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On Ward's wiki someone commented that objectivism has little creditibility among academic circles. That seems somewhat surprising, since it is a fairly popular philosophy from what I can tell, although I guess pop phi and the real thing often have little in common. Someone who knows about this sort of thing should probably add a critique of the above and explain the role of objectivism in philosophy today.

Objectivism is "popular" among people who don't study much philosophy. As Dianetics is to psychology, Objectivism is to philosophy. It's pop philosophy, of the same general quality as fad diets and pop psychology. Dogface 17:34, 12 Feb 2004 (UTC)

Of course it is true that it is popular among people who don't study much philosophy; that will happen when it is dramatized in works of fiction. And a 22-year-old who has not studied much philosophy has read only ideas that have been dramatized in fiction and thus made exciting can be pretty obnoxious in any discussion or argument about those topics, to say the least. It is also respected by many faculty in departments of philosophy (and psychology, and theology (not that they agree with Rand's atheism or other premises at variance with religion), and other humanities field) who are actually aware of its content. A partial list of professors considering Rand's ideas worthy of attention is at Talk:List of philosophers. Michael Hardy 20:06, 12 Feb 2004 (UTC)

There are a small number of scholarly journals, but it is true that Objectivism lacks credibility among professional philosophers. This may be in part because they do not like Rand's ideas very much, but it probably has a lot to do with the fact the she did not present her ideas in the manner of academic philosophers: she did not use the same lingo, did not publish in the same journals, etc., and so she has been off their radar. A recent flood of scholarly books (not to mention popular books and three movies) give reason to believe this may be changing - TS

This is not correct. Academic scholars are very well aware that objectivism and the objectivist movement exists. The reason it is not treated as a philosophy on it's own merits, is that it is not considered to add anything new to philosophy that did not exist before. The only thing objectivism does is collect a number of pre-existent ideas and join with the doctrine of capitalism. As I added for comparison in the article: compare to materialism, monism, physicalism, rationalism, empiricism, utilitarianism and the doctrines of egoism (psychological egoism and ethical egoism).

All of these existed prior to Rand's writings, and thus her ideas are not considered unique enough to be treated as a philosophical school on its own merits. Nixdorf 08:43 3 Jun 2003 (UTC)

Rand was the first to develop her theory of concept formation by means of measurement omission. Rand was also the first to integrate that epistemology with the particular metaphysical, ethical, and political standpoints that comprise Objectivism. Objectivism isn't a number of philosophical beliefs cobbled together; the ethics actually follow from the metaphysics and epistemology, and it all fits together. Philwelch 19:05, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)

It is claimed that the uniquely delimiting characteristic about Objectivism is that it is the first to directly connect ethics and metaphysics, or, to directly derive "ought" from "is". However valid or invalid; or unique or nonuinque this philosophical idea, or an may be in your opinion, Objectivism is clearly "treated as a philosophical school on its own merits". Samrolken 03:28, 10 Feb 2004 (UTC)

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I think it's important to note that Objectivism as defined by Rand is qualified with a statement that it is _her_ belief system. For any belief to be in line with Objectivism, it by definition has to be something that Ayn Rand believes. She said this herself, and it's something that many Ojectivists don't seem to know. This might also have something to do with why it is treated so derisively by the "philisophical elite". See http://www.objectivism.org -Alan Dershowitz (no, not THAT Alan Dershowitz)

Of course another reason is arrogant poppycock like that. Yes, there is a specific philosophy laid out by Rand which she called "objectivism", so calling any other philosophy "Rand's objectivism" or "Randian" is a mistake. But no person owns the language; just because Ms. Rand and her followers want to own the word "objectivism" itself, that's no reason to think they have a right to. The word "objectivist" already had meaning to real philosophers, and still does, and their refusal to allow it to be usurped by one writer is perfectly understandable. Even if they (and others who may choose to call themselves objectivists) choose to associate the word with Rand, but expand on or correct her mistakes and call that "objectivism", that might also be a perfectly rational thing to do, because they have as much right to the word as she does. The suggestion that philosophers (especially self-described objectivists) do this because they "don't know" she didn't approve is mudslinging beneath the dignity of honest debate. --LDC

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Since this is obviously a point of contention and probably has little bearing on an encyclopaedia definition of Objectivism, I'll respect the controversy clause and drop it. LDC, I don't have anything against objectivism and had no intent to subvert the neutrality of the document. My own belief system is fairly close to objectivism. I probably just dwell too much on tiny, contentious aspects of things and perhaps should adjust my thinking accordingly when writing here. A good portion of this debate stems from just how language can fairly be used, and after reading your profile I'm sure we have some philisophical differences in that area--but no mudslinging was intended. Sorry.

Just one more point? A great deal of Objectivists DO align themselves with Rand, and these were the people I was referring to. If there was an encyclopedia definition, it would probably have a lot about her in there and speak mostly of her philosophy. To most of the world, objectivism is aligned with her. Maybe someone more qualified than me should deal with the debate on this. It's confusing, but important enough to cover. - AD

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First, contra LDC, Rand and her followers call themselves Objectivists, not objectivists. The word is capitalized to distinguish it from the common English word; Objectivism capitalized refers to the philosophy of Ayn Rand; objectivism not capitalized refers to various other things. Rand did not want to "own" the word 'objectivism' and would have considered such a desire to be silly.

Second, I have known a lot of Objectivists but I have never known anyone who believes that Objectivism refers only to the canonical words of Ayn Rand. Those who do hold this opinion are considered to be little more than a fringe group, despite their claims to being "official". This belief, that Objectivism is a "closed system", makes no more sense than the claim that genetics is not part of Darwinism because Darwin never wrote anything about genes. Perhaps there is a place for these distinctions in an academic study of the history of ideas, but these distinctions serve no purpose and are in fact a hindrance in the study of the ideas themselves.

The relevent question is whether there is anything within the philosophy of Objectivism that requires it to be a closed system. If there is not - and there is not - then the argument that it is a closed system need not be acknowledged in a discussion of the philosophy. - TS

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"If you wonder why I am so particular about protecting the integrity of the term Objectivism,' my reason is that Objectivism is the name I have given to my philosophy - therefore, anyone using that name for some philosophical hodgepodge of his own, without my knowledge or consent, is guilty of the fraudulent presumption of trying to put thoughts into my brain (or of trying to pass his thinking off as mine - an attempt which fails, for obvious reasons). I chose the name Objectivism at a time when my philosophy was beginning to be known and some people were starting to call themselves Randists. I am much too conceited to allow such a use of my name...."

"What is the proper policy on this issue? If you agree with some tenets of Objectivism, but disagree with others, do not call yourself an Objectivist; give proper authorship credit for the parts you agree with - and then indulge in any flights of fancy you wish, on your own." (Ayn Rand, To the Readers of The Objectivist Forum, The Objectivist Forum, Vol. 1, No. 1.)

http://aynrand.org/objectivism/Q1.html

-AD

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Tim, I was intending to update this article a while ago with the information you allude to, but really, it's been quite a while since I've looked at any Rand-type stuff...

--LMS

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In my personal opinion Objectivism isn't a philosophical viewpoint at all. Its just the political opinions of Ayn Rand and her followers, plus some added rhetoric (much of that rhetoric consists in calling her views philosophy). (I might add I have a very low opinion of Ayn Rand as a thinker.) -- Simon J Kissane

Well, you might call her work bad philosophy (though I wouldn't, and the wikipedia certainly shouldn't), but I have to suppose that if you think that her work is primarily political, you must not be very familar with the entire body of her work or the work of academic philosophers interested in her ideas. Her political ideas, while controversial and more than moderately influential, aren't nearly as well-developed in her work as her ethical ideas and her epistemological ideas.

If you're interested in taking a second look at her more strictly epistemological ideas, I recommend either of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology or the excellent academic work Evidence Of The Senses by David Kelley, which presents Kelley's realist views on perception, which are grounded in Rand's epistemology.

If you're interested in taking a second look at her more strictly ethical ideas, I recommend Tara Smith's book Viable Values. Smith is a professor of philosophy at the University of Texas and her book deals with a fuller exposition and defense of Rand's meta-ethical views. --Jimbo Wales

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Indeed, the novel that made Rand famous is the only one she wrote that didn't have much politics in it, The Fountainhead, which portrays her notion of the ideal man in the person of the architect Howard Roark. So "political" is the wrong word. Unfortunately her politics is what got her the most publicity. Her notion of intrinsicism/subjectivism/objectivism, in that order, from more primitive to more sophisticated, as it applies to epistemology and to the theory of value, ought to be made explicit in this article. That would take some work, or I'd do it now. Michael Hardy 01:56 Feb 21, 2003 (UTC)

We need to remove the following and replace it with a more detailed and accurate summary "Objectivism (capitalized) is the name chosen by Ayn Rand for her philosophy. She described Objectivism as a philosophy for living on earth." What is that supposed to mean? What precisely is meant by the word "living"? And what do we mean by saying "on Earth". As opposed to Mars or Jupiter? Ayn Rand made clear that objectivism was a way of life, a moral philosophy, that every human must aspire to live by; without objectivism, she held that one would be immoral. RK 16:40 5 Jul 2003 (UTC)

Your comments about "Mars or Jupiter" are rather silly; "on Earth" is obviously a metaphor meaning that we're eschewing the supernatural and the like. I think it was Wallace Mattson, once head of the philosophy department at Berkeley, who commended Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology as important and original. Michael Hardy 22:06 5 Jul 2003 (UTC)

I wasn't being silly; I was pointing out that despite whatever you had in mind, you hadn't made yourself clear. There is a big difference between what you write here, and what you wrote in the article. I had no idea that you were alluding to a rejection of the supernatural. By the way, Rand's objectivism also rejects all forms of religion, and rejects the idea that any other form of belief or ethics is moral. Fine. But the introduction should not subtly imply this; it should just say it. BTW, I don't think anyone questions that some people in philosophy view her writings as philosophy in the scholarly sense of the term. However, if you bring this subject up you would also have to write that most philosophers don't see her work as being philosophy in this sense. RK 00:30 6 Jul 2003 (UTC)

You seem to be assuming I'm the one who wrote this article. I'm not. As for most philosophers, they are simply unfamiliar with Rand's writings. Michael Hardy 19:10 6 Jul 2003 (UTC)

I do not need to be a professional philosopher to see that the premise of Objectivism, to be blunt, is hogwash. It is not possible to have a reasonable society by just following your needs using logic while having disregard for others. Proof: a psychopath only cares for his own self interest. He is pure logic and his mind is free of emotion. Would a society of psychopaths endure? Last time someone tried to put psychopaths unbounded together in a mental institution they ended up killing each other. QED. This does not mean nothing is salvagable from the whole works. But it certainly impairs my interest in reading it. Note: I suggest you read "Descartes' Error" by Damasio. It is very interesting. Getting back into the subject: I feel the Wikipedia pages about Objectivism are a bit muddled and confusing. Should be more straightforward instead of beating around the bush. Anonymous 5:00 14 Jul 2003 (UTC)

So who said one should disregard other people? That a psychopath cares for his self-interest at all is obvious nonsense; psychopaths are not aware of nor interested in their self-interest. Psychopaths use "pure logic"?? That premise is bizarre, to say the least. If any philosophy says people should be psychopaths, you may have succeeded in refuting it, but in the mean time, your comments have no relevance. Michael Hardy 19:19 14 Jul 2003 (UTC)

Damasio, a neurologist expert on his field, says people have a center for emotion which changes the value we give things. Psychopaths, or people with certain brain disabilities caused by acidents, have this center for emotion blunted or destroyed and hence do not give any value to emotional knowledge. They have no empathy for anyone. Without any empathy, i.e. the most extreme form of egoism possible, psychopaths focus on immediate gain for self. The consequences are obvious. Please explain the effect of Nazism on the blunting of empathy. Did these people have no self-interest? Were they psychopatic or not? This alone IMHO refutes any philosophy based on unimpaired egoism, not just Objectivism. Hitler was an admirer of another, earlier, unimpaired egoism based philosophy. On a different matter, Objectivism promotes dogma at the expense of tolerance. People who do not agree with Objectivism are demonised and deserve to die as the useless scum they are. So much for being a progressive philosophy. Anonymous 23:14 20 Jul 2003 (UTC)

Objectivism promotes dogma? That is the exact opposite of the truth. "People who do not agree ... are demonized?" Obviously you've never met anyone who advocated Objectivism. Yes, Nazis are completely out of touch with self-interest; largely they lack selves. Were there any other philosophical defenders of human rights in the 20th century besides Rand? Why do you ask me to explain anything about Nazism? You're probably right, as I understand it, that it blunts emotions; that is part of why I say Nazis are completely out of touch with their self-interest and largely lack selves. But that obviously has no relevance at all to your points about the topic of this article. Michael Hardy 00:33 21 Jul 2003 (UTC)

Since this conversation is leading nowhere I will leave it at that. Time causes most people to open their eyes. Anonymous 0:43 22 Jul 2003 (UTC)

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I see the "Criticism" section just concerns ethical criticisms. Would anyone care to essay an existentialist or phenomenalist criticism? —Ashley Y 11:36, Dec 6, 2003 (UTC)

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The anonymous user identified only as 66.176.46.28 may have a point in saying that the section that was called "criticism of Objectivism" merely reported disagreement without giving arguments. But that's not a reason not to report that that widespread disagreement exists. Therefore I've reverted to the last previous edit and changed the phrasing of the title of the section from "Criticism of ..." to "Widespread disagreement with ...". Michael Hardy 14:42, 22 Dec 2003 (UTC)

That makes it read ridiculously POV ... I changed it back just now (before reading the above) in the hope that it will stimulate the section being filled out better. (yeah, lots of hope) - David Gerard 21:10, Feb 9, 2004 (UTC)

To be uncertain is uncomfortable, but to be certain is ridiculous - Chinese Proverb. Agnosticism rules,ok. [kevin armstrong]28 March,04.

Dispute of accuracy, supposed quote in "disagreement"

As a long-time student of Rand's works, I do not believe Rand ever said the quote:

"morality is by definition a system of values designed to answer all ethical questions. Some sort of a hierarchy of values must exist so that a person can rationally decide between conflicting values. A hierarchy implies that no two values are equal and that ultimately one value must be supreme. Without a hierarchy and a supreme value, any attempt at constructing a morality would result in an unsystematic hodgepodge of values. There would be no way to make rational moral decisions. There must ultimately be one supreme value; otherwise, morality is impossible. There can only be one absolute value. If there were two, then neither would be absolute. The only true absolute value is an individual's life. Objectivism is the only system derived from this value and is therefore the only correct morality. All other moralities are false."

Furthermore, I cannot find any verification of this quote anywhere. Therefore, I dispute the accuracy of this entry. I invite the user RK to explain the source of this supposed quotation.

Karbinksi's rewrite

Has anyone noticed the rewrite? It is better than the one it immediately replaced (with the nonsensical allusion to 'original validation'). But there are still many problems.

• Rand's ethical egoism, her advocacy of "rational selfishness," is perhaps her most well-known position.
  • The problem with this is the implied equivalence between ethical egoism and rational egoism (which "rational selfishness" links to). These are not the same positions.
• She defines morality as "a code of values to guide man's choices and actions - the choices and actions that determine the purpose and the course of his life."
  • This is the beginning of a long-winded and inconclusive rationale. Having checked some of the other philosophy articles, they all give reasons why philosophers held their most well-known or important positions. Since Rand's position on 'rational selfishness' is well-known and clearly important, some justification or rationale should be given.
  • The problem with this one is that it leaps about. We start with 'rational selfishness' in the first sentence then immediately move to 'values' and 'morality'. There is no idea in this sentence that connects in any obvious way with the first.
• Rand maintained that the first question isn't what should the code of values be, the first question is "Does man need values at all- and why?"
  • So the first question, the primary question is whether man needs values. Good. We are starting from first principles.
• Of primary importance for Objectivist ethics is an answer to the question "What are values?"
  • But now we are told the primary thing is not 'does man need values' at all, but something else. Be consistent.
• According to Rand it is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible," and, "[t]he fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do."
  • The previous sentence promised the hope of an answer to that important question 'what are values', but this sentence doesn't give us that. We are merely given a condition of the possibility of values. Also, this suggests that 'what are values' is not the primary question at all, but 'what is life'.
  • Also smuggled in here is a statement involving the fallacy of moving from 'is' to 'ought'. First, it's a fallacy. Second, isn't this move also a 'well-known position' of Rand? There are just too many ideas floating around. What position are we trying to explain here?

And so on. Note the paragraphs floating around towards the end of the section which talk about selfishness and more about values. The first step to a clean-up would be to move around these paragraphs so the section has an approximate logical order (this is what my version was working towards, but of course it has been deleted).

Peter Damian (talk) 20:00, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

• "But now we are told the primary thing is not 'does man need values' at all, but something else. Be consistent."
  • good point, needs to be fixed (entirely my writing at fault there).
• Problems with the opening paragraph
  • I havn't much time right now, but the introduction should focus on the beginning questions and Rand's definition of morality
• Moving from is to ought and defining life
  • I think we need to remember we are not working up a treatment of her ethics here, we are summarizing her position: values are objective. The level of detail where we consider the Objectivist definition of life is too low level in my opinion.
    • Eh wht n erth are you talking about. The section heading is 'ethics' so why wouldn't you 'work up to a treatment of her ethics in that section?Peter Damian (talk) 06:39, 16 May 2009 (UTC)

I think the main weakness in the section is presenting the Objectivist claim that values are objective. --Karbinski (talk) 20:48, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

There are many weaknesses in the section. I will discuss them one by one, starting with the question of what the section should be about. See below. Peter Damian (talk) 06:59, 16 May 2009 (UTC)

Q1: on summarising philosophical arguments

It was argued above that we should not be summarising a writer's reason for holding a position that is significant or important. Why? This is the practice in other articles in Wikipedia

E.g. in the section on Hume's view of induction in the article on Hume there is a long explanation of why Hume holds this view, giving a summary of his argument. Similarly Berkeley's arguments for idealism are given in the article about him in this section. Kant's reasons for holding his theory of perception are given in the corresponding section. Logically this suggests that the reasons Rand gave for her probably most well-known position ('rational selfishness') should be given in this article (or in some article about her philosophy). The average Wikipedia reader should thus be given:

• A brief explanation of what the position is.
• This should include an explanation of what makes Rand's theory an ethical one. Namely, that she is not simply saying or stating or observing that people act in their own enlightened self-interest, but that it is right or good to do so, and that they ought to do so. Any explanation that omitted this fact would fail to be a proper explanation. ("What, then, are the right goals for man to pursue? What are the values his survival requires? That is the question to be answered by the science of ethics." 22,4)
• That Rand gave arguments for her position. She didn't simply state that one ought to be rationally selfish, but gave reasons and arguments for this.
• A summary of the arguments that brought her to this view. Namely, that life and nothing else is valuable for its own sake, and that, therefore, everyone should always do whatever promotes his own life. We can quarrel about the "therefore" later.

Does anyone disagree with this approach? We can argue the details later. Peter Damian (talk) 07:01, 16 May 2009 (UTC)

Sounds good. I would also add criticism of Rand's ethical theory (eventually anyway) as I believe we are working on getting away from having separate "criticism" sections and towards integrating them in the articles more fully. I would also propose that we attempt to rewrite this article in sections. I'm not sure ethics is the best one to start with (it might be better to do metaphysics and epistemology first, as these are prereqs of Rand's ethics) but I wouldn't have a problem with starting here first. TallNapoleon (talk) 07:13, 16 May 2009 (UTC)

As this is where we happen to be, I suggest we keep on with this. We should discuss the metaphysics and other sections also. Another principle of good article writing is that any important principle held by a writer (such as in Rand's case the axiom of identity) should be presented in the context of their wider position. Thus, why did Rand hold the 'Axiom of Identity'? What follows from this axiom that is important for her general position? (Good question). Peter Damian (talk) 07:37, 16 May 2009 (UTC)

I think any editor who has been involved in working on philosophy articles will know that this is indeed normal practice on Wikipedia. Rand, as always, is a special case, so one must expect to provide supporting evidence for disputed parts of the summary.KD Tries Again (talk) 16:02, 16 May 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Agree. Fortunately I found a couple of references for her main argument last week, and someone has just sent me a third, James Rachels' chapter on egoism (and Rand) in The Elements of Moral Philosophy which I will get from the library next week. Peter Damian (talk) 17:24, 16 May 2009 (UTC)

Proposed first para

I therefore propose the following para. It starts by saying this is her most well-known position. It distinguishes rational egoism from ethical egoism (which the current version does not), and it distinguishes psychologism egoism from ethical egoism.

Rand's advocacy of rational egoism is perhaps her most well-known position. Rational egoism is a version of ethical egoism. This is different from psychological egoism, which is the theory that every human action is motivated by self-interest. Psychological egoism is not a normative theory: it does not say that every human action ought to be motivated by self-interest. Ethical egoism is a normative ethical theory that holds that each person ought to pursue his or her own self-interest, and that our only duty is to ourselves.

Peter Damian (talk) 07:43, 16 May 2009 (UTC)

How would you like this rewrite:

Rand's advocacy of rational egoism--a version of ethical egoism--which is perhaps her most well-known position. This differs from psychological egoism, which is the theory that every human action is motivated by self-interest, as psychological egoism states that humans are motivated by self-interest, while ethical egoism states that they should be motivated by self interest.

It's a bit more concise, and I don't think it loses much. TallNapoleon (talk) 08:05, 16 May 2009 (UTC)

Agree, it is more concise. Let's wait for others to comment. (Perhaps we ought to get the link to normative in somehow. Peter Damian (talk) 08:23, 16 May 2009 (UTC)

You know, I think we might actually include the bit distinguishing ethical egoism from psychological egoism in a ref as a footnote, as it doesn't directly pertain to Rand. TallNapoleon (talk) 09:33, 16 May 2009 (UTC)

I disagree, given that it directly pertains to Rand's view - see my remarks above. If we are explaining Rand's view, it is important to distinguish her view from a merely psychological one, moreover it is important to say it is an ethical one, i.e. she is talking about what ought to be the case. Otherwise there are people here who will try to resist any mention of her trying to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. Peter Damian (talk) 09:45, 16 May 2009 (UTC)

Note the definition of rational egoism is wrong there. Rational egoism is the view that it is always (and only?) rational to act in one's self-interest (while being neutral about whether one ought to be rational). Peter Damian (talk) 21:55, 16 May 2009 (UTC)

Are there secondary sources that make this distinction specifically for Rand? As for the "most well known position," I'm thinking of putting a fact template in there - I'm thinking there is an audience where rational egoism is the most prominent position, but in terms of the widest audience out there reading this article, Capitalism is the position she is best known for. --Karbinski (talk) 23:28, 18 May 2009 (UTC)

As well, the opening paragraph sets the stage for reporting Rand's ethics - what are her answers to those questions and what code does she come up with. To discuss the entire section:

• Intro (def'n, starting point)
• Life and Death alternative
• Life --> Values, Life as the ultimate value
• Man as a rational being (reason and volition) --> standard of good and evil, egoism
• Values as objective, rejection of intrinsic value, rejection of subjectivism --> is to ought, rational egoism
• The virtues
• Closing (nutshell)

You have the questions, the answer, that what man is determines what he ought to do, what man is, the standard of value for man to evaluate his code, values are objective, re-iterate man's method of survival, Objectivist ethics is therefore rational egoism, the implied virtues, a nutshell summary. There is alot to cover, I think positive statements of what the position is are more useful than negative statements of what it isn't (such as phsycological egoism) --Karbinski (talk) 23:47, 18 May 2009 (UTC)

A simple solution to one of the issues you raised would be to describe it as "one of her most well-known positions"--which it indisputably is. TallNapoleon (talk) 02:02, 19 May 2009 (UTC)

Not to imply any ill-intent, but that technically is exactly the process of using weasel words. The context is five branches of philosophy, now I don't actually know what her best known positions are, I suspect that its Capitalism followed by either reason or rational egoism. I'm trying to say that the strong form of this demands verifiability and the weaker form is irrelevant. --Karbinski (talk) 14:47, 19 May 2009 (UTC)

It would surely be fair to say that it's her distinctive position as far as ethics is concerned, and this is the ethics section. But I agree it's not an essential point to make. Could we start with a simple declarative sentence, "Rand believed that...(etc)," then go on to explain it? Might be easier. E.g.: "In ethics, Rand advocated rational egoism, the doctrine that human beings ought to be motivated by self-interest" (rough wording).KD Tries Again (talk) 14:58, 19 May 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

I'm tempted to make that edit. --Karbinski (talk) 13:46, 20 May 2009 (UTC)

discussion is taking place at Template:Objectivism_and_Ayn_Rand_Cross_Talk#Valliant_revisited

Restoring James Valliant and The Passion of Ayn Rand's Critics There appears to be no serious justification for omitting this book as a source on issues related to Ayn Rand and Objectivism. It is the only source for Ayn Rand's own words on the topics of Nathaniel and Barbara Branden. So, including reference to the Brandens' books on Rand while excluding Rand's own perspective is necessarily non-neutral and one-sided. Indeed, it is polemically set in biased opposition to Rand. Many of the sources Wikipedia cites have not been reviewed positively by Kirkus Reviews, as 'The Passion of Ayn Rand's Critics' has been -- "deserving of a place on the growing shelf" of books about Rand, it said. Numerous books and articles critical of Rand from self-published "vanity" houses -- like Writer's Club Press -- are used in Wikipedia. In its brief life, however, Durban House was named one of the "best new imprints" by Publisher's Weekly. Unlike the Brandens themselves, the author did not have a personal, nasty falling-out with Rand. The book is far more of a neutral"/"third party" source than either of these, and it contains first hand reports of equal quality to the Brandens from Rand herself. The author's academic credentials appear to be superior to either of the Brandens. The Sciabarra review cited has been distorted in the instant discussion of this book. Indeed, that this book got such sustained and serious attention from Sciabarra suggests that it is worthy of serious attention. It seems highly implausible that Sciabarra -- who also invited the author to discuss the book still further in 'The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies' -- intended excluding it as a scholarly source. Quite the opposite appears to the case. Sciabarra's engagement with the author suggests the book's seriousness and importance to Sciabarra. Also, previous references to 'The Passion of Ayn Rand's Critics' show that lecturers and scholars once associated with David Kelley's Objectivist group (even a board member) left that organization as a result of the release of this book. These are scholars and lecturers impacted the book being censored by Wikipedia. The book itself is part of the "history" of the Objectivist movement. That a number of scholars once critical of ARI were affected by the book also suggests its importance and seriousness, since these scholars and teachers found it to be "reliable" enough to act upon. Indeed, as his review of the book shows, Sciabarra is far ~ more ~ critical of another source cited repeatedly in Wikipedia, Jeff Walker's 'Ayn Rand Cult.' Other scholars are, too -- according to Wikipedia's own references to it. To add another example, Walker repeats the allegation that Branden may have killed his second wife(!) Excluding the book suggested but not Walker (or Nyquist, for that matter) seems to distort Sciabarra's intention. This author is also a first-hand reporter -- and a former student of -- Murray Rothbard. The error he cites from Rothbard is simply a fact -- no one was ever "excommunicated" by Rand for not sharing her musical taste, as Rothbard erroneously alleged. Thus, the facts presented in this title are also important, not merely the author's evaluation of them. Pelagius1 —Preceding unsigned comment added by Pelagius1 (talk • contribs) 18:19, 19 May 2009 (UTC) Hello Pelagius1. You are a brand new editor who seems to be a fan of the work of James Valliant. You've also edited the article to reinsert a citation of Valliant's work. Can you quote any third-party sources that have a high opinion of Valliant's work about Ayn Rand? Even published book reviews would help. EdJohnston (talk) 19:19, 19 May 2009 (UTC) Hello Pelagius1. Welcome to Wikipedia. Fear not being a new editor or being a fan (or not a fan) of anyone's particular work. You have made a case for the reliability of Valliant's work and done the natural thing and edited the article. There is no need to suffer a double standard. If you are not satisfied with what comes from this discussion, the community welcomes you to utilize its Wikipedia:Reliable sources/Noticeboard for consideration by a wider audience (concensus isn't limited to only whom happened to show up). --Karbinski (talk) 19:34, 19 May 2009 (UTC) I've re-opened the discussion on Valliant at Template:Objectivism_and_Ayn_Rand_Cross_Talk#Valliant_revisited. Please let's continue the debate there so it is all in one place. Thanks,  Skomorokh  20:16, 19 May 2009 (UTC) Please bear in mind that not only is 72.199.110.160 the IP that James Valliant sends email from, but that Pelagius1, our newish editor, is actually James Valliant. Which would make Pelagius1 subject to a few questions, I think. Wsscherk (talk) 05:48, 20 May 2009 (UTC) Erm, how do you know this? TallNapoleon (talk) 05:51, 20 May 2009 (UTC) The style is similar, and the coincidence of dates might be enough for a sock puppet report - have you got any evidence on this Wsscherk? If so it should go to ANI. --Snowded (talk) 07:24, 20 May 2009 (UTC) I disagree, on the basis of the fact that unlike Pelagius, our problem IP editor never, ever engaged on talk pages. Unless Wsscherk has some specific evidence to the contrary that this is James Valliant I don't think he should be checkusered. TallNapoleon (talk) 08:29, 20 May 2009 (UTC) Actually TN you are agreeing ....--Snowded (talk) 08:32, 20 May 2009 (UTC) Whoops... so I am. Maybe I should cut back on the late night editing... TallNapoleon (talk) 09:03, 20 May 2009 (UTC) How do I know this? I have put together several lines of evidence: Emails from James Valliant to me with the identical IP address to IP 160 Email from Valliant (today) to me in which he states (I paraphrase) that he is not topic-banned, since he just added a reference to the Objectivism(Ayn Rand) article (David Kelley). Reference to David Kelley book added to the page today, by Pelargius1. Acknowledgement by Pelargius1 that he had already edited Objectivist-related pages as an unlogged-in editor on user:Skmorokh(talk). The pattern of edits by IP 160 show many striking correspondences with Valliant, including repeated details added to his high school, extensive editing of pages such as university mentors and a deep level of familiarity with the book in question. Substantial interaction with Valliant in online discussions, thus a familiarity with his style/syntax/phrasings. (that IP 160 did never join in talk as opposed to Pelargius: IP 160 is topic banned until November. It is in IP 160/Pelargius/Valliant's interest to use whatever means are available to have his materials included in the Objectivism pages) I am a relative newcomer to Byzantiwikium, so I don't know what checkusered means. I will look it up, and I will also check the procedures for WP:ANI; thanks for the information. I don't think I should post the email headers here, nor the details of the emails to me. I thank you for the advice. I stand by my findings. Having said that, I ask the question again . . . what if? What if the same person is IP 160 and Valliant, and Pelargius1? Bear in mind I don't support the idea that all the references to Passion of Ayn Rand's Critics should be deleted from the articles here. Nor do I think the James Valliant article should be deleted, necessarily. I do want James to come clean and try to salvage some useful information. I will transfuse this note to the other discussion page as well. Wsscherk (talk) 10:05, 20 May 2009 (UTC) All right, if you believe this is the case I would suggest requesting a checkuser and taking this to WP:ANI. If 160 = Pelagius = Valliant, then he needs to be made aware of WP:COI and he needs to interact honestly. The problem is that this is based on private, personal information, so there's no way any of us can confirm it. TallNapoleon (talk) 10:17, 20 May 2009 (UTC) Looks to me like a posting to ANI with an offer to supply the emails etc. directly to any investigating administrator. If you need help doing that Wsscherk just ask, Skomorokh is one of the most au fait editors with the process but most of us have been there at one time or another. --Snowded (talk) 12:02, 20 May 2009 (UTC) Even if Pelagius1 is Valliant, and is the same editor as IP 160, he is topic-banned only from the article itself, not the Talk page. I agree it is better for him if he will clarify his identity. If he continues to edit the article itself, and does not obey consensus, further sanctions are possible. EdJohnston (talk) 13:18, 20 May 2009 (UTC) I'd be really surprised if 160 = Pelagius based on their wiki actions. There exists a sock-puppet notice board, so if someone thinks there is a real case, take it there instead of bogging down discussions with this stuff. That is, if one is serious about this they'll post on the noticeboard, if the discussion happens everywhere but on the noticeboard its likely the goal is to simply chuck mud at Pelagius. --Karbinski (talk) 13:56, 20 May 2009 (UTC)

Criticism

Why is there a criticism section? This seems out of place. I wouldn't go to the wiki entry on "Automobiles" in order to see their critic's views on them. Rather, I just want to find out about automobiles. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.33.205.21 (talk) 21:31, 28 June 2009 (UTC)

Articles on philosophies routinely include discussion of their critics. The analogy to automobiles just seems absurd. Why is philosophy like an automobile? Both leak? --Christofurio (talk) 22:29, 28 June 2009 (UTC)

Boisvert/Sciabarra passage

Earlier today, an anon editor removed the sentence about Raymond Boisvert's supposed criticism of Objectivism as "out of sync with the complex interrelationships and interconnected systems of modern life," summarizing the removal as "uncited dubious unrelevant statements." Peterdjones reverted with the summary "material was cited, despite edit summary. Needs discussion". So let's discuss.

Peterdjones's edit summary notwithstanding, the sentence is question is not cited, and has been fact-tagged since June. There is a reference note for the sentence immediately after, which is an obvious attempt to provide a contrasting viewpoint from Chris Matthew Sciabarra, but Sciabarra does not mention Boisvert. My take is that if no one can come up with a proper cite for the Boisvert criticism, then both it and the "response" from Sciabarra should be deleted. I note that this same passage (both sentences) was deleted without controversy from the Ayn Rand article back in June. At this point I see no reason why it shouldn't meet a similar fate in this article. --RL0919 (talk) 19:02, 16 July 2009 (UTC)

I looked back through the discussions of the Boisvert criticism in the archives of the Ayn Rand talk page. It all goes back to early 2008, and it seems quite clear that editors agreed that the criticism was verifiable (see here, for example. All the dispute is about whether Boisvert is important enough. Somewhere along the way, the footnote seems to have been dropped, and I haven't easily been able to recover the source. Editors like TallNapoleon and J.Readings were involved in the discussions. Maybe they know where the comments come from? (It's very difficult to search for the original, because countless pages simply refer back Wikipedia.)

I agree the Sciabarra "rebuttal" needs to go, if he's not actually rebutting Boisvert. This is a criticism section.KD Tries Again (talk) 21:21, 17 July 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

If someone can provide an actual citation for the Boisvert comment, then I don't see a problem with it staying (although it seems a bit obscure to be one of the first criticisms mentioned). But I don't think that it is safe to take the prior talk page discussion as confirmation of verifiability. --RL0919 (talk) 06:17, 18 July 2009 (UTC)

I'm not sure that I understand what RL0919 is asking. Does he want someone to verify that the quote exists in a published newspaper? If so, yes it does. Boisvert is a well-respected, well-regarded academic philosopher who has published countless articles in peer-reviewed journals. He was quoted in a New York newspaper (sourced from LexisNexis) regarding the work of Ayn Rand -- the full quotation and citation being found in the archives. For some reason, at the time, there was a concerted effort by a few editors (which have since been banned in the ArbCom ruling) to remove these and other reliably sourced criticisms from the article. It was removed. I respected (then) consensus and let the matter drop. A few months ago, someone (I believe Skomorokh) re-added the criticism. No one objected because the new consensus approved of additional balance to the article. I was both surprised and pleased to see it re-added, but was not about to make a fuss one way or the other. J Readings (talk) 08:21, 18 July 2009 (UTC)

The anon IP deleted them again without explanation. In fact, it went several steps further by deleting several pieces of material. Do others feel comfortable with this kind of behavior or shall we revert until discussion takes place? I would like to avoid another IP 160 incident. J Readings (talk) 10:23, 18 July 2009 (UTC)

What I'm asking for is straightforward: there should be reference note in the article providing a specific citation for the Boisvert criticism. If the details are all "in the archives," then it should be easy enough to add into the article. Can you point me to the specific archive page that has it? If the details are all there, I can add the cite myself. I'm not challenging the relevance of it for inclusion if there is a verifiable reference for it.

As to the recent IP edits, most of what the editor did seems OK to me. If anything needs to be re-inserted, I think the best thing to do is to put it into the revised section, rather than reverting to the old version. --RL0919 (talk) 16:10, 18 July 2009 (UTC)

Hi there. I'm the anon IP editor. I've been working on the Rand/Objectivism criticisms section since 2005, maintaining it periodically. My edits were motivated by the fact that the Criticism section did not start in an encyclopedic or readable way -- leading off with an uncited one-word comment by Buckley and proceeding to the Boisvert criticism, followed by an out-of-nowhere and not so well written Sciabarra sentence. Surely this section should at least be organized in some coherent fashion. Could you imagine reading the first paragraph of the old section in Britannica?

Regarding the removal of some materials: the Sciabarra comment is not pertinent to a Criticism section! It is not even responding, as far as I know, to any criticism discussed in this section. Should we also include other positive opinions of Rand in this section? Followed by some more vaguely responsive negative opinions for further balance, perhaps?

As to the removal of the Boisvert criticism, this archived RfC is what settled this issue in the past. My own views on this issue are stated at more length here. To summarize, I do not mean to disrespect Raymond Boisvert in the slightest, and I agree that he is a reputable and legitimate scholar, but his criticism of Rand does not rise to the level of prominence or notability that would merit inclusion. --Wilanthule (talk) 17:22, 18 July 2009 (UTC)

In the same section, the reference to Seddon's book needs to be strengthened. It doesn't even explain that it's critical of Rand and Objectivism.KD Tries Again (talk) 22:14, 18 July 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

FYI

If people who watch this page are also interested in how Wikipedia is governed, be sure to check out this: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Requests_for_comment/Advisory_Council_on_Project_Development . Slrubenstein | Talk 13:31, 18 July 2009 (UTC)

Sourcing: mostly not independent?

As of May 31, 2009, the majority of the sources on this page are by Rand or other authors who directly advocated for and helped develop this philosophy. While I think these sources have their place on this page, I also think it's somewhat problematic for the page to rely as heavily on them as it currently does. I think this page could be greatly improved by making the page rely on independent sources everywhere from the introduction. The sections that rely more heavily on independent sources paint a very different picture from the sections that are relying mostly on Rand. The result is an incongruent page--I would rather see the whole page developed in a consistent way, from a neutral perspective. What does everyone else think? Cazort (talk) 23:32, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

Is it not the case that the most comprehensive, knowledgeable and accurate explanations of Objectivist philosophy have been written by Objectivist philosophers or long-time scholars of Objectivism?  Skomorokh  23:36, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

There are a number of problems with the sourcing for this article. Not only is there a lot of use of primary sources, there are over a dozen cases where specific claims, including quotes, are backed by a citation that consists of the book. No page number, not even a chapter or article name. Just the book. For several of these the book is Atlas Shrugged, which is over 1100 pages long! It's a verification nightmare.

Now, I do agree with Skomorokh that many of the best sources will be Objectivist philosophers. But there are still good secondary sources from Objectivist philosophers. For the purposes of the article, citations to Peikoff's Objectivism (with page numbers, please!) or Bernstein's Objectivism in One Lesson are better than citations of Rand's novels and essays. Citations of Gotthelf's On Ayn Rand, Kelley's Evidence of the Senses, Machan's Ayn Rand or any of Tara Smith books would be better still. One does not have to turn to critics to get peer-reviewed secondary sources! (Which is not to say that material from non-Objectivist should be avoided.) --RL0919 (talk) 00:00, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

There is no reason or policy not to use Rand's own essays for reporting on Objectivism. I'm not saying secondary sources shouldn't be used, but I am saying there is no need to task oneself (or others) with replacing Rand citations concerning Objectivism. --Karbinski (talk) 11:29, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

Actually, that's not quite accurate: Wikipedia articles[1] should rely primarily on reliable, third-party, published sources (although reliable self-published [ed.- meaning without editorial review] sources are allowable in some situations). See WP:RS. J Readings (talk) 11:37, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

Using Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology to report on Objectivist Epitemology would be an allowable situation, no secondary source could be more reliable. --Karbinski (talk) 11:45, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

I would go farther and say such a book is de facto a secondary source --Karbinski (talk) 11:46, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

The same cannot be said about Atlas Shrugged or other fiction books however, any interpretation is obviously non-verifiable - per strict policy (and if it is - that is, Rand or Peikoff or whomever does so - then we can cite Rand or Peikoff or whomever instead of AS). --Karbinski (talk) 11:51, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

But we've already seen the intractable problems which arise when one editor tries to summarize what Rand has said in one of her philosophical works, and another editor disagrees with the summary. (How are her own books secondary sources?)KD Tries Again (talk) 15:02, 2 June 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

What you saw was not an intractable problem, OR is not a problem, it doesn't belong. ITOE is a look at Objectivist Epistemology much in the same way a book like Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics is a look at Objectivist Ethics. --Karbinski (talk) 16:44, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

I raised these concerns because Rand's own writings are not secondary sources, nor are the writings of anyone with an interest in promoting this philosophy. This is of particular concern to me because Objectivism makes normative moral and political statements. Citing the writing of Rand or other Objectivists on this page must be done with caution--as one must use caution while citing writings associated with the Catholic church while writing articles relating to Catholicism. Yes, these sources have their role and are fully necessary to create a quality page. But they cannot be treated as independent sources. Cazort (talk) 20:09, 3 June 2009 (UTC)

If a source is propounding its own original beliefs about a subject or describing events that they were a direct witnesses of, then in that respect it is primary source. If it is describing the beliefs of someone else or events that they did not witness directly, then it is a secondary source. This is true regardless of what attitude the source has towards those beliefs or events. If Leonard Peikoff or Tara Smith or whoever is dealing with Ayn Rand's ideas, then they are a secondary source, even if they wholeheartedly agree with those ideas. Insofar as they claim to be expounding on a philosophy of Rand's invention (as, for example, Peikoff explicitly claims to be doing in Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand and Smith claims to be doing in Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics), then they are secondary sources. They have their own POV, of course, but then so do all sources.

A writing by Rand, such as ITOE, is clearly not a secondary source for Rand's ideas. It could be a secondary source only to the extent that Rand discusses the ideas of others, but she doesn't do that very much and has been widely criticized for her approach when she does, so there would be obvious questions of reliability. --RL0919 (talk) 20:44, 3 June 2009 (UTC)

I agree with all of that except that a book such as ITOE is of questionable reliability as to what is the content of Objectivist Epistemology. That its a primary source doesn't somehow magically kill its reliability - its "the notable stuff" we are reporting on. Its not Ayn Rand reporting that Ayn Rand has changed history or some other event/biographical fact with "eye-witness" testimony, its Ayn Rand presenting objectivist epistemology as the emminent expert on the subject. While it would be fine to use only secondary sources, I think it would also be pointless -- essentially a contrived exercise motivated by a poor understanding of the wiki policy. There is *nothing* controversial at stake here: who is saying Objectivist Metaphysics isn't based on the three axioms, who is saying Objectivism doesn't claim human beings are posessed of a volitional conciousness, who is saying her theory of concepts doesn't involve measurement omission, who is saying her treatment of ethics doesn't claim that there is an objective standard of morality, who is saying her politics isn't absolutely laissez faire capitalism? All controversial topics qua metaphysics/epistemology/ethics/politics, but not a lick of controversy in terms of what Objectivism is. --Karbinski (talk) 21:37, 3 June 2009 (UTC)

I did not mean that ITOE is unreliable as a source about Objectivist epistemology, although I see how what I said could be read that way. I meant that Rand might not be considered a reliable source for describing some third party she discusses. For example, her interpretation of Immanuel Kant is widely disputed, so using her as a secondary source about Kant would be controversial. But I doubt we will be using Rand in that way in this article. She would be a primary source for her own ideas, and as such she's clearly reliable. It's hard for a primary source to be unreliable about the author's own opinions unless there is a claim that the source is falsified or ironic.

The issue with primary sources is the danger of creating original research by interpreting the source. When someone writes multiple essays or a whole book describing their position on a topic, it is hard to summarize that in a much shorter space without interpreting the material. And when it comes to interpretation the guidelines are pretty clear: use interpretations from reliable secondary sources instead. I see no problem with that. As I said, there are a number of reliable secondary sources (Peikoff, Smith, etc.) that can be used. --RL0919 (talk) 22:30, 3 June 2009 (UTC)

This is a very difficult problem, not least because OR tends to be in the eye of the beholder when it comes to summarizing texts. Other WP articles dealing with philosophical works use a mixture of citations to primary sources and secondary sources. This is unproblematic where there is general agreement on what the primary source says (or means). In the case of Rand, there is no such clarity: an editor who summarizes the primary source (rather than just quoting it) is likely to be accused of OR, but the secondary sources are limited. I'd be inclined to rely on tertiary sources - encyclopaedia articles about Rand's philosophy - but I don't expect a consensus to support that.KD Tries Again (talk) 14:03, 5 June 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

There are five book-length surveys of Rand's philosophy by five different authors (Bernstein, Gotthelf, Machan, Peikoff and Sciabarra), all of which meet WP sourcing standards. That's not counting a number of more focused works on ethics, aesthetics, etc., that also easily qualify as reliable sources. How many book-length works does it take to source an encyclopedia article? To be frank, I think the real reason primary sources are used so much is easy availability. Rand's books are in thousands of libraries, they're available in electronic format for easy cut-and-paste, and she's quoted extensively online. By that standard, getting a copy of Gotthelf's On Ayn Rand or Machan's Ayn Rand is like pulling teeth. --RL0919 (talk) 15:24, 5 June 2009 (UTC)

Examples of what I see as inappropriate sourcing

• "Objectivist epistemology, like most other philosophical branches of Objectivism, was first presented by Rand in Atlas Shrugged." cites only the book "Atlas Shrugged" itself. This manner of sourcing (citing a work of fiction to justify an assertion about the development of philosophical ideas within that work) strikes me as original research. I think the best way to source this statement would be to cite an independent source written about Atlas shrugged (ideally by an author independent from Objectivism). The next best way to source this sentence would be to reference a statement in which Rand herself stated that she had first presented Objectivist epistemology in that book.
• "Perhaps Ayn Rand's most distinctive and original contribution in epistemology"...this strikes me as promotional language, and the paragraph it occurs in is backed up only by a quote by Leonard Peikoff, someone with strong ties to Ayn Rand, hardly an independent source that would be needed to justify a statement about the distinctiveness or originality of Rand's contributions to epistemology. In this case, I think someone who is widely regarded as an authority on epistemology (beyond just the circle of objectivists) would need to be cited, in order to justify a sentence like that.

Is this making sense? I am trying to impart a higher level of rigor into this article: I would like to see this article reach good article status and I think that the sourcing is currently the weakest link in this article. Cazort (talk) 20:09, 3 June 2009 (UTC)

The first example appears to be OR, or at least very poorly sourced. On the other hand, if the claim was supported by a citation of Leonard Peikoff, David Kelley, etc., saying that the first presentation of Objectivist epistemology is in AS, then it would be entirely kosher. It would be a third party talking about something Rand did. It doesn't matter whether they are Objectivists or not unless there is some strong dispute among Objectivist vs. non-Objectivist sources about whether the statement is true.

The second example is clearly POV and should only appear in an article if it is attributed to a specific source as their opinion, and then only if the opinion of that source carries enough weight on the subject to warrant inclusion in an article. If Peikoff said that and is a recognized expert on Objectivism (which he is), then the statement should be something like, "Leonard Peikoff says that Rand's most distinctive ..." And if other reputable sources disagree, their contrary opinions can also be documented. This would all be from reliable secondary sources. Verifiability and NPOV are related but not identical. --RL0919 (talk) 20:53, 3 June 2009 (UTC)

I'm totally in agreement, let's just start editing. Cazort (talk) 17:32, 4 June 2009 (UTC)

The idea that only non-Objectivists can serve as meaningful citations is prejudicial, because most non-Objectivists who have bothered to express opinions about Objectivism have been actively opposed to Objectivism, and have often misrepresented Rand's views. If you try to "balance" the article thusly, it will not be neutral.

In fact, Objectivist epistemology, like most other philosophical branches of Objectivism, was first presented by Rand in Atlas Shrugged; she greatly elaborated on it afterward. And while the "Perhaps …" citation is worded inappropriately, Peikoff is in an excellent position to judge; RL9019's suggestion is good. What you should be asking is, are these statements true? And don't tell me how Wikipedia doesn't care what's true, just what can be cited. If that were really the case, it would be worthless. — DAGwyn (talk) 13:09, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

There are aspects of Objectivist epistemology that are not elaborated in Atlas Shrugged (Rand's theory of concepts) and some that are not in it at all (e.g., Aquinas's angels, or the notion of arbitrary assertions). I have no beef with quoting Galt's speech where relevant, but the epistemology ain't all in it.-RLCampbell (talk) 13:49, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

External Reality and Noumena

The contrast between 'external reality' and 'reality' in the following sentence is obscure, to say the least: "The name "Objectivism" derives from the principle that human knowledge and values are objective: they are not intrinsic to external reality, nor created by the thoughts one has, but are determined by the nature of reality, to be discovered by man's mind." But 'external reality' linked to an article on the Kantian conception of noumena, so I'm replacing 'external reality' with 'some inaccessible reality', and replacing 'reality' with 'reality (i.e., the empirical world)'. I expect no (serious) objection from people who understand Kant; I want no (frivolous) objection from people who have only read Rand. 145.116.9.201 (talk) 03:51, 15 June 2009 (UTC)

Just to be clear--there could be a serious objection from an objectivist as to whether glossing 'reality' as 'the empirical world' is right. For example, such a person might object that the 'empirical' qualifier is misleading because it suggests the existence of also something non-empirical in addition to the empirical world. But, in context, I think that particular objection is forestalled. There might be others, as I don't know Rand very well. But judging from what the sentence originally said, I'm guessing that I'm pretty close to right, and it's much clearer than what was there before. 145.116.9.201 (talk) 03:56, 15 June 2009 (UTC)

I think readers are going to have some trouble understanding that sentence as written. I would not have known what was meant in this context by "inaccessible reality" without the discussion here and the link to Noumenon. Aside from that, why introduce the noumenal at all at this point? We know Rand objected to what she wrongly understood to be Kant's distinction between phenomenal and noumenal, but does this have anything to do with values? Kant didn't argue that values are intrinsically noumenal, nor as far as I know did Rand ascribe that view to him (if anything, the contrary; she (wrongly) takes him to be a superficial relativist, basing values on the non-real phenomenal world). The sentence would lose nothing and read better without the reference to the noumenal: "...they are not created by the thoughts one has, but are determined by the nature of reality, to be discovered by man's mind."KD Tries Again (talk) 16:05, 13 July 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

If you manage to express Rand's views in Kantian terms, then you will have definitely distorted them. Rand contrasted the absolute view of concepts (where concepts are intrinsic properties of things-as-they-are), the subjective view (where concepts are arbitrary mental constructs, perhaps agreed to by convention), and the objective view (where concepts result from interaction of the observer with things that exist independently of the observer, with the result depending on the characteristics of both the things being observed and the means of observing). Objectivism in philosophy is thus closely analogous to the theory of relativity in physics. — DAGwyn (talk) 12:48, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

Rand did not use "absolute" in quite this way, but the 3-way distinction is characteristic of her. The analogy to theory of relativity, though plausible, would not go down well with the Ayn Rand Institute contingent that distrusts 20th century physics.-RLCampbell (talk) 13:46, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

Alan Greenspan

How can an article on Rand's Objectivism fail to contain a single reference to Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve and long-time disciple of Ayn Rand? Greenspan is one of the only Rand disciples ever in a position of power from the ideas and ideals of Objectivism could be implemented. In addition, Greenspan's laissez faire stance with regard to the U.S. economy -- including his opposition to any regulation of financial instruments known as derivatives -- is widely believed to have been a factor in the current economic downturn.

That legacy of Rand's teachings should be addressed in some manner in this article. Austinmayor (talk) 18:33, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

See Objectivist movement. Basically, this article concerns the philosophy itself, whereas that article deals with the assorted followers, students, hangers-on, schisms, and so forth. That would be the place for more detail about Greenspan. TallNapoleon (talk) 18:37, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

Ciao, Austin, and thanks for the comment. The best way to show that Greenspan should be in this article is to provide reliable sources (such as scholarly books, reputable newspapers and academic journals) which discuss his contributions to Objectivist philosophy. As TallNapoleon notes, Greenspan is more often associated with the movement itself rather than the philosophy. Regards,  Skomorokh  19:29, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

So Greenspan would be inappropriate for this article because he is not a member of the Rand priesthood but instead he is merely an adherent of Rand's philosophy who had his hand on the throttle of the global economy? If that's the way it is, that's the way it is.

But it reminds me of a joke about the University of Chicago: "Enough talk about how it will work in practice! The real question is, 'Will it work in theory?'" Austinmayor (talk) 12:55, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

Cribbed from elsewhere in Wikipedia and submitted for approval and possible inclusion:

During the 1950s and 1960s Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve of the United States from 1987 to 2006, was a proponent of Objectivism, writing articles for Objectivist newsletters and contributing several essays for Rand's 1966 book Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal including an essay supporting the gold standard. Greenspan and Rand maintained a close relationship until her death in 1982.

Some economists, including Nobel Prize winners Joseph E. Stiglitz and Paul Krugman, attribute a large degree of culpability for the devastating late 2000s recession to Greenspan and his aversion to government regulation of the economy. In a congressional hearing on October 23, 2008 Greenspan admitted that his free-market ideology shunning certain regulations was flawed. This has caused backlash from Objectivist intellectuals, blaming the economic crisis on Greenspan's pandering to the mixed economy and betraying his laissez-faire views.

Austinmayor (talk) 13:21, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

This article is about the philosophy of Objectivism, not about the personal histories of people associated with it. References to Greenspan would be appropriate if they discuss 1) the content of his contributions to the philosophy (such as what his articles for The Objectivist Newsletter were about, not just the fact that he wrote some) or 2) his subsequent disagreement with some aspects of Objectivism (which he mentions in his autobiography). His contributions to the philosophy seem to be minimal, probably not significant enough to include. But given his prominence, his later disagreements with Objectivism probably deserve inclusion in the Criticism section. --RL0919 (talk) 15:03, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

I dig it. This article is about Objectivist thinkers not doers. Thanks for all for taking the time to respond to my inquiry. All the best, etc. Austinmayor (talk) 16:53, 30 June 2009 (UTC)

It's quite wrong to label Greenspan as representative of Rand's ideas. Also, many people in power have been significantly influenced by Rand; Reagan and Thatcher come immediately to mind. — DAGwyn (talk) 12:31, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

I'm not sure what you mean by "representative" here. Greenspan remained an associate of Rand's until her death. He is not in good odor with the Ayn Rand Institute today, and his policy moves and pronouncements are disliked by many Objectivists as well as most libertarians, but those are somewhat different issues.-RLCampbell (talk) 13:43, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

Greenspan's autobiography says he developed disagreements with her philosophy, apparently while she was still alive. So in that respect it would not be appropriate, for example, to refer to some statement or action of his from his work as Fed chairman as being representative of Objectivism. Citing statements from his essays that Rand put in her own publications would be a different matter, because Rand reviewed and approved them. At this point, however, I don't see that either is necessary for this article. --RL0919 (talk) 15:10, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

Objectivist Epistemology: Attributing Authorship

I think the section on Objectivist epistemology could be substantially improved. There is unnecessary repetition of some points, no mention at all of others that are distinctive to Objectivism (such as "Aquinas's angels," defeasible certainty, the lack of a truth value for arbitrary assertions, etc.). One policy that would help is clearly attributing various positions to the authors who published them. Rand rejected the analytic-synthetic distinction, but the only publication on that topic is by Peikoff. The notion of perceptual form may have come from Rand, but the publicly available sources are a little bit by Peikoff and a bunch by Kelley. Arbitrary assertions were first mentioned in an article by Nathaniel Branden, later (in an altered version of the doctrine) in a book by Peikoff. It is one thing to note that an article or lecture was vetted and approved by Rand; it's another to claim, as the article presently implies, that the entire content of that article or lecture was the result of Rand talking while the author listened and tried to copy it all down without getting anything wrong.-RLCampbell (talk) 15:53, 6 August 2009 (UTC)

The article currently says that Rand rejected epistemological foundationalism. In the absence of a citation support this claim, I recommend taking it out. Objectivist epistemology, as expressed in her writings or Peikoff's, would seem to fit the description in the article aforelinked.-RLCampbell (talk) 16:20, 6 August 2009 (UTC)

In addition to the usual POV-pushing that enters most Objectivism-related articles, this article has been subjected to a lot of edit warring, some by users who have since been banned. The results of such conflicts are rarely good for the article. I would suggest a bold re-write of the section is in order. There was a substantial re-write of the politics section back in June, and IMHO it is a significant improvement over the old version (but I did most of the re-writing, so I may be biased). The epistemology and ethics sections are in need of similar overhauls. --RL0919 (talk) 17:29, 6 August 2009 (UTC)

I may attempt a rewrite. I also think it would be good to separate Objectivist content from Randian rhetoric ("Knowledge, she held, is...").-RLCampbell (talk) 20:40, 6 August 2009 (UTC)

I agree with Karbinski's recent deletion of the sentence about Fred Seddon's book. It was just kind of hanging out there, a propos of nothing, instead of being cited in support of or in opposition to any particular point.-RLCampbell (talk) 20:42, 6 August 2009 (UTC)

RLCampbell, in regards to foundationalism, since according to the article the two historical schools of foundationalism were empiricism and rationalism (which Rand opposed), I'm thinking that the author of that sentence was attempting a concise way of stating Rand's opposition to those schools. However, you're right. Objectivist epistemology seems to fit with foundationalism quite well.Brandonk2009 (talk) 21:08, 6 August 2009 (UTC)

Right. It's important to say that Rand rejected both rationalism and empiricism (of the modern sort). But she used lots of foundational language herself, and so have all of the informed expositions of her ideas.-RLCampbell (talk) 21:58, 6 August 2009 (UTC)

I'm working on a big rewrite of the entire section, reordering to bring some related material closer together, trimming the repetitive critiques of faith and skepticism, and adding some technical details (such as the hierarchy of concepts and contextual certainty). This will take another couple of days; I'm working on it off-line.-RLCampbell (talk) 15:19, 7 August 2009 (UTC)

OK, rewrite is now up. I hope I didn't step on too many of DAGwyn's changes. The only one I would definitely disagree with is the use of "arbitrary" as a general term without providing specifics about arbitrary assertions; I've now included a paragraph about arbitrary assertions.-RLCampbell (talk) 16:50, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

If the rewritten section on epistemology is basically acceptable, we can then deal with some redundancies in the section on developments after Rand. If Peikoff and Kelley are cited on epistemology, then their books are being treated as an exposition of Objectivism, rather than a further development of it.-RLCampbell (talk) 16:58, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

For the record, I have included in the rewritten section references to two articles I published in the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies. One is about the doctrine of the arbitrary assertion; the other is about the relationship between Ayn Rand's work (mostly in epistemology) and the so-called Cognitive Revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, which produced modern cognitive psychology. I'm also the Associate Editor of that journal, though as is normally the case with peer-reviewed journals, the review process for my submissions was handled by other editors. I don't think it will be too difficult to show that these articles are pertinent where cited, but as per WP:COI, you may wish to take note.-RLCampbell (talk) 17:06, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

Thanks for tackling that. It seems a bit long, but it's easier to cut than to create, so long isn't a bad way to start. I've moved the criticisms of Objectivist epistemology to the Criticisms section, based on the overall organization of the article, and I'll be doing a bit of trimming. --RL0919 (talk) 23:58, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

The Criticism section is a bit of a grab-bag. It could be put in topical order (metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, etc.) or historical order; it isn't quite in either, at present. Also, Buckley's dismissal of Rand makes for a snappy quote, but the basis for his verdict is not clear. Which parts of the system did he think were missing or defective?-RLCampbell (talk) 00:08, 9 August 2009 (UTC)

As I noted, there is also redundancy between the main exposition of Objectivism (which at various points cites Peikoff and Kelley) and the reference to their books as Post-Rand developments. Meanwhile, Tara Smith's books on ethics belong in the Post-Randian section, but the reviews that were tucked into a footnote might be better off moved to the Tara Smith article (along with other positive and negative criticism of her work).-RLCampbell (talk) 00:12, 9 August 2009 (UTC)

Agreed that the Criticism section needs work. It tends to be subjected to back and forth edits with criticisms being added and subtracted, sometimes for good reasons and sometimes because of editors' tendency to evaluate the criticisms based on their own agreement/disagreement. As for Buckley, his comment isn't what I would call a criticism of Objectivism. It's just an insult. The only reason I haven't cut it myself is because it ought to be replaced with other criticisms from academic sources rather than simply making the section even shorter than it already is, and that takes a bit more work to put together. --RL0919 (talk) 01:29, 9 August 2009 (UTC)

This is wrong: "Certainty is therefore defeasible, because contrary future evidence cannot be ruled out in advance." The certainty of Newton's laws of physics, within the context of speeds slower than a certain limit (around 200 meters per second I believe), is absolute. The point is that knowledge within a context is absolute. --Karbinski (talk) 18:36, 10 August 2009 (UTC)

"Defeasible" means that it can be undone. See, for instance, the passage on p. 180 of Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand about the philosophy lecturer who, in the end, turns out to have been Boris Karloff pretending to be that person. You could, by Peikoff's own theory, be contextually certain that the speaker is Leonard Peikoff (which is how used to present this case in lecture), then, after a while, notice that he is endorsing the ideas of Immanuel Kant, or appearing not to recognize people whom Leonard Peikoff knows, etc.... and in the end, your recently developed doubts are confirmed as the mask falls off. Or, on p. 172, "The implicit or explicit preamble to his conclusion must be: 'On the basis of the available evidence, i.e., within the context of the factors so far discovered, the following is the proper conclusion to draw.' Thereafter, the individual must continue to observe and identify; should new information warrant it, he must qualify his conclusion accordingly." Or, on p. 179, "Certainty ... is a verdict reached within a definite framework of evidence, and it stands or falls with the evidence."-RLCampbell (talk) 21:06, 10 August 2009 (UTC)

The evidence is what it is, and new evidence does not "undo" previous evidence. Its upto the thinker to integrate the new evidence, and check premises and conclusions as necessary. Contrary future evidence may certainly be ruled out in advance as *there is no* evidence of it.--Karbinski (talk) 22:08, 11 August 2009 (UTC)

New evidence might, however, undermine previous conclusions or lead to the rejection of previously held theories. Empirical counter-evidence cannot be ruled out in advance; the failure of Newton's laws, even within their context, may be very, very unlikely, but the possibility of their failure is not self-contradictory, and is therefore possible.KD Tries Again (talk) 16:18, 12 August 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

I see that my reply to Karbinski got written over in an edit conflict. Trying again. What gets undone isn't prior evidence, it's (on some occasions) prior generalizations or conclusions. Karbinski claims contextual certainty for Newton's laws within boundary conditions (bodies moving at 200 meters per second or less). But the boundary conditions weren't part of the original statement of the laws. How did the boundary conditions become known? What revisions to physics were necessary as a consequence? Did no old conclusions have to be rejected? I find it interesting that in OPAR Peikoff claims repeatedly that contextually certain conclusions are "immutable." In his earlier writings "immutable" was used only pejoratively; he once defined "dogmatism" as "faith in immutable revelations."-RLCampbell (talk) 16:28, 12 August 2009 (UTC)

KD, I expect Karbinski will be citing Peikoff's necessitarianism as a counter. In OPAR Peikoff claims that, outside the realm of voluntary human action, all that is possible is what is actual.-RLCampbell (talk) 16:28, 12 August 2009 (UTC)

I think it's time for a reminder that the talk page is for discussing the article, not for debating the subject matter. We should be discussing what sources can be used to obtain a verifiable description of Objectivist beliefs on this subject, regardless of whether the position described is a position that we accept. RLCampbell suggested Peikoff's OPAR as a source. I'd suggest Gotthelf's On Ayn Rand and Machan's Ayn Rand as other possibilities to research. I'll volunteer to check these, but I don't expect to get to it until the weekend. Any other suggestions for places to look? --RL0919 (talk) 16:30, 12 August 2009 (UTC)

Well taken. As to what the position *is*: no such thing exists that could be properly called "future evidence," consideration of the arbitrary is outside the realm of reason, and to categorize something as possible requires evidence. --Karbinski (talk) 17:16, 12 August 2009 (UTC)

Besides OPAR, Gotthelf's book may be useful on the matter at hand (I don't own a copy). Machan's book addresses the issue of foundationalism, and I will be adding a citation to it soon. But Machan does not get into the issues about certainty that we have been discussing. Both Rasmussen and Den Uyl (in the editors' long overview chapters about Rand's philosophy) and Sciabarra are also worth consulting here.-RLCampbell (talk) 23:19, 12 August 2009 (UTC)

Karbinski, is the attribution of arbitrariness to all claims about future evidence a conclusion that you developed yourself, or has it been made in articles or lectures that you could point me to?-RLCampbell (talk) 23:27, 12 August 2009 (UTC)

The conclusion is my own. Not sure what authority to direct you to if a reading of OPAR leads you to believe my conclusion is at odds with Objectivism. --Karbinski (talk) 15:34, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

The reason I asked is that OPAR seems to stop well short of saying that there is no such thing as "future evidence." I was wondering if there were unpublished lectures by Peikoff, or by instructors at the Objectivist Academic Center, in which that particular point is made.-RLCampbell (talk) 22:28, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

What's more, on p. 172 of OPAR we find, "In any situation where there is reason to suspect that a variety of factors is relevant to the truth, only some of which are presently known, he [the knower] is obliged to acknowledge this fact. The implicit or explicit preamble to his conclusion must be: 'On the basis of the available evidence, i.e., within the context of the factors so far discovered, the following is the proper conclusion to draw.'" If claims about future evidence are all arbitrary, on what grounds would the knower need to attach this preamble to his conclusion?-RLCampbell (talk) 22:59, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

There is no such thing as "future evidence." If I'm walking along with a drink in my hand I'm likely certain that the drink will still be in my hand and available for a swig in the immediate future. If someone stops me on the street and asks me if I'm certain that the drink will ... for a swig, I'd acknowledge that unless something knocks it out of my hand yes I'm certain of it. I have no evidence that a bullet will fly out and hit the cup or my hand, or that a stranger will charge me or my cup suddenly, or that I'm about to suffer from an aneurysm. Here is the rub: if a bullet does fly out and hit the cup out of my hand, having not seen a shooter beforehand, heard any other shots beforehand, been unaware of any recent similiar activity in the area, at no time was there any, that is there was always zero, evidence that the cup would be shot out of my hand. There were facts of reality that were relevant to my consideration that I didn't know about, *and* by the fact I was unaware of them means I had *no evidence* of them. When I finally have evidence of them, well, ... its evidence. This notion of "future-evidence" is a stolen concept as it denies what evidence is. (If someone really did stop me on the street to ask me that question, I'd suspect that perhaps something might be in the works to knock the cup out of my hand - I've left that aside for my example) --Karbinski (talk) 16:49, 14 August 2009 (UTC)

In Peikoff's "The Philosophy of Objectivism" lecture he has this to say in regards to certainty: "Idea X is "certain" if, in a given context of knowledge, the evidence for X is conclusive. In such a context, all the evidence supports X and there is no evidence to support any alternative... You cannot challenge a claim to certainty by means of an arbitrary declaration of a counter-possiblity... you cannot manufacture possibilities without evidence." In other words, one can be certain within the context of present evidence. One cannot deny certainty by pointing to the possibility of future evidence. I gathered that quote from the Ayn Rand Lexicon entry on Certainty. But by all means, check out Peikoff's lecture. It's excellent. Brandonk2009 (talk) 05:28, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

I'm familiar with Peikoff's lecture series, having taken it in 1981 when it was available through the primitive means of rented reel-to-reel tapes. The lectures did not specify what constitutes conclusive evidence for a generalization. More to the point, though: The question I raised is not whether, on Peikoff's view, the present certainty of a conclusion can be challenged because unspecified future evidence "might" go against it. The question was, rather, whether Peikoff accepts that conclusions that previously met his criteria for certainty are sometimes overturned by evidence obtained after the conclusions were initially drawn. That's what "defeasibility" is about.-RLCampbell (talk) 22:28, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

Although, oddly enough, some claims that were "certain" in Peikofs sense have indeed been overturned by future evidence.1Z (talk) 08:09, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

Apologies in advance for discussing the subject matter, but it's hard for a non-Randian philosopher to grasp how some of these ideas can be clearly communicated. As far as I can see now, any claim which seems well supported by evidence at any time would be, for Peikoff, certainly true. This has the interesting result that the same claim can be both true and false, depending on what evidence is available. Speaking of evidence, someone charged with murder would be guilty as a matter of absolute certainty if the evidence at time of trial was overwhelming and unchallenged; and yet also innocent with absolute certainty at any time disculpatory evidence is found.74.64.107.49 (talk) 20:10, 13 August 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

KD, I think all parties to this discussion would benefit from looking at Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, second ediiton, pp. 301-306. There, Rand is grappling with the problem that hypothesis-testing poses for her epistemology. In particular, when and how does the investigator close the book and decide that (a) enough evidence is in and (b) the available evidence rules out every alternative to a hypothesis that successfully accounts for all of the current evidence? She admits that she hasn't worked out an answer.-RLCampbell (talk) 23:06, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

Replace "and yet also" with "and then" --Karbinski (talk) 21:18, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

As well, there would be no claim "here is the evidence at the time of trial, here is the disculpatory evidence, he is guilty" - which is a *different* claim than "here is the evidence at the time of trial, he is guilty" - which is again a *different* claim from "here is the disculpatory evidence, he is innocent." --Karbinski (talk) 22:32, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

Peikoff is just changing the meaning of the word "certain". That's all there to it. 1Z (talk) 21:22, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

1Z, this is a common charge against Peikoff. He would defend his usage on the grounds that "out-of-context" certainty is unattainable, requiring one to know everything before one can know something. But whether you approve of his usage or not, the question is what he takes certainty (in his sense) to imply—and what the actual implications are. I agree with KD here; Peikoff's view appears to imply that you could be completely Peikovianly certain of some conclusion today, and discover tomorrow that your conclusion was false.-RLCampbell (talk) 22:44, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

RLCampbell, in my opinion, Peikoff did specify what constitutes conclusive evidence when he stated, "In such a context, all the evidence supports X and there is no evidence to support any alternative..." I think the key word here is "context". If you have a pile of validated evidence (and no refuting evidence), could you not say that a particular conclusion is true? Can you not be certain (as opposed to "possible" or "probable")? If tomorrow you find new evidence, should you not integrate that with all past evidence and create a new conclusion? And does not the integration of past evidence with new evidence and the revised conclusion still reside within the same particular context?Brandonk2009 (talk) 03:11, 14 August 2009 (UTC)

*If* you find new evidence - that can be a pretty big if. The hypotheticals should be discarded in favor of real life examples (I'm not suggesting we elaborate on the talk page). --Karbinski (talk) 15:30, 14 August 2009 (UTC)

Yes, let's please not elaborate here. There are a number of discussion forums where this sort of debate would be welcomed. What is clear to me is that any description of this issue in the article should be well-sourced and stick closely to the phrasings used in the sources, as variations are likely to produce disputes among the editors over whether the position is being accurately described. As promised earlier in the thread, I'll take a pass at it over the weekend. --RL0919 (talk) 17:06, 14 August 2009 (UTC)

It looks as though the treatment of certainty will have to quote Peikoff closely, because I've now gotten my mitts on Gotthelf's book and neither it nor Machan's gets into the certainty issue at all. I'll have to recheck Sciabarra's Russian Radical but my recollection is that it also does not address some of the questions that have arisen here.-RLCampbell (talk) 01:59, 15 August 2009 (UTC)

I understand that we shouldn't fill the Talk Page with debate (although the obvious response to Brandonk2009 is that this means that things will regularly be "certainly true" per Perkoff, while actually just not being true at all). But my simple concern is that we don't end up with an explanation (even with sources) that just doesn't make any sense to a normal, intelligent reader. This has happened repeatedly in the past with sections of this article. So the editors need to be clear on what Rand's position is (I am also worried Peikoff's position may go well beyond Rand's - which should be something for the Peikoff article). BTW, my edition of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology runs to barely over a hundred pages - in which chapter does Rand discuss this issue? Thanks.KD Tries Again (talk) 17:36, 16 August 2009 (UTC)KD Tries Again

Rand does not discuss certainty in any detail in ITOE. After reviewing a lot of possible sources over the weekend, I believe RLCampbell's comment above is correct: any discussion of this in the article will need to hew closely to Peikoff, because OPAR is the only source that discusses it in any detail. A few other sources mention that "contextual certainty" is an Objectivist belief, but only Peikoff discusses it at length. In a review of Peikoff's book, David Kelley complains that this is an underdeveloped area in Objectivist thought.

So, I can see two reasonable choices for discussing the Objectivist view of certainty. One is to provide a close paraphrase of Peikoff. The other is to mention the matter only minimally, on the grounds that this is what most sources do, and providing any longer treatment would give undue weight to something that only one author really discusses. Currently the article goes in the second direction, which IMO is the better way to go. --RL0919 (talk) 16:41, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

I believe the difficulty is that you first have to understand the contextual nature of knowledge before a discussion of certainty makes any sense (in terms of Objectivism). Any discussion of certainty not grounded in an understanding of knowledge as contextual is as sensical as blue grass and a green sky. In other words, if an idea like "future evidence" is acceptable to you, then the Objectivist view of certainty is so many flying pink elephants. I would suggest we have evidence that the whole sub-topic of certainty is outside the scope of an encylopedic level presentation of Objectivist epistemology. Context as discussed in ITOE is the more appropriate topic I think (I venture that disagreement with the Objectivist view of certainty is exactly disagreement with the Objectivist view of knowledge as contextual). --Karbinski (talk) 17:20, 17 August 2009 (UTC)

I've been reading Gotthelf's On Ayn Rand, which I think is really solid on Objectivist metaphysics. Also nice and clear on Rand's theory of concepts. But Gotthelf, after mentioning certainty as a key issue in epistemology, doesn't get into contextual certainty. This, I think, provides further support for RL0919's approach. By contrast, the contextuality of knowledge is addressed, in somewhat different ways, by Machan, Gotthelf, and Sciabarra. I remain unconvinced that Peikovian views about certainty are a gimme, as soon as one grasps that knowledge is contextual—or that Objectivist principles rule out any legitimate notion of "future evidence." I am curious, in fact, how Leonard Peikoff would respond to Karbinski's formulation, because unless I have seriously misunderstood Peikoff's conception of certainty, it presupposes the possibility of future evidence.-RLCampbell (talk) 14:43, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

If Peikoff disagreed with me, I would say he has it wrong, lol. --Karbinski (talk) 15:59, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

I did some further checking. It turns out there are comments on contextual certainty by Fred Miller and Roderick Long in the monograph Reason and Value that may be usable here.-RLCampbell (talk) 23:51, 21 August 2009 (UTC)