Talk:Nietzschean affirmation

Left-wing Corruption of Nietzsche

The corruption of Nietzsche's philosophy in the Wikipedia articles by radical-left activists is insane. What better way to neutralize one's enemy than to appropriate, weaken, soften and distort him? The German Rudiger Safranski, at least, has the balls to speak the truth in a world gone mad with doctrinaire socialistic political correctness:

"According to Nietzsche, nature produces the weak and the strong, the advantaged and disadvantaged. There is no benevolent providence and no equitable distribution of chances to get ahead in life. Before this backdrop, morality can be defined as an attempt to even out the 'injustice' of nature and create counterbalances. The power of natural destinies needs to be broken. In Nietzsche's view, Christianity represented an absolutely brilliant attempt to accomplish this aim ... Nietzsche greatly admired the power of Christianity to set values, but he was not grateful to it, because its consideration for the weak and the morality of evening things out impeded the progress and development of a higher stage of mankind.

Nietzsche could envision this higher stage of mankind only as a culmination of culture in its 'peaks of rapture,' which is to say in successful individuals and achievements. The will to power unleashes the dynamics of culmination, but it is also the will to power that forms a moral alliance on the side of the weak. This alliance works at cross-purposes with the goal of culmination and ultimately, in Nietzsche's view, leads to widespread equalization and degeneration. As a modern version of the 'Christian theory of morality,' this alliance forms the backbone of democracy and socialism. Nietzsche adamantly opposed all such movements. For him, the meaning of world history was not happiness and prosperity of the greatest possible number but individual manifestations of success in life. The culture of political and social democracy was a concern of the 'last people,' whom he disparaged. He threw overboard the state-sponsored ethics of the common welfare because he regarded such ethics as an impediment to the self-configuration of great individuals. If, however, the great personalities were to vanish, the only remaining significance of history would be lost in the process. By defending the residual significance of history, Nietzsche assailed democracy and declared what mattered was 'delaying the complete appeasement of the democratic herd-animal'(11,587; WP 125) ... Nietzsche opted against democratic life organized according to the principle of welfare. For him, a world of that sort would signal the triumph of the human herd animal...

If we are content to regard this highly personal philosophy and these maneuvers of self-configuration with fascination and perhaps even admiration, but are not willing to abandon the idea of democracy and justice, it is likely that Nietzsche would have accused us of feeble compromise, indecisiveness, and epitomizing the ominous 'blinking' of the 'last men.'" Safranski, Rudiger (trans. Shelley Frisch), Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography, Norton, 2002, pp. 296-298. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.3.10.2 (talk) 14:07, 12 September 2007 (UTC)

Note that the text above is misquoted ("According to Nietzsche," doesn't occur). This talk section may be found at Talk:Master–slave morality#Left-wing Corruption of Nietzsche, Talk:Transvaluation of values#Left-wing Corruption of Nietzsche, and Talk:Nietzschean affirmation#Left-wing Corruption of Nietzsche. Note that "Nietzschean affirmation" and "affirmation" does not occur in the quote and that no criticisms of or suggestions for improving the article are given. Hyacinth (talk) 05:44, 6 December 2016 (UTC)

I'm only going from memory, but - I think that it's not absolutely certain that Nietzsche would have held the concept of justice, itself, altogether - to be invalid. He held that some conceptions of justice are - not, invalid, of course - but of no use at least, for people with a higher sort of perception. He held that there is no objective or theologically or metaphysically grounded, explication of justice.

But - Nietzsche held that pre-modern pre-democratic ways of organizing society - were at least better, than modern ones. This was very directly relevant after all in his time and place - Germany was still not a democracy - and it had only become a modern state in 1871 - he would have been 27 years old at the time. The political powerful people of those times - kings, dukes, counts, or what have you, were rulers - and, what did rulers do? Among other things - of course, they dispensed justice. There is no metaphysical or theological absolute grounding for justice, according to Nietzsche - but, justice in an at all large-scale society does of course, have to occur - it would cease to be an at-all-large-scale society. Nietzsche - even though he wasn't a political philosopher - was not too dim to have realized that. He merely didn't believe that any projected absolute grounding of concepts of justice, actually exists.

Joseph McCord (talk) 12:14, 18 March 2024 (UTC)

After Nietzsche quote.

After the quote by Nietzsche it cites Kaufman's edition of "The Will To Power" as (Nietzsche 532-533). Perhaps it should mention that those are the pages of the book, and not the various sections/aphorisms that make up the book. A small inconsequential thing, but I was struggling to find the quote. Since the book index uses the numbered sections, not page numbers. So it would help a certain minority out there. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 207.202.132.152 (talk) 07:38, 3 April 2008 (UTC)

Thanks for noticing that, I've made the change. You don't need anyone's permission to edit Wikipedia articles, so if you see something that needs correction in future, go ahead and be bold! Skomorokh 12:12, 3 April 2008 (UTC)

As usual

Not a word about Schopenhauer. The fourth book of The World as Will and Representation, Volume I, had a stupendous effect on Nietzsche. He reacted to Schopenhauer's denial of the will–to–live throughout his life, even unto the last day of his sanity. It was Schopenhauer's denial that brought forth Nietzsche's affirmation. It seems to me that very few people are familiar with Schopenhauer's writings, and that includes professional philosophers, including those who have an interest in Nietzsche. Anyone who has read Schopenhauer will recognize the influence of his thoughts on Nietzsche. Since there is no mention of influence, it can be assumed that there has been no reading.Lestrade (talk) 17:01, 18 August 2009 (UTC)Lestrade

Lestrade you are right about Schopenhauer's influence but I think it would be more charitable to assume that the author of this short Wiki piece just chose to quickly describe N's affirmation without going into much detail. Could you formulate 2-3 short sentences about Schopenhauer's influence and add them to the entry? 147.188.244.41 (talk) 13:19, 17 April 2012 (UTC)

I took your advice and made an attempt at adding a small section on Nietzsche’s opposition to Schopenhauer. It may not be small enough for many readers. My tentative contribution may puzzle those who are unfamiliar with Schopenhauer’s writings. In order to understand Nietzsche’s affirmation of life as a reaction to Schopenhauer’s denial of the will to live, it may be necessary for a reader to become familiar with both Nietzsche’s and Schopenhauer’s works.Lestrade (talk) 20:24, 29 June 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

After making my contribution, I noticed that it has no relation to the “affirmation” that is referred to in the section entitled “Derridean interpretation.” There is nothing in common between the two sections. According to the quote at the beginning of the article, Nietzsche’s affirmation is related to “not only ourselves but all existence.” It is a psychological outlook, point of view, and subjective way of thinking. The Derridean section, however, seems to be somehow concerned with the mere “structure” of language. As a result, there is a serious schism in the article that may result in confusion to anyone who is trying to learn about Nietzschean affirmation.

Philosophy, in the last century, has abandoned psychology and busied itself with only objective behaviorial problems. That is because inner mental states are not outwardly manifest or evident unless they result in externally observable behavior. Language is outward behavior that can be observed and studied in public. Psychological outlooks and points of view, on the other hand, are private and unobservable. Nietzsche, however, considered himself to be a philosophical psychologist. (He originally titled Twilight of the Idols as A Psychologist’s Idleness.) He was employed as a professional philologist for a while, but was never really interested in technical linguistics. His works might require a reader to approach them from a pre–20th century way of thinking, that is, from a time when there were no restrictions against psychological investigations. In this way his affirmation can be understood as a yes–saying to life and the world, in contrast to Schopenhauer's no–saying.Lestrade (talk) 20:59, 29 June 2012 (UTC)Lestrade

I disagree with some of this, entirely. What Derrida is on about doesn't really have anything at all to do with the "structure" of language - at all - or at least, understood in any typical sense.

In my opinion - the words "structuralism" and "post-structuralism" are both extremely vaguely defined ones - at least as much so, as any terms for entire "schools" of art - and maybe their use was only in the first place, meant with a similar sort of intent. But the first reference for either is to Levi-Strauss - who wanted to try to discern some sort of "structure", or another - hypothetically underlying all human cultures - so the first reference for the word is actually to culture in general - not to language, specifically. Sure - there's also "structural linguistics" - but this is really only a pretty trivial input, in a way - in that it was simply the French-language origin of modern, descriptive rather than prescriptive approaches to linguistics - and, in a different vocabulary for describing the relationship between sign - meaning - and referent (and also the general idea that signs acquire their meanings, in relation to other signs).

So Derrida isn't actually at all - I think - talking about things such as the grammar - phonetics - etc. - of language. He is very much, talking about meaning - so-called "semantics" - which is something the study of which is barely at all approached, in modern linguistics (because you just can't do it, at all - in any really systematic way). But the "structure" that Derrida is referring to in the title of the essay, is more a reference to Levi-Strauss (he wrote a whole book on him, after all - and not one on the latter) than it is to Saussure.

The problems that Derrida is attempting to approach - are such questions as, why meanings tend to drift - not whether texts have meanings, at all, but whether those meanings can ever truly be "pinned down" - where there can or should be assumed to be an "authorial voice", within a text - and so forth and so on.

It's only in relation to questions such as those - that one could ever potentially become a "pessimist" about linguistics - or more accurately and more importantly - about the meanings of texts - whose authors are no longer around to directly address questions to, about their meanings - but in relation to all texts (he even turns the question against his own), in general - even.

The "affirmation", I think - is an affirmation of the fact that texts do have meanings - but, in the face of all those facts - about how difficult it is to hammer down - truly, objectively, or universally - each and every last meaning of every text. "The author is absent" - that's why it's a text, anyway, to begin with - and that's why questions regarding "presence" come in.

The question of "origin" is related - as is the question of (a perfectly and universally-consensually definable) "truth".

One could get "pessimistic" about those matters - and Derrida was constantly accused of putting forward that kind of "pessimism" - of arguing that there "there is no truth" - and things of that sort. But - he wasn't at all - he revered texts, as much as anyone ever has. He was only arguing for a different perspective - than one that yearns for the author to be, right there, within the text - in such a way that he can answer questions about its meanings - other than just, in our imaginative constructions of what it feels like - to try to decipher the meanings of a text (when we constantly do that - and, constantly speak in that way - because that's almost just a reflex of thinking).

Nietzsche's "affirmation" is an affirmation about life, itself - intended to embrace not to be in spite of, all of its hardships. Derrida's idea of "affirmation", in relation to attempting to understand the meanings of texts (of texts, especially - although by extension, perhaps of all language, in general) - is only related, by analogy. But, in the analogy - the "hardships" being referred to, are the hardships of the absence, in contrast to language as direct person-to-person conversation - of the "authorial presence" being there - to directly answer our questions about it. We infer an "authorial presence", in any texts that we love - but the author himself, is only "indirectly there" - actually - at best - which is where the word "trace" comes in - "trace" being, not not a "presence" - but also, not the full and complete presence, that we might long for. What Derrida chose to interpret as "metaphysics" - is any system of interpretation that attempts to construct the idea of a complete presence, in any texts whose meanings we are trying to understand. It's a kind of magical act - a legerdemain - to do that - hence a "sad nostalgia for presence". The meanings of texts being offered to an active interpretation - which has no magic act, through which to summon an imagined full-presence of an author, to resolve all of our conundrums about the meanings of a text, for us - is Derrida's alternative. One embraces all of the difficulties of understanding - just as, by analogy, Nietzsche argued that we should unconditionally embrace all of the difficulties and negatives of life, without shrinking from any of them - as being, of the very nature of language, and most importantly of all, of all meanings of language - always - while affirming that one will do one's best with them.

Humbly yours -

Joseph McCord (talk) 17:24, 18 March 2024 (UTC)

(It isn't, actually, in my opinion, even his best essay. I think that the one on Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas is.)

Joseph McCord (talk) 17:43, 18 March 2024 (UTC)

("overall nature of things, in particular fields - particular, discrete signifiers, used, always - whether one likes it, or not - as tools - and, the inevitable not-completely-determinate - always, needing to be interpreted - and in any case, varyingly interpretable nature of things - in the discourses of the humanities, and social sciences")

Joseph McCord (talk) 22:10, 18 March 2024 (UTC)

"play" just means, "give-and-take"

There are some limited number of particular meanings of the word, "play" - in the English language - in which it means, exactly that - mostly, in mechanic contexts (although you could also mention fishing).

It isn't, necessarily, a reference to a verb - but maybe more so, to an adjective.

He's only trying to point out, obvious things - although we don't always think about them, or talk about them - in that particular way.

Joseph McCord (talk) 22:31, 18 March 2024 (UTC)

"Play", in a sense - just means, "indeterminacy" {within specific particular concrete bounds - as in the sense of the word "indeterminacy", in physics}.

There is more to it, than just that - it also implies an active participation, in interpretation - and so therefore obviously, sometimes, matters of choices - but that's at least a place to start...

Joseph McCord (talk) 22:37, 18 March 2024 (UTC)

Thank you for your contribution about Shopenhauer's "nay-saying", Lestrade: very helpful to understand Nietzsche's view. denis 'spir' (talk) 18:29, 26 June 2013 (UTC)

inverted 2 main sections

Inverted 2 main sections ("contra Shopenhauer" and "Derrida's interpretation") since the latter (which came as 1st section) is in my view anecdotic for the subject of the article and in any case does not help at all in understanding Nietzsche's thought.

denis 'spir' (talk) 18:21, 26 June 2013 (UTC)

Missing a definition

A definition of Nietschean affirmation would be very helpful. All we have in the lede is a quote that describes it in a roundabout way. Qzekrom (talk) 02:15, 16 December 2015 (UTC)

Help me with post-WP:MOVE with Bejahung

Below is what I see and I cannot do it:

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The page "Nietzschean affirmation" (links | edit) has been moved to "Bejahung" (edit | history | links | revert | log) (move log)

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• The page Talk:Nietzschean affirmation has been moved to Talk:Bejahung.

FatalSubjectivities (talk) 17:19, 2 December 2022 (UTC)

Unilateral move undone

The recent move of this article to Bejahung has been undone. Please follow the procedure at WP:RM#CM for controversial moves, and it will get listed here as a requested move, and then editors can weigh in with their opinions about it in the move discussion. Thanks, Mathglot (talk) 09:46, 3 December 2022 (UTC)

Had a quick look, and if it comes to a RM, I believe it won't end up being supported by the merits. Consider this search in English books for occurrences of the term Nietzche (including inflected forms like Nietzchean or Nietzche's) that occur in close proximity to the term Bejahung. Note that this is a cherry-picked search, so it is not valid for determining whether Bejahung or Nietzschean affirmation is more common in English books. Rather it answers the question, "When Bejahung *is* used in English books, how is it used?" and thus likely considerably overstates the usage of Bejahung compared to Nietzschean affirmation. This search shows that where the term is used in English books, it is hardly ever used in running English text as a loanword (Jensen (2013) was one such case) but rather almost always uses it in a German quotation, or as a parenthetical or footnoted appositive or expression in Nietzsche's original German by way of explanation of the English word used in the running English text. A typical example from Metzger (2009): "Nietzsche's conception of affirmation (Bejahung) is a direct descendent of the scholastic tradition that Kant's critique renews and renovates." An unbiased, head-to-head search of the two terms shows around ten to one in favor of affirmation. Mathglot (talk) 19:34, 3 December 2022 (UTC)

Notes

modification just made

Requesting an for the addition to the page that I just made of the words, "far more than". Joseph McCord (talk) 11:42, 18 March 2024 (UTC) Joseph McCord

 Note: Your edits are already live, there is no need to make a request here — Martin (MSGJ · talk) 15:09, 18 March 2024 (UTC)