. Such a dictionary will convey the balance of the subject in a way that flicking around Wikipedia will never do, because a good editor will ensure that the space afforded to different topics is in proportion to the level of interest they excite among professional philosophers. It will also have the coherence of a complete work, a quality that of course Wikipedia should aim at too, but by its nature is unlikely ever to achieve.

Finally, I think the opening paragraph of the Searle article is well written (nothing to do with me!) and sets the scene well. It provides links to the main topics of interest to Searle, and in my opinion it is rather those articles which should properly be addressed to lay readers as well as to the philosophical cognoscenti. MaherCoen (talk) 13:52, 15 February 2009 (UTC)

I think the last paragraph was certainly warranted - you come across as a jerk, and not in the elitist way you seem to be shooting for: you sound like a disgruntled undergraduate philosophy major (but then again, so does Searle...). You've constructed some imaginary narrative about a journalist trying to spread philosophy to the unwashed masses, thereby failing at the most important part of academic work: reading closely. You then to proceed to belittle this person in a decidedly acerbic manner, based again on this same mis-reading. While I would also strongly resist the suggestion that articles on philosophy should be written non-technically, your inflammatory rhetoric and Hearst-worthy prose make you seem like a buffoon.

71.54.203.30 (talk) 06:26, 15 March 2011 (UTC)

request

That editors who contribute to and watch this article check out this Article for Deletion nomination and comment. Thanks, Slrubenstein | Talk 19:30, 26 January 2009 (UTC)

Criticism in speech acts section

There is criticism of Searle's work inserted in the speech acts section of the article, but this criticism appears to come from nowhere:

Despite his (1969, 54) announcement to present a "full dress analysis of the illocutionary act", he (1969, 57-71) in fact merely provides an analysis of the (allegedly prototypical) illocutionary act of promising, together with sets of semantical rules, intended to represent the linguistic meaning of devices indicating further (supposed) illocutionary act types (these sets of rules enable the reader to reconstruct at least in part Searle's conceptions of these act types). Thus in fact he fails to distinguish illocutionary acts from other acts; that is, he fails to install any concise terminology: it remains in the open whether, for instance, answering a question, expressing love, or cursing actually are supposed to be 'illocutionary acts'. As a consequence, a serious examination of the truth of what he says about 'illocutionary' acts is extremely difficult.

It doesn't include any citations of sources. I think it should be removed if it can't be sourced. Tweisbach (talk) 10:46, 16 June 2009 (UTC)

OK, I removed it. Tweisbach (talk) 08:46, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

Original Research Template Added

As this article only refers to literature by Searle himself or his critics, it falls under the category Original Research. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:No_original_research . 84.208.80.50 (talk) 08:07, 23 February 2010 (UTC)

Moved this thread here to its place in order after coming to see what specific content was in question. Since the subject of the article is a famous living philosopher and there are no specific complaints, removing the tag. 72.228.177.92 (talk) 00:01, 26 March 2010 (UTC)

External Linker

Ckatz, I question the validity of removing what seems to be a valid, if somewhat low-value external link based on one's judgement of who added it. Is there some policy you can quote to educate me as to why this is verboten? I'll gladly end my objection to your deletion if there is. I would think that if you think the editor in question is doing something wrong you would report that editor and have the account blocked or banned. As it stands there seems to be nothing wrong with the link itself other than questioning the motives of the contributor. μηδείς (talk) 17:58, 28 May 2010 (UTC)

It's not block-worthy; the editor in question has been notified of the external links guideline. As for the link itself, it has been removed per that guideline. Simply put, we do not link simply for the sake of linking. If the interview in question is truly useful, then we should consider using it to reference existing or new text. Hope this answers your question. Cheers. --Ckatz^chat_spy 19:32, 28 May 2010 (UTC)

I note your use of the passive voice, but would it not be more informative to say that it was you who notified the user of the external link policy? I also note that the rationale has changed from his being viewed as a single-purpose account to the questionable value of the link. So far as I can see there is no straightforward violation of any policy. The only one that even comes imaginably close is the promotion of a site, but the link goes directly to the pdf in question, not to the site, which is in any case a non-profit scholarly website which offers free access and pushes no POV. The only way this can be called "promotion" is to define any linking at all as such. At this point it looks like a judgement call, and in the spirit of AGF, I have to assume that this contributor's motives are simply as they appear, the wish to provide a link to what he views as a relevant resource. I can see removing the link at this point only if it is redundant, (i.e., do the other links better cover the same exact material?) or if a consensus of editors and not just one person judges that it is not of sufficient value.μηδείς (talk) 20:08, 28 May 2010 (UTC)

An error.

Didn't J. L. Austin introduce the term "Direction of fit" in How to do Things with Words? The article ascribes the idea to Anscombe. Did she actually use this term? I think the article is in error. ---- CharlesGillingham (talk) 22:10, 3 July 2010 (UTC)

Citations needed / poor journalism

The critical attitude of the section on Speech Acts requires a citation, and I tagged it.

In general, the article this section could use much higher journalistic standards. We need to know who thinks what. The article section is missing phrases like: "Searle claims that ... " and "according to Searle," and the criticism needs to be attributed as well, as in "Daniel Dennett disagrees, writing that ...", etc. So I've tagged the whole article. ---- CharlesGillingham (talk) 22:10, 3 July 2010 (UTC)

Atheism

Can someone find an appropriate (i.e. reliable) source for Searle's atheism? Thanks. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.76.236.44 (talk) 02:25, 24 August 2010 (UTC)

Since there was no mention of atheism in the article, I have removed it from Category:Atheist philosophers. -84user (talk) 04:46, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

"Flamboyant atheist" Peter Dear, 'Today's television and radio programmes', The Times, 22 February 1984; pg. 31; Issue 61764; col A. μηδείς (talk) 05:27, 21 September 2010 (UTC)

This is a quotation from a book by Vera, with a short quotation by Searl on the issue. Maybe he can be labelled as agnostic.

"His epistemology is intentional, therefore objective. Biologically he is a Darwinist, and theologically a naturalist: 'if it should turn out that God exists –he says- that would have to be a fact of nature like any other.'SEARLE, JOHN R., Mind, Language, and Society, cit., p. 34." Vera, F. THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS ACCORDING TO JOHN SEARLE, 2007, p. 36. User:guillermogp, 22 April 2011. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 114.45.247.193 (talk) 03:56, 22 April 2011 (UTC)

The quotation could imply pantheism as well as agnosticism. However, I'd say it makes little sense to ascribe such labels on Searle. Kopare (talk) 01:00, 8 August 2011 (UTC)