Talk:Lesson of Munich
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Oxymoron
editThis statement is self-contradictory: "Many scholars argue that Neville Chamberlain's capitulation to German demands guaranteed eventual war as Hitler believed he could do as he pleased without the other Great Powers going to war to stop him."
Do many scholars argue that the Great Powers should have gone to war with Hitler to ensure that they didn't have to go to war with him? Marshall46 (talk) 09:38, 16 November 2009 (UTC)
- Not necessarily. The statement is likely intended to say: Because Hitler thought that he would remain unopposed, he continued his expansion (which he may or may not have done, if he thought that he would be opposed); the fact that Hitler continued his expansion, in turn, forced the "Great Powers" into an eventual all-out war (or they would have seen themselves picked off, one by one, which also amounts to war).
- Many scholars, without a doubt, feel that if Hitler had met with sufficient resistance sufficiently early, there is a chance that he would have desisted. Certainly, in the light of what did happen, this would have been the better approach. Further, even if it did come to war, considering how the war played out, it would have been strategically better to take an armed conflict as soon as possible. (Hindsight...)94.220.240.23 (talk) 08:31, 15 December 2009 (UTC)
- Better expressed as, "earlier armed resistance would have deterred Hitler and prevented a major war". But that is arguable. Did England and France have sufficient arms to resist Hitler before 1939? Would the populations of those countries, in an atmosphere of revulsion from war, have tolerated armed intervention over the Rhineland or the Sudetenland? Was even Stalin in a position to go to war with Hitler before 1941? You had better find the scholars who do argue that. It still lacks a citation. Marshall46 (talk) 09:25, 15 December 2009 (UTC)
- One who occurs to me immediately is William Shirer, who pointed out at the time that while "even" Stalin wasn't ready for WWII (he was perhaps the least ready of them all), Hitler wasn't either. Per Shirer, the Wehrmacht was still mobilizing and did not believe they could penetrate the Czech border fortresses; Shirer presents the Munich Agreement as Hitler's way of getting by diplomacy what he couldn't get otherwise. There's more to his position, and plenty of counter-arguments of course, but I've never heard Shirer dismissed as any kind of fringe wacko. Scutigera (talk) 14:03, 9 August 2021 (UTC)
- @Marshall46 That is very arguable indeed. Those who express that sentiment are generally speculating and it should probably not be taken seriously without at least a pinch of salt. Those advancing that argument never answer the question of why the Czechs did not fight. Flanker235 (talk) 05:59, 5 February 2023 (UTC)
- One who occurs to me immediately is William Shirer, who pointed out at the time that while "even" Stalin wasn't ready for WWII (he was perhaps the least ready of them all), Hitler wasn't either. Per Shirer, the Wehrmacht was still mobilizing and did not believe they could penetrate the Czech border fortresses; Shirer presents the Munich Agreement as Hitler's way of getting by diplomacy what he couldn't get otherwise. There's more to his position, and plenty of counter-arguments of course, but I've never heard Shirer dismissed as any kind of fringe wacko. Scutigera (talk) 14:03, 9 August 2021 (UTC)
- Yes in William L. Shirers book "The Rise and Fall of the third Reich", part two, chapter four, under the heading "consequenses of Munich", (directly translated from the swedish translated edition) he quotes the nazi general Keitel as he in the Nürnberg trials says that the german generals were really happy over that they didn't have to attack the Czech borders since they, at the time, had quote:
"unsufficient means to attack the Czech border fortresses. From a strict military point of view we lacked the means to make an attack that would be able to break through the border fortification". And the field marshal von Manstein was of the same opinion. He is also quoted. If Shirer quotes them correctly, (and has anybody questioned that?, it seems to me that the earlier version of the truth is more accurate than the modern narrative of the wise Chamberlain, as recently promoted in Netflix Movie Munich (2021). Chamberlain maybe sincerely thought either that he prevented war, or that he at least bought the west time, but he really didn't, according to Shirer. What is the good counter-arguments to these early findings? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 185.113.97.236 (talk) 20:29, 4 February 2022 (UTC)
- The overwhelming verdict, rightly or wrongly, is that Chamberlain was not a hero. The mere presence of a Netflix movie isn’t really reflective of a movement to correct it, even if a correction is justified.
- To be perfectly honest, I don’t know what Keitel was talking about. When the Germans marched into Austria for the Anschluss, it happened at extremely short notice. Furthermore, there were different plans for the way the Sudetenland would be carved off, one with the fortresses and one without.so it is a moot point as to whether the Wehrmacht would have needed to March against fortresses or not.
- But in any case, this is all a bit ahead of the ball game. While the Germans were undoubtedly running an informal proxy war in the Sudetenland - a situation the agreement hoped to quell - the question of marching into Czechoslovakia was a little way off.
- And all of this raises the question of why the Czechs did not fight. Flanker235 (talk) 05:54, 5 February 2023 (UTC)
The German population of Sudetenland had been granted self-determination and home-rule by President Wilson after World War 1. But the newly - founded Czechoslovakian State did not fulfil its promise. This was one of the reasons for Chamberlain`s appeasement policy.--92.230.68.156 (talk) 19:06, 23 July 2010 (UTC)
- Self determination was a component of appeasement. Flanker235 (talk) 05:55, 5 February 2023 (UTC)
Utter nonsense.
Self-Determination of Nations or Self-Determination of Minorities? German immigrants to the Czech Lands were a minority - not a nation, and most countries in Europe have minorities.
A minority ruled by a Nazi like Konrad Henlein is not a minority, but a horde. --Posp68 (talk) 15:51, 2 August 2019 (UTC)
- Strictly speaking, they were not immigrants. They were Germans who found themselves on the other side of the border as a result of Versailles. Flanker235 (talk) 05:56, 5 February 2023 (UTC)
Merge with Appeasement
editThis article adds nothing. Marshall46 (talk) 19:38, 19 September 2010 (UTC)
This article needs a rewrite
editWhile there are several parts of this that make a good case for how the Munich Agreement has been characterised by politicians and some sections of the media, there are many simplistic assumptions made in this article about the reasons for it. While they may be perfectly accurate in terms of a leader making a partisan speech for domestic political consumption, they are not necessarily facts by themselves and this needs to be made absolutely clear. Without that, the misuse and exploitation of the average voter’s lack of knowledge can’t be adequately highlighted. Flanker235 (talk) 06:08, 5 February 2023 (UTC)