Talk:Meta-ontology/Archive 2

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New section on meta-ontology and philosophy of science

I've written a new sectrion as identified above. I have worded it carefully to point out that the topic is 'meta'ontology and connected it to topics brought up by Carnap and Quine that Inwagen has clearly identified as meta-ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 22:41, 30 March 2013 (UTC)

it looks like another essay to me with the same non third party sourcing but I will check it later today. You should really be using the talk page you know ----Snowded ^TALK 04:44, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

OK I checked, its all the same material with come commentary from you thrown in. The Imogen stuff is already covered, you are writing an essay to extend that to the field of Philosophy of Science, choosing material that fits your perspective. Get it published in a reliable source then we can use it, but here its all original research using primary sources. Some of it repeats material you tried to insert into Philosophy as well, but you were rejected there. May I strongly suggest that you seek agreement to changes on the talk page - very open to discussing, but at the moment its an almost daily insertion of near identical text by you ----Snowded ^TALK 10:58, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

Hi Snowded: I'd like to talk about the question of meta-ontolgy and philosophy of science in a more detached manner. There are a few points I think we could agree upon. One is that a scientific theory has an ontology. Another is that the Carnap-Quine debate is about whether this ontology contains two kinds of objects or only one: are the objects of the formal theory and the objects of the observational implementation of that formal theory separate kinds of thing or the same kind of thing? We also might agree that the formal theory often is mathematical, and that there is an entire field about mathematical ontology that includes for example, mathematical structuralism. Can we agree about these items? Brews ohare (talk) 15:21, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

Next, we might agree that there is discussion about these ontologies. When is such discussion metaontology? According to Hofweber: meta-ontolgy is discussion about "what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the questions it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered." Is this a suitable description of meta-ontology? I don't think the Carnap-Quine debate falls entirely under this definition. Part of it does; the part that is about how one arrives at the two ontologies, the 'sorted' one or the 'flat' one, by an abstract analysis of scientific theories. The actual description of these two ontologies, however, is 'ontology' not meta-ontology. But it may be difficult to explain the process without describing the result as well. Do you have any comments on this score? Brews ohare (talk) 15:21, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

Finally, the discussions of Kuhn and of Hawking are directly aimed at the nature of scientific theory and such a discussion necessarily has implication for the ontology. Now, the quote from Kuhn to the effect that his thinking leads him to believe in a 'flat' ontology says that selection of a 'good' theory has ontological implications. Likewise, the statement of Hawking that there is no 'model-independent' reality also is a statement about a 'flat' ontology. So the implication is that the ideas behind these views of science have a lot of connection to the Carnap-Quine meta-ontological debate. Is it meta-ontology too? Brews ohare (talk) 15:21, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded, you may take the tack that Talk pages are not for discussion of what we think, but what the sources say. I get that. But it would be helpful in writing this article if we understood each other, and understood how we view what the sources say. Brews ohare (talk) 15:21, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

Talk pages are for improving the article, if that means some "what we think" then fine. I think this article is about discussing material which is referenced as meta-ontology. Wider issues on ontology belong on the article of that name. Model-independent reality (taking it at face value, but I am less sure Hawking is an authority here) is a ontological question in its own right, its not a question about the nature of ontology. The stuff on Kuhn is straight down the line Philosophy of Science not "meta-ontology" and again belongs on the article concerned not here. Carnap/Quine (which needs shortening) is there because it is used by one author to illustrate what he has chosen to call meta-onotlogy. Without that reference it would have no place here ----Snowded ^TALK 15:26, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Thanks for the reply. There are a few points I'd like to paraphrase to be sure I got your viewpoint.

• The article meta-ontology should be restricted to material that uses the word 'meta-ontology' explicitly. I'd take that as meaning material that falls under Hofweber's definition that metaontology is about "what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the questions it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered." is to be excluded unless it also mentions the word meta-ontology. Is that correct?
• The Carnap-Quine debate is a marginal case that satisfies your criterion of explicit mention of 'meta-ontology' but it really doesn't belong here either because it is not actually about 'meta-ontology' according to some definition of that term that hasn't been brought forward yet. Is that correct?
• What is your idea of a correct definition of meta-ontology?

Brews ohare (talk) 15:40, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

It should be restricted to material which is properly referenced as being meta-ontology (which is not the same thing). In the Hofweber statement that would mean that the tasks themselves are not, but the question of what the tasks are is. You are writing material on the tasks. Carnap/Quine should only be there in so far as it is necessary to support the description of what the author says. I wouldn't hazzard a definition as I think ontology contains its own definition but that is irellevant----Snowded ^TALK 15:46, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Can you amplify what you mean by 'properly referenced' and distinguish that from requiring an explicit mention of the word 'meta-ontology'? Brews ohare (talk) 15:49, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

Also, Hofweber says meta-ontology includes "with what methodology the [questions of ontology] can be answered". Do you include a discussion of methodology in your view? Brews ohare (talk) 15:54, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

(ec)Well lets say the Oxford Companion had an entry then it would be rather like its one on Meta-ethics. For meta-ethics is says that is the study of meaning of what it means to call something right or wrong, rather than determining what is write or wrong. So if we had that, then we could expand on those discussions taking care not to replicate or parallel material already in the ethics article. Meta-ontology does not seem to have an equivalent entry so its problematic. At the moment we just have some authors who use the term so that is all we can include. It would be especially difficult here anyway as ontology in philosophy is a very different thing from science and information theory, it of its nature about the nature of things. Hofweber's key phrase is "what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish" so again its not about the tasks themselves, it about which tasks ----Snowded ^TALK 15:55, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

I don't think you addressed my questions. Can you try to be more direct? Brews ohare (talk) 16:01, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

I have a philosophy degree, we are trained never to just answer a question, but to challenge the question :-) Its simple this article can talk about what are the tasks of ontology, but not elaborate on those tasks. A proper reference is something like the Oxford companion or the Stamford one but they say similar things to the point I am making. A part of the problem here is that the analytic tradition has a tendency to believe that all philosophy is "meta" but I just mention that in passing. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:06, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

Well, that approach is hard to handle. One has to ask a lot of questions. I'd take the Carnap-Quine debate as primarily about: What is the proper ontology of science? I'd say from your standpoint (and I may be wrong about this) proposals for such an ontology fall inside ontology. On the other hand, Carnap and Quine address this question by proposing two ontologies, and then posing the question: Which is correct? Now we are into meta-ontology, I'd take it, because we need a methodology for answering such a question. How'm I doing? Brews ohare (talk) 16:15, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

From this angle, this statement of Carnap is 'meta'ontology:

The latter introduction, they believe, is legitimate only if it can be justified by an ontological insight supplying an affirmative answer to the question of reality. In contrast to this view, we take the position that the introduction of the new ways of speaking does not need any theoretical justification because it does not imply any assertion of reality.

Agreed? Or, is this simply a characterization of the ontology of formal systems like mathematics?Brews ohare (talk) 16:29, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

It may be that most of the Carnap-Quine debate is actually a question of whether ‘ontology A’ and ‘ontology B’ can be translated into a single ‘ontology Quine’. Then is Quine's methodology for executing such a translation meta-ontology? Or is the proposal itself, that such a translation is the right approach to settling the issue, meta-ontology? Is there an infinite regress involved here? Brews ohare (talk) 16:39, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

The philosophers may be behind the cutting edge on this issue. The IT people have set up a pretty clear definition of ontology, and have gone into extensive detail about translations between ontologies, and the compatibility of different ontologies with different 'conceptualizations'. Isn't the entire issue of deciding such compatibility meta-ontology?

The whole ensemble of WP articles concerning Ontology (information science) is a morass, and that article hasn't had substantial attention for five years already. This page meta-ontology has received no substantial attention since its inception in 2007. Brews ohare (talk) 16:45, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

The point is that it is not for you or I to determine what is or is not meta-ontology. I can't speak plainer than that. Sorting out the IS ontology article would be a great service by the way, but I'm not going there----Snowded ^TALK 18:04, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Of course there is no disagreement about "it is not for you or I to determine what is or is not meta-ontology". However, we might consider what it is that is meta-ontology, according to sources. In particular, we have Inwagen's characterization of the Carnap-Quine debate as 'meta-ontology', and I've posed the question: What aspects of this debate did he intended to include under this name? His wording ‘What are we asking when we ask “What is there?” ’? is subject to interpretation. His further comment is

"We must distinguish Quine’s meta-ontology from his ontology – from his various theses about what there is and isn’t. Quine’s meta-ontology comprises such propositions as his theses on quantification and ontological commitment. His ontology comprises such propositions as the proposition that there are no propositions."

That suggests that Quine's formal apparatus for determining the ontology that is implied by certain language constructs is metaontology. This apparatus constitutes what might be called a 'methodology' and so falls under Hofweber's definition as well. I asked for your opinion on this matter.

And finally, the various criteria for a good theory advanced by Kuhn, Hawking and others might be called a methodology for selecting a theory, and as such is also a methodology for selecting an ontology as well. Kuhn explicitly admits that this is the case in the quote provided above. Your opinion is that this is not meta-ontology, presumably because, although it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, it doesn't call itself a duck, eh? Brews ohare (talk) 18:45, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

(e/c) "However, we might consider what it is that is meta-ontology, according to sources"... were it not for the WP:TLDR guaranteed to disrupt the willingness of others to participate in such a talk page discussion... Please don't expect editors to entertain your dialectic with answers to rhetorical questions: you get on with quoting Inwagen both in regard to Carnap-Quine and in general. Clearly, he can be quoted in the article. In the grand scheme of things, it should come as no surprise his suggestion that philosophers have been asking the wrong questions about 'what is' is less than pivotal—and what turns on such marketing is generally beside the point—it's just 'newing up' a sanitary brand of metaphysics. As Snowded said in passing, "the analytic tradition has a tendency to believe that all philosophy is 'meta'"... a positive explanation for their erstwhile hostility to metaphysics, perhaps... but even Brews seems to have had his doubts^[1][2] about refactoring this 'meta' into an unlikely nom du guarre for questions of realism in the philosophy of science. Cute, but don't do that (obviously), and please don't "refactor" the outstanding RfC either...^[3] (revise your additional presentation on a subpage, so that others can follow along). Again, please stop adding it to the article.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 23:31, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

Brews, if you can find a third party source that supports your interpretations above then the material can be included, but you are otherwise, as ever, attempting to write an essay which is a worthy enterprise if you can find a journal to take it ----Snowded ^TALK 22:17, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded, there is just no getting you to put a toe in the water, eh? Maybe you studied philosophy, but you sound more like an Enron executive in front of a Senate Committee. Brews ohare (talk) 22:23, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

We are here to write an encyclopaedia Brews and there are rules we follow. I realise you were frustrated on the Philosophy article and that you are frustrated here but that is no reason to descend to personal attacks. Did you learn anything from you ban on editing physics articles? At the moment it looks like you didn't ----Snowded ^TALK 22:27, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

Snowded, I wasn't trying to be nasty here. I invited you to state your opinion on several specific issues, and you won't. I thought I'd tease you a bit. Sorry. In any event, it appears that the categorical statement by Inwagen:

"We must distinguish Quine’s meta-ontology from his ontology – from his various theses about what there is and isn’t. Quine’s meta-ontology comprises such propositions as his theses on quantification and ontological commitment. His ontology comprises such propositions as the proposition that there are no propositions."

is a reliable published source explaining what aspect of Quine's discussion with Carnap is meta-ontology. It is the part having to do with ontological commitment. It would seem therefore that a section on ontological commitment has a place in the article meta-ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 23:07, 31 March 2013 (UTC)

In rough outline, the ontological commitment argument in this context is about what certain language implies about two objects: the objects of the formal structure (as discussed, for instance, in mathematical structuralism) and the objects referred to when applying the formal structure to observations in the lab. Quine says the two objects are so intertwined that to call them different is wrong. Carnap takes the much more readily understandable view (understandable because it doesn't take translation of English into symbolic logic) that they are different. I'd say (and of course this would have to be verified) that most scientists take Carnap's view, but some like Weyl, who are Platonists, believe that all science is about discovering the Platonic realities revealed to the penetrating mind, and so would take a peculiarly cerebral form of Quine's view. Hawking and Kuhn seem to take Quine's view on the basis that the observations used to support a model support it only in concert, and not individually, and in Hawking's case, the same observations can be explained by several theories and each sees the observations differently, supporting the view that the observational objects are at least colored by the theory being used to filter them. This whole subject is quite fascinating, and the vehicle of ontological commitment seems likely to me to open the door of meta-ontology to matters that include Kuhn, Hemple, Duhem, Hawking, Davies and who knows who else. Brews ohare (talk) 04:26, 1 April 2013 (UTC)

Given that I am criticising you for attempting to edit the article based on your views rather than proper sourcing so its unlikely I am going to offer my own views, neither should I. Otherwise Inwagen is one paper. If you want to make the article one about his paper - something I was happy with up front - then fine. However it isn't the case so you need more than Inwagen as a source to justify inclusion. Your last paragraph is pure original research and/or synthesis ----Snowded ^TALK 04:46, 1 April 2013 (UTC)

Ontological commitment

I've put in a section on ontological commitment. It's purpose is to explain what Inwagen saw as meta-ontology and provide an introduction to how ontological commitment is related to meta-ontology. It may be that i have fallen short of my goals, and so some revisions might be in order. However, I suggest that where they are needed, changes be made, rather than simply reverting this entire section on the ground that it is imperfect in some ways. Brews ohare (talk) 16:39, 1 April 2013 (UTC)

You've written another essay, the style is conversational, in the main it's your extrapolation and interpretation of one author again - in fact the whole of this article has become a summary of one article by one philosopher. There is already more than enough, too much in fact, on that one author's view of the Q-C debate, this simply too much. The most we need on ontological commitment is a link to the article of that name ----Snowded ^TALK 14:18, 2 April 2013 (UTC)

Modern developments in meta-ontology

In this edit Snowded has removed reference to ontological pluralism and three sources relating this topic to Carnap. Snowded's explanation for his removal is that it is "off topic".

That explanation is hard to follow for several reasons:

(i) the discussion the Carnap-Quine debate between 'flat' and 'sorted' ontologies is the subject of most of the article;

(ii) the cited sources state recent evolution of opinion away from the Quine-side of this discussion toward the Carnap side, which seems quite on-topic to me;

(iii) the philosopher WL Craig clearly places this discussion in the realm of meta-ontology as does .

For these reasons, I have re-inserted this material, which at a minimum requires discussion here before its re-reversion by Snowded. Brews ohare (talk) 15:33, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

Carnap- Quine is used to illustrate one authors use of the term. That does not mean the article is about the debate, or about extensions to the debate. That material belongs elsewhere. The Craig reference is a blog please. You have to justify inclusion of material, If another edit reverts then you discuss. Happy to do that but for the moment the material goes. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:00, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

You are off the beam here, Snowded. I have not made the claims you suggest. You refuse to accept that 'meta-ontology' is explicitly used to describe the subject of the Carnap-Quine debates by scores of authors in multiple publications. It is not that 'meta-ontology' is about Carnap and Quine; it is about the issues they have raised about 'what is meant by "what is?"' The matter is perhaps most clear in Amie L. Thomasson . The Craig reference is not cited in the material I added to the article, but I mention it to show that he thinks the topic is meta-ontology. Thomasson is a different kettle of fish, and you are w-a-a-ay out on a limb to dismiss her. Brews ohare (talk) 18:01, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

The Carnap-Quinne debate is used by some others to talk about meta-ontology, although neither author uses the word. Thomasson also uses the debate. It does not justify you in an extended discussion of that debate, other than what is necessary to explain the issue. That is more than adequately discussed. You quoted Craig as your point three above, I did you the courtesy of answering that point. Oh and I haven't dismissed Thomasson, please stop these multipl misrepresentations of what other editors say, its started to look deliberate as I don't believe you are stupid. I do dismiss your use of her work. ----Snowded ^TALK 19:10, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

Four different views of ontology modeled after Schaffer. Top to bottom: flat, sorted, structured and multiply structured

Well, Snowded, it is interesting that although Amie L. Thomasson and others think there is something new going on here and there are new books and papers about it, you don't think it's worth a mention. I simply wanted to cite them as later developments, but because you require more to be said to demonstrate that something actually is going on here, I'll look into doing that for you. Brews ohare (talk) 22:05, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

Please stop this silly mis-representation Brews. Try and explain HERE what you want to achieve and how it links to the source then we can talk about it. The edit I reverted as a COATRACK and/or OR. I'm open to change but it has to be properly sourced and not just a string of quotes selected by you ----Snowded ^TALK 05:26, 13 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: I think the present proposal here is flawed, and it should be phrased in terms of ontological pluralism. The Carnap-Quine debate can be seen in this light as a comparison between a 'sorted' and a 'flat' ontology in the sense of Schaffer. The work of Amie L. Thomasson and Price and Eklund are clearly relevant and should be presented. The work of Hawking contributes a wrinkle to this discussion, just a wrinkle, namely the view that (i) the theoretical coverage of the domain of science is covered by a patchwork of overlapping models, and (ii) where they overlap one has a choice of ontologies. In the sense of Hirsch. In an overlapping region the overlapping ontologies are mutually translatable, but outside the overlap they are disparate. Some kind of figure might help illustrate the differences, not necessarily the one at the right.

This is the outline of what I think a good presentation of the modern situation should contain. I am mot suggesting that this outline is in suitable form for inclusion in the WP article as it stands now. I would appreciate some help in putting this material together, if you are up for it. Brews ohare (talk) 16:49, 13 April 2013 (UTC)

I read the Thomasson paper on the plane to Berlin this afternoon. As far as I can see it's just another summary of the Q/C debate with maybe a modern update in the reference to Putman. Whatever the sources on this subject so far used in this article seem to relate to said debate, and from a logic/linguistic perspective only. So I don't see that there is much to add to what we have. Now if you can find meta-ontological material outside of those schools it would be an addition. Otherwise to include ontological pluralism you really have to demonstrate from sources that it is a key part of meta-ontology as opposed to ontology and so far you have not done that so its a COATRACK. Your diagram is origin research, your link to Hawking unsupported by references ----Snowded

^TALK 21:20, 13 April 2013 (UTC)

My reading of the Thomasson paper provides a few key points. First, the paper identifies Carnap with meta-ontology, defusing the argument that this categorization was peculiar to Inwagen. The next issue is whether anything is added by Thomasson (setting ourselves up rather dubiously as better judges of this matter than the philosophers who reviewed the paper for publication). Thomasson says that the Carnap-Quine debate is misplaced: "The real distinction instead is between existence questions asked using a linguistic framework and existence questions that are supposed to be asked somehow without being subject to those rules—asked, as Quine puts it ‘before the adoption of the given language’." "But to say that the meaning of the term “object” or “exists”—or of sentences framed using those terms—depends on our conceptual scheme is not at all to say that objects (the term now being used in accord with the rules of an established language, say English) depend on our conceptual scheme. The meaning of ‘planet’ similarly depends on our choice of conceptual scheme, but planets (now using, not mentioning, the term) don’t depend on there being any conceptual scheme whatsoever."

Whatever one thinks of Thomasson's success or failure, there is a point here that can be presented. It seems to me to have a lot in common with the other authors of the 21rst centruy.

Personally, I don't think Thomasson has got the point completely here. The real issue is how to separate observations that support a theory from the theory they support. Hawking has suggested we cannot separate an individual theory from its reality: the best one can do is try to spread out the domain of application of various theories and thus reduce the number needed to encompass what we know.

The amazingly complex connection between the 'Higgs boson' in theory and the 'Higgs boson' as experimentally established in the Hadron collider requires a lot of thinking to establish we are not in a nearly circular situation; blurring the distinction between analytic and synthetic objects if you like. This issue, IMO, is very real, very important to the 'big science' vs. 'little science' debate, and to actually understanding why the scientific enterprise works, and where it may break down. It seems to me that it can be done in the abstract, but I haven't found a good discussion of the point. Maybe you know of one? Brews ohare (talk) 22:49, 13 April 2013 (UTC)

Yes adding Thomasson to the reference list is fine and the "displaced" point possibly. Hawkings no and everyone is telling you list. I also suspect its a breech of your restriction on Physics come to to think of it for you to be running this campaign. ----Snowded ^TALK 03:34, 14 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: this is not the answer to a plea for cooperation. You seem intent not so much on helping with the presentation but on searching for pretext to get rid of me. Why do you want that so-o-o bad? Brews ohare (talk) 06:49, 14 April 2013 (UTC)

I am not prepared to co-operate in building coatrack articles or doing original research. The fact that you persist in trying to do that is a problem, and one that you have had elsewhere. I've been very very patient for over a month now, but that is running out ----Snowded ^TALK 07:05, 14 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: If you stop to think about it, I've been very patient myself in dealing with your unwillingness to discuss content directly and instead resort to attacks and 'Moses-on-the-mount' sermons instead. You might notice that my conduct has always been about content, and I have been open to modifications and changes. The articles where the two of us have been involved have made some advances despite your repeated reversion of material. It is unfortunate that the moderate voice of Pforrest has disappeared from WP.

You requested an outline of what I thought might be accomplished here, and I obliged. Your response now is to chastise me for my attempt, accuse me of trying to build a WP:Coatrack, and of venturing to violate the ban against me for physics topics. And you talk about your patience? Your patience is that of a cat at a mouse hole. Brews ohare (talk) 15:09, 14 April 2013 (UTC)

A lot of your contributions have been to make judgements about other editors if you check. When you have raised RfCs other editors have not backed you so please get a grip and make some proposals which are relevant to the topic, rather than your personal extrapolations. ----Snowded ^TALK 19:58, 14 April 2013 (UTC)

What is closer to the truth, Snowded, is that you have made knee-jerk dismissals of my suggestions and only after repeated prodding actually read the sources to find that they said exactly what I claimed they said.. Brews ohare (talk) 20:03, 14 April 2013 (UTC)

Oh please, just try and realise that people can legitimately disagree with you ----Snowded ^TALK 20:07, 14 April 2013 (UTC)

I imagine you applaud the category of editor's making 'legitimate' disagreement, Snowded, and will continue to strive toward that goal. Brews ohare (talk) 20:12, 14 April 2013 (UTC)

Modern views

Snowded, in your comment here you accepted that Thomasson's views could be stated. I have done that. I'd now like you to address Eklund's views as expressed here. Eklund also extends the Carnap-Quine debate and includes discussion of work by Sider and Dorr. I believe something along these lines should be included as well. Brews ohare (talk) 15:39, 14 April 2013 (UTC)

For example, Eklund says "Cian Dorr has argued that we should take ontological questions as being asked in a version of natural language – Ontologese – especially well suited to ontological concerns (e.g. where no ontological claims are analytic). This is different from a Carnapian emphasis on expediency." (Reference is to Dorr, Cian: (2005). "Chapter 8: What we Disagree about when we Disagree about Ontology". In Mark Eli Kalderon, ed (ed.). Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Clarendon Press, Oxford. pp. 234–286. ISBN 978-0-19-928218-0. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) ) Brews ohare (talk) 16:05, 14 April 2013 (UTC)

I've accepted that her article is a suitable reference. I will review the wording you have put in. Otherwise Eklund seems to be another example of you extending beyond the scope of the article. The Carnap-Quine debate is used here to illustrate what a few authors mean when they talk about meta-ontology. That does not mean that this should be come an article about the Carnap-Quine debate or about the ontological issues in it except in so far as they are termed metaontology. On that basis I can't see a reason to add Eklund ----Snowded ^TALK 20:19, 14 April 2013 (UTC)

I've removed the second half of the two concatenated Thomasson quotes due to WP:SYN. The second quote was not about the Carnap-Quine debate at all, nor about the distinction being drawn in the first quote: it was about the anti-realist "unfortunate consequences" of Putnam's "very influential" conceptual relativity... his so-called internal realism. Not that Thomasson's views were stated, but to clarify what "extends the Carnap-Quine debate" would suggest along the lines of Eklund's discussion of Sider and Dorr, given the quote from page 7 of the pdf... he continues: "The comparison with Sider and Dorr is meant only to illustrate — should an illustration be needed — how a wedge can be driven between the claim that there is an [External/Internal] distinction and the claim that ontological questions are shallow".—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 10:36, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

Good call ----Snowded ^TALK 12:43, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

So why not add the Sider-Dorr discussion? Brews ohare (talk) 13:55, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

'cause its a variation on the Carnap-Quine debate which is only here to illustrate the subject ----Snowded ^TALK 14:08, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

I don't see why a development in an 'illustration of the subject' (the Carnap-Quine debate) falls outside the article about meta-ontology. And MachineElf's reasoning for removing the Thomasson quote is exactly the opposite: that it does not refer to the Carnap-Quine debate you call 'an example' of the subject. Confusing. Brews ohare (talk) 14:26, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

Comments by Thomasson are 'meta-ontology'

Thomasson says:

"But to say that the meaning of the term “object” or “exists” — or of sentences framed using those terms — depends on our conceptual scheme is not at all to say that objects (the term now being used in accord with the rules of an established language, say English) depend on our conceptual scheme."

This observation was removed by MachineElf from the article on the grounds that it is "not about the Carnap-Quine debate".

But the article meta-ontology is not entirely about the Carnap-Quine debate either. It is about meta-ontology, and the entire Thomasson paper stresses that her discussion is meta-ontology. She says in her introduction:

"And what difference would rediscovering it make to contemporary discussions in metaontology? Those are the questions I aim to answer."

Thomasson's comment removed by MachineElf addresses Carnap's separation of 'external' from 'internal' objects, Carnap's ontology, and proposes a different one. It is a comparison of ontologies.

Now one can say that a comparison of ontologies belongs under the subject of 'ontology'. But that point of view already has been accepted by the article meta-ontology in its introductory paragraph where it refers to Hofweber, who says

"meta-ontology, which strictly speaking is not part of ontology construed narrowly, but the study of what ontology is. However, like most philosophical disciplines, ontology more broadly construed contains its own meta-study, and thus meta-ontology is part of ontology, more broadly construed. Nonetheless it is helpful to separate it out as a special part of ontology. Many of the philosophically most fundamental questions about ontology really are meta-ontological questions. "

In other words, "yes, comparison of ontologies can be viewed as part of ontology, namely the part 'helpfully' separated and designated as ‘meta-ontology’". The removed Thomasson quote properly belongs in the article. Brews ohare (talk) 14:22, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

The statement from Thomasson is more than enough for this article. The quote adds nothing of relevance. ----Snowded ^TALK 14:26, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

Apparently, Snowded, you are placing your opinion that Thomasson's discussion is inconsequential above the opinion of Thomasson herself (a well known and widely published professional philosopher) and the opinion of her peers and editors. I don't think that is WP policy.

I suspect that you have not absorbed what Thomasson has to say and so do not yet understand her contribution here. The omitted quote is her counter-proposal to Carnap and the key to what she has to say. Brews ohare (talk) 14:40, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

Try to attend to what I say rather than your constant misrepresentations Brews and keep your suspicions to yourself. I do not think the material should be there for the reasons stated. and I am not interested in participating in one of your interminable attempts at strawman arguments ----Snowded ^TALK 14:47, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: You have failed to present your 'legitimate' objections to including this material. So far your objection consists of your unsupported statement that Thomasson's discussion is 'nothing of relevance'. I find that an unsupported and unsupportable claim. Thomasson has proposed that the Carnap view of 'internal' and 'external' objects needs elaboration in a direction Carnap did not envision, or at least did not discuss adequately. The suppressed quote states her proposal. Brews ohare (talk) 15:06, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

I think I have Brews and I'm not prepared to engage with tendentious extended discussions. ----Snowded ^TALK 15:11, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

If you have done more than assert your personal evaluation of the importance of Thomasson's work, I am unaware of it. Of course, your opinion is valuable, but it is not in itself a grounds for rejecting the views of a published and well-known philosopher. Perhaps you could point me to something on this Talk page that is a more substantial presentation of your position? Brews ohare (talk) 15:16, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

Perhaps you refer to these remarks of yours, which I had thought you had revised when you finally accepted a mention of Thomasson? There you say "Whatever the sources on this subject so far used in this article seem to relate to said debate, and from a logic/linguistic perspective only. So I don't see that there is much to add to what we have." Is that your current argument as well? If so, it is still simply your opinion that a 'logic/linguistic perspective' is inconsequential in a metaontological discussion, clearly not the view of Thomasson or a host of other modern contributors to this subject. Brews ohare (talk) 15:23, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

I suspect one could add Quine to the list of those thinking this discussion is almost entirely about 'logic/linguistic perspective'. Brews ohare (talk) 15:25, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

See multiple previous comments on Original Research, Synthesis and Coat Racking. See also responses from other editors on related issues on your RfCs. ----Snowded ^TALK 15:30, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

So you have no 'legitimate' grounds to reject including Thomasson's position. Instead of good reasons, you provide a list of WP policies with no indication why they should be considered, and a completely non-specific reference to 'responses' to RfC's unrelated to the Thomasson quote. You avoid any direct engagement over the pertinence of Thomasson's arguments to meta-ontology, which you contest because of your personal opinion, from wherever that might originate. Brews ohare (talk) 15:57, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

Thomasson position not rejected just the quote. Policies quoted as you keep ignoring them----Snowded ^TALK 16:04, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

Rejection of the quote leaves only an opaque one-line preamble to Thomasson's position. Thomasson's position is clarified in the rejected additional quote, related directly to Carnap's 'framework', and without the quote it is not understandable to most readers. If anything, more detail is needed, not less. Please try to make some useful suggestion about the Thomasson quote instead of vague listings of WP policies. Brews ohare (talk) 16:19, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

I'd say that Thomasson's position has a lot to do with Hirsch and several others in invoking a larger context for 'existence' of objects, one that transcends any particular framework. It may be that when all is boiled down it is a less formal version of Quine's view that 'synthetic' and 'analytic' objects blur together. What we need here is a real presentation of this matter of how the 'objects' of observations supporting a model are colored by their counterparts in the model they are supposed to support. Brews ohare (talk) 16:29, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

This observation was removed by MachineElf from the article on the grounds that it is "not about the Carnap-Quine debate". It was removed due to WP:SYN Brews, because you quite literally concatenated an unrelated quote regarding Putnam's influence to the one you introduced regarding the Carnap-Quine debate, thereby misrepresenting Quine's position as somehow anti-realist. It's a meta-strawman (how droll) to misrepresent my edit as a general rejection of "Thomasson's position" on meta-ontology, a deflationist position that's conveyed in no way whatsoever by the quote I removed: But the article meta-ontology is not entirely about the Carnap-Quine debate either. Obviously, yet you're harping on it nonetheless and I did not, in fact, reject your admittedly opaque inclusion of "Thomasson's position" on the Carnap-Quine debate, which your concatenation of the unrelated quote would misrepresent. You continue: Thomasson's comment removed by MachineElf addresses Carnap's separation of 'external' from 'internal' objects, Carnap's ontology, and proposes a different one. It is a comparison of ontologies. Not true... I've already explained what the removed quote is about... WP:IDHT.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 17:47, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

MachineElf: The modern developments of meta-ontology are inadequately presented in this section. I don't think my two quotes do any serious harm to Thomasson's argument. However, if you can improve upon the situation, why not do that? You might also look into the other modern sources mentioned by Eklund and by Thomasson and by Price. The goal here is to improve the article, and perhaps you can do a good job of this. Brews ohare (talk) 18:16, 15 April 2013 (UTC)

Metaphysician, reel thyself :) Thomasson's a curious choice... she repeatedly laments the marginalisation of a deflationary approach, characterizing her proposed rehabilitation as Carnapian in spirit:

fishing 101

I’ll argue, first, that Carnap’s original position was often dismissed because it was wrongly associated with verificationism and anti-realism. But I will argue that there is a way to interpret Carnap’s view that does not rely on verificationism nor lead to anti-realism. Carnap’s was then put aside and forgotten given the common assumption that Quine had won the Carnap-Quine debate and made the world safe for serious metaphysics. Later attempts to revive a deflationary position only made matters worse: Putnam’s deflationism linked the view to anti-realism, and while Hirsch rescued it from that association, he linked deflationism to a form of quantifier variance. Since then, quantifier variance has come to be considered the route deflationists must take. Putnam, Carnap, and Hirsch and other deflationists have all been lumped together as defenders of quantifier variance, and serious metaphysicians have set their sights on defending serious metaphysics by attacking quantifier variance or defending the idea that the quantifier is (or can be) univocal. I’ll argue, however, that Carnap in fact is not committed to quantifier variance in anything like Hirsch’s sense, and that he does not rely on it in his ways of deflating metaphysical debates. As a result, the contemporary focus in metametaphysics on quantifier variance is the product of a historical wrong turn, and is irrelevant to the prospects for evaluating a truly Carnapian approach". ... So why was the Carnapian deflationary approach to existence questions discarded, left behind in the history of philosophy, with Quine’s brand of ontology soon to take over and dominate for the next sixty years or more? ... The full story about why Carnapian deflationism about ontology virtually fell off the map for the next several decades may have as much to do with the friends as enemies of deflationism. ... But there are two ways in which Putnam’s deflationism takes importantly different turns than Carnap’s, both of which have had unfortunate consequences. For these differences have deflected the main metaontological dispute away from the central issues and have contributed to making the deflationary project distasteful and keeping it largely underground. ... Most of the focus of metaontological debates for about the next twenty years has centered on the question of whether the quantifier varies in meaning or not (see, e.g. Hirsch 2002, 2009; van Inwagen 1998, 2009; Sider 2007, 2009). Both [turns] have come to be strongly associated with Carnapian deflationism. Thus, for example, Matti Eklund writes: …it is common to take Carnap to be what I will call an ontological pluralist: to hold a view not unlike that today defended by Eli Hirsch (under the name quantifier variance) and Hilary Putnam (under the name conceptual relativity). (Sometimes Hirsch and Putnam are even described as ‘neo-Carnapians’). (2009, 137)

—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 00:13, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

I see this is amusing, but do you think you will tackle summarizing it? I was reading about Wittgenstein (§68 in Philosophical Investigations) this afternoon and it seems to me he has beaten the moderns to the punch: "For I can give the concept number rigid limits in this way, that is, use the word ‘number’ for a rigidly limited concept, but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is not closed by a frontier."..."But then the use of the word is "unregulated" - It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules." Wittgenstein is discussing the word 'game', but introduced 'number' along the way. Brews ohare (talk) 01:01, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

Please tell me that you are not planning to try and include that as well? ----Snowded ^TALK 04:41, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

RfC: Proposed discussion of Hawking's views

Stephen Hawking has proposed model-dependent realism as his approach to the ontology of science. Inasmuch as meta-ontology is the subject where different views of ontology are considered, it seems appropriate to include Hawking's views in this article. The following paragraph is suggested as an addition at the end of the subsection Further views. Comments and suggestions for improvement are appreciated. Brews ohare (talk) 16:33, 10 April 2013 (UTC)

Paragraph for the end of subsection Further views

The proposed paragraph follows:

The question of different approaches to ontologies is addressed by Stephen Hawking as well, although he has declared "philosophy is dead" and suggests his analysis somehow lies outside philosophy:

"Model-dependent realism short-circuits all this argument and discussion between the realist and anti-realist schools of thought. According to model-dependent realism it is pointless to ask whether a model is real, only whether it agrees with observation."

— Hawking and Mlodinow, The Grand Design, p. 46

Whether one shares Hawking's assessment of settling this debate or not, his contribution is known as model-dependent realism and suggests there are multiple realities, each associated with its own peculiar scientific model. As a result, we have a patchwork of overlapping ontologies corresponding to theories with overlapping domains of application. Each ontology is structured in the sense of Schaffer, but there simply is not a single unique ontology, at least at the present stage of development of science:

"Just as there is not flat map that is a good representation of the Earth's entire surface, there is no single theory that is a good representation of observations in all situations."

— Hawking and Mlodinow, The Grand Design, p. 8

Comments

• Although Hawking is not a philosopher himself, as Hawking is a very well known scientist, and his book The Grand Design with Mlodinow is widely known, it seems a WP reader might wish to know of his opinions. Brews ohare (talk) 16:33, 10 April 2013 (UTC)
• In this connection, I'll add the following quote:

"Let me explain. Having set aside a Monday afternoon to read Hawking and Mlodinow’s book, I spent that morning working through a scholarly article from Blackwell’s Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics on a philosophical viewpoint known as ontological pluralism. Ontological pluralism is a view in a sub-discipline of philosophy whose name sounds like stuttering: meta-metaphysics, or, as it’s sometimes called, meta-ontology. This is philosophy at its most ethereal. Ontology is the study of being or of what exists, the nature of reality. Meta-ontology is one notch higher: it inquires whether ontological disputes are meaningful and how best to resolve them."

"Imagine my utter astonishment therefore to find Hawking and Mlodinow espousing ontological pluralism (without being aware of the name) as their philosophy of science! They call their view “model-dependent realism.”" — William Lane Craig ... Hawking and Mlodinow: Philosophical Undertakers

Craig, Research Professor of Philosophy at the Talbot School of Theology in La Mirada, California, includes Hawking and meta-ontology in the same paragraph! Brews ohare (talk) 17:19, 11 April 2013 (UTC)

• This is an article about meta-ontology not ontology. Despite being asked many times (on many articles) Brews has not been able to find a philosophical source that would link Hawking to this article. In addition Hawking does not talk about meta-ontology at all, its original research and/or synthesis to include the material here. For other articles it might be appropriate, but for an article where the subject is probably only known to a sub-set of philosophers its not ----Snowded ^TALK 16:37, 10 April 2013 (UTC)

Meta-ontology is about different meanings of the assertion "there exists..." Evidently Hawking's proposal of model-dependent realism is one way to look at this topic, one that asserts there are overlapping meanings, each associated with a particular theory among many overlapping theories. So it is the case that Hawking's views are related to meta-philosophy.Brews ohare (talk) 16:45, 10 April 2013 (UTC)

The idea of a RfC is that you make a comment then allow other editors to say something. When you raised an RfC on Philosophy you attacked every editor who made a comment, that is bad form. Your argument above is pure original research and your definition of meta-philosophy is a statement about one thing that is mentioned in ontology. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:51, 10 April 2013 (UTC)

The idea that a comment is an attack is revealing. Brews ohare (talk) 17:16, 10 April 2013 (UTC)

It was :-) ----Snowded ^TALK 17:21, 10 April 2013 (UTC)

• WP:COATRACK: Hawking won't even confess to philosophizing, much less meta-ontologizing... as no source accusing him of the latter will be forthcoming and no WP article "is the subject where different views of ontology are considered", I'd be hard pressed to support such a suggestion... especially one making an egregiously false claim that Hawking "suggests there are multiple realities, each associated with its own peculiar scientific model".—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 21:13, 10 April 2013 (UTC)

MachineElf: Out of curiosity, why do you think it is 'egregiously false' to say Hawking suggests multiple realities, when model-dependent realism insists that every model has its own reality? Brews ohare (talk) 23:14, 10 April 2013 (UTC)

Because it's a blatant misrepresentation of what Hawking wrote.—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 05:05, 11 April 2013 (UTC)

I find that statement does not agree with my reading of The Grand Design. Here are two quotes that seem to me to support the view of the proposed paragraph above:

"We shall adopt an approach that we call model-dependent realism. It is based on the idea that our brains interpret the input from our sensory organs by making a model of the world. When such a model is successful at explaining events, we tend to attribute to it, and to the elements and concepts that constitute it, the quality of reality or absolute truth. But there may be different ways in which one could model the same physical situation, with each employing different fundamental elements and concepts. If two such ...theories or models accurately predict the same events, one cannot be said to be more real than the other; rather we are free to use whichever model is the most convenient."

— Hawking and Mlodinow, The Grand Design, p. 8

"According to the idea of model-dependent realism introduced in Chapter 3, ...there is no model-independent test of reality. It follows that a well-constructed model creates a reality of its own."

— Hawking and Mlodinow, The Grand Design, p. 172

So what is the basis of your interpretation, please? Brews ohare (talk) 05:24, 11 April 2013 (UTC)

Brews, you did this at the Philosophy article. Pushing back tendentiously on any RfC contributor who did not support you. Its a pattern of editing that has got you topic banned elsewhere and you are dangerously near the edge of a ArbEnforcement report at teh moment. ----Snowded ^TALK 10:36, 11 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: I simply want to understand the basis for MachineElf's understanding. It might change my understanding as well, which would completely change the proposal here. Your insistence upon viewing such exchanges as hostile is peculiar. Brews ohare (talk) 14:38, 11 April 2013 (UTC)

carry on like this and you are heading for arbitration enforcement with a request for you physics topic ban to be extended to Philosophy. Your call ----Snowded ^TALK 17:25, 11 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded I do not understand your attitude here. As I have said, MachineElf has a different take on Hawking, and I'd like to know how he arrives at his take. I've presented quotes that don't seem to indicate the same viewpoint, and I'd like his interpretation. And I have quoted Craig, who suggests Hawking's view is already well-known as a branch of meta-ontology called ontological pluralism. That might be a different approach to this subject matter.

The objective of the RfC is not, as you seem to think, to solicit votes and one-liners. The object is to arrive at an opinion on this material and ways to present it, if at all. Achieving that goal requires an exchange of views. These exchanges are not arguments (at least with most editors). They are a discussion. There is a difference, you know. Brews ohare (talk) 00:42, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

Brews, take a look at some other RfCs. Yes there is dialogue, but the proposer does not demand clarification and argue his case in response to each opposer. On the RfC on Philosophy you irritated several editors by refusing to accept their position demanding explanation, then explanation of explanations followed by explanations of the explanation of the original explanation. That is a behaviour issue. You should also notify other editors if you are taking an issue to a forum as well by the way. ----Snowded ^TALK 12:59, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: To return to the proposal, what do you think about changing the proposal to refer to ontological pluralism, which appears to be understood to be a branch of meta-ontology? Brews ohare (talk) 13:08, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

Looks like aother Coatrack proposal to me. ----Snowded ^TALK 13:41, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

In this connection, Amie Thomasson's paper appears to me to be close to Hawking's proposal. Brews ohare (talk) 13:39, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

Also in this connection Carnap and ontological pluralism, a chapter in Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology.. Brews ohare (talk) 13:59, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

OMG you are doing the name association thing again. This article references Carnap, this other article references Carnap and ontological pluralism so Brews can add a paragraph to this article. Thats OR. You need something which is not an extension of Carnap (that might belong elsewhere), but something that is a referenced link to the subject of the article. ----Snowded ^TALK 15:05, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: Your snobby response sprinkled with italics and OMG's is not a substitute for your actually reading these sources, which seriously elaborate from a 'philosophically kosher' point of view what Hawking says about this subject. Of course, Hawking is only somewhat original in his claims, and doesn't demonstrate much awareness that he sometimes treads well-worn paths, but these authors have arrived at the basis for his views from a stance based on philosophical history. Your scoffing would be more usefully replaced with a careful discussion of these sources and how they might be presented in this article. Brews ohare (talk) 15:47, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

• Oppose, this is pure WP:SYNTHESIS. Rather than argue about Hawking's amateurish bullshit, I suggest making this article, which is presently a disjointed mess, into something readable. Ease off the scholarly writing style (excessive quoting and leading off sentences with proper names) and imitate the style of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy meta-ontology entry. Abductive (reasoning) 14:51, 11 April 2013 (UTC)

Abductive The idea that the proposal is an example of WP:SYNTHESIS is interesting. The proposal does state the views of Hawking, both about reality and about philosophy, so there is no distortion of his opinions here, and no WP:SYNTHESIS on that account. On the other hand, Hawking doesn't use the word 'ontolgy' or 'meta-ontology', so the issue comes up:

Is it WP:SYNTHESIS to say that Hawking is involved in a meta-ontology discussion, even though he doesn't say so himself, and no independent source is cited to say that he is?

I think what we have here is a case of asking whether a WP editor is permitted to decide whether Hawking is involved in meta-ontology, or, is it the case that such a determination is beyond an editor's prerogative? It seems to me that decision depends upon how clearly the definition of meta-ontology applies to Hawking's model-dependent realism: if it is clearly within or outside the definition, then a WP editor is simply using the normal definitions of English and there is no problem. If, to the contrary, model-dependent reality cannot be clearly related to the definition of 'meta-ontology', then the paragraph is indeed WP:SYNTHESIS. How does this analysis fit with your views of the proposal? Brews ohare (talk) 16:07, 11 April 2013 (UTC)

The comment by Craig that I recently ran across appears to place the discussion of Hawking squarely in the realm of meta-ontology. This is not a terribly reliable source, perhaps, but it indicates that the idea of Hawking as engaging in meta-ontology has direct support aside from some questions that might be raised about the definition of meta-ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 13:47, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

LOL if you use that source with quotes like this "not merely condescending but also as outrageously naïve", then it would dismiss any idea of taking Hawking seriously on the subject ----Snowded ^TALK 13:54, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

It is a common academic practice to sniff at other academics. In this case, there is little doubt that Hawking displays lots of such sniffing at philosophers, so he's going to get some sniffing back at him. We can rise above this kind of snobbism on WP :-) Brews ohare (talk) 14:02, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

Sniffing or not it does not support your case ----Snowded ^TALK 15:05, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

The point here, Snowded, is that Hawking has a case, that his views are widely adopted among scientists so far as model-dependent realism is concerned. Although they use different terminology, philosophers like Carnap, Popper, Kuhn, Schaffer, Thomasson, Eklund, Price and many more, are on the same page. The nose-thumbing between Hawking and some philosophers like Craig discredits all parties involved, and you simply imitate this silliness. Brews ohare (talk) 18:23, 12 April 2013 (UTC)

You really are just arguing pointlessly against consensus that an off-hand remark some theologian made on his blog places "the" Hawking discussion "squarely in the realm of meta-ontology"... Not sure on what "page" the WP:OR about Carnap, Popper, Kuhn, et.al. would be, Eclectic Wicca perhaps, but if you think Hawking "has a case", add it to The Grand Design, you just can't prosecute it here. I think the best one's on page 9, BTW: "Although we are puny and insignificant on the scale of the cosmos, this makes us in a sense the lords of creation."—Machine Elf ¹⁷³⁵ 23:53, 13 April 2013 (UTC)

First of all, I suggest that the editors most involved with the article back off and give some space for editors coming from the RfC to offer opinions. Just listen for a bit.

My personal take: As far as I understand the situation from the above quotations, Hawking is clearly offering an ontological theory, but is not engaging in the comparison of ontologies (meta-ontology) to any significant extent. His theory could appropriately be included in some way under ontology, but not here. hgilbert (talk) 11:30, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

Hgilbert: Thank you for contributing here. I agree that discussion of Hawking's ontology as such belongs in Ontology, but discussion of his arguments why his ontology is preferable to that of Aristotle or Plato belongs in meta-ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 17:11, 21 April 2013 (UTC)

Witttgenstein

According to Anat & Anat: Wittgenstein pointed out "Despite its plausibility, [the] reduction of language to representation cannot do justice to the whole of human language; and even if it is to be considered a picture of only the representative function of human language, it is, as such, a poor picture." That appears to me to be the take-off position of Hirsch and Thomasson in their discussion of Carnap, and directly challenges the analytic/synthetic internal/external ontology. It seems quite possible that the critique of Carnap's ontology by modern philosophers has a lot in common with Wittgenstein. The separation of what part of this formulation is meta-ontology from what is ontology might cause controversy among some WP editors, but hopefully that doesn't mean it cannot be done. Brews ohare (talk) 13:20, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

Hirsch quotes Wittgenstein and appears in part to be attempting a more formal analysis of usage than Wittgenstein tried to do. Brews ohare (talk) 13:33, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

Then go and write an essay about it and see if you can get it published. This is blatant original research----Snowded ^TALK 13:40, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

Very open-minded, eh Snowded? It's a bit unjustified to invoke WP:OR in a simple posit that maybe there is something to be said about Wittgenstein in the understanding of Carnap. In fact, Google books shows 88,600 hits on 'Carnap Wittgenstein'. Brews ohare (talk) 13:47, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

You are expanding on Carnap and Quinne not dealing with the subject of this article. Further the expansion is your own work, And of course there are google hits. Sorry Brews but you are refusing to listen to the many many editors who have tried to explain this too you. ----Snowded ^TALK 14:08, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: I'm unaware of 'many editors' taking a stance on Wittgenstein's part in meta-ontology. The Google book hits bring out a considerable discussion of Carnap vis à vis Wittgenstein, including direct interaction between the two men. It may not be all meta-ontology, but some is. Brews ohare (talk) 14:16, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

Many editors over many articles have made it clear that your approach is various OR, Synth and Coatracking. This is just the latest example. When you have proper third party sources bring it here Until then stop wasting everyone's time. If I wasn't busy this week I think I would take this to Arbitration Enforcement now as its gone on too long. I will next week if the behaviour doesn't change and I can create the time to assemble the multiple links ----Snowded ^TALK 14:22, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

Great: knitting a sweater from a buttonhole, eh Snowded? It might be observed that Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is readily interpreted to be entirely within meta-ontology as it is in fact a critique of the entire approach to ontology by Russell, Carnap and others. Brews ohare (talk) 14:27, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

Your call, your block history should have taught your something by now, evidently not. This is not the place for you to write personal essays based on what you consider interesting links and connections and things that you "might" want to observe. As I say and this is fair warning, if the behaviour does not change then its going to Arb Com enforcement ----Snowded ^TALK 14:31, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: The principal editor I am having trouble with is yourself, and that is because you primarily refuse to analyze content and instead mainly vent your pique. This thread is a clear example: you refuse to consider the possibility that Wittgenstein should be mentioned in meta-ontology, and instead of presenting your understanding of Wittgenstein, and instead of reasoning about his relevance, and instead of considering the supporting material I have presented, you immediately launch into an unsupported rant about my activities in general. Brews ohare (talk) 15:02, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

So far your two RfCs have not gained any support so its not just me. I don't reject mention if it is sourced. Your supporting material is alllyou drawing conclusions which is what you mean by analysiting context. we dont do that here. I do reject you going down one of your word association essay writing trips which have been rejected by other editors here and elsewhere. This is a near exact repitition of the problems you had on Physics articles which resulted in a series of sanctions. Your response to a fair warning (many a editor would just raise your behaviour without warning) results in insults which will hardly help your case. ----Snowded ^TALK 15:18, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: There is no reason for us to be at odds here. I have proposed in the past on this Talk page several possible additions to meta-ontology that are set out as full-blown proposals with sources and invitation to comment. The idea is to get counter-proposals, rewording, different sources and in general to find ways to improve the proposal. They are not challenges to you personally.

I have abandoned or revised a number of these proposals. It is all about development of text. The discussion involves back and forth, but it should revolve around what the sources say. Of course this back-and-forth involves WP editors' opinions about the sources. But discussion is not settled by simple pronouncements of your opinion, without sources to back you up, nor by your complaints about me, nor by changing the subject to avoid direct consideration of points.

If you look back over our engagements, they have resulted in changes to the main articles where we met. Usually these changes have occurred only after a great deal of struggle. My opinion is that this struggle is largely due to your immediate presumption that I am an idiot, and only after long travail do you concede that the sources actually do have some pertinence. This process would be much shorter if you addressed my proposals as serious attempts at useful additions, deserving of considered reaction.

Wittgenstein will follow the same path, I imagine. However, as yet I have not proposed an insertion for the main article. Brews ohare (talk) 16:01, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

You know, the scary thing is that I think you think all of that is true. ----Snowded ^TALK 16:26, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

Hi everyone, I tried to google for Wittgenstein meta-ontology and in the process I came across some references to Fregean meta-ontology. Is including something about Fregean meta-ontology a possibility for the article? (Not by me; just a casual suggestion.) --Bob K31416 (talk) 23:08, 16 April 2013 (UTC)

I see no reason not to include any and all meta-ontology in this article, even where it pre-dates Inwagen's coining of this term and so doesn't use the term 'meta-ontology' explicitly. Perhaps you would care to provide links you found to Frege's work? The Wittgenstein approach is sometimes called the 'ordinary language' approach to ontology and suggests that usage is the determinant of meaning. Obviously this is an approach to ontology and so an orientation toward this approach falls under the rubric of meta-ontology, the discussion of what one means when one asks "What is?". Brews ohare (talk) 16:35, 21 April 2013 (UTC)

The connections between Wittgenstein and Carnap are described at length in Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language : a Study of Viennese Positivism and the Thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Brews ohare (talk) 16:44, 21 April 2013 (UTC)

You can't include material that you have decided is meta-ontology, unless a reliable source makes the reference. 101 Wikipedia ----Snowded ^TALK 20:26, 21 April 2013 (UTC)

As pointed out to you before, Snowded, over and over again, and as you continue to ignore, material that falls plainly under the definition of meta-ontology is entirely acceptable in an article on meta-ontology. There is no WP policy stating otherwise. Of course, you are free to argue that (for example) some particular statements by Wittgenstein don't fall under the definition of meta-ontology. That difference of opinion could be pursued to find some common ground, and it may be that the result is open to interpretation. But certainly what Wittgenstein says concerning the inadequacy of Carnap's synthetic/analytic division of objects is an assessment of what constitutes a valid ontology, and therefore lies within the definition of meta-ontology. Refusal to allow into the article Wittgenstein's understanding of how to judge Carnap's ontology, based upon Snowded's personal criterion that for inclusion Wittgenstein (or some other party) must attach to this judgment the word 'meta-ontology', is nuts. Brews ohare (talk) 01:39, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Brews ohare,

• The Existence of God: An Exposition and Application of Fregean Meta-Ontology — Note that lower on the webpage there are links to some parts of the book.
• Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of Neo-Fregeanism
• The Metaontology of Abstraction — For David Chalmers et al, eds., Metametaphysics, Oxford University Press. See the next reference below.
• Metametaphysics David Chalmers, David Manley, Ryan Wasserman

I got the above by googling: Frege meta-ontology. I only looked at some of the results on the first page. Regards, --Bob K31416 (talk) 01:54, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

And has been explained to you by several editors Brews that is original research and/or a coatrack. Carnap is used as an illustration of a meta-ontological issue by an author so that is fine, Going on to write an essay about Wittgenstein and Carnap is not unless you have an author who does that in the context of meta-ontology. Material from Bob's references which are specific, in so far as they illustrate this subject would be fine ----Snowded ^TALK 03:51, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

The subject that interests Inwagen and he called meta-ontology, as Inwagen states explicitly, is addressing the question of 'what is meant when we ask What is ? '. Illustration of this subject is all that I'm interested in for the article meta-ontology. There is no intention to write an essay about Wittgenstein and Carnap except as it relates to this subject. I am pleased that such matters are allowable in your judgment, Snowded. Perhaps we can agree as to what particulars of the Carnap-Wittgenstein engagement fall within this domain. Brews ohare (talk) 05:32, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

I wonder sometimes if you read what other editors say. Inwagen uses Carnap as an illustration so it is legitimate to use that material reflecting the source (and others). You can't then extend that to discuss Wittgenstein's treatment of Carnap. Such material would belong in the ontology article if relevant. Creating a parallel article to ontology is coat racking. If you can get agreement of editors on ontology to reference this as the main article for "what is meant when we ask what is" questions then it might be legitimate. However that would involve agreement that meta-ontology is the correct term for that question, rather than a term used by some authors but not universally accepted or referenced. For you to decide that Wittgenstein can illustrate a concept which he makes no reference to is original research. ----Snowded ^TALK 05:46, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

So your remark "Material from Bob's references which are specific, in so far as they illustrate this subject would be fine" translated to English means "Material from Bob's references that specifically mentions the word 'meta-ontology' would be fine." However, "material that discusses the topic area but does not use the word 'meta-ontology' explicitly is not fine because it is impossible to tell whether they are discussing meta-ontology or not unless they say so themselves." I don't think you can find any WP policy that says that. The one policy you mention, WP:Coatrack, says: "a coatrack is a Wikipedia article that ostensibly discusses the nominal subject, but in reality is a cover for a tangentially related biased subject. That description has no relevance here to discussing a sub-topic of ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 14:02, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

[[od}} You can't write a parallel article with material that should be in the ontology one - this was pointed out by other editors to you in a recent RfC. You have to establish through sources that the material relates to the subject of the article. At the moment you are saying "Inwagen uses Carnap to illustrate a point, Wittgenstein mentions Carnap so I can write material on Wittgenstein. Given that all your RfCs have confirmed other editors disagree with you I wonder if you plan to learn?----Snowded ^TALK 17:07, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: You misunderstand. There is no intent to make meta-ontology an article parallel to ontology. The connection to Carnap is not what you suggest. The connection roughly is this: Carnap has proposed a schema for determining 'what is' that results in things that 'are' by virtue of their place in a 'framework' and also things that 'are' by virtue of (ultimately) sense perception. That is Carnap's ontology. Quine said that Carnap's approach to determining what things 'are' is faulty and proposed the notion of ontological commitment as the right way to do this. (The problem with Carnap's approach, according to Quine, is that the idea of 'framework' cannot be precisely defined without ultimately overlapping with some notions belonging to the other side of his ontology, the sense-perception side.) This argument is partly ontology (Quine's proposal for a 'flat' ontology) and partly meta-ontology (Quine's critique of Carnap's methods). Inwagen coined the term meta-ontology to describe this process of critiquing a proposal for an ontology, whether that be done on the basis of proposing an alternative ontology and defending it against another, or by some other form of criticism. Now Wittgenstein also has criticized Carnap's ontology on a basis somewhat like Quine's but more general, from the standpoint of 'ordinary language'. Now Wittgenstein is proposing a different approach, which is his ontology, but he also criticizes Carnap's dependence on 'frameworks' contending that while one can define 'what is' using a Carnap 'framework', that is too restrictive a methodology. (The 'usage' of a term envelopes a variety of 'frameworks' and transcends any one of them.) This contention is meta-ontology.

The above discussion is what should go into the article, with appropriate sources Brews ohare (talk).

Not really and I don't think you have answered my point. Inwagen makes a series of points that are illustrated by Carnap/Quine. To extend that to Wittgenstein's criticism of Carnap in the context of an article on meta-ontology is original research . The article is not about Carnap, its is about meta-ontology ----Snowded ^TALK 17:36, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: I gather that my explanation fell into your 'too long, did not read' category. You indicate no understanding of what was said above. Brews ohare (talk) 18:15, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

No Brews I indicate no agreement with your argument, you too frequently confuse that with not understanding ----Snowded ^TALK 18:21, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

It seems that there is plenty of material in reliable sources that explicitly mentions "meta-ontology". Suggest adding that to the article before trying to add the material that is contentious here because it doesn't explicitly mention "meta-ontology". Also, this might be a good time to take a break from the debate of the present issues. --Bob K31416 (talk) 18:35, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Bob, taking a break would be a good idea if it were really a matter of being too heated over this matter, and letting things cool down. But that doesn't seem to be the issue here.

Snowded: It would be clear to me that you disagree with me and did not simply ignore me if you actually said something related to what I have said. You refuse to allow that any critique of ontological methodology is meta-ontology. So, for example, Wittgenstein very very explicitly has critiqued Carnap's idea of 'frameworks', one of Carnap's two means of answering ‘what we mean when we ask What is ?’. To say a critique such as this one of Carnap's methods is not meta-ontology, as you seem to claim, is simply a refusal to accept what meta-ontology is defined to be, so far as I understand the term. If you really think critique of methodology for arriving at an ontology is not meta-ontology, how do you arrive at that idea? Have you some different definition of meta-ontology in mind? Can you support it with a source? Brews ohare (talk) 18:47, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Neither Carnap or Wittgenstein would even consider they were doing meta-ontology, they were discussing what for them (and many current philosophers) are fundamental issues in ontology. Meta-ontology is a term used by some philosophers to describe one aspect of ontology considered as a whole. We therefore report on what those philosophers say and how they illustrate it. The illustration (for you here Bob) does not have to mention meta-ontology specifically) as it is an example of a problem defined by a reliable source as one that is meta-ontological. My definition or your definition do not matter, its what sourced material says about the subject that we include, not the speculations of individual editors. You keep asking me to have a discussion about the subject with you as if we were philosophy students. That is not what the talk page is for, its for discussing material which is properly sourced and directly relevant to the subject. That relevance being established by a source not your (or my) opinion ----Snowded ^TALK 18:55, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

(edit conflict)I wasn't thinking of heat but rather no sign of movement towards agreement on these issues after a considerable amount of discussion.....a very considerable amount. For now, it seems better to channel the effort into tangible improvemnt of the article. --Bob K31416 (talk) 19:03, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Agree, the referenced material you provide below can develop material. The other disagreement has ranged over a couple of articles and RfCs now ----Snowded ^TALK 19:12, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Bob's links

Bob suggested that Frege be mentioned in the article meta-ontology. We have for instance:

Eklund Hale and Wright on the Metaontology of neo-Fregeanism. It begins "A number of recent authors (Fraser MacBride 2003; Matti Eklund 2006; Ted Sider 2007; Katherine Hawley 2007) have discussed the issue of the metaontology of neo-Fregeanism."...Sider (2007) argued that the neo-Fregeans would do well in relying upon a thesis of quantifier variance such as that defended by Eli Hirsch in recent writings (e.g. 2002), according to which there are different possible quantifier meanings for an existential quantifier to have. MacBride (2003) claimed that the neo-Fregeans rely on a metaontology similar to that of Rudolf Carnap (1950) and the later Hilary Putnam (e.g. 1987, 1994). Hawley (2007) compared the maximalist reading and the quantifier variantist reading, and came out in favor of the maximalist reading."

I see here reference to Sider, Carnap, Putnam, MacBride, and Hawley (and later Hale and Wright mentioned in the title) as having discussed meta-ontology: "they present their own positive metaontological view, what they call ‘minimalism’. (Despite the name, it is not the opposite of maximalism. More later on the relation between these two theses.)"

It seems likely that to understand the terms here like 'neo-Fregean', 'quantifier meanings', 'existential quantifier', some basis has to be laid. Perhaps an introduction to the 'meta-ontological views' of minimalism and maximalism. That basis would not itself be 'meta-ontology', but it would seem reasonable to allow a presentation in Meta-ontology within this context so the actual 'meta-ontology' could be presented.

Hale and Wright The Metaontology of Abstraction The work by Hale and Wright addressed by Eklund above.

Snowded: What is your reaction here? It appears that this material does explicitly mention meta-ontology as you have requested, and it brings up a number of other scholars relevant to meta-ontology (at least according to Eklund, Hale and Wright) that should be footnoted to make sense of the discussion. Brews ohare (talk) 14:26, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

We also have Thomasson (other articles by her too) who says:

"Are existence debates in ontology genuine debates? Or is there something wrong with them that makes them not worth pursuing?"

"Those who ask this metaontological question can be very roughly classed into two camps. On one side are thsoe I will call 'serious ontologists'..[who] presuppose that ontological questions have answers... On the other side are those who, for one reason of another, think the serious ontologist's pursuits are misguided. "

Here again we have explicit mention of metaontology and again a statement of questions it examines. The work of Karen Bennet, Stephen Yablo, Hilary Putnam and Eli Hirsch are brought into the metaontological discussion, along with Schiffer, Hawthorne, and Van Inwagen. It would seem something about this discussion could be presented in meta-ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 14:39, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

We have also some other works considered by Ted Sider to relate to meta-ontology. Brews ohare (talk) 14:44, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Snowded: What is your stance regarding some form of presentation in Meta-ontology of all this discussion? Brews ohare (talk) 14:47, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Brews ohare, Re "It seems likely that to understand the terms here like 'neo-Fregean', 'quantifier meanings', 'existential quantifier', some basis has to be laid." — Perhaps the first step is to put info from the reliable sources you mentioned at the beginning of this section, into the article? --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:51, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Summarising Hale & Wright without extensive quotation seems reasonable, suggest you draft something here first. Thomasson I am less sure of but open. People brought into that discussion far less so. ----Snowded ^TALK 17:09, 22 April 2013 (UTC)

Fine. The Frege thing is basically a revisiting of the relation of math to logic, and in particular to the notion of 'number' as something with an existence beyond its role in arithmetic. Of course, Wittgenstein visited this issue almost a century ago with the idea that 'number' in ordinary usage transcends arithmetic usage and has a meaning outside it. This modern development is more narrow in scope but still intends to resurrect the idea of number as 'bigger' than arithmetic. Thus, the Carnapian 'mapping' of 'number' as defined within a framework onto reality by some prescription involving observations is (perhaps) made clearer. Brews ohare (talk) 18:24, 22 April 2013 (UTC)