Talk:MV Kerlogue

Commemoration

I will remove the Commemoration pics when we have a general article on shipping durung the emergency ClemMcGann (talk) 20:01, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

Gone - to Irish Mercantile Marine during World War II ClemMcGann (talk) 22:47, 11 October 2009 (UTC)

MV

what is a mv , please explain Gnevin (talk) 20:16, 16 March 2008 (UTC)

Done - MV is an abbreviation of Motor Vessel or Merchant vessel - ClemMcGann (talk) 19:08, 23 March 2008 (UTC)

Conflict or misinformed politician?

In the lead section, the politician's speech claims that the ship was blown out of water by RAF, but the end of article mentions that the ship was sold to Norway in 1955+

Might need a clairfication, and perhaps movng the quote from speech out of lead? --TLein (talk) 11:50, 11 September 2008 (UTC)

I fail to see the problem. To be "blown out of the water" does not necessarily mean "sunk". From [1] : it is destroyed or defeated comprehensively. It was destroyed. The entire superstructure was destroyed. The wheelhouse and controls were gone. Both lifeboat were reduced to splinters. It was repeatedly dive-bombed for 20 minutes.

Perhaps some may not be familiar with the idiom "blown out of the water", however it was used in the speech. I'm reluctant to change it ClemMcGann (talk) 18:03, 11 September 2008 (UTC)

Blown out of water, in the way I understand it, does mean that the ship is rendered complete wreck. I didn't say that the speech should be changed, as it's direct quote, but maybe theplace of the speech should be elsewhere than in the LEAD? --TLein (talk) 07:32, 15 September 2008 (UTC)

It sets the tone, I'd rather leave it ClemMcGann (talk) 11:06, 15 September 2008 (UTC)

The quote from Dick Roche describes the RAF attack as occurring subsequent to the Biscay rescue; it almost gives the impression it was a retaliatory act. The body of the article makes clear the rescue occurred *after* the RAF attack. Does it make any sense to include this remark then? The rest of the quote could remain. It's a second-hand source, albeit a reminiscence of his father.Dduff442 (talk) 10:14, 28 April 2009 (UTC)

His words were "Kerlogue got what she deserved from the Royal Air Force a few weeks earlier".

Yet the article quotes him as saying "This ship was rewarded for its humanitarian efforts when, on its next voyage, it was blown out of the water by the RAF" and makes no mention of the statement above?Dduff442 (talk) 14:57, 27 October 2009 (UTC)

Forde's book (page 51) records an apology from another British officer to Capt Donohue (Fortune's replacement) for the behaviour of "a desk sailor". There are a few other pieces of the story, Coogan's book has a criticism of the Polish squadron by another RAF officer. There is a message, released on 50-year rule, from military intelligence of the British Embassy in Dublin that it was unfortunate that Capt Fortune was attacked as he "passed on what he knew". There is more to this story, but we don't do original research here ClemMcGann (talk) 23:06, 11 October 2009 (UTC)

Roche's comments make the article self-contradictory -- I don't understand how you can conclude this improves matters. By placing a (very) long quotation from Roche in the lead, you accord it prominence his notability in the field does not warrant. He's a politician, not a historian. It is plain that the strafing attack *preceded* the rescue of the German sailors yet Roche describes it as a retaliatory act, an impression you accent by placing it in the lead.

I don't know about British Coastal Command's attitude to Ireland and her neutrality -- it seems safe to assume there were a few at least who were very hostile. On the other hand, few today comprehend the extremity of danger to which aircrew were subject. For comparison purposes, Bomber Command crews suffered a loss rate of more than 60% on *average* during the entire war, with the vast majority (92%) being fatalities. The bombing campaign was suspended only when crews' chances of surviving a tour of duty dropped below 20%, which occurred on numerous occasions. The aircraft moved as fast as possible for obvious reasons and if you want to get an idea of the difficulty of identifying targets in those conditions, look up 'gun camera footage' on youtube. You'll have to imagine the effect of the winter weather on the Bay of Biscay.

Bar the Irish merchantmen, every other ship in the Bay of Biscay at that time was either an allied or german warship. (Ireland had an agreement with germany; 'certain named Irish ships' were the sole exclusion to unrestricted submarine warfare in those waters) Every allied airman encountered U-Boats, very few ever encountered an Irish merchant.

I find it extraordinary you don't find the Polish nationality of the strafing crew worth mentioning in the main body of the article. 'Eire' was a word probably unknown to them.

You've done an otherwise marvellous job with the article, an article on a very notable subject. It was for this reason I waited so long for your return instead of just making the edits myself. The lead is too long according to wiki style guidelines, and is editorially unbalanced. Roche has no expertise and little noteworthiness in this area and his comments are clearly wrong. In the light of these facts, I appeal to your scholarly integrity and sense of fair play.Dduff442 (talk) 14:48, 27 October 2009 (UTC)

Although I do not agree with you, I have trimmed the speech, I trust it is to your satisfaction.

I don't like censoring, however I do see how you could contend that there was a contradiction - in the chronology - as related in the speech.

Dick Roche may be a politician, but he is a politician of some note. He was a senator when he made that speech. He is now the Minister for Europe and the recent passing of the Lisbon referendum further raises his standing. His father was one of the crew. He is in a unique position to relate the events.

A lot more could be said of the RAF attack, but it would, imo, unbalance the article. I do not accept the excuses you offer for the RAF. Michael Kennedy's book: Guarding Neutral Ireland has a few interesting facts, derived from released 60-year papers, on pages 253,254, these center around the issue of paying compensation. A note from the Dominions Office is described as a "damning indictment of the men of 307 Squadron" the note says "there was nothing suspicious about the ship and anyone but the Polish pilots would have hesitated to attack". A note from the Admiralty said "They had been warned to expect the Kerlogue, they knew she was at sea the day of the attack". The decision to pay compensation went all the way to the War Cabinet, ex-gratia grants were made because "the Ship had been engaged in carrying a British cargo at the time" (War Cabinet conclusion (162(43)) 26 Nov 1953). Then there is the message, (previously mentioned) released on 50-year rule, from the British Naval Attache in the Dublin Embassy reported to the Director of Naval Intelligence that it was "unfortunate" that Capt Fortune was attacked as he "passed on what he knew". We can only guess what that meant. However we know that there were instances of Irish ships smuggling Free French agents from Britain to the continent. (I have no reason to believe that the Kerlogue did so).

Returning to the RAF. They reported that they attacked a 1,500 ton French ship - the Kerlogue was 335 tons. They claimed that the Kerlogue fired cannon at them - the Kerlogue was unarmed. I suggest that these are serious discrepancies, that they were trigger-happy.

The Kerlogue was fortunate, her cargo of coal saver her. The Cymric was unfortunate. She vanished in the same area a little later on 24 February 1944

Nonetheless I have trimmed the speech. ClemMcGann (talk) 03:16, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

I don't dispute the aircrew were trigger happy. It was near-universal, however, for aircrew to overestimate the size of targets regardless of their standard of training. The impact of cannon shells on the ship could be mistaken for return fire. Equally, they may have attacked the ship deliberately out of some animus towards the country -- there doesn't seem to be enough information to draw a conclusion.

Friendly fire incidents, including against ships, were common. I recently read an account by a cmdr of a US AA Bn. His position, a mile or so away from the front, was bombed and then repeatedly strafed by a P-47. After the fourth or fifth attack, the gunners shot the aircraft down, killing the pilot.

I appreciate the work you've done on the article. The rescue of the destroyer survivors was a major event. I'd prefer to see the info from the notes moved to the body of the article, but their your sources so I'll drop the issue. Thanks for your attention. Dduff442 (talk) 09:05, 30 October 2009 (UTC)

I am not going to get involved in the actual content dispute but the lead does not comply with the WP:LEDE guidelines which state that: "the lead should briefly summarize the most important points covered in an article in such a way that it can stand on its own as a concise version of the article". It does not achieve that objective and could be improved. I suggest moving the quotation down into the main body of the prose and refine the lede to paraphrase the whole article without too much emphasis on any one aspect of the main prose. I have a postally censored cover from one of the injured German survivors who was taken to the military hospital in Cork before being transferred to the Curragh. Would an image be of interest? Cheers ww2censor (talk) 04:02, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

The aircrew doing the attacking were Poles and at the time few Poles had much sympathy for anyone doing anything helpful to the Germans. If they had been an average RAF crew the attack is unlikely to have happened as most would have been familiar with the word EIRE being associated with a neutral Ireland. This is perhaps also why the attackers mistook the Irish Tricolour for the French one. So I suspect that the attack was a simple mistake by a pair of perhaps inexperienced crews who had not come across a neutral ship before - no enemy ship had a prominent national flag painted on its side, only neutrals, so that should have worried them. That they mistook the explosions of their own cannon shells on the Kerlogue for return fire says they were not that experienced. Then again, that they undertook an attack on a vessel at sea is also a guide as the squadron was a night fighter one, not an anti-shipping/strike squadron. In other words, it was not what they were trained for.

The Sunderland not giving any assistance is likely due to there not being any ships nearby and being unwilling to break radio silence to report the vessel in distress - all communication between the ship and the aircraft would have been by morse Aldis lamp which could not be monitored by U-boats. The state of the sea would have had a bearing on whether the aircraft could have landed to give assistance, if it was too rough then the Sunderland would be unable to land, and if it had come across the Kerlogue at the end of its patrol it may have been too short of fuel. But they would have reported it when they landed.

I suspect they may not have broken radio silence because the ship was obviously not in danger of sinking. You didn't risk alerting the U-boats for a lone ship that was obviously not about to go down. If the men had been seen to be boarding lifeboats then a signal would almost certainly have been made, Irish vessel or not. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 14:01, 3 November 2013 (UTC)

Question over coordinates in de-classified documents

"12:55, Sighted Eire merchant vessel Kerlogue in 50°03' north, 9°16' west. On course 240° at 8 knots." Two Mosquito planes, X and S, of No. 307 Polish Night Fighter Squadron: "16:17, 48°55' north, 9°13' west"

This comes from Forde's book. Does the book explain/comment on what looks like a discrepancy between Kerlogue's position and speed at 12:55 and the reported position of attack? GraemeLeggett (talk) 08:00, 21 May 2020 (UTC)

Forde just gives the locations, without comment. We actually have three locations:

12.55pm 50°03' north, 9°16' west. On course 240° at 8 knots. from RAAF Flight-Lieutenant K Sampson

16.17pm 48°55' north, 9°13' west. circling - from 307 Polish Night Fighter Squadron

18.05pm 49°49' north, 9°11' west. on course 315° at 5 knots. from RAAF Flying Office C. Clark

One would expect the 16.17pm reading to be between the 12.55 and the 18.05, but it isn't. Lugnad (talk) 22:23, 21 May 2020 (UTC)

Which gives the ship's track as moving roughly one degree south (60 nautical miles) in a bit over three hours then reversing course to travel a degree north again in under two. Seems improbable for her possible maximum speed, which implies that the navigator(s) on the Mosquitos were out on their calculations. GraemeLeggett (talk) 07:33, 22 May 2020 (UTC)

They were going south with a cargo of British coal for the electric generator in Lisbon. After the attack they turned north, and set course for Cork. I agree with you, the Mosquitos must have been mistaken.Lugnad (talk) 16:18, 22 May 2020 (UTC)